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The thesis titled, Cyberspace, Surveillance, Law and Privacy analyses the implications of state 
sponsored cyber surveillance on the exercise of the human right to privacy of communications 
and data privacy of individuals, subject to untargeted interception of digital communications. 
The principle aim of the thesis is to assess the legality of mass cyber surveillance of the Five 
Eyes alliance, with an emphasis on the United States and the United Kingdom. The study also 
considers the growing trend among the law enforcement agencies to access data without 
consent located in foreign jurisdictions without recourse to the Mutual Legal Assistance 
arrangements. The objective of the thesis is to demonstrate that these activities breach states’ 
human rights obligations under the international human rights frameworks and to show the 
unprecedented impact that surveillance technologies continue to have on this right. The 
research also highlights the inadequate protection of privacy in the internet. This leads to the 
evaluation of a number of possible legal solutions on the international level to the problem of 
mass surveillance, since the internet is a global environment designed for unrestricted data 
flows among jurisdictions and therefore facilitates continued violation of privacy of 
communications and data privacy. The thesis finds that bearing in mind (a) the highly 
politicised nature of the internet governance discourse, (b) the reluctance of states to subject 
peacetime espionage to international law regulation through a legally binding treaty, (c) the 
fact that international human rights law relating to privacy of communications is in need of 
modernization, (d) the reluctance of states to commit to a legally binding cyber treaty, (e) the 
slow pace with which customary cyber international law rules emerge and (f) the tendencies of 
states on the domestic level towards the introduction of draconian surveillance legislation at 
the expense of privacy,  any progress in this regard at this stage will be piecemeal and likely to 
be achieved through a combination of the updating of the existing international and regional 
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On 6th June 2013 a British newspaper, the Guardian reported that the United States (US) 
National Security Agency (NSA) collects domestic telecommunications metadata from 
Verizon Business Network Services.1 The following day, the same newspaper revealed details 
about PRISM, a suite of NSA programmes that targeted internet communications and stored 
data of ‘non-US persons’ outside the US and those communicating with them, together with 
the extent to which the US companies cooperate with the government. 2 More revelations 
followed, including details of the interception of communications by both the NSA and its 
British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) on political leaders 
attending 2009 London G20 summit and GCHQ conducting massive intercepts of domestic 
communications.3 This information came to the fore, as a result of document disclosures by a 
former Booz Allen Hamilton employee, Edward Snowden. Snowden made it publically known 
that the scope of intelligence gathering activities, by the NSA and other similar organizations, 
is now unprecedented. Once a narrow, targeted focus of intelligence agencies on gathering 
information domestically has escalated to allegedly targeting communications of everyone by 
default. 4  Snowden confirmed that the NSA ‘specifically targets the communications of 
everyone. It ingests them by default. It collects them in its system and it filters [...] analyses 
[...] measures […] and […]  stores them for periods of time simply because that’s the easiest, 
most efficient, and most valuable way to achieve these ends’,5 that is getting intelligence by 
whatever means.  
                                              
1 Glenn Greenwald, ‘NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily’ (6 June 2013) The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order>.  
2 Susan Landou, ‘Making Sense from Snowden: What’s Significant in the NSA Surveillance 
Revelations’ (2013) 11 IEEE Computer and Reliability Societies, p. 66. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
5 Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald, ‘NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden: I Don’t Want 




These revelations have thrust into the limelight the fact that many states have a great capacity 
to conduct simultaneous, invasive, targeted and broad-scale surveillance then ever before.6 
With the declining costs of technology and data storage, the financial disincentives of states to 
conduct digital surveillance have diminished. 7  Equally, the technological platforms upon 
which global political, economic and social life are increasingly reliant, are not only vulnerable 
to mass surveillance, but they actually facilitate it. 8 These and similar observations from 
international organizations, human rights bodies, a number of states and countless civil society 
groups underpinned subsequent discussions regarding the legality of intelligence gathering 
activities of the NSA and its partner agencies, especially relating to the right to privacy and 
freedom of expression. In addition, a related but relatively unexplored problem that has 
emerged in recent years, which is also facilitated by the borderless internet, relates to the 
tansborder data access without consent by the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) pursuant to 
criminal/terrorism investigations.  
Most of the attention that followed the allegations of the NSA and GCHQ activities has centred 
around the assessment and reform proposals of the exiting domestic legal frameworks. Thus, 
the United Nations General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions on the right to privacy in 
the digital age as a result of the Snowden leaks.9 These non-legally binding documents called 
upon all states to review their procedures, practices and legislation related to communications 
surveillance, interception and collection of personal data, emphasising the need for states to 
ensure the full and effective implementation of their obligations under international human 
rights law. 10  However, relatively little consideration has been given to the human rights 
obligations of the states involved in cyber surveillance under international human rights law 
and international legal redress and solutions regarding mass surveillance. This thesis therefore 
not only addresses the question of the legality of these activities in the context of states’ 
international human rights obligations, but also identifies a need for greater global and 
coordinated protection of privacy of communications and data protection. Furthermore, 
recognizing the complex nature of the issues involved, this study looks further afield to 
                                              
6 UN HRC, ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. Report of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ UN Doc A/HRC/27/137 (30 June 2014), para 2. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 
9 UN GA Resolution, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, UN Doc 68/167 (14 December 
2013); UN GA Resolution, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, UN Doc 66/169 (14 
December 2014); UN GA Resolution, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, UN Doc 
A.3/71/L.39/Rev.1 (16 November 2016). 
10 ibid. 
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international espionage law. In so doing, it positions cyber surveillance within the context of 
other signals intelligence gathering operations. It identifies a legal gap that inadvertently 
facilitates the practices of some of the world’s largest intelligence agencies, namely the lack of 
international treaty and the absence of customary international law rules regulating peacetime 
espionage. The thesis puts forward a number of options to bring mass untargeted cyber 
surveillance activities in line with states’ international human rights obligations. Consequently, 
it positions the calls from some states, international human rights organizations and civil 
society for a hard law solution within the broader cyber security and internet governance 
discourse. To that end, it conceptualises a cyber treaty modelled on United Nations Convention 
of the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS).11 The study finds that due to the polarised attitudes of 
states to the issues of cyberspace management an internationally binding treaty addressing state 
behaviour in this domain is unlikely to be achieved at this stage and in any case, will take a 
considerable amount of time to come to fruition. Furthermore, it is still unknown how privacy 
of communications and data privacy would be safeguarded through such an instrument. 
Bearing this in mind, the thesis concludes that any progress in this regard will most likely be 
incremental and to occur as a combination of various measures on an international and regional 
levels, such as the processes of modernizing the already existing privacy frameworks (in 
particular Article 17 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 and 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950), ‘globalizing’ the Council of 
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data 1981 and the gradual development of customary law rules regulating untargeted 
mass surveillance, cyber espionage and transborder data access without consent through soft 
law.  
 
This chapter delineates the aims, objectives and scope of the work. It defines the terms 
used throughout the thesis, such as cyberspace, cyber surveillance and transborder access to 
data. It posits cyber surveillance within the broader category of peacetime espionage and shows 
that mass surveillance programmes such as PRISM and Tempora can be attributed to the states 
concerned thus triggering their responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. However, 
generic attribution regarding other forms of cyber espionage must not be assumed, as 
                                              
11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, 
entered into force 1 November 1994. 
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attribution will be triggered on the basis of the effective control test and each case must be 
considered individually. 
The chapter continues to set out the international human rights framework, which will form the 
legal bases in Chapter 4 for the evaluation of the legality of cyber surveillance and transborder 





This part will define the terms cyberspace and peacetime espionage, including (a) cyber 
espionage and cyber surveillance; (b) the actors involved; (c) the targets of mass surveillance; 
(d) the means and methods used and (e) the types of intercepted data. It will discuss the status 
of peacetime espionage and cyber espionage, including cyber surveillance under international 
law. It will also address the issue of state responsibility and attribution in the context of cyber 
espionage and cyber surveillance. Finally, the term transborder data searches/access to data 
will be defined.  
 
1. Cyberspace  
 
‘Cyber’ is a prefix that denotes ‘computer and electromagnetic spectrum-related activities’.12 
The term cyberspace features in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Operations (Tallinn Manual 2.0),13 a second document of this type compiled by an 
International Group of Experts at the invitation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence with an aim of promoting and informing the debate among 
states regarding the applicability of international law in the cyber domain. The Manual defines 
cyberspace as ‘the environment formed by physical and non-physical components to store, 
modify and exchange data using computer networks’.14         
It is a man-made domain, which encompasses the global digital communications environment 
                                              
12 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Nuclear Lessons from Cyber Security?’, (2011) Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
18. 
13 Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
14 ibid, Glossary p. 564.  
 13 
that is embedded in political, economic and social activity.15 The definition adopted for the 
purposes of this thesis is borrowed from Benkler, who describes cyberspace as an environment 
consisting of three layers: the physical, the logical and the content.16 The first includes the 
wires, cable and radio frequency spectrum.17 The second consists of software, whilst the third 
is the information created by the users.18 As a term, cyberspace was popularized in the fantasy 
work of a science fiction novelist William Gibson, who in his 1984 novel Neuromancer19 
described this environment as a ‘consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of 
legitimate operators […] A graphic representation of data abstracted from banks of every 
computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity’.20  
 
 
2. Peacetime Espionage 
 
 
(a) Espionage, Cyber Espionage and Cyber Surveillance 
 
Espionage involves the gathering of information relating to closely protected secrets, often 
considered as a matter of national security, or of military importance. It is defined, as ‘a 
consciously deceitful collection of information, ordered by a government or organization 
hostile to, or suspicious of those the information concerns, accomplished by humans 
unauthorised by the target to do the collecting.’21 Espionage is one of the oldest political and 
military activity known in history, whose roots can be traced to ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome 
and China.22  Accounts of spying appear in some of the world’s earliest documents, including 
                                              
15 Ronald J. Deibert & Masashi Crete-Nishihata, ‘Global Governance and the Spread of 
Cyberspace Controls’, (2012) 18 Global Governance, 339. 
16 Yochai Benkler, ‘From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulating 
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access’, (2000) 52 Federal Communications Law 
Journal 561, p. 562. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 William Gibson, Neuromancer, (New York: Ace Books 1984). 
20 ibid. 
21 Geoffrey B. Demarest, ‘Espionage in International Law’, (1996) Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 24, p. 326. 
22 Allen Dulles, The Craft of Espionage (New York, David West Group Co., 1963). 
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those dating from the times of Pharaoh Ramses (ca. 1274 BC.).23 Today it is also widely 
‘regarded by states as a necessary tool for pursuing their foreign policy and security interests 
and for maintaining the balance of power at the inter-state level’.24 As a method of intelligence 
gathering, espionage can be subdivided into five categories: (a) imagery intelligence (image 
reproduction by electronic or optical means, including photography, radar, infrared, and remote 
sensing from sky or space); (b) signals intelligence (or SIGINT) (information derived from the 
interception of signal transmission); (c) measurement and signature intelligence (applying 
various scientific methods, such as electro-optical, acoustic, radio frequency etc. for data 
extraction); (d) open source intelligence (collecting publically available information) and (e) 
human intelligence (or HUMINT) (overtly and covertly deriving information from human 
sources).25 The next part of this chapter will define cyber espionage, outline its various types 
and give reasons as to why cyber espionage cannot be said to form part of international 
customary law.  
 
 
(b) Cyber Espionage  
 
Whilst it could be said that espionage has existed since the dawn of human history, 
peacetime cyber espionage is a relatively new, but rapidly expanding phenomenon. Some 
commentators even argue that cyber espionage currently enjoys a ‘golden age’.26 There are 
numerous reasons for this, including that it ‘reduces risks to intelligence agencies, allows large 
scale out sourcing of intelligence collecting activities and offers possibilities hitherto unheard 
of in terms of the ease, swiftness and inexpensiveness of intelligence gathering and with regard 
to the amount of collected information’.27 Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines cyber espionage as ‘the 
use of cyber capabilities to surveil, monitor, capture or exfiltrate electronically transmitted or 
                                              
23 Gale Encyclopedia of Espionage and Intelligence, ‘Espionage and Intelligence, Early 
Historical Foundations’, <http://www.faqs.org/espionage/Ep-Fo/Espionage-and-Intelligence-
Early-Historical-Foundations.html>. 




26 see for example Katharina Ziolkowski, ‘Peacetime Cyber Espionage-New Tendencies in 
Public International Law’ in Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. 
International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy (NATO CCD COE Publications, 
Tallinn 2013), p. 425. 
27 ibid. 
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stored communications, data, or other information’.28  Among the most publicised operations 
of this kind are GhostNet,29 Shady Rat,30 Flame31 and the Red October.32 In recent years cyber 
espionage has become almost common-place. The prevalence, with which these operations 
take place could by exemplified by the release in 2013 of the Mandiant Report33 exposing one 
of the People’s Republic of China (China) most persistent cyber economic espionage units, 
referred to as Advanced Persistent Threat 1 (APT1), believed to be the People’s Liberation 
Army’s Unit 61398. Allegedly, the Unit ‘has systematically stolen hundreds of terabytes of 
data from at least 141 organizations across a broad range of industries in English speaking 
countries and has demonstrated the capability and intent to steal from dozens of organizations 
simultaneously’.34 APT1 maintains an extensive infrastructure of computer systems around the 
                                              
28 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 13, Rule 32, p. 168. 
29  Information Warfare Monitor, ‘Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage 
Network’ < http://www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf>. 
GhostNet, discovered in 2009 and attributed to China, has successfully infiltrated computer 
systems of embassies, foreign ministries and other government offices in 103 countries, 
including the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan exile centres in India, London and New York City.  
30  Dimitri Alperovitch, ‘Revealed: Operation Shady Rat. An Investigation of Targeted 
Intrusions into More Than 70 Global Companies, Governments and Non-Profit Organizations 
During the Last Five Years’ (2011) <http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-
operation-shady-rat.pdf>. 
Dimitri Alperovitch, the vice president of an internet security company McAfee, reported that 
since 2005 this Remote Access Tool (RAT) targeted at least 72 organizations, including 
defence contractors, numerous global businesses, the United Nations and the International 
Olympic Committee. McAfee Report characterised these intrusions as ‘a five year targeted 
operation by one specific actor’, allegedly China.  
31 The Daily Telegraph, ‘Flame: World’s Most Complex Computer Virus Exposed’,   
(28 May 2012)   
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9295938/Flame-worlds-most-
complex-computer-virus-exposed.html.> Flame, active between 2010 and 2012, targeted 
individuals, government and educational institutions mainly of Iran, but also Israel, Palestine, 
Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. According to The Daily Telegraph ‘it could 
gather files, remotely change settings on computers, turn a computer microphone on to record 
conversations, take screen shots and copy instant messaging chats’. 
32 Kaspersky, ‘Red October. Diplomatic Cyber Attacks Investigation. Report’ (14 January 
2013) <https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/36740/red-october-diplomatic-cyber-
attacks-investigation/>. In 2012 Kaspersky Lab revealed a still on-going and large scale cyber 
espionage network, which targets diplomatic, communications, nuclear and energy (including 
oil and gas) government sectors in Easter Europe, former USSR countries and Central Asia. 
The report produced by that organization stated that ‘the main objectives of the attackers were 
to gather intelligence from the compromised organizations, which included computer systems, 
personal mobile devices and network equipment’.  
33 ‘Mandiant: APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Report’ (2013) < 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf>. 
34 ibid p. 3. 
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world, with potentially hundreds of human operators.35 Other reports of cyber espionage also 
abound. In 2014 CrowStrike Global Threat Report, for example, noted an alarming increase in 
such attacks with more nations involved than ever before for economic competitive, political 
and nationalistic reasons.36 The unprecedented scale of these activities was also revealed by 
Edward Snowden, who in 2013 released a number of documents to The Guardian, relating to 
the US National Security Agency (NSA) global surveillance programme. 
 Based on the current state practice, at least three broad forms of cyber espionage can 
be distinguished: (i) economically and politically motivated cyber espionage, which includes 
industrial espionage (ii) military cyber espionage; and (iii) mass cyber surveillance (also 
termed as bulk interception of communications). The next part will discuss economically and 
politically motivated espionage and suggest as a separate sub-category of cyber espionage- 
cyber surveillance. 
  
(i) Economically and Politically Motivated Cyber Espionage 
 
These types of espionage may be conducted by state agencies (such as the NSA and GCHQ) 
or on behalf of states, by individual hackers, or groups acting for states (for example Chinese 
Comment Crew or APT1),37 or on their own behest. 
Economic or industrial cyber espionage involves the theft of intellectual property and 
industrial secrets. These covert cyber intrusions are usually targeted and focus on, inter alia, 
industry and the research and technology sector, thus potentially undermining a country’s 
economy and global competitiveness.38 The scale and propensity of these practices against 
some nations, including the US, is such, that it is now recognized as posing serious threat to 
that country’s national security. Some commentators note that the haemorrhage of US 
intellectual property allegedly due to cyber espionage activities perpetrated by China has 
currently reached the level of national crisis. 39 It has been observed that nearly every US 
business sector, such as advanced materials, electronics, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, 
                                              
35 ibid. 
36 Kelly Jackson Higgins, ‘Nation State Cyber Espionage. Targeted Attacks Becoming Global 
Norm’ < http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/nation-state-cyber-espionage-
targeted-attacks-becoming-global-norm/d/d-id/13190>. 
37 Wired, ‘Chinese Military Group Linked to Hacks of More Than 100 Companies’ (19 
February 2013) < https://www.wired.com/2013/02/chinese-army-linked-to-hacks/>. 
38 Christina Skinner, ‘An International Law Response to Economic Cyber Espionage’ (2014) 
46 Connecticut Law Review p. 1167. 
39 ibid, p. 1168. 
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chemicals, aerospace, heavy equipment, autos, home products, software and defence systems, 
has experienced massive theft and illegal reproduction.40 China relies on, inter alia, hackers at 
state funded universities and privately owned Chinese technology companies. It is said to be 
more prolific at conducting cyber espionage than all other countries put together.41 The scale 
of the problem is such, that the US White House officially accused China of cyber espionage. 
On 19 May 2014 the US Department of Justice indicted five members of the People’s 
Liberation Army for the alleged economic cyber espionage activities of Unit 61398.42  
The United States has also been blamed for economically motivated cyber espionage. The 
leaked Edward Snowden documents in 2013 revealed that the NSA endeavoured to exploit the 
technology of Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, through creating ‘back-doors’ 
directly into the company’s networks- the so called operation ‘Shotgiant’.43 President Obama’s 
administration was adamant that the NSA breaks into the company’s networks were motivated 
by legitimate national security purposes.44 However, according to the leaked documents the 
purpose also included gaining access to Chinese’s customers in such countries as Iran, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya and Cuba, secured as a result of Huawei investing in new 
technologies by lying undersea cables to connect its $40 billion a year networking empire.45 
The US and China has been involved in a struggle to create norms relating to industrial cyber 
espionage since 2009,46 including the signing of an agreement not to support or conduct cyber 
enabled theft of intellectual property in 2015,47 as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
5 of this thesis. 
                                              
40 ibid. 
41 David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, ‘NSA Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security 
Threat’ (22 March 2014) The New York Times  
< https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-
spy-peril.html?_r=0>. 
42 The US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, ‘US Charges Five Chinese 
Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against US Corporations and a Labour Organization 
for Commercial Advantages’ (19 May 2014)  <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-
five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor>. 
43 Higgins, supra note 36. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid.  
46 Martin Libicki, ‘The Coming of Cyber Espionage Norms’ in H. Roigas et al. (eds.)  9th 
International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Defending the Core (NATO CCD COE 
Publications 2017) 7-19, p. 9. 




Among the many instances of politically motivated cyber espionage are the NSA 
monitoring of an American law firm representing a foreign government in trade disputes with 
the US, the targeted surveillance of the United Nations, the European Union and other 
international organizations through such operations as ‘Blackfoot’,48 ‘Perdido’ and ‘Powell’.49 
These operations, according to the NSA internal document had a key influence on ‘American 
negotiating tactics at the UN’ in connection with the Iraq war, as the NSA was able to inform 
the US State Department and the US Ambassador to the UN that the required majority had 
been secured before the vote was held on the UN resolution.50 The recent example of targeted 
politically motivated cyber espionage is the Russian Federation’s (Russia) intrusion into the 
US Democratic National Committee (the ‘DNS hack’).51 The incident, first exposed by the 
private security firm CrowdStrike,52 was allegedly conducted by two groups linked to the 
Kremlin, identified as Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear and exposed in 2016.53 In the run up to the 
2016 US elections, the Kremlin was allegedly able to gain access to the email cache, which 
were released by WikiLeaks, damaging presidential candidate Hilary Clinton’s election 
prospects.54 Whilst the DSN hack was not vote-tempering and President Obama emphasised 
that President Trump’s campaign merely exploited the hack to their advantage, Russia’s 
alleged involvement in the election is currently under investigation. Furthermore, questions 





                                              
48 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Mass Surveillance, (18 March 2015) Doc. 
13734 p.10. ‘Blackfoot’ was the NSA operation to gather data from French diplomats’ offices 
at the New York UN headquarters.  
49 ibid. Operation ‘Perdidot’ targeted the European Union’s offices in New York and 
Washington, whilst ‘Powell’ was NSA’s operation involving eavesdropping on the Greek UN 
offices in New York.  
50 ibid, p. 11.  
51 Dmitri Alperovitch, ‘Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National 
Committee’ (15 June 2015) CrowdStrike Blog <https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-
midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/>. 
52 ibid. 
53 The Guardian, ‘Top Democrat’s Emails Hacked by Russia After Aid Made Typo, 
Investigation Finds’ (14 December 2016) < https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/dec/14/dnc-hillary-clinton-emails-hacked-russia-aide-typo-investigation-finds> 
54 ibid. 
55 Libicki, supra note 46, p. 12. 
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(ii) Cyber Surveillance 
 
Surveillance is the ‘close observation or listening of a person or place in the hope of gathering 
evidence’ 56  and forms part of the SIGINT collection. The origins of collecting signals 
intelligence can be traced to the advent of the telegraph. Telegraphic transmissions became 
recognized as public property once radiated signal entered the public domain and therefore are 
perceived as being open and available for anyone to detect and collect.57 
 This thesis focuses on mass, untargeted cyber surveillance conducted by state 
intelligence agencies against individuals world-wide for national security purposes, as against 
targeted instances of cyber espionage (economic/industrial, political and military). The 
definition of cyber surveillance used throughout the thesis originates from the 2013 report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue to the United Nation’s Human Rights Council, which defines 
communications surveillance as: 
  
‘the monitoring, interception, collection, preservation and retention of 
information that has been communicated, relying or generated over 
communications networks.’58 
 
The next part of this chapter will define cyber surveillance activities in more detail by 
describing (a) the actors involved; (b) the targets of mass surveillance (c) the means and 
methods employed and (d) the types of intercepted data.  
 
 The Actors Involved in Mass Cyber Surveillance 
 
This thesis will focus on the legality of cyber surveillance activities of the intelligence agencies 
of the Five Eyes coalition of states, in particular the United State and the United Kingdom. The 
Five Eyes comprise the five English speaking intelligence agencies, namely: the US National 
                                              
56 Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary (West Group 1999) 1459. 
57 Glenn Sulmasy and John Yoo, ‘Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International 
Law’ (2006) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law p. 631. 
58 UN HRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue’ UN Doc A/HRC/23/40 (17 April 
2013), p.3.  
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Security Agency, 59 the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 60 and 
partner agencies  from Canada, Australia and New Zealand.61 The study will predominantly 
focus on the activities of the NSA and GCHQ for the following reasons. First, human rights 
law is concerned with the protection of  individuals against violations conducted by states and 
public authorities, imposing on states the duty to ensure and secure the rights to individuals.62 
It will be shown below that mass cyber surveillance can be directly attributed to the US and 
UK, which raises the questions of the legality of these practices, explored in Chapter 4 of the 
thesis. Secondly, the US dominance over the internet is beyond doubt, with much of the traffic 
being routed through that country. Equally, the pre-eminence in the global market of the 
American private internet companies (such as Google, Apple, Amazon or Facebook) gives the 
US broad access to all internet traffic travelling through its territory. In addition, the UK’s 
GCHQ reportedly has the biggest access to the internet traffic of all the Five Eyes countries.63 
Finally, mass surveillance seems to be conducted pursuant to national laws of those states and 
justified on the bases of access to material relating to terrorism and organized crime, which is 
important for the purposes of legal scrutiny with regards to the compliance of these domestic 
laws with the human rights obligations of these states. Although the consideration of human 
rights obligations of the private sector involved in surveillance and transborder data access 
without consent (the so-called tech giants such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft etc.) is 
part of the issue regarding the protection of online privacy, it is beyond the scope of this work. 
The Five Eyes operates under an arrangement said to have been entered into in  1947, called 
the United Kingdom-United States Security Agreement (the UKUSA Agreement). Very little 
is known outside the state services what exactly that agreement comprises. It is not however 
                                              
59 National Security Agency, ‘Mission and Strategy’ (3 May 2016) 
< https://www.nsa.gov/about/mission-strategy/>. 
60  The UK GCHQ, in existence in various forms since 1919, is mainly responsible for 
SIGINT collection.  
61 Canada’s intelligence agency is called Communications Security Establishment Canada 
(CSEC); Australian’s- Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and New Zealand’s- 
Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).  
62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, (16 December 1966), 999 
UNTS 195 (ICCPR) art 2(1); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), (5 May 1949) ETS No. 005, 213 UNTS 222, art 1; African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (27 June 1981) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
ILM 58 (1982), art. 1; UN HRC General Comment No. 31 ‘Nature of the General Legal 
Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 8. 
63 Wired, ‘A Simple Guide to GCHQ’s Internet Surveillance Programme Tempora’ (24 June 
2013) < http://www.wired.co.uk/article/gchq-tempora-101> 
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an international treaty, as it has not been registered with the UN Secretariat in accordance with 
Article 102 Charter of the United Nations.64 Therefore being secret, it cannot be ‘invok[ed] 
before any organ of the United Nations’.65 UKUSA has not only established the Five Eyes for 
the purpose of sharing primarily signals intelligence,66 but gave the partners a much wider 
scope of operations enabling the agencies to intercept, collect, analyse and decrypt intelligence 
information. 67  Purportedly, UKUSA assigns the responsibility for surveillance to various 
partners by allocating them the interception ‘rights’ of different parts of the globe. 68 The 
agreement also provides for the establishment of jointly run operations centres, ‘where 
operatives from multiple intelligence agencies of the Five Eyes work alongside one another.’69  
The level of cooperation under the agreement is so complete that the national (intelligence) 
product is often indistinguishable.70 For that reason the operational methods of the UK and US 
will be treated as representing the policy stance of all the Five Eyes conducting mass 
surveillance pursuant to the UKUSA. 
  
 
 The Targets of the Mass Surveillance 
 
The subject of the interceptions are not only a vast number of the ordinary people world wide, 
but also some organizations, including, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Doctors 
of the World,71 numerous heads of state, including the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
other state leaders from some 122 countries, including, Columbia, Belarus, Guatemala, Peru 
                                              
64 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, art 102(1). 
65 ibid, art 102(2). 
66 Privacy International, ‘Eyes Wide Open. Special Report’ (26 November 2013)  
<https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/Eyes%20Wide%20Open%20v1.pdf
>, p. 4.  
67 ibid, p. 6. 
68 ibid. For example, UK zone includes Africa and Europe, together with the east of the Ural 
Mountains; Canada’s covers north latitudes and the Polar regions; Australia’s- Oceania and 
New Zealand’s- the south Pacific. 
69 Privacy International, ‘Two Years After Snowden’, (June 2015)  
<https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/Two%20Years%20After%20Snowd
en_Final%20Report_EN.pdf>. 
70 Privacy International, ‘The Five Eyes’, <https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51> 
71 Privacy International, ‘Two Years After Snowden’, supra note 69. 
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and Somalia.72 According to the 2015 report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, Mass Surveillance, the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) allowed the 
NSA to intercept information concerning all but four states of the entire world (namely the 
other four states of the Five Eyes coalition, except the sovereign territories such as the British 
Virgin Islands) as well as international organizations, including the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Atomic Energy.73  
This research will predominantly address the state violations of the right to privacy of 
private individuals regarding their digital communications. The thesis does not consider in 
great detail the legality of interception of information that falls within the sovereign authority 
of states, i.e. ‘data which belongs to a state but which is being stored on or transmitted through 
cyber infrastructure located on the territory of another state’,74 including pertaining to that of 
the heads of states. The interception of that type of data is beyond the scope of this study, but 
is highly likely to breach not only the right to privacy under international law, but also as 
discussed by Buchan, in certain circumstances the principle of territorial sovereignty and non-
intervention ‘when it has more than insignificant impact on the authority structures of a state’.75  
 
 Means and Methods  
 
No fewer than thirteen methods of mass surveillance have been identified76 thus far, some of 
which fall outside the scope of this thesis, but they are all worth outlining to illustrate the vast 
scale of currently conducted operations. Most of these methods are based on the allegations, 
which emerged from the Snowden documents, subsequently endorsed and validated by many 
international and regional human rights organizations, including the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe in the 2015 report Mass Surveillance.77  
                                              
72 The Guardian, ‘NSA Listed Merkel Among Leaders Subject to Surveillance-Report’, (29 
March 2014) < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/29/nsa-merkel-leaders-
surveillance-documents-snowden>. 
73 Council of Europe, ‘Mass Surveillance’, supra note 48, p. 7. 
74 Russell Buchan, ‘The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage’ 
in Anna-Maria Osula and Henry Roigas (eds,) International Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy and 
Industry Perspective (NATO CCD COE Publications 2016) p. 76; Russell Buchan, ‘Cyber 
Espionage in International Law’, in Nicholas Tsagourias and Russell Buchan (eds.), Research 
Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), pp. 168-
190. 
75 ibid.  
76 Privacy International, ‘Eyes Wide Open’, supra note 66, p. 5. 
77 supra note 48. 
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The means and methods of mass surveillance of communications include:  
(a) direct interception of transatlantic undersea internet cables by the NSA and GCHQ 
using respectively the Tempora and the Upstream programmes:  
(i) Tempora started in late 20111 and is allegedly run by GCHQ under 
secret agreements with commercial companies (‘intercept partners’) 
and involves attaching of intercept probes to transatlantic fibre optic 
cables located on the UK soil, which carry data to western Europe from 
telephone exchanges and internet servers in north America. This 
provides analysts the access to ‘huge amounts of data’ including all 
web, email and social chats.78 The obtained information is held in a 
‘repository’- content for three days and metadata for up to 30 days ‘to 
allow retrospective analysis and forwarding to other systems’.79 
(ii) Upsteam data collection programmes, such as BLARNEY, 
OAKSTAR, FAIRVIEW and STROMBREW, allegedly involve the 
collection by the NSA of communications from the infrastructure, 
which carries internet traffic, rather than from  servers of internet 
companies and involves ‘the collection of communications from fibre 
optic cables and infrastructure as data flows by’.80 
(b) Collection by the NSA of private electronic data from servers of nine US internet 
companies, under the PRISM programme, the so-called PRISM providers, namely: 
Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. 
The programme was first authorised by the then President Bush, following the 
attacks of 11 September 2011 and has been expanded under the Foreign Intelligence 
Services Act of 2006 and 2007. The types of data collected include emails, chats, 
videos, photos, stored data, video conferencing and online social networking 
details.81 
(c) Interception of internal fibre optic cables used by Google and Yahoo through a 
joined NSA-GCHQ project called MUSCULAR to transmit unencrypted data 
                                              
78 David Anderson, ‘A Question of Trust. Report of the Investigatory Powers Review’, (June 
2015) < https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-





between their data servers.82 Allegedly in 2012-2013 in thirty days 181 million 
records were sent from a British collection point to the USA via that programme.83 
(d) collection of text messages by the NSA from around the world through a tool called 
DISHFIRE. According to Edward Snowden, almost 200 million text messages per 
day in 2011 were collected this way, through SMS analysis, which often contain 
metadata and metacontent (content derived metadata). The metacontent includes 
notifications relating to credit card transactions and flight plans, which can enhance 
analytics.84 
(e) interception of webcam images using a programme called OPTIC NERVE. 
Allegedly, GCHQ had intercepted and collected webcam images from Yahoo from 
1.8 million Yahoo accounts globally.85 OPTIC NERVE saved one image every five 
seconds and users were ‘unselected’, i.e. the collection was in bulk, rather than 
targeted.86  
(f) tracking the location of mobile phones. According to Privacy International, ‘the 
NSA collects nearly 5 billion records a day pertaining to the location of mobile 
phones around the world under the set of programmes known collectively as CP-
TRAVELLER’.87 This is done to such an extent that ‘the capabilities are outpacing 
[the NSA’s] ability to ingest, process and store the data’;88 
(g) intercepting telephone calls of entire countries, under the programmes code- named 
MYSTIC and SOMALGET. Although worth mentioning as part of a ‘package’ of 
surveillance methods, these activities are outside the scope of this thesis;  
(h) lobbying for surveillance laws abroad: according to Privacy International, a special 
NSA team, named Foreign Affairs Division, has been tasked with pressurising other 
countries to change their laws to enable mass surveillance and co-operate with the 
NSA. As with the interception of telephone call conversations mentioned above, 
these practices are outside the ambit of this chapter, 
(i)  providing other partner intelligence agencies, such as Germany and Denmark, with 
equipment and expertise in order to tap undersea cables in their territories in order 
                                              
82 ibid. 







to acquire more information from them. According to Privacy International, ‘the 
technology enables partners to ‘ingest’ massive amounts of data in a manner that 
facilitates processing and provides a copy of the intercepted communications to the 
Five Eyes’;89 
(j) undermining encryption standards; Bullrun and Edgehill are decryption 
programmes that the NSA and GCHQ have allegedly been using to sabotage 
encryption standards and undermine the ability to securely communicate;90     
(k) infecting individuals’ devices with intrusive malware in order to be able to have 
unrestricted access to any smartphone or any other computer at any time, not just 
in exceptional circumstances; 
(l) controlling core communications infrastructure. According to Privacy International, 
the NSA and GCHQ working in partnership with telecommunications companies,  
are ‘aggressively involved in shaping traffic to artificially change the route of 
internet communications, redirecting them to flow past Five Eyes interception 
points’ in addition to ‘tapping’ the communications that cross their borders;91  
(m) stealing the encryption keys: allegedly, GCHQ and NSA ‘hacked into the internal 
computer network of Gemalto, the largest manufacturer of SIM cards in the world, 
stealing billions of encryption keys used to protect the privacy of mobile phone 
communications around the word.’92 
 
 Types of Intercepted Data 
 
The revelation of Edward Snowden in 2013 disclosed that the NSA operates two types of 
programmes pursuant to two different regulatory frameworks, each authorising collection of 














Metadata is also know as communications data, which is ‘all other information about a 
communication other than the content- the where, when, who, how long and how’.93 In terms 
of electronic communications, such as emails, communications data refers to the ‘to’ and 
‘from’ lines in the email and its technical details, but not the subject line of the content.94 In 
the context of the UK law, a definition of communications data is contained in Article 21(4)(b) 
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), which states that: 
 
 communications data are made up of ‘traffic data’ and ‘any information 
 which includes none of the contents of communications (apart from any  
information falling within paragraph (a)) and is about the use made by 
 any person […] in connection with the provision to or use by any person  
 of any telecommunications services.95 
 
This type of data has a significant value to security and law enforcement agencies, as it can 
help build a detailed picture of an individual’s personality, habits and contacts. Unlike content 
data, it is also not misleading.  RIPA recognized the importance of gathering information 
derived from communications data and in Section 22 lists eight broadly defined purposes, for 
which metadata could be accessed, including in the interest of national security, crime 
prevention and public safety.96  
                                              




95 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s. 21(4)(b). 
96 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s. 22 states: 
(1)  This section applies where a person designated for the purposes of this Chapter 
believes that it is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (2) to obtain any 
communications data. 
 (2) It is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection to obtain communications 
data if it is necessary— 
  (a)  in the interests of national security; 
  (b)  for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; 
  (c)  in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; 
  (d)  in the interests of public safety; 
  (e)  for the purpose of protecting public health; 
  (f)  for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other 
imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department; 
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 Content of Communications 
 
The US Foreign Intelligence Services Act 2008 (FISA) on the basis of section 702 allows the 
government, through the use of the PRISM programme, to conduct surveillance targeting the 
contents of communications of non-US persons reasonably believed to be located abroad, when 
the surveillance will result in acquiring ‘foreign intelligence information’.97  The US may 
acquire ‘foreign intelligence information’ on a number of national security grounds, including 
information related to ‘actual or potential risk’, or ‘other grave hostile acts of a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power’, 98  possible sabotage, 99  ‘clandestine foreign intelligence 
activities’ 100 and ‘information relating to the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United 
States.’101 
The information is gathered in bulk and therefore does not necessarily fall within the rubric of 
these enumerated grounds. Edward Snowden disclosures revealed and President Obama’s 
Review Group Report102 confirmed, that all information accessible to NSA is bulk collected.  
Having collected all the material, the NSA officials would then query communications using 
specific ‘identifiers’, such as phone numbers and email addresses that they reasonably believe 
                                              
  (g)  for the purpose, in an emergency, of preventing death or injury or any 
damage to a person’s physical or mental health, or of mitigating any injury 
or damage to a person’s physical or mental health; or 
      (h)  for any purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to (g)) which is specified 
for the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the Secretary of 
State. 
97 Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act1978 (amendment 2008), Title VII s. 702 
‘Procedures for Targeting Certain Persons Outside the United States Other Than United 
States Persons’ (50 U.S.C. sec. 1881a): 
‘This authority allows only the targeting, for foreign intelligence purposes, of 
communications of foreign persons who are located abroad.’ 
98 50 U.S.C § 1801 (e)(1)(A) states that: 
(e)  “Foreign intelligence information” means— 
(1)  information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is 
necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against— 
(A)  actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; 
99 50 U.S.C § 1801 (e)(1)(B) 
100 50 U.S.C § 1801 (e)(1)(C) 
101 50 U.S.C § 1801 (e)(1)(B) 
102 Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 




are used by non-US persons abroad to communicate foreign intelligence information.103 The 
2014 US Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) 104  confirmed collection of signals 
intelligence in bulk, 105 where collection in bulk means ‘the authorized collection of large 
quantities of signals intelligence data which, due to technical or operational considerations, is 
acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.)’.106   
The PPD-28 circumscribed the scope of previously broadly defined ‘foreign intelligence’ 
information by limiting it to ‘information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of 
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or 
international terrorists’ and enumerated specific grounds for the US bulk collection of non-
publicly available signals intelligence, including espionage, terrorism, threat from weapons of 
mass destruction and cyber security threats.107  
 
(c) Espionage/Cyber Espionage and International Law 
 
Being a common practice in international relations even at times of peace,108 states have 
                                              
103 ibid. The Report states on p. 136 that: 
Under section 702, the determination of which individuals to target pursuant to these FISC-
approved certifications is made by NSA without any additional FISC approval. In 
implementing this authority, NSA identifies specific “identifiers” (for example, e-mail 
addresses or telephone numbers) that it reasonably believes are being used by non-United 
States persons located outside of the United States to communicate foreign intelligence 
information within the scope of the approved categories (e.g., international terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, and hostile cyber activities). The NSA then acquires the content of telephone 
calls, e-mails, text messages, photographs, and other Internet traffic using those identifiers from 
service providers in the United States.’ 
104 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Presidential Policy Directive- Signals 
Intelligence Activities. Policy Directive/PPD-28’ (17 January 2014) 
< https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-
directive-signals-intelligence-activities>. 
105 ibid. Section 2 of the PPD-28 states that:  
‘Locating new or emerging threats and other vital national security information is difficult, as 
such information is often hidden within the large and complex system of modern global 
communications. The United States must consequently collect signals intelligence in bulk in 
certain circumstances in order to identify these threats. Routine communications and 
communications of national security interest increasingly transit the same networks, however, 
and the collection of signals intelligence in bulk may consequently result in the collection of 
information about persons whose activities are not of foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence value’, p. 4.  
106 ibid. 
107 ibid. p. 5.  
108 The law of armed conflicts, jus in bello, recognizes the existence of these practices, but 
does not regulate them directly. Instead, the relevant legal instruments relate to the treatment 
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been cautious to subject espionage to international regulation, which accounts for the lack of 
international norms directly designed to regulate these activities through an international treaty, 
or convention.109 At least one of the reasons for this lack of engagement is that it is not in the 
interest of nation states, or the international system, to permit regulation of their intelligence 
gathering activities.110 Simply put, most states partake in the conduct of espionage and expect 
that it may be conducted against them. In spite of the lack of a general rule in international law 
prohibiting peacetime espionage, 111 these activities are not conducted in a legal vacuum. 
International law norms, such as the general prohibition of intervention, the principle of 
territorial sovereignty, the law of the sea, air law, the law on diplomatic relations and human 
rights law do apply but in an indirect manner.112 Therefore, their lawfulness must be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis. Some authors, such as Wright argued that the traditional forms of 
espionage violate the principle of territorial sovereignty, stating that:  
[i]n times of peace […]  espionage and in fact any penetration of the territory of a state 
by agents of anther state in violation of the local law is also a violation of the rule of 
international law imposing a duty upon states to respect the territorial integrity and 
political independence of another state.113 
 Other legal scholars have advocated however that espionage is not only common place but 
also critical to maintaining international peace and security since it actively contributes to the 
fight against international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 114 
Equally, the widespread state practice evidenced by the existence of intelligence agencies 
proves that espionage services are a legitimate function of a state. 115  Their intelligence 
collection activities are therefore perfectly lawful, since they have often been put on a statutory 
                                              
of spies; see for example: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Annexed to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 
18 October 1907, Article 29; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 46 (1), (2), (3) and (4). 
109 ibid. 
110 Sulmasy and Yoo, supra note 57, p. 626. 
111 ibid. ‘State’s practice throughout history (…) supports the legitimacy of spying. Nowhere 
in international law is peaceful espionage prohibited’. 
112 Max Plank Encyclopedia, supra note 24.  
113 Quincy Wright, ‘Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in International Affairs’ 
in Richard Falk (ed.,) Essays on Espionage and International Law (Ohio State University 
Press 1962), p. 12. 
114  Sulmasy and Yoo, supra note 57, p. 637. 
115 Jeffrey H. Smith, ‘State Intelligence Gathering and International Law: Keynote Address’ 
(2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law p. 544 
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footing in the domestic legal systems, as for instance is the case with the US National Security 
Act of 1947. 116   Consequently, this state practice led some commentators to assert that 
peacetime espionage is legal as a matter of customary international law117 and by extension so 
must be cyber espionage.118 However, before such a conclusion could be reached, the legality 
of peacetime espionage (including cyber espionage) must be assessed in the light of the 
principles dictating how customary law is formed. The first port of call is the UN Statutes of 
the International Court of Justice 1948.119 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statutes lists, among other 
sources of law, ‘international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law’.120 
International customary law consists of two elements,121  namely (a) state practice, or usus and 
(b) the acceptance of such practice as law (opinio juris). This two element approach to the 
identification of a rule of customary law,  which requires an assessment of both practice and 
the acceptance of that practice as law, is reiterated by the International Law Commission in its 
Second Report on the Identification of Customary International Law.122 
(i) State Practice 
In order to establish customary law, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared in 
the Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru)123  that a customary rule must be ‘in accordance with a 
constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question’.124 The requirement that some 
degree of uniformity amongst state practices was essential before a custom could be established 
was emphasised in the Fisheries Case.125  This condition was also reiterated in North Sea 
Continental Case,126  where the ICJ held that indispensable to the formation of a new rule of 
customary law is the requirement that state practice must be ‘both extensive and virtually 
                                              
116 Sulmasy and Yoo, supra note 57, p. 628. 
117 see for example Christopher Baker, ‘Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional 
Approach’ (2004) 19 American University International Law Review; Roger D Scott, 
‘Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law’ (1999) 46 Air Force 
Law Review; Demarest supra note 21. 
118 Buchan, supra note 74, p. 81 
119 United Nations, Statutes of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946. 
120 ibid, art 38(1).   
121 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America), (Merits) (27 June 1986) ICJ Reports, para 207. 
122 UN GA International Law Commission, ‘Second Report on the Identification of 
Customary International Law’ (22 May 2014) UN Doc A/CN.4/672. 
123 Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru), (20 November 1950) ICJ Reports 226. 
124 ibid. p. 284. 
125 The Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) (18 December 1951) ICJ Reports 116, 
131, 138. 
126 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v the Netherlands) (20 February 1969) ICJ Reports 3, para 74. 
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uniform in the sense of the provision invoked’.127 In the Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (the Nicaragua case) the ICJ observed that there is no need for ‘an 
absolutely rigorous conformity’128 of a particular practice by states. Nor is there a requirement 
that all states must have participated in a certain practice.129 Rather there must be a ‘general’, 
not universal practice and that of the most influential or powerful states would carry the general 
weight. 130 However, even absent universal acceptance, the requirement of ‘extensive and 
virtually uniform’ state practice is ‘an extremely high threshold’131 that states must meet before 
a legally binding custom can be created. Espionage and by extension cyber espionage, falls at 
this first hurdle. Despite there being an extensive state practice of espionage and widely held 
tacit acceptance of it being a common, inherent and established function of a state, this practice 
is usually accompanied by a ‘policy of silence’.132  Yet, the International Law Commission’s 
Second Report on the Identification of Customary Law clearly states that ‘it is difficult to see 
how practice can contribute to the formation or identification of general customary 
international law unless and until it has been disclosed publicly’.133 Consequently, secret state 
practice does not ‘contribute to the formation or identification of general customary 
international law’.134 The signals intelligence sharing agreements amongst some states are 
inevitably secret. This is certainly the case regarding signals intelligence co-operation among 
the Five Eyes coalition pursuant to the 1947 UKUSA Agreement. The initial Agreement tied 
the two countries into a worldwide network of listening posts run by the NSA and GCHQ and 
was later extended to include intelligence sharing among Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
It was published and officially acknowledged for the first time in 2010 after freedom of 
information requests from Britain and the US some sixty years after signing.135 Under UKUSA 
the UK and the US agreed to exchange the knowledge from operations involving interception, 
decoding and transmitting foreign communications, including the acquisition of 
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communication documents and equipment.136 UKUSA expressly provided that the activities of 
GCHQ were to be wrapped in official secrecy, stating that ‘it will be contrary to the agreement 
to reveal its existence to any third party whatsoever’.137 It was so secretive, that reportedly even 
the Prime Minister of Australia did not know of its existence until 1973.138 In addition, the 
official state denials of conducting cyber surveillance negate this practice qualifying as being 
conducted publically and openly, since statements made on behalf of governments are classed 
as a source of state practice for the purposes of ascertaining the existence of customary law 
rule.139 For example, in 2013 the then GCHQ director Ian Lobban, called to testify before the 
UK parliamentary committee in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, insisted that the 
agency was not conducting espionage en masse on the British public.140 In 2014 the New 
Zealand spy agency Government Communications Security Bureau worked to implement a 
mass metadata surveillance system as the top government officials publically insisted that no 
such programme was planned and would not be legally permitted.141 States sometimes are 
forced to publicly acknowledge to secret intelligence collection activities, as was the case with 
the 2014 Obama Speech on the NSA Reform, admitting NSA mass surveillance. 142 
Nevertheless, these activities remain covert and as noted by Buchan ‘to accept such conduct as 
evidence of state practice is at odds with the basic tenant of customary international law that 
state practice is material and detectable’. 143  Therefore, although undoubtedly there is a 
widespread state engagement in peacetime espionage activities, it is doubtful that it can be 
established as forming part of usus for the purposes of international customary law. 
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(ii) Opinio Juris 
It is also unlikely that peacetime espionage/cyber espionage satisfies the second element, that 
is opinio juris. Opinio juris is a belief that a state activity is legally obligatory. It is a factor, 
which turns the usage into a custom and renders it part of the rules of international law.144 The 
ICJ explained the concept of opinio juris in the Nicaragua case in the following terms:  
[…] for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned ‘amount 
to settled practice’ but they must be accompanied by opinio juris sieve neccessitatis. 
Either the [s]tates taking such action or other [s[tates in a position to react to it, must 
have behaved so that their conduct is evidence of a belief that the practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such belief […], 
the subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris.145 
The states concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation.146 Cyber espionage and in particular mass cyber surveillance is difficult to reconcile 
with this element to establish a customary rule. As will be shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
mass cyber surveillance is unlawful under the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human 
Rights. To that end, the UN High Commissioner’s for Human Rights Report, The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age147  prepared at the request of the UN General Assembly, emphasised 
that ‘overt and covert digital surveillance in jurisdictions around the world have proliferated 
with governmental mass surveillance emerging as a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional 
measure.’ 148  The views expressed in that report, together with UN General Assembly 
Resolutions 68/167,149 69/166150 and A/C.3/71/L.39/Rev.1151 on The Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age, evidence deep concern among most nations regarding mass surveillance. They 
also reflect the attitudes of the international community. All these points to the lack of 
‘evidence of a belief that [mass untargeted cyber surveillance] is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it’.152  Furthermore, customary law is established by virtue 
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of a pattern of a claim, absence of protest by states particularly interested in the matter at hand 
and acquiescence by other states.153 The ICJ defined acquiescence in the Gulf of Mine case as 
‘equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may 
interpret as consent’.154 Thus, where states are seen to acquiesce in the behaviour of other states 
without protesting against them the assumption is that such behaviour is accepted as 
legitimate.155 This clearly is not the case with mass cyber surveillance, as a number of states 
following the 2013 Snowden disclosures vehemently protested against the NSA activities as 
being contrary to international law. 156 For example, the then President of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil Dilma Rousseff directly attacked the NSA at the UN General Assembly 
address accusing the agency of violating international law by its indiscriminate collection of 
personal information of Brazilian citizens and economic espionage targeted on the country’s 
strategic industries. The President called these actions illegal not only because they breach the 
right to privacy, ‘without which there can be no true freedom of expression and opinion and 
therefore no effective democracy’, but also because they ‘undermine the respect for 
sovereignty without which there can be no basis for the relationship among nations’.157 Other 
states have also expressed their disapproval. For instance, the German Bundestag set up a 
Committee of inquiry on the NSA affair in 2014, which is the only parliament among the  
Council of Europe member states, which has taken such a step.158 Therefore, based on the 
widely held condemnations from the international organizations (including the UN General 
Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the Council of Europe) and individual states (such as Brazil and Germany), it 
can not be said that nations acquiesce without protestation to cyber espionage, particularly 
mass cyber surveillance. On the contrary, there is clear evidence of protest based on breaches 
of international law, including international human rights, which negates agreement to these 
practice and thus, the formation of customary rule. 
 In summary, peacetime espionage, including mass cyber surveillance, cannot be said to 
have become part of customary law because it fails to meet the two requirements set out in 
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Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. First, these practices do not 
fulfil the requirement of constant and uniform state practice, being seldom acknowledged 
publically, conducted pursuant to secret agreements and often officially denied. Secondly, they 
cannot be said to form part of opinio juris because many states clearly do not believe that they 
are lawful under international law. In fact, as noted above, some states publicly assert the lack 
for respect for human rights and point out that these practices breach international law principle 
of territorial sovereignty. The fact that cyber surveillance is not regulated by an international 
treaty and is not part of international customary law is therefore crucial in the discussion as to 
how to bring these activities within the rule of law globally. The ways that this can be achieved 
and their prospects of success will be discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
 
(d) Cyber Espionage, Cyber Surveillance and State Responsibility 
 
Another issue that must be addressed at this stage is that relating to state responsibility, a 
fundamental principle of international law, which provides that whenever one state commits 
an internationally unlawful act against another state, international responsibility is established 
between them.159  
 The episodes of cyber espionage and hostile cyber operations (some examples of the 
former were outlined above, whilst some examples of the latter will be considered in Chapter 
2 of this thesis), show the challenges that these activities pose to international law also in 
relation to establishing responsibility. As lex generalis, the principle of state responsibility 
applies in cyberspace. To that end, the UN Group of Government Experts recognized that states 
must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to 
them under international law.160 In addition, the International Group of Experts drafting the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed in Rule 14 that ‘a [s]tate bears international responsibility for a 
cyber-related act that is attributable to the [s]tate and that constitutes a breach of an 
international legal obligation’. 161Generally, responsibility for hostile cyber operations will 
depend on whether a particular act can be attributed to the state as it is the state that is 
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responsible for the internationally wrongful acts of the de jure and de facto state organs.162 
Therefore, attribution in cyberspace is critical when determining the rights and responsibilities 
of states, for without it ‘states are limited in their options to defend against unlawful cyber 
operations, both within jus ad bellum and jus in bello’.163 This is an equally important issue in 
the context of states’ human rights obligations, as it is the state who bears ‘a prime 
responsibility and duty to protect, promote and implement all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’164 
 
(i) The Nature of State Responsibility 
 
The concept of state responsibility and its customary law status has been confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice in such cases as the Nicaragua,165  the Tehern Hostages166 and 
Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros.167 It was summarized by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) in the Factory at Chorzów case168  as ‘[…] principle of international law, and even a 
general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make 
reparation.’169 This responsibility as a matter of international law will arise when two elements 
are met. First, an act or omission is attributable to the state.170 Secondly, it constitutes a breach 
of an international obligation.171  
 This approach has been reiterated by the International Law Commission in the Articles 
on the Responsibility of State for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State 
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Responsibility), adopted in 2001.172 Although the Articles are not a treaty, they have been 
extensively cited by international courts and tribunals, are evidenced in state practice and 
therefore considered as an authoritative statement of the customary law on state 
responsibility.173 Thus, Article 1 of the Article reiterates the general rule and states that ‘every 
internationally wrongful act of a [s]tate entails the international responsibility of that [s]tate’.174 
Article 2 provides that there is an internationally wrongful act when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission (a) is attributable to the state under international law and (b) constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation of the state.175 The Commentary to Article 2 explains that 
term “‘attribution’ is used to denote the operation of attaching a given action or omission to a 
[s]tate”.176 The Commentary also makes it clear that ‘for particular conduct to be characterized 
as internationally wrongful act, it must first be attributable of the [s]tate’, which it goes on to 
explain is ‘a real organized entity, a legal person with full authority to act under international 
law’.177 Furthermore, the Commentary explicitly recognizes that a state does not act of itself,  
but “ ‘an act of the [s]tate’ must involve some action or omission by a human being or group’ 
[for] ‘states can act only by and through their agents and representatives’”.178 It follows that to 
establish responsibility there must be a link between the state and the person or persons actually 
committing the unlawful act or omissions.179 To that end, the Articles identify the following 
categories of individuals, whose acts may be imputable to the state:  
(a) state organs (exercising legislative, executive, judicial or any other function), 
notwithstanding of their position within the state hierarchy.180 This category covers all 
the individual and collective entities, which make up the organization of the state and 
act on its behalf.181 This provision reflects customary international law and as stated by 
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the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide  case (Bosnia v Serbia), it is ‘one of the cornerstones 
of state responsibility that the conduct of any state organ is to be considered an act of 
the state under international law and therefore gives rise to responsibility of the state if 
it continues a breach of an obligation of the state’;182   
(b)  persons or entities exercising elements of government authority, which are not an organ 
of the state under Article 4, but are empowered by the law of that state to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority and are ‘acting in that capacity in the particular 
instance’.183 The Commentary to Article 5 explains that this provision is ‘intended to 
take account of the increasing common phenomenon of parastatal entities, which 
exercise elements of governmental authority in place of [s]tate organs, as well as 
situations where former [s]tate corporations have been privatized but retain certain 
public or regulatory functions’.184 An example of such a parastatal entity is a private 
security firms authorised to act as prison guards;185 
(c)  an organ placed at the disposal of a state by another state, if that organ was acting in 
the exercise of elements to the governmental authority of the former state. 186 The 
instances of such situations may include a section of the health service placed under the 
orders of another country to assist in overcoming an epidemic, or judges appointed in 
particular cases to act as judicial organs of another state;187 
(d) state organs, persons or entities empowered to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority even if when so acting they they exceed their authority or contravene 
instructions.188 This provision addresses unauthorised or ultra vires acts of state organs. 
It makes it clear that the conduct of such an organ or entity empowered to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority acting in its official capacity is attributable to 
the state even if the organ acted in excess of the authority or contrary to instructions;189 
(e) person or groups acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of the 
state.190 The Commentary explains that as a general principle the conduct of private 
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persons or entities is not attributable to the state under international law.191 However, 
there may be circumstances ‘where such conduct is nevertheless attributable to the state 
because there exits a specific factual relationship between the person or entity engaging 
in the conduct and the [s]tate’.192 This could occur either where (i) a private person acts 
on the instructions of the state in carrying out the wrongful conduct or (ii) where a 
private person acts under the states’ direction or control.193 In cases involving private 
persons acting on the instructions of the state (category (i)), the attribution to that state 
is widely accepted in international jurisprudence.194 Instances where responsibility will 
be attributed in this context include state organs supplementing their own action by 
recruiting private persons as auxiliaries, who are not part of state police or armed forces 
but who are sent abroad to carry out a particular mission.195 However, in the case of 
private persons acting under the state’s direction or control (category (ii)), the issue 
whether conduct was carried out ‘under direction or control’ is more complex. Such 
conduct, according the the Commentary to Article 8 ‘will be attributable to the [s]tate 
only if it directed or controlled the specific operation and the conduct complained of 
was an integral part of that operation’.196  The ICJ interpreted the degree of control that 
a state must exert in order to give rise to responsibility as ‘effective control’. In the 
Nicaragua case197 the Court had to determine whether the conduct of the contras was 
attributable to the United States in order to hold that country responsible for breaches 
of international humanitarian and human rights law committed by the contras.  The ICJ 
found that the US assistance and the general control over the contras were not sufficient 
in the absence of further evidence to attribute their acts to the US government. The 
Court stated that ‘[f]or this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United 
States, it would in principle have to be proved that that [s]tate had effective control of 
the military and paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations 
were committed’.198 Therefore, general overall control would have been insufficient for 
responsibility to arise. However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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Yugoslavia in the Tadić case 199  adopted a more flexible approach to determine 
attribution, holding that the degree of control might vary according to the circumstances 
and a high threshold might not always be required.200 To that end, the Tribunal applied 
the ‘overall control’ test to ascertain whether acts of hierarchically structured groups, 
such as military groups, armed bands, irregulars or rebels could be attributed to the 
state. In rejecting the higher standard of ‘effective control’ in favour of the ‘overall 
control’, the Tribunal held that such groups are less likely to receive express direction 
and control from that state due to their ‘structure, a chain of command and a set of rules 
as well as the outward symbols of authority’.201 It is therefore more likely that a state 
would exercise ‘overall control’ over such groups, that is only have control over the 
group generally and not specifically directing them with regards to each specific act.202 
This lower standard of attribution has however been criticised by the ICJ in the 
subsequent Bosnian Genocide case. 203  The Court declined to uphold the ‘overall 
control’ test and reaffirmed the customary status of the ‘effective control’ standard, 
holding that the actions of Serbia and certain paramilitary groups were not attributable 
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because there was insufficient evidence to show 
that the state instruction and direction was given in case of each operation where the 
alleged violations occurred. In so doing,  the ICJ reaffirmed the approach adopted in 
the Nicaragua case, stating that ‘[i]t must […] be shown that [the] ‘effective control’ 
was exercised, or that the [s]tate’s instructions were given, in respect of each operation 
in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions 
taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations’.204 
(f) person or a group of persons if the person or group was in fact exercising elements of 
the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in 
circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority;205 
(g) insurrectional or other movement in the event that the insurrection is successful and the 
movement become the government of the state;206 and finally 
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(h) approval and adoption by a state of acts of private persons or entities.207 
 
In addition to the requirement that an action or omission must be attributable to a state to 
trigger its responsibility under international law, Article 12 of the Articles of State 
Responsibility requires that there must be a breach of an international obligation. 208 The 
Commentary to Article 12 explains that the breach of international obligation means that the 
act in question is not in conformity with that which is required by that obligation regardless of 
its origin.209 This applies to all international obligations of states, whatever their origin may be 
and include customary rules of international law, obligations arising under a treaty and general 
principles applicable within the international legal order.210 
 
(ii) Attribution in the Context of Cyber Espionage 
 
Rule 15 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 makes it clear that ‘cyber operations conducted by organs 
of a [s]tate, or by persons or entities empowered by domestic law to exercise elements of 
governmental authority, are attributable to the [s]tate’.211 This provision reflects Article 4(1) 
of the Articles on State Responsibility as it reiterates that a sate would be held liable for 
wrongful acts of its organs, such as the military or intelligence agencies.212 The interpretation 
of  ‘state organ’ in Rule 15 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 likewise reflects the broad definition 
adopted by the International Law Commission213 and includes ‘all persons or entities that have 
that status under the [s]tate’s domestic laws […] regardless of their function or place in the 
governmental hierarchy’.214 It follows that ‘any cyber activity undertaken by the intelligence, 
military, internal security, customs, or other [s]tate agencies engages [s]tate responsibility if it 
violates an international legal obligation binding on that [s]tate’.215 Such organs must perform 
governmental function and the responsibility will be triggered even if the conduct in question 
is ultra virus, that is it exceeds the authority granted by the states or contravenes its 
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instructions.216 What qualifies as elements of governmental authority are those that represent 
quintessential governmental function, that is activities over which governments typically 
exercise competence, such as the conduct of foreign affairs, the operation of police force etc.217 
In order to attribute a particular conduct to the state in the context of cyber espionage, two 
situations must be distinguished: (a) cyber surveillance and (b) other forms of espionage 
(industrial, political and military). 
 
 Attribution and Mass Cyber Surveillance Programmes 
 
Mass cyber surveillance conducted through such surveillance programmes as PRISM, 
Tempora and Upstream are highly likely to be attributable to the United States and the United 
Kingdom for at least two reasons. First, they are operated by state intelligence agencies (the 
NSA and GCHQ), which under Article 4 of the Articles of State Responsibility (reflected in 
Rule 15 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0) are the organs of those states, as they conduct state 
functions. Thus, the National Security Agency is the official US cryptologic organization, 
constituted under the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID No. 9) issued 
by President Truman and the National Security Council in 1952.218  Founded in 1952, the NSA 
is the biggest signals intelligence agency in the United States, mainly focused on the oversees, 
rather than domestic surveillance. Among its functions are internet and phone interceptions 
and code breaking. Following the controversy of the Watergate scandal, the NSA was placed 
under the investigation of the US Senate Church Committee in 1975.219 As a result of the 
Committee’s findings, the US Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 
(now amended by the 2008 Amendment Act), which set guidelines with regards to what and 
how the NSA was to conduct its collection activities.220 In particular, the organization was 
placed under the supervision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), so that any 
interception of communications of the American citizens had to be conducted pursuant to a 
warrant issued by the FISC.221 The  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (as amended) is also 
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one of the legal basis upon which the NSA conducts its signals intelligence gathering abroad. 
Similarly, GCHQ performs state functions set out under the UK Intelligence Services Act 
1994.222 Being a primarily foreign-focused intelligence agency, its signals intelligence role can 
only be exercised in the interest of national security, economic well-being of the UK and in 
support of the prevention or detection of serious crime. 223  GCHQ provides advice and 
assistance to certain UK bodies and public sector for the protection of communications in the 
UK.224 The overall responsibility within the UK government for intelligence and security 
matters lies with the Prime Minister, whilst the day-to-day ministerial responsibility for GCHQ, 
with the Foreign Secretary. The activities of GCHQ are subject to scrutiny by the Intelligence 
and Security Committee of Parliament, whilst its interception of communications operations 
are authorised under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 225  Complaints 
regarding GCHQ can be brought before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.226  
Secondly, the government of the US was forced to publically admit the existence of its mass 
cyber surveillance apparatus, particularly the PRISM programme, 227 following the Snowden 
disclosures and consequently face the uproar from other heads of state, including Brazil and 
Germany. Whilst the UK confirmed that it has been the recipient of data from PRISM via its 
intelligence sharing relationship with the US, the government adopted a ‘neither confirm nor 
deny policy’ towards Tempora.228 
On these bases it could therefore be concluded that intelligence collection authorised by 
the US FISA 2008 and UK RIPA 2000 through inter alia the PRISM and Tempora programmes 
operated by the NSA and GCHQ engage these countries responsibility under international law 
since they can be attributable to these states and as shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis, violate 
their international human rights obligations, thus constituting an internationally wrongful act.  
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 Attribution and Other Forms of Cyber Espionage 
 
Attributing other forms of cyber espionage to any given state is more problematic as these types 
of operations may involve state, or non-state actors. Each instance of cyber espionage must 
therefore be assessed separately. 
  As already noted above, a state is generally responsible for internationally wrongful 
acts by both the state organs229 and non-state actors who are neither de jure or de facto state 
organs, but who operate under the direction or control of the state.230 In the context of cyber 
espionage, a state’s responsibility will therefore be triggered if  (a) a particular cyber operation 
can be attributed to that state organ or (b) be imputed to that state if conducted by non-state 
actor (that is neither de jure or de facto state organ) if that entity is if fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of the state carrying out the conduct.231 As 
noted above, the direction and control requirement has been interpreted and confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua232 and the Bosnian Genocide233 judgments as 
the ‘effective control’ test.  This test has been endorsed by the International Group of Experts 
in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 as applicable in cyberspace and reflecting customary international 
law.234  Thus, Rule 17 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 confirms that ‘cyber operations conducted by 
a non-[s]tate actor are attributable to a [s]tate when: (a) engaged in pursuant to its instructions 
or under its direction or control, or (b) the [s]tate acknowledges and adopts the operations as 
its own’.235 Cyber operations of such state agencies as the NSA and GCHQ seem to be excluded 
from the ambit of Rule 17 as the commentary to this rule explains that ‘acting pursuant to 
instructions of a [s]tate is generally equated with conduct that is authorised by that [s]tate, but 
does not fall within the scope of Rule 15 [Attribution of cyber operations by State organs], 
which addresses entities that have been legally empowered to exercise particular elements of 
government authority.’236 Rule 17 therefore covers non-state actors that function as a state’s 
auxiliary.237 State responsibility in this context will be established on the basis of the effective 
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control of a particular cyber operation, whenever it is the state that determines the execution 
and course of the specific operation and the cyber activity engaged in by the the non-state actor 
is the ‘integral part of the operation’.238 Moreover, ‘effective control includes both the ability 
to cause constituent activities of the operation to occur, as well as the ability to order the 
cessation of those that are underway’.239 
 The identification of a particular individual or entity for the purposes of attribution is 
evidentially very difficult as any cyber operation can be conducted with a degree of anonymity 
and/or denied. An internationally wrongful act in cyberspace may be ascribed to a particular 
computer (by way of its IP address that pin points its geographical location). However, the 
identity of its users is uncertain and may only be known by way of presumption, or through an 
exposure of a whistle blower.240 It follows, that if a computer can be identified as a government 
computer due to its location, for example in a government department or on diplomatic 
premises, than a cyber espionage operation may in principle be attributed to the state.241 This 
could be so on the basis of the identity of the operator, who may be presumed to be a 
government agent, or the location of the computer, as it falls under the exclusive and complete 
control of the state. An illustration of attribution on this basis is the German government 
diplomatic protest against the UK and US government’s espionage against German 
governmental departments, including the office of the Chancellor from the UK and US 
embassies in Berlin.242  
 The difficulty regarding attribution, unless it is formally acknowledged, is further 
compounded where cyber espionage appears to be conducted by a non-state actor. A case in 
point is the cyber breaches of the US Democratic National Committee’s computer system (the 
DNS hack) discussed previously, by two entities identified as Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear. 
These two groups were linked by the US authorities to the Russian state.  This was justified by 
the US government on the grounds of their “advanced methods consistent with nation-state 
level capabilities including deliberate targeting and ‘access management’ tradecraft” and 
because both groups ‘engage in extensive political and economic espionage for the benefit of 
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the government of the Russian Federation and are believed to be closely linked to the Russian 
government’s powerful and highly capable intelligence services’.243 In January 2017 the US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued 
a Joint Analysis Report, titled ‘GRIZZLY STEPPE-Russian Malicious Cyber Activity’, 244 
which publically attributed the DNC cyber intrusion to the Russian state. The report ‘provid[ed] 
technical details regarding the tools and infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and military 
intelligence services (RIS) to compromise and exploit networks and endpoints associated with 
[inter alia] the US elections’.245 Public attribution to the Russian state, the document stated, is 
supported by the technical indicators from the US intelligence community, the DHS, FBI, 
private sector and other entities.246 The report expanded on the previous Joint Statement issued 
in October 2016 from the DHS and the Director of National Intelligence on Election 
Security. 247  It concluded that the technical indictors prove that threat actors are ‘likely 
associated’ with the Russian state.248 However, the focus on the report for attribution purposes 
was not on the ‘effective control’ test but instead on capabilities, methods, motivations and 
technical indicators.249  
This and other examples of recent state practice regarding publicly attributing hostile cyber 
operations to other states250 point to the growing tendency that “imputed state responsibility 
for the unlawful cyber operations of non-[s]tate actors who are neither de jure nor de facto 
[s]tate organs is being assigned without rigid adherence to the ‘effective control’ test [but on 
the basis of] control and capabilities test, examining motivations, geographic location, 
technical indicators and relationship between the non-[s]tate actor and the [s]tate”.251 
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3. Transborder Data Searches 
 
  In addition to the globe-spanning networks created by the intelligence agencies, the law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) seem also to exercise an almost unrestricted transborder access 
to data stored in ‘a cloud’ and/or on servers located in other jurisdictions by private companies 
as part of their criminal investigations. In most countries these authorities comprise the police, 
but they may also include prosecutors’ offices, designated military/defence authorities, 
financial and tax agencies, border/customs officials and special directorates.252  
The ability of the LEAs to directly access computer data has been an on-going practice even 
before the Snowden revelations,253 but his exposures highlighted that enormous amounts of 
data generated daily can be accessed by the authorities of third countries, often without any 
authorisation, in order to secure electronic evidence for the purposes of criminal prosecution, 
circumventing the formal cooperation channels, such as the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) 
procedures. The scale and the seriousness of the problem have been recognized inter alia254 by 
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the Cyber Crime Committee (T-CY), 255  a body that represents the state parties to the 
Cybercrime Convention (the Budapest Convention).256 Based on Article 46 of the Budapest 
Convention, the consultations of the Committee aim at facilitating the effective use and 
implementation of that Convention, the exchange of information and the consideration of any 
future amendments.257  In the 2014 report titled ‘Transborder Access to Data and Jurisdiction: 
Options for Further Action’ by the T-CY, the T-CY observed that the increasing number of 
countries unilaterally access data stored abroad for criminal justice purposes. The T-CY 
recognized the problems these practices create but noted that relying on states to adopt their 
own solutions would lead potentially to a ‘jungle situation’, whilst taking no action would 
result in more crime and violation of human rights. 258 The Report warned that the Budapest 
Convention must not be used for national security or mass surveillance purposes, as it does not 
permit blanket/transborder access, collection and transfers of data.259 Similar concerns were 
raised by the Council of Europe Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Article 29 Working 
Party), a body composed of representatives from the data protection authorities of each EU 
Member State, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Commission. 
According to the view expressed by the Article 29 Working Party ‘transborder data transfers 
in the field of law enforcement must exclude blanket/mass transborder access, collection or 
transfer to/of data, which is incompatible with the [European Union] Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights’.260 In addition the Council of Europe 
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Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, in his 2014 report observed that Article 32 
of the Budapest Convention ‘appears to support the tendency of law-enforcement agencies to 
resort to “informal” means of information gathering, even across borders, without laying down 
clear safeguards (for instance that such informal measures should not be used for intrusive 
information-gathering activities that normally, in a state under the rule of law, require a judicial 
warrant).’261  He also noted that Article 32, ‘seems to support the tendency of such authorities 
to increasingly “pull data” directly from servers in other countries, or to demand that companies 
within their jurisdiction-particularly the main internet giants-do this for them, without recourse 
to formal, inter-state mutual legal assistance arrangements, arguably in violation of the 
sovereignty of the state where the data are found’.262  
 This situation creates challenges for international law, as it is highly likely to breach 




Cyberspace is a relatively new environment for scholarly enquiry. It has been widely accepted 
that many of the international human rights that individuals enjoy offline are also protected 
online.263 This thesis therefore goes beyond the enquiry as to whether international human 
rights law applies to this environment. Instead, it seeks the answer to the following questions: 
 
1. What are the obligations of states with regards to the protection of online privacy when 
conducting mass untargeted cyber surveillance/transborder data searches? 
 
2. Do states violate the right to privacy when engaging in these practices?  
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3. How do the existing international human rights treaties apply in the context of cyber 
surveillance/transborder data searches? For example, are states bound by human rights 
obligations when conducting extraterritorial surveillance and if so, what legal test 
applies? 
 
4. Are individuals’ rights safeguarded sufficiently under the existing international law, or 
is there a need for a new international treaty setting out privacy norms?  
 
5. If, so what are the prospects that such an instrument be adopted? What other options 
are there if this is not feasible?  
 
 
The research methods adopted for the purposes of this thesis is doctrinal, sometimes also 
described as theoretical legal research. Doctrinal research asks what the law is on a particular 
issue. 264 Generally, this type of research is concerned with analysis of the legal doctrine and 
how it has developed and applied. It is conducted through the collection and analysis of primary 
sources, such as relevant legislation and case law, together with secondary materials such as 
journal articles and other written commentaries on the case law and legislation. 265  The 
researcher’s principle or even sole aim is to describe a body of law and how it applies.266 
 
 This thesis researches a particular aspect of states’ behaviour in cyberspace in the 
context of international human rights law. In order to establish the content and scope of these 
norms the research enquires into the sources of international law, as specified in Article 38(1) 
of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice.  Article 38(1) provides that: 
 [t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law  
 such disputes as are submitted to it shall apply: 
(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
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(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of law.  
 
The sources used for the purposes of conducting this research can be grouped in the following 
categories: (a) international treaties; (b) evidence of emerging customary law; (c) judicial 
decisions; (d) teaching of publicists; (e) acts of international organizations and (f) soft law. 
Each source will be briefly described in turn.  
 
(a) International Treaties  
 
Article 38(1) refers to international treaties as sources establishing rules and as such they 
represent legally binding obligations undertaken by state parties. A definition of a treaty is 
found in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties, which states that a 
treaty is ‘an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed 
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation’.267 
The right of privacy of communications is guaranteed in a number of international and 
regional treaties. This research centres on the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 (ICCPR),268 the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR)269 and the 
American Convention of Human Rights 1969 (ACHR).270 The reason for selecting these legal 
instruments are two fold. First, they set out the benchmark of privacy protection internationally 
and regionally. Secondly, they are also applicable to the United States and the United 
Kingdom-the states with the most advanced cyber surveillance capabilities and in case of the 
US, prolific transboder data searches.271        
               From October 2012 the number of states parties to the ICCPR stands at 
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167, including the Five Eyes members. Australia ratified the ICCPR in 1978, Canada in 1976, 
New Zealand in 1978, the United Kingdom in 1976. The US signed the ICCPR on 5 October 
1977 and ratified it on 8 June 1992. According to the US Declaration (1) ‘[…] the provisions 
of articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing’, which means that the Covenant 
does not have effect in domestic law as the US has not passed legislation to give it such effect. 
Therefore, individuals may not rely directly on its provisions in the US courts.272 
The European Convention on Human Rights binds only those state parties of the 
Council of Europe, which ratified the Convention and includes 47 members. The only signatory 
from the Five Eyes is the United Kingdom, which incorporated it as part of its domestic law 
with the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1999 on 2 October 2000. The ECHR does 
not have any legal effect on the United States or the other Five Eyes members at either 
domestic, or international level.  
The US has signed the Pact of San Jose on 6 January 1977 but has not ratified it, 
therefore it cannot be bound by the Convention.273 The remaining four members of the Five 
Eyes neither signed nor ratified it. Nevertheless, it will be taken into consideration for the 
purposes of Chapter 4, ‘Right to Privacy’ as the practices of the Five Eyes clearly impact on 
the right to privacy in the Pan-American system. 
The research does not however consider in any great detail the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights (AFCHPR),274 as it lacks specific recognition of the right to 
privacy. Brief mention is nevertheless made in Chapter 5.  Nor does it address the legality of 
mass surveillance/transborder data searches in relation to the obligations contained under the 
African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data 2014.275 For the Convention 
to enter into force, Article 36 specifies the number of ratification at fifteen.276 Thus far, only 
Senegal has ratified the treaty.277  
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International law treats states as the principle law makers of the international system. In that 
sense, ‘states are simultaneously the main subjects of international law and the entities, whose 
choices and conduct generate positive international law. The choices and conduct of states are 
their ‘practice’ and the general practice of states is an essential element in the emergence, 
evolution, decline and disappearance of norms of customary international law’.278  
Since 1947 the task of the ‘promotion of the progressive development of international law and 
its codification’ has been vested in the International Law Commission (ILC) by the UN General 
Assembly.279 The ILC’s report on the Identification of Customary Law280 adopts as its basic 
approach to the determination of the existence and content of a rule of customary international 
law general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).281 Each element must be separately 
ascertained and requires an assessment of evidence.282 The Law Commission confirmed that 
requirement of practice entails predominantly states’ conduct in the exercise of their executive, 
legislative, judicial or other function. 283  The forms of state practice includes, inter alia 
‘diplomatic acts and correspondence, conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an 
international organization or at an intergovernmental conference, conduct in connection with 
treaties, executive conduct, including operational conduct ‘on the ground’, legislative and 
administrative acts and decisions of  national courts’.284 The requirement of opinio juris was 
explained by the ILC to mean that ‘the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of 
legal right or obligation’.285 The forms of evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) include 
among others, ‘public statements made on behalf of [s]tates, official publications government 
legal opinions, diplomatic correspondence, decisions of national courts, treaty provisions, and 
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conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an 
intergovernmental conference’.286  
The methodology in this thesis regarding how states approach the subject of governance of 
cyberspace, how international law applies to that domain, how to protect certain rights and 
resolve internet’s future stewardship reflect the aforementioned forms of state practice and 
opinion juris articulated by the International Law Commission. To that end, a wide array of 
material was consulted in the process of the research of this study to ascertain the current trends 
in state practice. The sources used therein represent the official position of states individually, 
or collectively acting through a variety of international organizations. Examples of documents 
that were consulted included:  
 speeches of heads of state or state officials; 
 transcripts of governmental proceedings; 
 domestic legislation; 
 decisions of domestic courts and tribunals; 
 press releases and communiques; 
 policy statements; 
 official manuals issued to state officials and armed forces. 
 
Where official documents are not available, unofficial sources such as online newspaper 
reports and academic works have been used.  
 
(c) Judicial Decisions  
 
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice provides that judicial 
decisions are amongst the ‘subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law’. 
Although judicial decisions are not themselves sources of law, they may be used to ascertain 
the existence and scope of rules sourced in treaties, custom and the general principles of law.287 
This study considered the jurisprudence of the most prominent tribunals, including the 
International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations 
(HRC). The focus of the enquiry in this regard related in particular to the interpretation of the 
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meaning and scope of the right to privacy and its application in the context of cyber surveillance 
practise of the Five Eyes states. Furthermore, the decisions of some courts, such as the ECHR 
may be influential on the way certain rights are interpreted by other human rights bodies, such 
a the HRC. They have also decisive impact on state practice, as being legally binding states 
must accept the court’s view of international law and alter their behaviour accordingly. This is 
reflected in the Asylum case, where the ICJ remarked that:  
 
 [i]t should be remembered […] that the decision in a particular case has  
 deep repercussions, particularly in international law, because views which  
 have been confirmed by that decision acquire quasi-legislative value, in spite  
 of the legal principle to the effect that the decision has no binding force except  
 between parties and in respect of that particular case.288  
 
Consequently, the recent decisions of the ECHR and to some extent of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union discussed in Chapter 4 ‘The Right to Privacy’,  in relation to mass 
surveillance and data retention serve as a valuable guide in relation to the direction of the legal 
developments in this area.  
 
(d) Teachings of Publicists  
 
Article 38(1) of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice specifies that the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations are also amongst the subsidiary 
means for the determination of the rules of law. These publications are not themselves sources 
of law, but may be used to ascertain the existence and scope of rules sourced in treaties, custom 
and the general principles of law. In the context of cyberspace one such source that this thesis 
makes a frequent reference to is the Tallinn Manual 2.0, referred to earlier in this chapter. The 
Manual is not an official document, but a product of two separate endeavours undertaken by 
Groups of Independent Experts acting in their personal capacity. 289 As such, it does not 
represent the view of its sponsoring nations, or NATO. However, it is an authoritative guide as 
to how international law applies to cyber operations, aimed at an objective re-statement of lex 
lata.290  
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(e) Acts of International Organizations 
 
International organizations, such as the UN General Assembly or the Council of Europe 
provide forums within which international relations may be conducted.  The International Law 
Commission Report on Identification of Customary Law states that ‘a resolution adopted by 
an international organization or an an intergovernmental conference cannot, of itself create a 
rule of customary international law’.291 It may however ‘provide evidence for establishing the 
existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or contribute to its 
development’.292 It may also ‘reflect a rule of customary international law if it is established 
that the provision corresponds to a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).293 
Accordingly, UN General Assembly resolutions do not generate rules, which form part of 
general international law, but nevertheless may help to create such rules.294 In that sense, they 
and the acts of the regional organizations, such as the Council of Europe, may provide evidence 
of opinio juris. They may therefore contribute to the emergence of rules of customary 
international law binding on all states.295 This study takes account of series of  UN General 
Assembly resolutions, including those that were adopted by the Assembly shortly after the 
Snowden disclosures, such as the resolutions on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age.296  
 
 
(f) Soft Law 
 
Soft law is described as ‘any material which is not intended to generate, or  is not per se capable 
of generating, legal rules but which may, nonetheless produce certain legal effects.’297 The 
thesis considers a number of such non-legally binding instruments, including presidential 
declarations, UN GA resolutions, various guidelines and bilateral agreements, referred to 
throughout the thesis and discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 ‘International Legal Solutions’. 
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These materials provided an indication of the likely future course of international law’s 
development in the context of mass surveillance. 
 
The research was conducted between 2013-2017 and was almost entirely 
contemporaneous with the legal and political developments in the area of cyber surveillance 
disclosures of Edward Snowden in 2013. It relied on the primary and secondary sources 
described above. The selection process of these sources reflected the manner in which 
international law is created. Where possible authoritative sources were consulted, which 
influenced particular research findings. A number of historical sources were also used, as the 
means of the background to the research (in particular in Chapters 2 and 3 relating to the 
internet governance discourse and cyber security matters).  
The research findings were also influenced to some degree by the researcher’s participation in 
a number of international conferences and exchanges in the field of cyber security attended 
between 2013-2017.  
 
SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis consists of six chapters.  
Chapter 1, ‘Introduction’, introduces the topic, defines the main terms, sets out the legal 
framework and describes the methodology used. 
Chapter 2, ‘Cyberspace and Cybergeopolitics’, forms the background to the thesis with 
an aim to illustrate the long standing political and ideological differences with regards to the 
future stewardship of the internet evidenced through the protracted internet governance 
discourse. The Chapter discusses the divergent policies to cybersecurity approaches by selected 
nations forming seemingly opposing sides, broadly represented by China and Russia on the 
one hand and the United States and most European countries on the other.  
Chapter 3, ‘The Role of International Law in Cyberspace Regulation’, builds on these 
findings and proceeds to analyse the international legal status of cyberspace. The Chapter’s 
main conclusions are that this is an environment, in which states may not claim full sovereignty, 
but where nations can and do exercise sovereign rights. It is also not a global common under 
the existing international law regimes. The Chapter finds some similarities between this 
domain and international seas and applies by analogy the United Nation Law of the Sea 
Convention 1982 as a possible guide upon which to model a legally binding international 
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treaty. The rationale for doing so stems from the repeated calls from some states since the 
1990s to codify the behaviour of states in cyberspace in a hard law instrument.  
The calls from states, international organizations and civil society for the legal 
regulation of state behaviour, including ceasing mass cyber surveillance and better protection 
of online privacy intensified in the aftermath of Edward Snowden298 disclosures of 2013. 
Chapter 4, ‘Privacy in the Digital Age’, focuses on the legality of state sponsored cyber 
surveillance and transborder access to non-publically available data with regards to the right to 
privacy of communications and data protection under the international and regional human 
rights treaties, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 
17 (ICCPR)299; the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, Article 8 (ECHR);300 the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Individual Data 1981, Article 5 (Convention 108)301 and the American Convention on Human 
Rights 1969, Article 9 (the Pact of San Jose).302 The subjects of enquiry are the intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies of the Five Eyes alliance. The Chapter finds that both these 
activities breach the right to privacy of communications of the individuals located within the 
territories of the intercepting states and foreigners outside state borders. This supports the need 
to clarify in what circumstances and how would states be liable for their violations of that right.  
In light of the increased wave of terrorist attacks in the recent years, the practice of 
states shows growing tendencies for deploying more surveillance powers to conduct domestic 
and extraterritorial surveillance at the expense of civil liberties, particularly the right to privacy. 
However, achieving an international consensus for a cyber treaty setting out ‘the rules of the 
road’, which could also curtail cyber surveillance and protect online privacy, seems elusive. 
This is the subject of discussion in Chapter 5, ‘International Legal Solutions to State Mass 
Surveillance’. The Chapter recognizes that hard law global solution at this stage is unlikely. 
Focusing on the right to privacy, this Chapter considers other options, including (a) regional 
multilateral treaty put forward by the Council of Europe (CoE); (b) the expanding of the reach 
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of the recently modernized Convention 108 beyond Europe (c) modernizing and supplementing 
the already existing legal framework contained in Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR and 
(d) a number of soft law options. 
The concluding Chapter 6 summarises the findings. Edward Snowden revelations of 
2013 brought into the sharp focus the persistent and sustained state practice of conducting cyber 
surveillance en masse. Some of the means employed, such as the use of the PRISM and 
Upstream programs, received legislative approval. Others, such as Tempora have not been 
officially acknowledged by the authorities, but continue unabated. This thesis demonstrated 
that even those surveillance programmes that received legislative attention and control are 
unlawful, as they almost certainly breach the right to privacy under international human rights 
treaties. Governments of many states emphasise that bulk intelligence gathering, pursuant to 
more draconian legislative powers would facilitate greater success in pursuing their national 
security goals. However, doubts exist as to the operational utility of these programmes. 
Consequently, there can be no doubt that the right to privacy of communications online and 
data privacy require a concerted effort from the international community. This process will 
most likely be incremental and facilitated by informal agreements, diplomatic channels and 
bringing the existing international laws up to date. The chapter does not dismiss the need for 
an international legally binding instrument, in a form of either a cyber treaty modelled on the 
UNCLOS 1982, or a separate privacy treaty for the digital domain. However, it takes the 
realistic approach, concluding that such a solution will depend on a number of factors, not least 


























With the significant rise in civilian and military functions conducted in cyberspace, the idea 
that this domain needs governance has increasingly gained consensus among the international 
community, especially in the light of the proliferation of deleterious activities, from cyber 
crime, attacks on cyber infrastructure, exploitation of cyber systems to unsolicited emails 
(spam). Equally, states recognized that this threat cannot be adequately dealt with by any single 
nation acting alone, as ‘cyberspace extends far beyond the domain of internal affairs of any 
state’.303 The need for a framework for effective international cooperation on matters relating 
to cyber security304 is beyond doubt and the work undertaken by intergovernmental bodies, 
such as the United Nations (UN) reflects this reality.305 Although international law is the 
obvious mechanism306 to regulate states’ cyber behaviour, thus far very few specific rules exist. 
The discussion regarding the management of cyberspace and in particular the internet began in 
the 1990s, at the time of the early technological developments of this facility. It focused on 
whether the internet is susceptible to any form of state regulation. With the growing state 
practice showing the trend to shape and constrain behaviour in cyberspace within their 
jurisdictions for strategic, security and political ends this debate no longer plays a significant 
role. Cyberspace can and is subject to state regulation and the major players now deliberate 
how exactly to achieve this. To that end, a UN Group of Government Experts (UN GGE) 
representing 15 United Nations member states, including the People’s Republic of China 
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(China), the Russian Federation (Russia) and the United States (US), reached an agreement 
that international law applies to that domain in non-legally binding reports submitted to the UN 
General Assembly in 2013 and 2015.307 However, despite reaching this broad agreement, it 
remains uncertain how international law applies. One aspect of this uncertainty is the lack of 
consensus regarding an adoption of a hard law international treaty for cyberspace, despite a 
number of proposals from some states. This lack of agreement among states has been further 
exacerbated following the 2013 Edward Snowden disclosures regarding mass cyber 
surveillance, which reinforced political distrust and led to many states and international 
organizations condemning these practices and calling for greater protection of human rights in 
cyberspace. Consequently, the codification of the applicable rules in a binding treaty remains 
the subject of much contention, whilst the development of specific customary law rules seems 
elusive.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to the thesis by outlining the 
historical and current geopolitical dynamics of cyberspace governance and approaches to cyber 
security in order to discuss in more detail the way forward relating to the stewardship of this 
domain in Chapter 5 of this study. This chapter consists of two parts. Part one outlines cyber 
security approaches of selected ‘cyber powers’, represented by the United States and some 
European countries on the one hand and Russia/China on the other hand. This part discusses 
the ideological and cultural divergence in their approaches to the management of this domain 
both on the domestic and international levels, encapsulated by the multistakeholder and 
sovereignist models. This to some extent, explains the the lack of agreement in the sphere of 
internet governance and cyber security. This in part accounts for the continued lack of 
consensus regarding the adoption of a multilateral treaty and the emergence of clear customary 
international law rules. This part of the chapter goes on to highlight the tendencies in state 
practice towards greater assertion of control over the activities in cyberspace. One recent 
example of this trend (discussed in more detail on Chapter 5 of this thesis) is the calls for a 
European-only communication network in the aftermath of the 2013 Edward Snowden 
disclosures with an aim of having a technical infrastructure for online communications on the 
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European soil to ensure the legal protection of data against foreign abuse.308 Such quests for 
separation lead in part two to engage with the fundamental question related to the legal status 
of this domain under international law. Thus, this part first asks whether states can claim full 
sovereignty over cyberspace per se, or any part therein. It concludes that asserting full 
sovereignty over the entire cyberspace by any given state is not possible,309 but that states may 
and do exercise territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction over cyberspace activities.310 By 
examining the current trends in state practice in the context of prescriptive, enforcement and 
judicial jurisdiction, part two lays down the theoretical  foundations for discussing in Chapter 
3 how to achieve the balance between national interests and the assurance that the internet 
remains an open  medium of communication in years to come.  
 
1. CYBERSPACE AND THE ‘CYBERGEOPOLITICS’ OF GLOBAL INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE 
 
(a)   Cyber Security Dimensions 
 
With increased recognition of the importance of globally interconnected electronic 
communications, the economic wealth it helps to create, political stakes involved, not to 
mention the threat derived from hostile cyber operations, the international community has 
become engrossed in the debate regarding the future of cyberspace and challenges posed to 
national security.311 Threats of cyber attack312 attributed to the ease and relatively low cost of 
inflicting harm on the functionality of computer-operated physical infrastructures by a variety 
of actors (such as, hackers, ideologically motivated individuals, states, criminal and terrorist 
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organizations) exposes the vulnerabilities of most nations, even those with superior military 
power.313 Although extreme scenarios of deleterious cyber operations have not yet occurred,314 
several states were subjected to cyber attack, of which other states were suspected as the 
instigators.315 One of the earliest examples was the June 1982 gas pipeline explosion in Siberia, 
as a result of an alleged logic bomb installed in the computer system by the US Central 
Intelligence Agency.316 Other such high profile cyber operations include the 2007 denial of 
service attacks on Estonia, which lasted over a month, but did not result in loss of life, cause 
material damage, or injury.317 The release of the Stuxnext worm in 2010 on Iran’s industrial 
infrastructure with the alleged purpose of sabotaging the Natanz uranium facility318 has been 
described as ‘the first and so far only known use of malicious software designed to cause 
material damage by attacking the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system 
of a national critical infrastructure’.319 In November 2014 a group calling itself ‘Guardian of 
Peace’, allegedly from North Korea, hacked Sony Pictures demanding the withdrawal from 
public release Sony’s North Korean comedy, ‘The Interview’. The incident was described by 
James Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence, as ‘the most serious cyber attack ever 
made against US interests’.320  There are other documented cases, where the deployment of 
cyber operations were used in connection with and in aid of military campaigns or armed 
conflicts, for example against Georgia in 2008.321 These instances show that the internet, 
designed to be borderless, is a means by which benevolent, or malevolent, actions taken in one 
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country will have an outcome in another without the user ever having left their own country.322  
There can therefore be no doubt that the need for international cooperation in handling cyber 
security is not only desirable, but increasingly necessary, as cyber threats are serious, growing 
and destabilizing.323  
So widespread is the concern amongst the international community that since 1998 the UN 
General Assembly began adopting annual resolutions, 324  highlighting that information 
technologies ‘can potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of 
maintaining international stability and security’.325 In addition and also as a result of these 
concerns, a number of United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) were 
established with the purpose of examining threats in cyberspace and how to cooperatively 
address them.326 As a consequence, the GGE reached of a broad agreement that international 
law and in particular the Charter of the United Nations is applicable in cyberspace.327  Other 
organizations have become increasingly engaged with cyber security issues too, including the 
Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, which in 2010 Astana 
Commemorative Declaration recognized cyber threats, as one of the ‘emerging trans-national 
threats’.328 In 2008 North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) set up Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) accredited with full status of international military 
organization and in 2010 issued New Strategic Concept, which acknowledged the damage that 
can be inflicted as a result of cyber attack.329  
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 To date there is no all encompassing international law treaty specifically dealing with 
threats to cybersecurity, or a uniform states’ agreement of opinio juris capable of forming the 
basis of customary international law in this area. However, as already mentioned, there is a 
generally accepted states’ view that international law applies to cyberspace operations. 330 
There are also a number of regional treaties that provide a ‘patchwork of regulations’ for 
cyberspace activities. 331  Among them are the 1992 Constitution of the International 
Telecommunications Union, 332  Council of Europe 2001 Convention on Cybercrime (the 
Budapest Convention),333 the 2009 Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Information Security 
Agreement (the Yekaterinburg Agreement)334 and the African Union Convention on Cyber 
Security and Personal Data Protection.335 These international agreements, albeit important in 
their own right, have their limitations.336 For example, the Budapest Convention aims to meet 
challenges of fighting cyber crimes, such as online fraud, copyright infringement and child 
pornography by harmonizing national laws, improving investigative techniques and increasing 
cooperation among states. However, the Convention excludes from its scope of application 
‘conduct undertaken pursuant to lawful government authority’337 and therefore does not apply 
to cyber operations conducted by states. 338  To date, forty-five states have ratified the 
Convention, including non-Council of Europe members, such as Australia, Japan and the 
United States. 339  Other legal instruments, such as the Yekaterinburg Agreement and the 
African Union Convention on Cyber Security have either very limited membership (the 
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Yekaterinburg Agreement), 340  or have not yet come into force (the African Union 
Convention).341  
The reluctance of states to codify the applicable rules in a comprehensive multilateral 
treaty is well documented.342 A number of unsuccessful attempts have been made since 1996 
with France putting forward an early proposal titled Charter for International Cooperation on 
the Internet.343 Subsequent endeavours also failed with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
submitting to the UN General Assembly a Code of Conduct for Information Security in 2011 
and 2015.344 Thus far, none of these proposals have been embraced with enthusiasm by other 
states345 and the unwillingness to commit to an international treaty been further fuelled by the 
distrust generated by the 2013 Snowden disclosures.346  
Equally, states seem reluctant to contribute towards the development of cyber-specific 
customary international rules. 347  Many countries have issued cyber security defence 
documents, some of which contain references to international law and therefore are ‘not only 
helpful as an assistance in treaty interpretation, but can also be evidence of state practice and 
could declare and seek to impose on those who are subject to its guidance, a certain attitude to 
the law, or an interpretation of the law, or an operational intent that relates to existing law 
either supportively or in some problematic way’. 348  However, judging from the official 
attitudes to cyber security outlined below by the ‘cyber powers’ represented by the US and its 
allies on the one hand (broadly termed the ‘West’) and China, Russian and other like minded 
states on the other hand (the ‘East’), it soon becomes apparent why a clear opinio juris on 
matters relating to cyber security is not easily ascertainable and thus far failed to crystalize.  
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Generally, in order to determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international 
law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is state practice that is accepted as law (opinio 
juris).349 This includes taking into account the evidence of the contrary practice of states that 
does not support the purported rule.350  The divergent approaches of states discussed in the next 
part of this chapter also to some extent explain the reasons for the inability to adopt an 
‘omnibus’ treaty in the near future. To illustrate these conflicting attitudes to cyberspace public 
statements made on behalf of these states, official cyber security documents and other forms 
of evidence will be outlined below to show the rivalry among the major powers relating to the 
principles that should govern not only international cyber security law, but also the issues 
related to internet governance. 
 
(i) Cyber Security Approaches of the ‘West’ 
 
 The US has been described as the ‘only one’ cyber superpower in the world351 and since 
1999 has been prolific in its production of official documents on cyber security matters.352 The 
US attitude to cyberspace generally and to the internet in particular are broadly representative 
of the other states comprising the Five Eyes alliance. These could be encapsulated in one 
phrase, that is ‘internet freedom’, which was first introduced by the then Secretary of State, 
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Hilary Clinton in her speech of that title in 2010.353 Secretary Clinton called cyberspace a 
‘global network common’ and remarked, inter alia, that ‘the [US] stands for a single internet, 
where all humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas’. 354  These views were 
subsequently echoed by the Obama Administration in the 2011 International Strategy for 
Cyberspace: Prosperity Security and Openness in a Networked World (International Strategy 
2011).355  The document sought to establish its normative perspective for cyberspace as a 
global political space and to that end, stated that the US government’s main goal in cyberspace 
is to: 
 
work internationally to promote an open, interoperable, secure and reliable information 
and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, 
strengthens international security and fosters free expression and innovation. To achieve 
that goal, [the administration] will build and sustain an environment in which norms of 
responsible behavior guide states’ actions, sustain partnerships and support the rule of 
law in cyberspace.356  
 
It could be said that the International Strategy 2011 is representative of the US views regarding 
cyberspace as it unveiled that country’s plans for the future of the domain. At the forefront of 
this vision was that cyberspace, viewed as a global political space is to be governed by the rule 
of law. At the core of the administration’s international cyberspace policy was the commitment 
to fundamental freedoms (freedom of expression and association, to receive and impart 
information and ideas through any medium and regardless of frontiers)357, privacy, the free 
flow of information, 358  respect for property, protecting from crime and the right of self-
defense. 359 Preserving global network functionality and improving cyber security featured 
strongly, in addition to ensuring that in future cyberspace is globally interoperable, with stable 
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networks and reliable access. The administration’s vision regarding its future governance was 
unequivocally based on continuing with the multistakeholder model (described in more detail 
elsewhere in this chapter), which the document states, is not limited to governments, but 
includes appropriate stakeholders.360 International Strategy 2011 made several references to 
the need for the ‘rule of law’ in cyberspace domestically and internationally.361 The ‘rule of 
law’ was defined in the report, as ‘a civil order in which fidelity to laws safeguards people and 
interests; brings stability to global markets; and holds malevolent actors to account 
internationally’.362 The stability that the International Strategy referred to should be achieved 
through norms of behaviour,363 or as the document put it, ‘an environment of expectations that 
ground foreign and defense policies and guide international partnerships’.364 Furthermore, it 
expressly referred to the role that international law should play in this domain, stating that: 
 
[t]he development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention 
of customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. 
Long-standing international norms guiding state [behavior], in times of peace and 
conflict, also apply in cyberspace. Nonetheless, unique attributes of networked 
technology require additional work to clarify how these norms apply and what additional 
understandings might be necessary to supplement them. We will continue to work 
internationally to forge consensus regarding how norms of behavior apply to cyberspace, 
with the understanding that an important first step is such efforts is applying the broad 
expectations of peaceful and just interstate conduct to cyberspace. 365 
 
Thus, the ideological thrust of the International Strategy could be summarized as an attempt 
to marry protecting national security interests in cyberspace with upholding fundamental 
freedoms, through close international cooperation and consensus building through norms. It 
also illustrates the reluctance to contribute to the articulation of cyber-specific customary law 
rules, seemingly preferring to enhance the development of customary law through promoting 
the development of international cyber norms. Similar attitudes were also expressed in the 
2011 US Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report, according to which:  
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 [t]he United States is actively engaged in the continuing development of norms  
 of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, making clear that as a matter of US 
 policy, long standing international norms guiding state behavior also apply  
 equally in cyberspace. Among these, applying the tenets of the law of armed  
 conflict are critical to this vision, although cyberspace’s unique aspects may  
 require clarification in certain areas.366 
 
  This trend is also discernable from the 2015 US Law of War Manual 2015 as 
supplemented by its 2016 version.367 The Manual addressed, inter alia, how the law of war 
principles and rules apply to relatively novel cyber capabilities and the cyber domain.368 It 
observed that:  
 
 [a]s a matter of US policy, the United States has sought to work internationally 
 to clarify how existing international law and norms, including the law of war  
 principles apply to cyber operations.369 
 
In the words of one commentator, the Manual is ‘a representative example of another missed 
opportunity to steer the development of cyber custom’ as it ‘skirts virtually all of the unsettled 
issues, including standards of attribution, rules of targeting or the requirement to review cyber 
weapons.’ 370  It is true to say that law and norms are very closely related concepts in 
international law and inter-state agreements on norms may incrementally influence the 
development of the law.371 Nevertheless, a crucial difference is that a violation of a binding 
rule of international law gives rise to international legal responsibility, 372 whilst the same 
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cannot be said of non-legally binding norms regulating cyber conduct.373  
 The United Kingdom 2011 Cyber Security Strategy. Protecting and Promoting the UK 
in a Digital World374 by and large reflects these themes. The UK vision for cyber security in 
2015 is: 
 
[…] for UK to drive huge economic and social value from a vibrant, resilient and secure 
cyberspace, where our actions, guided by our core values of liberty, fairness, 
transparency and the rule of law, enhance prosperity, national security and strong 
society.375  
 
The UK government, having recognized the ‘limits of its competence in cyberspace’376 and the 
fact that much of the infrastructure it needs to protect is owned and operated by the private 
sector, specifically stated that the expertise and innovation required to keep pace with the threat 
will be business-driven.377 The document also acknowledged the need to seek partnership with 
other countries to improve defense in view of the fact that the internet is fundamentally 
transnational and dependent on the infrastructure not entirely based in the UK. References were 
made to the role and protection of human rights, in particular the right to privacy, in the context 
of pursuing cyber security policies that enhance individual and collective security. To achieve 
these set goals, the Strategy urged everyone, that is the private sector, individuals and 
government to work together.378 Nevertheless, the subsequent UK National Cyber Security 
Strategy 2016-2021379 (Cyber Strategy 2016) recognized that the approach taken in the 2011 
National Cyber Security Strategy ‘has not achieved the sale and pace of change required to 
stay ahead of the fast moving threat’.380 The UK government’s vision for 2021 is that ‘the UK 
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is secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the digital world’.381 In 
order to realize this vision, the government will work to defend against cyber threats, deter all 
forms of aggression in cyberspace and develop an innovative cyber security industry.382 Cyber 
Strategy 2016 reiterated the need for international action and ‘investment in partnerships that 
shape the global evolution of cyberspace in a manner that advances [the UK’s] wider economic 
and security interests’.383 The document recognized that international cooperation on cyber 
issues has become an essential part of wider global economic and security debates, which lacks 
a single agreed vision.384 Importantly, the Strategy stated that: 
 
[t]he UK and its allies have been successful in ensuring some elements of the rules-based 
international system are in place: there has been agreement that international law applies 
to cyberspace; that human rights apply online as they do offline; and a broad consensus 
that the multi-stakeholder approach is the best way to manage the complexities of 
governing the [i]nternet. However, with a growing divide over how to address the 
common challenges of reconciling national security with individual rights and freedoms, 
any global consensus remains fragile.385  
 
Among the objectives set in the Cyber Strategy 2016 is the ‘safeguard[ing] of the long term 
future of a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, driving economic growth and 
underpinning the UK’s national security’.386 This will be achieved through, inter alia, ‘UK 
[…] continu[ing] to champion the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance [and] 
oppos[ing] data localization.’387 The UK approach to achieve these ends rests, among other 
things, on ‘strenghten[ing] and embedd[ing] a common understanding of responsible state 
behavior in cyberspace, build[ing] on agreement that international law applies in cyberspace, 
continu[ing] to promote the agreement of voluntary, non-binding, norms of responsible state 
behavior and suppor[ting] the development and implementation of confidence building 
measures [emphasis added]’.388 
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 In summary, the policy pronouncements regarding cyber security matters of the United 
States, also echoed by the other Five Eyes partners such as the UK, can be viewed as (a) the 
continued promotion of the internet as an open environment, where information can flow 
unimpeded among jurisdictions; (b) a policy stance, according to which international 
customary law rules apply to cyberspace operations and therefore there is no need to invent 
new rules and (c) the belief that any additional rules would be developed through voluntary, 
non-legally binding norms and confidence building measures. 
 
 (ii) The ‘Eastern’ Approaches to Cyber Security  
 
 The Russian Federation 
 
Non-Western states seem to be taking a rather different view, when it comes to defining 
cyberspace, cyber security policies and the overall approach to its future governance. Whilst 
the Western governments tend to use the term ‘cyberspace’, Russian and Chinese sources refer 
to it as ‘information space’. 389  The term ‘information space’ is featured in such Russian 
documents as Basic Principles for State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of 
International Information Security to 2020390 and the 2011 Draft Convention on International 
Information on Security (Draft Convention).391 The phrase has also been used in the Draft 
International Code of Conduct for Information Security 2011,392 a document submitted to the 
United Nations by China, Russia and other countries, which having been rejected by the US, 
was re-drafted and re-submitted in 2015. 393  The Russian 2011 Draft Convention on 
International Information on Security, 394  an official government document released at an 
international meeting of high-ranking officials responsible for security matters in 
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Yekaterinburg, defines ‘information space’, as ‘the sphere of activity connected with the 
formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use and storage of information infrastructure and 
information itself’. 395  It considers ‘information security’, as the ‘protection of [Russia’s] 
national interests in the information sphere defined by the totality of balanced interests of the 
individual, society and the state’.396 The 2011 Draft Convention contains 23 issues of concern 
to Russia in that environment, some of which run counter to the views on the use and 
governance of the internet championed by the Western states. The fundamental points of 
divergence are that Russia perceives free flow of information content as a threat. This can be 
gleaned from Article 4, which lists ‘main threats to international peace and security in the 
information sphere’. Among them Art 4(8) considers the following, as one of such dangers: 
 
 [t]he manipulation of the flow of information in the information space of other  
 governments, disinformation, or the concealment of information with the goal 
 of adversely affecting the psychological or spiritual state of society, or  
 eroding traditional cultural, moral, ethical and aesthetic value.397  
 
Conversely, both the US and the UK are strong advocates of free information flow. The already 
referred to United States International Strategy for Cyberspace for instance, pledges that the 
US will ‘prioritize openness and innovation on the internet’ in contrast to governments that 
‘place arbitrary restrictions on the free flow of information or use it to suppress dissent or 
opposition activities’.398 The UK is in broad consensus with this view. For example, in 2011 
the then Foreign Secretary William Hague remarked in the London International Conference 
on Cyberspace that ‘cyberspace remains open to innovation and the free flow of ideas, 
information and expression’.399  
Another important point of disagreement is the idea that the Russians view information 
technologies as (Western) weapons, which could potentially challenge state sovereignty by 
causing social and political instability. The idea of ‘internet sovereignty’, which percolates 
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throughout the Draft Convention, illustrates how deeply divided are the views of these two 
opposing sides. This is inter alia, reflected in Article 5(5) of the 2011 Draft Convention, which 
states that: 
 
 [e]ach state party has the right to make sovereign norms and govern its  
 information space according to its national laws. Its sovereignty and laws 
 apply to the information infrastructure located in the territory of the state  
 party or otherwise falling under its jurisdiction. The state parties must strive  
 to harmonize national legislation, the differences whereof must not create 
 barriers on the road to a reliable and secure information space.400  
 
The idea of national control of all internet resources within states’ physical borders and the 
associated concept of application of local legislation,401 seems in conflict with the US approach 
annunciated for example, by the US Secretary of State Clinton, who in her speech of December 
2011, stated that countries such as Russia wish to: 
   
[e]mpower each individual government to make their own rules for the internet that not 
only undermine human rights and the free flow of information but also the 
interoperability of the network. In effect, the governments pushing 
 this agenda want to create national barriers in cyberspace. This approach  
 would be disastrous for internet freedom.402 
 
 The People’s Republic of China 
   
China has the largest population in the world and with 721 million internet users and has 
become increasingly dependent on various cyber assets.403 With this increased dependency, 
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Chinese authorities began placing growing emphasis on cyber security measures.404 However, 
China has not established an exhaustive approach to cyber issues in the form of a strategy 
clearly outlining the country’s cyber objectives and their execution.405 Instead, the Chinese 
domestic approach is characterized by complex hierarchies, command structures and various 
defence papers.406  
Generally, it could be said that the Chinese understand matters relating to cyber activities 
as something strongly integrated within society and do not separate them from the general flow 
of governance.407 Uncontrolled information is perceived as a threat to the regime and ever since 
the internet became publically available the question was not whether to control it, but how.408 
Consequently, the internet is built with this in mind through real-time censorship, which 
sharply contrasts with the idea of ‘internet freedom’ held by the West.409 In addition, the 
Chinese government are sensitive about foreign information systems and believe that the 
technology that originates from the West is equipped with Trojan horses and loopholes to steal 
China’s national secrets and prevent its economic upsurge.410 As a result of these concerns, not 
only is the development and supply of high quality home grown products encouraged, but 
heavy controls have been imposed over the information security industry deterring foreign 
investors, especially from the US from seeking business opportunities in China.411 
To appreciate the divergence in approaching cyber related issues, a useful illustration is the 
difference in the terminology used by China. In similar vein to the Russians, the Chinese also 
tend to use the phrase  ‘information space’ rather than cyberspace412 and consider that: 
 
[t]he main function of the information space [is] for people to acquire and process data […] 
a new place to communicate with people and activities, it is the integration of all the world’s 
communications networks, databases and information, forming a ‘landscape’ huge, 
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interconnected, with different ethnic and racial characteristics of the interaction, which is a 
three-dimensional space’.413 
 
The Western approach holds cyberspace as a global domain covering the use of electronics, 
interdependent networks of information technology infrastructure including the internet and 
other telecommunication networks and data. In contrast, the Chinese understand cyberspace as 
only a subset of information space-the landscape for the largest scale communication to the 
world’s population, which includes human information processing and cognitive space. 414 
Consequently, the Chinese regard ‘information space’ and ‘information security’ holistically, 
unlike Western governments, who tend to approach cyberspace and cyber security 
separately.415  
The main cyber security related policy goals and national strategies were first published 
in 2003 (the so-called Document 27) by the State Network and Information Security 
Coordination Small Group.416 The Document laid foundations for formulating the necessary 
national cyber security policies in relation to, inter alia, disaster recovery, incident 
management and e-government security plan.417 At its core, the Document had the concept of 
‘active defence’, that is attacking only after receiving an attack. 418 Its aims included the 
protection of critical infrastructure, enhancing encryption and dynamic monitoring, together 
with the improving of the indigenous innovation.419 Since 2006 all of the country’s information 
security strategies can be linked to the  15-year grand strategy for future innovation, titled ‘The 
National Programme for the Development of Science and Technology in the Medium and Long 
Term 2006-2020’ (the National Strategy) issued by the State Council.420 The document is 
widely perceived as a cornerstone of China’s overall standardization policy and includes the 
protection of the internet against harmful activities directed against, or having the effect of 
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undermining national security or commercial, social and individual interests.421 To achieve 
these ends, a state must be able to defend itself and the society, compete fairly and productively 
in the national and global economic order and preserve social norms, privacy and security of 
the individual citizen. 422  In contrast to the Western approach, the Chinese regime places 
particularly strong emphasis on the challenges posed by cyber activities that threaten existing 
domestic social and political norms or values, such as the dissemination of false rumors, as 
well as the sovereignty of the nation state.423 It is in this context that the major ideological 
differences lie. Thus, the Chinese authorities call for the establishment of sovereign ‘virtual 
territory’ on the internet termed ‘cyber sovereignty’,424 advocating the need for a government 
to identify the boundaries of such a territory and protect it against cyber threats.425 In this sense, 
the Chinese approach to cyber security and the administration of the internet is distinctly state-
centric. This can be gleaned from the National Strategy,426 as it made security and protection 
of information technology a national priority. The State Council’s focus is on all information 
technologies, suppliers and infrastructures, civilian and military alike, including the People’s 
Liberation Army.427 It is a top-down, proactive and holistic governmental approach, aimed at 
protecting commercial enterprises and governmental entities by giving detailed instructions to 
civilians and government leaders as to what and how to protect information networks and the 
importance this plays in the overall State Council plan.428  The recognition that the ‘strategic 
significance of the internet lies in the fact that it has become an effective tool that transgresses 
national boundaries, communicates information worldwide and influences international and 
domestic affairs’, 429  reinforces long standing Chinese concerns with social disorder and 
therefore the need for a strong, supervisory state to uphold societal norms and preserve social 
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harmony.430 The idea of ‘internet freedom’, whereby information flows unrestricted is viewed 
with suspicion. This is reflected in the concerted effort undertaken by the Chinese authorities 
to impose controls over internet content collectively known as the Great Firewall of China. The 
ideological thrust of cyber security could therefore be summarized as the ‘defense and 
expansion of socialist ideology and culture’, whereby the internet in China must reflect socialist 
‘cyber culture’ and resist ‘ideological infiltration and political instigation’. 431 Furthermore, 
‘both quasi and non-authoritative Chinese sources state that the US dominance and de facto 
control over internet technologies and the cyber infrastructure is unfair, presenting a source of 
instability and potential danger for the global cyber system’.432 This to some extent is reflected 
in the National Strategy, which supports ‘techno-nationalism’ by calling for China not to obtain 
any ‘core technologies in key fields that affect the lifeblood of the national economy and 
national security’, from abroad, including next generation internet technologies, digitally 
controlled machine tools and high-resolution earth observation systems.433 
The subsequently issued State Council’s 2012 New Policy Opinion (NPO), translated 
as ‘The State Council vigorously promotes informatisation development and offers several 
options on conscientiously protecting information security’ 434  by and large reflects these 
themes. However, unlike the previous documents, the NPO links developments in information 
security with people’s economic and social improvement.435 The document comprehensively 
covers the majority of essential areas of cyber security and indicates the main weaknesses in 
China’s information security mode, pointing out the increased vulnerabilities from growing 
dependence on the internet. 436  The hostility towards foreign technologies was not only 
reflected in the NPO but is now visible in the the new China’s Cyber Security Law (discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis), which took effect on 1st June 2017. It aims at heavily 
regulating the Chinese technology sector437 and thus reinforces the concerns that  that country’s 
cyberspace will become increasingly isolated from the rest of the world in the coming years.  
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By 2014 the Chinese governments prioritizing information security led to the 
establishment of the Central Leading Small Group for Internet Security and Informatisation, a 
new body chaired by China’s President Xi Jingping.438 The President explained the necessity 
for the new body stating that ‘no internet safety means no national security and no 
informatisation means no modernization,439 subsequently also stating that internet security and 
information management are ‘two wings of one bird, two wheels on one car’.440 It could be 
said that Chinese approach to cyber security encapsulates the need to improve the security of 
the domestic internet infrastructure, to reinforce the move towards indigenous innovation 
detailed in the 15- year plan and for China to become the leading actor on the global stage by 
promoting an alternative attitude to internet governance. 441  The Chinese government’s 
approach is perhaps best expressed in its ‘Seven Baselines’ doctrine for using the internet 
introduced in 2015. 442  It requires that whatever is expressed online must respect seven 
elements, namely laws and regulations, the socialist system, the country’s national interests, 
citizens’ lawful rights and interests, public order and accuracy.443  
 
In summary, the Chinese, Russian and other like-minded states position regarding cyber 
policy can be summarized as (a) a distrust in the internet as a medium for free flow of 
information; (b) a belief that it is the role of the government to take control and safeguard 
domestic ‘information space’ and create a ‘virtual territory’, thus promulgating ‘cyber 
sovereignty’; (c) regulation of state behavior through a hard law multilateral binding treaty, in 
contrast to the US, which sees the development of cyber law through norms. 
 
The conclusion that can be reached is that the Western and the Eastern approaches to 
cyberspace and cyber security do not sufficiently align at this stage to contribute to the 
development and interpretation of customary international law. These domestic policies seem 
to pursue disparate goals both nationally and, as will be shown in the next part of this chapter, 
on an international plane. This disparity may be gleaned from different attitudes to defining the 
basic terms relating to cyberspace (including such phrases as, cyber space and cyber security), 
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which at least to some extent explains a conceptual gap in information security policy.444 It 
could be said that these ideologies underpin the fundamental incompatibility to cyber security 
and are illustrative of a much broader and opposing philosophy to cyberspace generally, 
namely, centralized, state-centric government command and control by the Chinese and 
Russian authorities versus de-centralized, self-governing model by a variety of stakeholders 
upheld by the US and its allies. In that sense, they mirror the differences in political ideologies 
of the two systems, which is present in the on-going debate regarding the future of internet 
governance445 discussed next. 
 
(b) Internet Governance 
 
If cyberspace is described as a domain for telecommunication, then the internet is ‘the 
networked physical infrastructure of interconnected computers that allows information to move 
through cyberspace and the web is simply a service that runs on the internet’. 446  The 
encyclopaedic definition states that the internet is ‘an association of computer networks with 
common standards, which enable messages to be sent from any host on one network to any 
host on any other.’ 447  The internet was originally designed by American scientists and 
engineers as a tool for military communications.  With the funding from the US government it 
became fully open to commercial use in 1995 and since that time almost all its infrastructure 
worldwide is owned by the private sector,448 whilst its operations are primarily overseen by 
The Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a non-profit 
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organization, created to take over the responsibilities administered by Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA)449 and headquartered near Playa Vista, Los Angeles, California, 
with bases in Belgium and Australia.450 
The future of internet governance is a subject of an on-going political dispute and a focal point 
of international conflict among states.451 The definition by the Working Group on Internet 
Governance (WGIG) of internet governance states that it: 
 
[i]s the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil 
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision making 
procedures and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the internet’.452   
 
In the early 1980s, when the term ‘internet governance’ was first introduced, its role was 
confined to a relatively narrow set of technological policy issues relating to the management 
of its global core resources: domain names, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses,453 and the root 
server system. 454  Since the establishment of ICANN in 1998 and with the expansion of 
functions that the internet performs, which before then were delivered thorough separate 
technologies and governed by separate legal and regulatory regimes,455 the meaning and scope 
of the term has significantly expanded. The recognition by states of the strategic importance of 
cyberspace in international relations, the concerns over its security in the light of some recent 
revelations, such as the release of the Mandiant Report,456 Edward Snowden’s leakage of US 
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government’s surveillance programmes, 457  its growing military use, 458  together with the   
human rights concerns, to name but a few, propelled cyberspace to become an arena for 
strategic and global competition.459 The range of contested issues that the internet governance 
is currently concerned with is expansive and varied, including: (1) censorship and content 
regulation; (2) intellectual property protection, trademarks and copyrights; (3) cyber security; 
(4) human rights protection; (5) surveillance policies; (6) control of spam; (7) cyber crime; (8) 
resource assignment and coordination policies of ICANN; (9) technical standards formation; 
(10) economic regulation of communication services.460 This is not by any means an exhaustive 
list, but it merely indicates the complexities involved and the fact that even the most technical 
aspects of internet operations, such as the allocation of IP addresses, the introduction of domain 
names, or the management of root servers, have become highly politicised.461  
There is no doubt that this list will expand with innovation and on-going technological 
progress. Central to the internet governance debate are two competing models underpinned by 
divergent ideologies described in the next section of this chapter: the multistakeholder 
governance model and the sovereignist model. To appreciate the global politics of cyberspace, 
a historical thumbnail sketch will briefly outline and bases for the rivalry among states and set 
out two phases of this discourse, namely the cyber libertarian versus cyber realist polemic and 
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 The First Phase: Cyber Libertarianism versus Cyber Realism 
 
The current multistakeholder model reflects the decentralized liberal approach envisaged by 
the early American internet pioneers, such as Barlow,462 Clark463 and Englishman Berners-
Lee,464 who held liberal views when it came to functions, design and running of this facility. It 
is worth outlining the early debate of the 1990s between them and their opposition, both US 
government and academics, which is sometimes referred to, as a discourse between cyber 
libertarians and cyber realists (or positivists), because it continues to resonate in the current 
governance discourse. This early polemic was mainly focused on whether the internet (and 
cyberspace) can be governed at all and what role, if any, should governments play therein. The 
proponents of unbridled internet freedom, sometimes referred to as cyber libertarians, believed 
that it was the technical architecture based on the protocol system, which ignored national 
boundaries, that was the main driving force behind the internet. Nation states, governments, 
their laws and institutions had no role to play in this new virtual domain and all disputes created 
in the emergent, self-governing virtual communities could be resolved via consensus through 
freedom of association. 465  For Barlow, for example, a quintessential internet pioneer 
expressing his view in the Declaration of Independence, cyberspace was ‘the new home of 
mind’,466 where traditionally conceived and state derived power structures had no part to play. 
Thus, any attempt to impose external legal controls would be futile, since in his reasoning, it 
is an environment with no physical borders.  In any case, rules would lack legitimacy because 
of an absence of a rule making authority (which he rejected anyway) and de facto enforcement 
powers. Barlow’s emancipated and rather naïve stance found support in Post and Johnson’s 
‘Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in Cyberspace’.467 Their belief was that since ‘cyberspace 
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radically undermines the relationship between legally significant [online] phenomenon and 
physical location’,468 any attempt at regulating it would lack legitimacy. Furthermore, since 
cyberspace is everywhere, but nowhere in particular, it is ‘a-jurisdictional’ and therefore no 
sovereign state has a more compelling claim than any other to impose on it its own exclusive 
laws. It would also be unjustifiable to subject acts abroad to a domestic regulation.469  These 
convictions were founded on a basic premise: the rise of the net destroyed the link between 
geographical location and recognizable, well-grounded characteristics of statehood: power, 
effective control, legitimacy and the ability stemming from physicality of statehood to give 
notice which sets of rules apply.  Post and Johnson claimed that the ‘net radically subverts a 
system of rule making, based on borders between physical spaces’470 and concluded that a-
territorial nature of the internet precludes any state from making a legitimate claim to regulate 
it. This being the case, self-governance would much better furnish liberal democratic ideas.471 
Consequently, if the internet must be regulated at all, it ought to develop its own effective 
governing institutions, whose legitimacy would derive from the consent of the internet users.472 
In this way, in the libertarian discourse, a new space for ‘netizens’ (net citizens)473 would be 
created, free from traditional nation-state rules474 and generally based on ‘netiquette’ (internet 
etiquette), whilst for business people, fashioned on rules of lex mercatoria.475  
The rebuttal of this discourse was initially articulated by Goldsmith, who described it 
as ‘cyber anarchy’ and took issue with classifying cyberspace, as separate from the real world 
and devoid of any rules.476  In sharp contrast to the utopian, libertarian doctrine, cyber realists 
firmly asserted that the political and legal institutions known collectively as a state, is the 
appropriate regulatory organization to oversee internet regulation.477 Goldsmith in particular, 
believed that the libertarian argument suffers from three major flaws, which he called 
‘persistent fallacies’: (1) the fallacy that cyberspace is a separate space; (2) that territorial 
governments cannot regulate the non-territorial net; and (3) over optimism that there will be 
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cheap, plentiful information. 478  The conviction that cyberspace is nothing else than an 
extension of pre-existing communication media and therefore susceptible to legal regulation, 
re-oriented the displaced role of the users, who operate in a ‘real world’ and are ‘no more 
removed than telephone users, postal users, or carrier-pigeon users,[…] are in front of the 
screens in real space using a keyboard to communicate with someone else, often in different 
territorial jurisdiction’.479 For another cyber realist, Reed, ‘human and corporate actors and the 
computing and the communication equipment, through which the transaction is effected, all 
have a real-world existence and are located in one of more physical world legal jurisdiction’.480 
In addition Lessing, in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace,481 argued that the internet is 
‘evolving from an ‘unregulatable’ space to one that is highly ‘regulatable’482 through four 
forms of regulation: law, social norms, the market and code architecture. Further support of 
this stance was articulated by Goldsmith and Wu in Who Controls the Internet?, who  displaced 
cyber libertarian argument by asserting that the internet will only work, if it is controlled and 
such control can only be provided by territorial governments.483 Their rebuke of the libertarian 
doctrine was emphasised by the rejection of anarchy in place of coercive governmental power, 
which they justified by a simple assertion: democratic governments, with all their faults, are 
still 
 
[l]east-bad system known to history. With an open and free press, regular elections and 
an independent judiciary, democratic governments are the best system that human 
beings have ever devised for aggregating the varied interests and desires of a sovereign 
people into a workable governing order and for minimising or correcting the many 
pathologies that invariably encumber governmental systems.484  
 
The cyber libertarian approach is now seen very much as a product of its times. The 
view that prevails now is that the internet does not constitute a distinct physical space, or a 
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different jurisdiction, but is a result of advanced telecommunications technology.485  The next 
phase of the debate involved not only academics, but nations reflecting the view of Goldsmith 
and Wu that ‘many aspects of the net will be governed on a global scale’ since ‘many internet 
controversies are fast transforming into disputes among nations and classic problems of 
international relations’.486 Nonetheless, both the internet and cyberspace continue in existence 
as a result of the original architecture by and large based on libertarian ideology, that is through 
the de-centralized system of networks and the laissez-faire approach to its operation and 
development. 
 
 The Second Phase: Global Governance- The ‘Battle for the Soul of the 
Internet’.487 
 
The efforts to construct a global coordination and policymaking framework for the internet 
began in the mid 1990s and to date remain unsuccessful. 488  The internet emerged and 
developed, with no direction from intergovernmental processes, such as the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and without generating rules of international law, as for 
example those found in the International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs).489 Even the 
creation of ICANN in 1998 490  went almost unnoticed at the time by the majority of 
governments. This in many respects contributed to the internet’s governance development 
through the multistakeholder system, where state and non-state actors collaborated on 
managing technical and operational tasks.491 As the internet expanded globally, many countries 
became concerned with this status quo, especially in the light of US dominance.492 Their 
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overriding aim was to bring the governance within intergovernmental processes and 
international law.493  
The first major battleground was the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS),494 initiated by the ITU in 1998 and authorised by UN General Assembly Resolution 
58/83.495  It was held in two phases: the first one in 2003 (Geneva) and the second in 2005 
(Tunis) where, in the words of one commentator ‘governments, both democratic and 
undemocratic, felt the need to assert their belief that they should have authority over internet 
related public policy issues’.496 The range of their proposals included strengthening the ITU 
according to the sovereignist approach, creating a new, intergovernmental-oriented entity and 
drafting an internet treaty.497 The Geneva Summit’s aim was to focus on information and 
communication technology and development. It was an outlet for countries, such as South 
Africa, China and Brazil to formally express their dissatisfaction with internet governance 
arrangements, in particular the central role of ICANN, which they portrayed as ‘a unilateral 
creation of the United States government’.498 This group of states was advocating a need for a 
more traditional intergovernmental model, or failing that, at the very least, multilateral decision 
by national sovereigns to confirm, or amend, the existing arrangements.499 The opposite side 
(ICANN, the Internet Society and the US government) downplayed these criticisms and 
demands, proclaiming that the patchwork of governance arrangements among ICANN, WIPO 
treaties and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) was fit for purpose.500 The Geneva 
phase of WSIS mandated the creation of a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), 
which was tasked with (1) development of a working definition of internet governance 
(referred to above); (2) identifying the public policy issues relevant to internet governance; and 
(3) development of a common understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of 
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governments, existing intergovernmental and international organizations and other forums, as 
well as the private sector and civil society from both developing and developed countries.501 
In 2005 WGIG issued a final report, in which it recommended the creation of a new 
multistakeholder forum to deal with internet issues,502 the Internet Governance Forum (IGF),503 
a discussion group with no-decision making authority. The WGIG report failed to specify the 
working methods of the IGF.  Perhaps more importantly, however, it concluded that 
governments should control ‘public policy’, but leave ‘technical management’, or ‘day to day 
operations’ of the internet to the private sector and civil society, as these functions are 
inextricably linked. 504 The overall outcome of the Geneva WSIS was an agreement on a 
Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action, with an aim of their implementation. 
The second WSIS Tunis phase in 2005 505  was intended to foster governments’ 
agreement relating to the oversight of the management of critical internet resources (domain 
names, IP addresses, internet protocols and root servers) and to put ICANN under the regime 
of an Intergovernmental Internet Council.506 The official outcome document, the Tunis Agenda 
for Information Society507 challenged specific aspects of ICANN’s regime and declared that all 
states, not just the United States, should have ‘an equal role and responsibility for the DNS root 
and for internet public policy oversight’.508 The Agenda failed however to introduce specific 
mechanisms for adopting the principles that it set out to achieve. Both Summits produced 
virtually no concrete change to ICANN and had contributed little to defining a framework for 
global internet governance.509 The only solid result was the creation of the IGF, as a mechanism 
to continue the debate.  
The same year saw the emergence of a coalition among the ‘rising powers’ of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa, also known as BRICS, viewed by some as a ‘concerted 
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counter-hegemonic movement’ 510  against US dominance in cyberspace. Although all 
governments from the BRICS coalition show an interest in shaping cyber policy, their priorities 
are different and therefore the overall approach fragmented. In fact, their agendas diverge 
significantly. 511  The main differences lie between those states, which favour the 
intergovernmental approach, based on international cooperation and those preferring to adopt 
a strict, sovereigntist cyber policy. This is evidenced by a lack of joint BRICS proposal on 
information security, or a new internet governance body.512 So far, formal proposals have been 
submitted, either through the collaboration of India, Brazil and South Africa, known as the 
IBSA coalition, who in 2003 put forward the Brasilia Declaration, or the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization submitting the Code of Conduct for Information Society to the UN 
General Assembly in 2011 and 2015.513 
Another significant event regarding the developments of international cooperation of 
internet governance was the 2012 the International Telecommunications Union World 
Conference on International Telecommunication held in Dubai to review the International 
Telecommunications Regulations 1988 (IRs), discussed in more detail below. This was a high 
ranking meeting that to this day is widely perceived as a fiasco. Following the disagreement in 
Dubai, the next two years were replete with meetings on all levels and the debate on the future 
regulation of the internet gained in sharpness. The main event of 2013 was the eight Internet 
Government Forum conference in Bali. 2014 was described as a ‘year of meetings’ on all 
levels, including the Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunications 
Union in Busan, South Korea.514 
 
This historical thumbnail sketch to some extent explains the deeply polarized global 
debate and political power struggle, at the heart of which are three of the above mentioned 
competing models: the multistakeholder, with the central and continued role played by 
ICANN; the intergovernmental with the primary role of the ITU and the sovereignist, mainly 
supported by Russia and China. Each will be considered in turn below. 
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 The Multistakeholder Model and ICANN  
 
As a result of its historic origins, the internet is currently managed through a model 
known as multistakeholderism. This method of internet management has no hierarchy and 
consists of governments, private companies and non-governmental organizations. It has 
representatives from public interest advocacy groups, business associations and other parties, 
who all participate in intergovernmental policy deliberations alongside governments.515 The 
fact that it was the US authorities that were instrumental in the internet’s creation and its 
shaping was evidenced by a contractual relationship between the US Department of Commerce 
and ICANN, which operates through an Affirmation of Commitments Licence,516 issued by 
the United State’s Department of Commerce National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA).517 This operating licence, which in eleven clauses defines ICANN’s 
responsibilities, was clarified and renewed in 2006. The licence expired in 2016 and the key 
internet domain function was transferred to ICANN on 1 October 2016,518 discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5.   
The ICANN’s mission ‘is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global internet's system 
of unique identifiers and to ensure their stable and secure operation.’519 In particular, ICANN: 
(1) coordinates the allocation and assignment of the three sets of unique identifiers for the 
internet, which are (a) domain names (forming a system referred to as SND ); (b) PI  addresses 
and autonomous system (AS) numbers; and (c) protocol port and parameter number; (2) 
coordinates the operation and evolution of the SND  root name server system; (3) coordinates 
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policy development reasonably and appropriately related to these technical functions’. 520 
ICANN has a 16-member board of directors, selected to reflect ‘diversity in geography, culture, 
skills, experience and perspective’.521 Its functions were set out in the 1998 Memorandum of 
Understanding, 522 which aimed ‘to transition management responsibility for domain name 
system (DNS) functions performed by, or on behalf of, the US Government to a private-sector 
not-for-profit entity’.523 The principles of stability, cooperation, ‘bottom-up’ coordination and 
representation were outlined, as foundations for this process.524 Giving the main responsibility 
for running and overseeing internet’s workings to the private sector, multistakeholder 
governance organization, with an input from governments through the Government Advisory 
Committee in preference to national and international communications sector, where the ITU 
could play a role, was said to be a deliberate move on the part of the US government from the 
very beginning of funding the internet project. 525  Crucially, ‘ICANN had not placed 
governments at the forefront of visible activity, but instead placed industry needs and the 
operation of a competitive deregulated international communications sector, as being the major 
thrust of coordination activities’, 526  which reflects the cyber libertarian approach of its 
founding fathers. ICANN’s main attribute is that is promulgates and works through a so-called 
‘bottom-up’ processes. This allows the government, private sector, civil society and the 
technical community to develop incrementally and work together to solve internet policies. 
There can be no doubt that this approach has enabled in the last twenty years an incredible 
technical innovation and expansion of this facility worldwide. Such a way of administering the 
internet is not only favoured by the US, but also by its Western allies, for whom ‘a free, open, 
borderless and secure internet can be managed only by a collaborative effort of all 
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concerned’, 527  based on ‘shared norms, programmes, protocols and decision making 
procedures’.528 Nonetheless, ICANN has enjoyed a mixed level of success. It managed to 
establish itself, as the major admistrator of the infrastructure elements of the internet protocol 
in a de-regulated manner, which reflects the nature of the internet industry. 529  It has 
successfully restructured the generic top-level domain name business, by replacing a single 
monopoly operator with a system of registry operators and registrars. ICANN’s stewardship 
and continued success in keeping the internet ‘open’ has been achieved however, with 
continued sponsorship of the US administration. 530 Critics point out that ICANN and the 
American government practically monopolized the global communications industry, since 
ICANN has not offered viable mechanisms for other national, or regional interests to be 
represented at a governmental level. 531  Indeed, through ICANN, the US successfully 
established a governance regime dominated by itself and by non-state actors.532 This the US 
government has achieved, by privatizing and internationalizing key policymaking functions, 
whilst retaining until 2016 considerable authority for itself through ICANN and the Department 
of Commerce, together with  asserting ‘policy authority’ over the domain name system’s root 
and reserving the right to review and approve any changes to the root zone file proposed by 
ICANN.533 The relationship between ICANN and the US government, which ceased in October 
2016, sent for years a message to the rest of the world that the US is withholding the internet 
from conventional international governance processes, thereby strengthening the position of 
already entrenched US-based enterprises across a lucrative global internet market. 534 The 
criticisms of ICANN’s domineering role, the lack of transparency and accountability were 
repeatedly voiced by those countries, which preferred to see the United Nations in charge of 
the web. In 2011 they were joined in this vision by the Obama administration.535 As a result, 
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in 2014 the administration unveiled its plans to phase out ICANN’s role of overseeing the 
IANA’s contract. Consequently, the US Department of Commerce ceded its power over the 
the internet’s naming system ending an almost 20 year process of handing over a crucial part 
of the internet’s governance.536  
 The Sovereignist Model and the Intergovernmental Policy 
The existing US lead multistakeholderism and therefore the American cyber hegemony, has 
been challenged by another regime, often referred to as sovereignist model and pursued via a 
variety of channels, including the UN institutions and hence also called the intergovernmental 
model. 537  This approach, upheld by a loose coalition of disgruntled like-minded states 
including Russia and China, seeks to develop strategic engagement with international 
institutions, such as the ITU, in order to exert a degree of control in cyberspace. Their aim is 
to tame US leadership by transferring authority to an international governmental organization 
(IGO) in order to dilute the US power and set it firmly in the rules and institutions that channel 
and limit the ways that power is exercised. The focus of the sovereignist model is on 
establishing territorial control over cyberspace, reasserting a Westphalian notion of sovereignty 
through an IGO, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). 538 Russia in 
particular has protested for years a ‘policy vacuum’ and institutional gap within the current 
multistakeholder model.539  The Kremlin and other like-minded governments, wish to re-assert 
state sovereignty by ‘shifting the balance of participation from a network-to network system to 
a government-to-government system, in which experts would be required to participate 
indirectly-through government actors [said to be] much less well informed on the issues’.540 In 
November 2014 at the First World Internet Conference hosted in Wuzhen, China President Xi 
affirmed that under the terms of mutual respect and trust, China was willing to cooperate with 
other states to achieve a peaceful cyberspace and a multilaterally governed, transparent 
internet, emphasising however that sovereignty must be fully respected in that domain.541 A 
                                              
536 BBC News, ‘Has the US Just Given Away the Internet?’ (1 October 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37527719>. 
537 Ebert and Maurer supra note 159, p. 1059. 
538 ibid p. 1060. 
539 Julien Nocetti, ‘Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance’, 91 
International Affairs (2015) 110. 
540 ibid, p. 117. 
541 The Economic Times, ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping Calls for International Cooperation 
on Cyberspace Security’ (19 November 2014), in Raud supra note 101, p. 15. 
 95 
year later, during the keynote speech at the Second World Internet Conference President Xi 
called for ‘building a cyber community of common destiny and put forward the principles of 
respecting cyber sovereignty, safeguarding cyber security and building cyber order’.542 The 
President proposed building an internet governance system based on a multilateral approach, 
rejecting unilateralism, whereby only a few parties discuss the future of the internet.543 The 
speech indicated China’s dissatisfaction with the current status quo. To that end, China’s 
President called to reform the existing international internet governance system based on four 
principles, namely the respect for cyber sovereignty, openness, cooperation and good order.544 
Worthy of  note is President Xi’s reiterating the importance of cyber sovereignty, when he 
stated that:  
 
[w]e should respect the right of individual countries to independently choose  
their own path of cyber development model, model of cyber regulation  
policies and Internet public policies and participate in international cyberspace  
governance on an equal footing.545 
 
The Eastern states continue to support cyber sovereignty, which aims to increase state 
control over cyberspace, even at the expense of open networks and defend the principle of non-
intervention in internal state affairs.546 This ideology they pursue through a variety of channels: 
domestically (as outlined above and in the next part of this chapter) and both internationally, 
via the UN organizations such as the ITU and regionally through the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO).   
 
 The Role of the International Telecommunications Union  
 
The intergovernmental policy model sees the operations of the internet to be overseen 
through a cooperation of states via an international treaty, reflecting a top-down approach and 
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the ITU as best placed for achieving their own internet governance agendas. These states adhere 
to a more traditional concept than the de-centralised multistakeholder mechanism, that is one 
based on balancing competing national interests through common regulatory measures 
undertaken within each national regime to regulate public-sector processes. 547  For their 
governments, public communications is a public-sector activity and therefore its control should 
be borne by national and international regulatory regimes. Therefore the ITU, as an 
intergovernmental venue historically linked to the telecommunications sector, is the entity best 
suited to redress the distorted position of one state (the US) holding a virtual monopoly over 
international telecommunications. The ITU is one of the oldest institutions in the sphere of 
telecommunications. Its origins can be traced to the 1865 International Telegraph Convention, 
which established the International Telegraph Union. Having combined the 1865 International 
Telegraph Convention with the 1906 International Radiotelegraph Convention, the 
International Telecommunications Convention was formed and the body’s name was changed 
to International Telecommunication Union to reflect its full scope of responsibilities, which at 
that time included all forms of wireless and wireline communications. Following an agreement 
with the then newly formed United Nations, the ITU undertook responsibilities for 
international telephony, telegraphy and radio communications in 1947 and over the next four 
decades oversaw the expanding system of international telephony and data. Today its role 
includes overseeing the operations of the global radio spectrum, satellite orbits and other 
carrier-centric technologies. Its members comprise countries and private companies, rather 
than individuals and the main source of funding is through a hefty membership fee.   
 The ITU’s involvement with the evolution of the internet has been virtually non-
existent. Nevertheless, the organization has made numerous attempts to strengthen the role it 
plays in this process, reflecting the concerns of many countries regarding the multistakeholder 
governance and the US dominance. For some countries, (including China, Russia and the Arab 
States) it is an institution of choice to head and oversee the workings of the internet, which 
they believe would allow them greater say in its running and be a forum for democratic 
representation. This is illustrated by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement in 
2011, prior to the 2012 Word Conference on International Telecommunications (WSIT-12) in 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, that Russia would like to ‘establish international control over 
the internet using the monitoring and supervisory capabilities of the ITU’ and that the ITU 
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could become responsible for allocating at least some of the internet’s addresses.548  
 The ITU initiated the process of international engagement with the future of internet 
governance by sponsoring the establishment of the two phase WSIS (mentioned above) and 
attempting to amend the International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs)549 at the WCIT-
12 in Dubai. The ITRs, last negotiated in 1988 in Melbourne, define the general principles for 
the provision and operation of international telecommunications. During the two-week Dubai 
Conference several proposed changes on such topics, as international mobile roaming, 
numbering, naming, addressing fraud and the internet were discussed. The revised version of 
the ITRs was finalised, but only 89 out of 151 states in attendance signed it. That group of 
states consisted of mostly emerging countries led by Russia, China, Brazil and the Arab 
States.550 The United States, Japan, Australia, United Kingdom and most of European countries 
declined to agree to the proposed changes. In the run up to the Dubai Conference, the supporters 
of the multistakeholder model argued that the ITU and some of its members were using the 
Conference to ‘bring internet governance under governmental and intergovernmental control, 
with dire consequences for innovation, commerce, development, democracy and human 
rights’.551 At the outset of the Conference several proposals were tabled552 specifically relating 
to the internet, including: (1) to define the term ‘internet’ and explicitly bring the internet into 
the regulatory structure of the treaty; (2) to bring internet naming, addressing and identifiers 
into the treaty; (3) to include a provision on access to internet websites; and (4) proposals from 
multiple states on spam, information security and cyber security.553 In particular, the proposed 
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Article 1 ‘Purpose and Scope of the Regulations’, stated that: 
[t]hese Regulations also contain provisions applicable to those operating agencies, 
authorized or recognized by a Member States, to establish, operate and engage in 
international telecommunications services to the public, hereinafter referred to as 
authorised operating agencies. 554 
 
The US viewed this provision, as an avenue for expansion of the traditional role of the ITU 
into the internet555 and opposed it. The American delegation argued that it broadened the scope 
of the revised ITRs to include private sector internet service providers and government network 
operators.556 Ambassador Kramer, the US Head of Delegation remarked that ‘the United States 
consistently sought to clarify that the treaty would not apply to internet service providers or 
governments or private network operators’.557 He also noted that ‘spam is a form of content 
and that regulating it inevitably opens the door to regulation of other forms of content, 
including political and cultural speech’. 558  However, as some African states insisted on 
including the provision on spam, a statement was added to Article 1.1, according to which, 
‘these Regulations do not address the content-related aspects of telecommunications’. 559 
Another new addition to the ITRs, Article 5A ‘Security and Robustness of Networks’, obliged 
state parties to ‘endeavour to ensure the security and robustness of international 
telecommunications networks’.560 This provision too was objected to by the US, who argued 
that the ITU and the ITRs were not the ‘useful venue for addressing security issues and cannot 
accede to vague commitments that would have significant implications but few practical 
improvements on security’.561 The result of the Dubai Conference was a lack of consensus 
among the participating states, as to whether the revised ITRs should apply to the internet and 
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its governance.562 The disagreements over the proposals relating to (1) the internet, internet 
governance, or information security; (2) naming or addressing; and (3) modifying the basic 
business models, meant that the revised treaty was not adopted by a consensus.  The revised 
ITRs took effect on 1 January 2015 for those countries, which agreed to be bound by them. 
The ITU members, who do not accept the revised Regulations remain to be bound by the 
original ITRs. However, as it is an open treaty, any member state can still accede to it in the 
future.563  
It could be said, that WCIT-12 deepened the rift among the international community 
and reinforced the disagreements and fragmentation about internet governance in the 
subsequent meetings, most notably during the ITU World Telecommunication Policy Forum 
in May 2013 and the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 2014 in Busan, South Korea. The Busan 
Conference, in particular, resulted in another failure to ‘inject’ the ITU with more central role 
in the design and operation of the technical protocols of the internet.564 A large number of 
countries proposed changes concerning internet organization. None of these changes however 
made it through, due to ‘concerted pressure by a number of Western governments, advised 
continuously by the net specialists’.565  
 
In summary, the Dubai Conference confirmed that the global internet will continue to 
work on principles devised by a broad range of groups, that governments have a lead role in 
deciding the network infrastructure within their own territories, but that there is a growing, 
international consensus that the internet works best, when governments are just one part of the 
decision-making process.566 The exact nature of the future role that the ITU could play in the 
internet development and management is difficult to predict at this stage.  It appears to have 
been further side-lined with the US government handing over the control over the domain name 
system to ICANN in 2016. However, as one commentator noted, China and/or Russia, along 
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with parts of the Middle East may regroup and try to push for more global control567 and greater 
ITU involvement. For sceptics, such as Post, it is impossible to imagine any UN-style body, 
by design controlled by majority vote among the world’s governments, many of which still 
adhere to ‘state monopoly telephone network’, to replicate and manage the existing internet. 568 
Nevertheless, the debate relating to the role of governments and intergovernmental 
organizations in overall internet governance will continue.  
 
 Policy Shaping Through Regional Organizations 
 
Those states among the international community, who are dissatisfied with current status quo, 
also seek to challenge the historical dominance of the United States in cyberspace through 
regional organizations and alliances. Russia in particular has been active in this regard in the 
last decade and recently has increased its diplomatic efforts in promoting a more centralized, 
top-down agenda through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has cyber 
security within the remit of its activities, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
and the BRICS group.  
2006 marked the start of Russia’s greater engagement with the SCO,569 which it perceives as a 
vehicle for the advancement of its internet governance agenda.570 The SCO’s aim is to share 
information and coordinate policies in cultural, economic, security and cyberspace policy 
areas.571  However, experts see it as ‘a regional vehicle of ‘protective integration’ against 
international norms of democracy and regime change, with shared information policies being 
seen as critical to that end.’572 In 2011, four members of the SCO, (China, Russia, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan), submitted Draft International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security573(Draft Code) to the United Nations General Assembly. The Draft Code used the 
phrase ‘information space’ rather than cyberspace and proposed, inter alia, ‘to reaffirm all 
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states’ rights and responsibilities to protect, in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, 
their information space and critical information infrastructure from threats, disturbance, attack 
and sabotage’. 574  It also proposed ‘the establishment of a multilateral, transparent and 
democratic international management of the internet to ensure an equitable distribution of 
resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure functioning of the internet’. 575 
The US and its allies rejected the proposed Draft Code, opposing in particular the sovereign 
control idea, mainly on the grounds relating to the protection of freedom of expression, 
association and possibility of suppression of free speech through government control over 
content for the purpose of political domination. The US unequivocally disagreed with the 
multilateral governance.576 It was felt that the proposed Code ‘would legitimize the view that 
the right to freedom of expression can be limited by national laws and cultural proclivities, 
thereby undermining that right, as described in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights’ 
and that it attempted to ‘replace existing international law that governs uses of force and 
relations among states in armed conflict with new, unclear and ill defined rules and 
concepts’.577 The US stance on some of these issues is reflected in its International Strategy 
for Cyberspace, which states that: 
 
[t]o promote internet governance structures that effectively serve the needs of all 
[i]nternet users we will promote and enhance multi-stakeholder venues for the 
discussion of [i]nternet governance issues. The very architecture of the [i]nternet 
embodies a mode of social and technical organization, which is decentralized, 
cooperative, and layered. Each of these characteristics is fundamental to the benefits 
the [i]nternet has brought. That architecture fuels the freedom of innovation that enables 
economic growth. It fuels the freedom of expression and association that enables social 
and political growth and the functioning of democratic societies worldwide.578   
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Viewed in the light of this ideology, the Draft Code ‘present[ed] an alternative view that seeks 
to establish international justification for government control over internet resources’579 and 
sought to strengthen governmental power over the internet by invoking a multilateral 
governance that would replace the multistakeholder model, where all users have a voice, with 
top-down control and regulation by states.580  As a response to this rejection, on 9 January 2015 
the six members of the SCO (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan) issued a revised Draft International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security581 (Draft Code 2015) The letter accompanying it stated that it was ‘revised taking into 
full consideration the comments and suggestions from all parties’.582 Some of its provisions 
remain however practically unchanged. It restates, for example the same vision that the SCO 
countries share regarding state control of cyberspace governance, which was contained in the 
2011 Draft Code and favours the ‘establishment of multilateral, transparent and democratic 
international governance mechanisms, which ensure an equitable distribution of resources, 
facilitate access for all and ensure the stable and secure functioning of the internet’.583 This 
provision yet again attempts to sideline the multistakeholder model and as one commentator 
noted,584 it ‘echoes a controversial resolution adopted at the WCIT-12’,585 which confirms that 
‘SCO member states’ views on internet governance have not shifted and are not intended as 
any accommodation to the advocates of the multi-stakeholder governance model’.586  The Draft 
Code 2015, like its predecessor, refers to the ‘information space’ and ‘reaffirms rights and 
responsibilities of all states’587 to protect it. Since the revised code does not include major 
changes, it is unlikely that it will find global support due to the ideological differences among 
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the international community.588 However, its principles may be implemented regionally or 
among the like-minded states.589 
 
 Domestic Cyber Sovereignty 
 
In tandem with pursuing the sovereignist agenda through international and regional 
organizations, some states are attempting to territorialize cyberspace by seeking to exert greater 
controls over their ‘segment’ of it within their borders. Some of these tendencies were 
discussed earlier in this chapter in the context of domestic cyber security policies. For such 
states as for example, Russia and China re-claiming control in this domain is not just a matter 
of national security, but comports with their abhorrence of broader ideology of denationalized 
liberalism, which to them the internet epitomizes. Russian’s drive for cyberspace control to 
dilute continued US dominance is underpinned by a greater need, which dictates continued 
upholding of traditional international law principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. 
These are the two core policy elements that dominate Russia’s overall attitudes towards global 
cyberspace matters. Consequently, Russia’s authorities conceive of cyberspace as a territory 
with virtual borders, which correspond to physical state frontiers.  To realize this vision, 
Russian authorities wish to extend the remit of international law to that domain.590 Having 
drawn conclusions from the power of digital technology, such as Twitter, YouTube and 
Facebook during the revolutionary processes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt between 2010-2012, 
Russia’s political elites regard all things digital as tools capable of undermining the political 
status quo, especially by the young. This ‘appreciation’ has resulted in law enforcement 
agencies monitoring closely the impact of the political use of networked technologies upon 
social mobilization and democratic transition. 591  The Kremlin is becoming increasingly 
concerned with the power of the internet, which it sees as politically disruptive, allowing 
citizens to circumvent government controlled traditional media, such as television and radio 
broadcasting. China mirrors this approach. In fact, the Chinese authorities place a particularly 
strong emphasis on the challenges posed by cyber activities that threaten domestic, social and 
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political norms, or values (such as the dissemination of false rumours), as well as state 
sovereignty.592 The true extent of the Chinese authorities’ ambitions to control the internet 
through delineating Chinese ‘sovereign virtual territory’593 can be gleaned from the elaborate 
set of government policies instigated and performed by a myriad of national agencies and 
requirements of self-regulation, collectively referred to, as the Great Firewall of China.594 
China and Russia are not alone in the quest to build their own digital territories. Iran 
has laid down technical foundations for a national online network that could be detached from 
the global internet and permit tighter control over the flow of information and potentially to 
better manage cyber attacks.595 This may give the Iranian authorities greater power to shut off 
access to the internet at times of civil unrest, as was the case in 2009 during the anti-government 
protests. 596  Forty other countries, including Ethiopia, Cuba and India, routinely monitor 
internet traffic 597  and target the unrestricted access to it through legislation, in effect 
performing ‘virtual land grabbing’.598 The OpenNet Initiative, an advocacy group, lists over 40 
countries that block the internet content for political, social and security reasons.599 Another 
illustration towards states’ erecting ‘cyber walls’ is the 2014 German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s proposal following the Snowden disclosures. The Chancellor announced plans for a 
European communications network to curb mass surveillance conducted by the US NSA and 
the UK GCHQ.600 It is envisaged that the European communications network would be build 
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inside Europe in order to prevent the emails and other internet data from automatically passing 
through the United States.601 
Concerns have been raised by the devotees of the unified cyberspace, that if these trends 
continue, the internet would revert to a fragmented collection of more, or less connected 
proprietary islands reminiscent of the AOL and CompuServe days.602 The segmentation that 
may result from these tendencies could be construed as part of the overall policies of those 
states, who would much prefer cyberspace resources be contained within their borders. A 
question thus arises, as to whether under international law it is possible for nations to extend 









Sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional building blocks of 
international law, which governs a community consisting primarily of states having a uniform 
legal personality.603 The doctrine of sovereignty in international law relates to the collection of 
rights, powers and duties adhering to each particular state.604 The definition is contained in 
Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933, which states that: 
 
[t]he State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 
(a) a permanent population; 
(b) defined territory; 
(c) government; and 
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(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.605 
 
The principle is also enshrined in various international treaties. For instance, Article 2(1) of 
the UN Charter states that: 
 
[t]he Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its 
 Members.606  
 
The 1970 UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operations Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations further elaborates on this notion by stating that ‘all states enjoy sovereign 
equality […] Each state enjoys the right inherent in full sovereignty’.607 
Sovereignty in international law epitomises the very essence of the state, namely the power 
over generally defined territory and inhabitants under its control. It is also a political concept, 
symbolized by Hobbes’ Leviathan and described by Boldwin, as internal strength and external 
limitation of power.608 Krasner609 developed a modern definition of the term, which comprises 
four elements: (1) international legal sovereignty, which denotes the practices associated with 
mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that possess formal juridical 
independence; (2) Westphalian sovereignty, which describes political organization based on 
the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a specific territory; (3) 
domestic sovereignty, which is the ability of a state to exercise effective control within its 
territory and the competence to construct formal organizations of political authority within the 
polity; and (4) independence sovereignty, which describes the ability of public authorities to 
regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants or capital across the borders 
of their state.610 Krasner considers sovereignty as a polity of complex ideas comprised of 
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separate, but related components. The international legal and Westphalian sovereignties are 
focused on the issues of legitimacy and authority, but exclude control, which he confines to the 
exercise of sovereign powers within the state. Thus, sovereignty in international relations is no 
longer an absolute right of states to political self-determination, but rather a set of obligations 
circumscribed by international treaties aimed to encourage closer cooperation to promote, inter 
alia, international peace and security,611 economic development, trade, international finance, 
labour, human rights protection, health and communications.612 To achieve these aims, states 
agreed to put restrictions on sovereignty and delegated some of their powers to international 
and regional institutions, such as the United Nations, the European Union and the African 
Union. This augmentation of state powers prompted some observers to express concern that 
sovereignty is in decline. For example, Simma and Pulkowski note, that law on international 
level is increasingly 
 
[…] a spread-out web of normativity. States are shown, as inexorably losing ground. 
Juxtaposed pyramidal arrangements of state law are increasingly being replaced by 
more, or less confused and overlapping networks of normativity, arranged in tangled 
hierarchies-even though many residues of the former model, stay unperturbed.613  
 
 Others regret the erosion of omnipotent sovereignty on account of globalization 614  and 
attribute a variety of factors as a root cause of this trend, such as human rights protection, 
exchange rates, monetary policy, arms control, chemical weapons, landmines, warfare, 
environmental control, all of which make policy options opened to states in any real sense 
increasingly constrained. 615  As a consequence of these trends, the rules promulgated by 
intergovernmental organizations have been increased in depth and density, whereas national 
courts, administrative agencies and even parliamentary bodies are said to increasingly function 
as part of cooperative regulatory and enforcement trans-governmental networks and no longer 
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as simply parochial national institutions.616 Krasner concurs with this analysis. His idea of 
sovereignty, as ‘organized hypocrisy’ corresponds with the mainstream opinion that with 
changes to the basic nature of the international legal system, the scope of activities over which 
states can effectively exercise control is declining.617 Some writers take the opposite view and 
assert that through this diffusion, rather than weakening, sovereignty has been strengthened in 
recent years to become ‘the new sovereignty’, described as a ‘right and capacity to participate 
in international institutions that allow their members, working tighter, to accomplish ends that 
individual governments alone could once never hoped to accomplish’.618 
  
  (i) Territorial Sovereignty 
 
The idea of sovereignty and territory are closely related in international law and denote an 
exercise of governmental control over some defined, geographical space. Territory not only 
links the idea of sovereignty, land and people, but is an area, which can be both spatial and 
locational.619 Understood as an area, territory can be maritime, aerial, or celestial ‘as long as it 
is a space, place or sphere of physical activities capable of being occupied by use of, or 
passage’.620 International law does not require any specific size of an area to be called a state- 
Monaco’s territory for example is less than 0.5 km2.621 Nor are the size of the population, or 
clearly defined boundaries a pre-requisite of statehood. This last point was affirmed by the 
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case,622 where it was stated 
that: 
 
  [t]he appurtenance of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way governs  
   the precise delimitation of its boundaries, any more than uncertainty as to 
   boundaries can affect territorial rights. There is for instance no rule that the  
   land frontiers as a [s]tate must be fully delimited and defined and often in  
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   various places and for long they are not.623 
 
What is important though, is the right of a government to control what happens within the state 
to the exclusion of other states, as articulated by Judge Max Huber in the leading case on the 
subject, The Isle of Palmas Arbitration,624 where he summarised this concept as follows: 
 
[s]overeignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in 
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other state, the functions of the state.625 
 
 Judge Max Huber also defined the term ‘territorial sovereignty’ stating that: 
 
[t]erritorial sovereignty […] involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a 
[s]tate. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory 
the rights of other [s]tates, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace 
and in war, together with the rights which each [s]tate may claim for its nationals in 
foreign territory.626 
 
Thus, territory, as a component of statehood, plays a crucial role. However, territorial 
sovereignty is not confined purely to land, but also comprises subterranean areas, waters, 
rivers, lakes, the airspace above the land (although there is no international agreement, as to 
the precise upper limit) and 12 miles of territorial sea adjacent to the coast.627 In this sense, 
international law has extended the label ‘territory’ and the sovereign rights and duties that 
accompany it to categorize these additional resources,628 or spaces. The demarcation of such 
spaces plays an important role in modern international relations, since it makes good policy in 
both the domestic and international legal orders for there to be distinct territories and a 
fundamental understanding of the juridical nature of all forms of physical and extraterrestrial 
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territories.629 It follows that wherever possible, the precise distinction in terms of delimitation 
and demarcations of all territories must always be attempted, even if not achieved.630 Classical 
international law recognizes five modes of acquisition of territory, namely occupation, 
prescription, cession, accretion and conquest.631 ‘Occupation’ is derived from occupio, a mode 
of acquisition in Roman law, by which ‘a person obtains absolute title by first possessing a 
thing that previously belonged to no one, such as a fish in the sea, or a wild bird’.632 Some 
writers believe that occupation is the acquisition of terra nullius-that is territory which, 
immediately before acquisition, belonged to no state, either because it has never belonged to 
any state, or has been abandoned,633 or territory not possessed by a community having a social 
and political organization.634  Very rarely can a territory be considered as belonging to no one 
these days, save for some islands that come about, as a result of geological activity, since most 
of the land areas of the globe are placed under territorial sovereignty of an existing state.635  
The question that arises in the context of cyberspace, is whether for the purposes of 
acquiring sovereign rights through occupation, cyberspace could be considered as terra nullius. 
Undoubtedly, to be viewed as such was an aspiration of those among the cyber libertarians, 
who believed in an idea of a ‘global village’ of shared resources and a borderless world of 
global transnationalism,636 as for instance was the case with Barlow and Johnson and Post. 
Their views that international law principles, such as sovereignty do not apply to cyberspace 
and that the internet constitutes a distinct physical space or a different jurisdiction are now very 
much confined to the cyber-libertarian discourse of that era. The idea that the principle of state 
sovereignty applies in cyberspace is now accepted637 and evidenced in state practice. Indeed, 
the International Group of Experts contributing to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed that ‘various 
aspects of cyberspace and [s]tate cyber operations are not beyond the reach of the principle of 
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sovereignty’.638  To date cyberspace may not have yet been demarcated along the territorial 
lines, but its component parts belong to states, or private organizations. States therefore ‘enjoy 
sovereignty over any cyber infrastructure located on their territory and activities associated 
with that cyber infrastructure’.639 The principle of sovereignty applies to all three layers of 
cyberspace-the physical, logical and content (social). 640  Thus, the physical layer (that is the 
hardware and other infrastructure such as cables, routers, servers etc.,) is owned by private 
organizations and/or under the control of states. It follows that ‘[s]tates enjoy sovereignty over 
any cyber infrastructure located on their territory and activities associated wit that cyber 
infrastructure’.641 Consequently, as observed by Buchan 
 
[…]where computer networks are interfered with, or where information is interfered 
with that is located on [the] networks and those networks are supported by cyber 
infrastructure physically located in a state’s territory, that state’s territory can be 
regarded as transgressed and thus a violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty 
occurs.642  
 
Irrespective of who the infrastructure belongs to (whether to government institutions, private 
companies, or individuals), it will be protected by the principle of territorial sovereignty, so 
long as it is located on the territory of that state.643 Equally, the individuals and groups who 
make the internet operational and its users (the content layer) are subject to authority of states. 
The logical layer is a result of someone’s intellectual endeavour, subject to intellectual property 
rights and therefore also subject to state’s authority. If there was any doubt as to the fact that 
the internet is not free from regulation and consequently, state authority, it has been dispelled 
by state practice evidenced by many governments using various techniques to control, censor 
and filter online information, the Great Firewall of China being the obvious example. Indeed, 
Lessing argued that ‘technology allows us to do or prevents us from doing all the things we 
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can or cannot do on the internet and technology can be shaped so as to enshrine values of 
liberty, or values of control’.644 Being dependent on technology and people who run, operate 
and use it, it is possible in theory that cyberspace may one day cease to exist, unlike the natural 
areas of terra nullius. It could be said that cyberspace simply does not seem to fit within the 
legal definition of unclaimed territory, because it does not possess such attributes.  
Some legal scholars, such as Brownlie, suggest however that the requirement of terra nullius 
is not the only prerequisite of acquisition by occupation.645 In fact, ‘effective occupation’ is a 
far stronger basis of acquisition than terra nullius. ‘Effective occupation’ is, however a relative 
concept and varies according to the territory concerned.646 In the Eastern Greenland case647 
the Permanent Court  of International Justice asserted that 
 
[a] claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act of title, such as a treaty of 
cession, but merely upon continued display of authority, involves two elements, each 
of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign and some 
actual exercise or display of such authority.648  
 
This has been affirmed in the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration case, where it was unanimously held 
that 
 
[t]he modern international law of acquisition of territory generally requires that there 
be: an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of 
jurisdiction and state functions on a continuous and peaceful basis.649  
 
The question that arises is therefore could states claim sovereignty in cyberspace based on 
effective control, that is, to re-iterate Judge Max Humber’s pronouncement in the Isle of 
Palmas case, to ‘exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state’?650 
The internet was founded on a distributed and decentralized technology and although the early 
days of its entrepreneurship were a testament to the spread of an unbridled global internet 
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freedom, the nationalistic tendencies soon crept in. These tendencies, Shultz noted, ushered in 
a ‘greater assertion of state power and a greater control over national territories as far as 
information flows are concerned’.651 Thus, the dark side of the web, which manifested itself 
as, for instance hate speech websites, unregulated online casinos, pornography sites and the 
like, triggered a movement for cultural and nationalistic withdrawal.652 So prevalent are the 
domestic information controls these days (that is actions conducted in and through cyberspace 
that seek to deny, disrupt, manipulate and shape information for strategic and political ends), 
that they became a subject of a burgeoning area of cyberspace research.653  A number of means 
are used and broadly speaking, comprise a variety of technologies, regulatory measures, laws, 
policies and tactics. They include media regulation, licensing regimes, content removal, libel 
and slander laws, together with content filtering.654 Some states, such as the US and France, 
control local internet intermediaries: the people, equipment and services within national 
borders that enable local internet users to consume the offending internet communications.655  
Most important of these intermediaries are the Internet Service Providers (ISPs), search 
engines, browsers, the physical network and their sources of funds.656  Such internal controls, 
according to Goldsmith and Wu ‘make it harder for local users to obtain content from, or 
transact with, the law-evading content providers abroad. In this way, government affects 
internet flow within their borders even though they originate abroad and cannot easily be 
stopped at the border’,657 especially so, since content providers cannot subvert intermediaries 
because they cannot do without them.  The most basic of cyberspace controls is internet 
filtering, or censorship, that is the prevention of access to information online within territorial 
boundaries, which is justified on a variety of grounds depending on the government involved. 
The rational for censorship include copyright violation, sexual exploitation of children, or 
promotion of hatred and violence.658 Non-democratic regimes, such as China, filter content 
related to minority rights (Tibetan independence), democracy sites (Amnesty International, 
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Human Rights Watch, Hong Kong Voice of Democracy), news sites (BBC News, CNN, Time 
Magazine), government (Voice of America, US Department of Defence). 659  Apart from 
regulatory and legal measures, states have also shown willingness to disrupt communication 
networks for political purposes, sometimes at the time of elections, on other occasions during 
public demonstrations. These activities have been named ‘just-in-time-blocking’ and described 
by the OpenNet Initiative, as denial of access to information during important political 
moments when the content may have the greatest potential impact, such as elections, protests, 
or anniversaries of social unrest.660 Both democracies and autocracies have been known to 
employ such tactics: during the 2011 Arab Spring (Egypt and Libya), Nepal in 2005 and Burma 
in 2007.661 In 2011 the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron said in the House of Commons 
in response to the 2011 riots in the UK that ‘we are working with the police, the intelligence 
services and industry to look at whether it would be right to stop people communicating via 
[social media] when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality’.662 
This state practice is a clear indication that states can and do exercise a degree of control 
over the internet content. However, as has been agreed by the International Group of Experts 
involved in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 ‘no [s]tate may claim sovereignty over cyberspace per se’, 
because ‘much of cyber infrastructure comprising cyberspace is located in the sovereign 
territories of [s]tates’.663 The reason why any given state cannot claim full sovereignty over the 
entirety of cyberspace lies in the inability to exercise the the exclusion of any other state, the 
functions of the state.664 For example, the Russian authorities have been particularly vocal in 
this regard, expressing their dissatisfaction with American companies as Google, Facebook and 
Twitter, which in their view undermine the Russian values and the political system. 
Consequently, both houses of parliament called for tighter controls. Suggestions have been 
made that all servers, on which Russian citizens’ personal data are stored should be located in 
Russia. A media campaign was started to bring global web platforms under Russian 
jurisdiction-either requiring them to be accessible in Russia by a domain name extension of 
.ru, or obliging them to be hosted on Russian territory. 665 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry 
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Rogazin stated that services, such as Facebook and Twitter, are elements of a larger American 
campaign against Russia, whilst President Putin in April 2014 publicly described the internet 
as a ‘CIA project’, confirming that the Kremlin is infuriated by America’s stranglehold on the 
web in terms of both infrastructure (networks, monopoly in naming and addressing) and the 
pre-eminence of American companies.666 Furthermore, as the Russians note, ten out of thirteen 
root servers that are essential for the functioning of the entire internet are located in the US and 
the other three on the territory of US allies-Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden.667  
It seems therefore that effective control over cyberspace to the exclusion of other states 
is not feasible. As a consequence, states cannot claim full sovereignty in this domain. Having 
said that: 
  
[t]he fact that cyber infrastructure located in a given [s]tate’s territory is  
linked to cyberspace cannot be interpreted as a waiver of its sovereignty.  
Indeed, [s]tates have the right, pursuant to the principle of sovereignty, to disconnect 
from the [i]nternet, in whole or in part […].668  
  
 (ii) Other Legal Regimes  
 
World resources are allocated their own categories under international law and 
governed by different types of legal regimes and institutions. As noted above, a broadly 
demarcated territory is the basic building block of statehood, within which a government can 
exercise its right to political self-determination.669 In some cases, international law provides 
for full sovereignty over a territory (and/or area), as is for example the case with the airspace. 
Article 1 of the 1944 Chicago Convention states that ‘the contracting states recognize that every 
state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory’.670 In other 
cases, for instance the territorial waters, which cover twelve miles of the adjacent sea and 
seabed, state have sovereignty but treaty and customary international law allows limited rights 
to other states therein, such as the right of innocent passage. 671  Apart from territory, 
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international law has also developed additional ways to categorise the Earth’s resources, among 
them terra nullius (an unclaimed territory, for instance a new volcanic island) and res 
communis (things common to all, that cannot be owned or appropriated, such as light, air and 
the sea).672 This categorization applies to the high seas, the outer space and the Antarctic, which 
despite having their own disparate legal regimes, share one thing in common, namely that states 
are barred from claiming sovereignty in these domains. Thus, Article 87 The Law of the Sea 
Convention 1982 (UNCLOS) states that ‘the high seas are open to all states, whether coastal 
or landlocked’673 and lists specific rights that all states may enjoy, including the right to 
navigate, of over flight and fishing. The Convention makes any claim to sovereignty over high 
seas invalid by virtue of Article 89, which reads,  ‘no state may validly purport to subject any 
part of the high seas to its sovereignty’.674  The outer space has likewise been given status of 
res communis by virtue of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which provides that ‘outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation 
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means’.675 However, 
the fact that sovereignty cannot be claimed over these areas, does not necessarily exclude 
exercise of jurisdiction. This is evidenced for example by Article VIII of the Outer Space 
Treaty, according to which: ‘a State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched 
into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object and over any 
personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body’. 676 Furthermore, there are 
instances, where the law allowed for the extension of sovereign rights (but not full sovereignty) 
and the exercise of jurisdiction in areas previously classified, as part of the res communis. One 
such example is the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), established under Article 55 the UNCLOS 
1982 and described as ‘an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific 
legal regime […] under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal [s]tate and the rights 
and freedoms of other [s]tates are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention’.677 
The EEZ ‘confers upon coastal states sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
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exploiting, conserving and managing, the living and non-living resources’678 of the water 
column, seabed and subsoil to a distance of 200nm.679 The regime extended costal states’ rights 
to cover one third of ocean space and it must be stressed that it ‘was conceived primarily, as a 
jurisdictional zone, rather than one of absolute sovereignty and therefore could not interfere 
with traditional high seas freedoms’.680 Thus the EEZ has been described, as 
combining characteristics of the territorial seas and the high seas, but cannot be 
assimilated to either. It is a sui generis zone with its own distinctive regime. Unlike the 
territorial sea, it is not an area, in which coastal states have a plenary and ipso jure 
entitlement to sovereignty and in contrast to the high seas, it is not a zone in which other 
states have unfettered freedoms. It is an amalgam, or multifunctional’ zone, in which 
coastal states enjoy sovereign rights in relation to economic resources and also 
jurisdiction not only in relation to these rights, but also for certain other matters 
including environmental protection.681  
 
Article 55 of the UNCLOS 1982 gives EEZ a status of ‘specific legal regime’ and has been 
described as ‘remarkably durable and free from major controversy…successfully melding 
aspects of both sovereign rights (ownership or dominium) and jurisdiction (competence or 
imperium)’.682  
Another example of such legal innovation is that relating to the continental shelf, which in 
geographical terms is described, as a sloping platform of submerged land surrounding the 
continents and islands, normally extending to a depth of approximately 200 meters, at which 
point the seabed fall away sharply.683 Its legal definition is contained in Article 76 UNCLOS 
1982, which states that:  
 
[t]he continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extends beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
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territorial sea is measured whether the outer edge of the continental margin does not 
extend up to that distance.684  
 
By virtue of Article 77(1) UNCLOS 1982 coastal states have a right to exercise sovereign rights 
over the continental shelf, for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources.  
They also have a freedom to decide whether, or not to explore or exploit it and whether, or not 
to grant access to other states.685 Additionally, Article 77(4) gives coastal states sovereign 
rights over all natural resources, both living and non-living. Although there is a substantial 
overlap between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes, in that both give to coastal states 
essentially the same rights to exploit the non-living and living resources of the seabed and 
subsoil of an area of up to 200nm, they differ in that continental shelf need not be proclaimed 
and vests inherently in coastal states, unlike EEZ, which must be asserted.686 
These two separate but related regimes illustrate that the legal bases for exercising 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction can be on occasion provided for by international law, where 
states cannot claim full sovereignty. Both the EEZ and continental shelf are legal constructs, 
which have been successfully deployed to provide means for states to explore, exploit and 
protect certain areas, where claiming full sovereignty is restricted. Chapter 3 of the thesis will 
discuss these regimes in more detail, with the view of ascertaining whether some aspects of 
cyberspace management could be modelled on them, whilst the next part of this chapter will 
show how states exercise their jurisdiction in the cyber context.  
 
(b) Jurisdiction in Cyberspace 
 
States’ regulation and control of parts of cyberspace is not only feasible, it has been already 
undertaken to such an extent that some authors, fear its fragmentation.687 The variety of means 
and methods outlined above to subject content of information to state control could be viewed 
collectively, as governments exercising sovereign rights. Such exercise of state powers within 
a given territory is known in international law as jurisdiction, which is defined as: 
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[t]he power of the state under international law to regulate or otherwise impact 
upon people, property and circumstances and reflects the basic principles of 
state sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs.688 
 
 
Whilst the term ‘sovereignty’ covers the total legal personality of a state, jurisdiction refers to 
particular aspects of the substance, especially rights (or claims), liberties and powers.689 It is a 
vital and central feature of sate sovereignty, as it is an exercise of authority, which may alter, 
create or terminate legal relationships and obligations.690  Jurisdiction thus pertains the power 
of states to subject persons or property to their laws, judicial institutions, or enforcement 
capacity.691 This corresponds to three types of jurisdiction, namely legislative, judicial and 
enforcement. 692  Legislative jurisdiction ‘refers to the supremacy of the constitutionally 
recognized organs of the state to make binding laws within its territory.’693 Judicial jurisdiction 
empowers state’s courts may try cases concerning the persons, property or events, whilst 
enforcement jurisdiction means that the executive has the capacity to enforce the judgments or 
convictions against the defendant or accused. Unlike the legislative and adjudicative 
jurisdiction, enforcement jurisdiction is strictly territorial. This means that generally state 
officials may not carry out their functions on foreign soil, unless the host state expressly 
consents to it.694 Thus, if states enforce their laws abroad, this would constitute violations of 
the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention.695 
International law does not seem to impose restrictions on the jurisdiction of courts in civil 
cases, but it restricts jurisdiction in criminal cases. 696  This occurs on the basis of the 
territoriality, nationality, protective and universal principles.697 
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Territorial jurisdiction is the simplest and the least contentious form of criminal 
jurisdiction, even in respect of enforcement and usually established by the legislative and 
judicial practice of states in two ways.698 The first is on the basis of the so-called subjective 
territoriality principle, which may be asserted by those states, where the criminal conduct 
commenced.699 The second, the objective territoriality principle, allows a state to assert its 
jurisdiction and prosecute the offender where the criminal conduct caused injurious effect 
within the territory of the effected state, hence also referred to as the ‘effects doctrine’.700  
 The nature of territoriality principle was examined by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) in the well known case of Lotus,701 which established a number of important 
rules. First, a state cannot exercise its jurisdiction outside its territory, unless an international 
treaty or customary law permits it to do so. The Court held that: 
 
[n]or the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a  
[s]tate is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary- it may 
not exercise its power, in any form in the territory of another state. In this  
sense, jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a state 
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from convention.702  
 
Secondly, a state may exercise jurisdiction within its territory in any matter (civil and criminal) 
even if there is no specific rule permitting it to do so. It follows, that states have a wide measure 
of discretion, which is only limited by a prohibitive rule of international law. The PCIJ 
explained: 
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 [i]t does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a [s]tate from  
 exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which  
 relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on 
 some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable  
 if international law contained a general prohibition to [s]tates to extend the  
 application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,  
 property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general  
 prohibition, it allowed [s]tates to do so in certain specific cases. But this is  
 certainly not the case under international law as it stands at present. Far from  
 laying down a general prohibition to the effect that [s]tates many not extend  
 the application of their laws and jurisdiction of their courts to persons,  
 property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide 
 measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive  
 rules; as regards other cases, every [s]tate remains free to adopt the principles 
 which it regards as best and most suitable. This discretion left to [s]tates by  
 international law explains the great variety of rules which they have been able 
 to adopt without objections or complaints on the part of other [s]tates […]. In  
 these circumstances all that can be required of a [s]tate is that it should not  
 overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within 
 these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.703  
 
Thirdly, the PCIJ endorsed the ‘effects doctrine’ as a basis for legislative jurisdiction. The PCIJ 
allowed the Turkish court to exercise its jurisdiction with respect of acts committed outside its 
territory because ‘one of the constituent elements of the offence, and more specifically its 
effects have taken place’704 in that state. In doing so, the Court equated the Boz-Kourt (the 
Turkish vessel) to the Turkish territory and found that the effects of the French captain’s actions 
of the Lotus were felt within Turkey and thus Turkish courts could prosecute the French 
captain.705  
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The Lotus principle, according to which that which is not prohibited by international law is 
permitted, has been subsequently affirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its  
2010 Advisory Opinion on the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo.706 This concerned a 
request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ by the UN General Assembly (UN GA) regarding 
the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence from Serbia. The Court considered the legality 
of the declaration from three perspectives, asking inter alia the following question: ‘is the 
unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo in accordance with international law’?707 The ICJ interpreted the request from the UN 
GA narrowly and provided an opinion on whether or not the declaration of independence was 
in accordance with international law and not the issues regarding the extent of the right to self-
determination, or the existence of any right to secession.708  In deciding that the declaration 
was not prohibited, the Court stated that there was no practice in general international law, 
which allowed it to conclude that declarations of independence are prohibited.709 The adoption 
of the declaration of independence did not violate general international law, the SC Resolution 
1244 (1999) or its Constitutional plan and therefore the adoption of that declaration did not 
violate any applicable rule of international law.710 In order to answer this question the ICJ relied 
on the Lotus judgement stating that in relation to a specific act it is not necessary to demonstrate 
a permissive rule so long as there is no prohibition.711 The ICJ focused on whether there are 
prohibitive rules against declarations of independence in international law and not whether 
international law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its 
independence, or whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities situated 
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(i) State Jurisdiction in Cyberspace  
 
The primary basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in cyberspace is territorial.713 Thus, a state 
can exercise territorial jurisdiction over (a) cyber infrastructure and persons engaged in cyber 
activities on its territory; (b) cyber activities originating in, or completed on, its territory; or (c) 
cyber activities having a substantial effect in its territory.714 This is because ‘under international 
law, a [s]tate enjoys full territorial jurisdiction (prescriptive, enforcement and judicial) over 
persons and objects located on its territory, as well as conduct occurring there’.715 Any cyber 
activity originating in a state’s territory will be subject to the subjective territorial jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding whether it has an extraterritorial effect.716 In addition, a state will be able to 
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the effects doctrine (i.e. the objective territorial 
jurisdiction) in relation to a cyber activity that originates outside its territory, but  which is 
completed within it, if the act concerned is directed against persons or objects located there, or 
is otherwise intended to culminate in that state.717 The effects doctrine has been increasingly 
accepted as the basis for jurisdiction with regards to ‘acts, including cyber operations that do 
not originate, conclude, or materially take place in the state in question, but have effect 
therein’.718 However, this basis for establishing jurisdiction may cause friction among states in 
circumstances where, for instance,  the effects of a particular cyber operation may be felt in 
many different states. In that sense, the doctrine remains controversial and the conditions 
imposed on it are not yet fully settled in international law.719  Nevertheless, the International 
Group of Experts drafting the Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed that ‘[the effects doctrine] may now 
reasonably be said to reflect customary international law’.720   
States have consistently asserted their right to regulate online activity using the 
territorial link to assert prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction on the basis of the effects felt 
in their country. An early and well known example in the criminal context is the French case 
                                              
713 The extent of extraterritorial human rights obligations regarding states’ activities in 
cyberspace will be examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age’. 
714 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 7, Rule 9, p. 55 
715 ibid, para 4, p. 52. 
716 ibid. para 5, p. 56. 
717 ibid.  
718 ibid, para 10, p. 57. 
719 ibid. para 13, p. 58 
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of LICRA & UEJF v Yahoo France.721 The case concerned an action brought by two French 
Jewish organizations against Yahoo! Inc. (an American organization) for allowing individuals 
in France to buy Nazi memorabilia from third parties on Yahoo’s auction site. The website was 
hosted by Yahoo!, provided by an American server, but accessible from France and elsewhere 
in the world. Offering for sale such objects is protected in the US by the First Amendment, but 
illegal in France.722 The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris found that it had jurisdiction 
over the case and ordered Yahoo! to take down the website and to pay a fine. The Court asserted 
its jurisdiction on the basis of the effects the internet behaviour had in France, stating that ‘by 
permitting the display of these items and the possible participation of internet users in France 
in such an exposition/sale, Yahoo commit[ed] a wrong within French territory’. 723 
Furthermore, ‘the harm was suffered on the territory of France’, because the site was accessible 
in France and therefore had to comply with French law, even though the material offered for 
sale was legal in the US. Thus, the French Court asserted its jurisdiction over acts adversely 
affecting French territory, even though Yahoo website was clearly connected with the US, 
having being set up and maintained on a server situated in the US.724 Since then this reasoning 
has been replicated many times by other courts-‘each time legitimising the right of the 
destination state to assert control over foreign site based on its local accessibility’. 725 For 
example, in R v Perrin726 it was held that the UK Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to bring 
charges against the defendant, a French national residing in the UK and operating a US hosted 
website, which published obscene material accessible in England. Mr. Perrin was convicted 
and sentenced under the UK Obscene Publications Act 1959, but argued that because of the 
worldwide nature of the internet, publishers could not foresee the legal requirements in all the 
individual states where the material could be accessed. He also alleged that the UK had no 
jurisdiction to bring charges against him because the company was registered and operated 
legally in the US. UK Court of Appeal reasoned however that if the UK courts were not able 
to examine publication related cases because the place of publication did not fall under the 
courts’ jurisdiction, that would encourage publishers to publish in countries where prosecution 
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722 Article 808 and 809 of the French New Code of Civil Procedures. 
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724 Kohl supra note 6, p. 38. 
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2000) 1StR 184/00, LG Mannheim; Arzneimittelwerbung im Internet BGH (30 March 2006) 
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was unlikely. Furthermore, as Mr. Perrin was a UK resident, UK law was accessible to him. 
Consequently, he should have sought legal advice since he was carrying out professional 
activities in that country. Finally, the Obscene Publications Act 1959 applied to the 
transmission of data that was stored electronically. 
 Similar effects based approach can be seen in the civil context, in particular in relation 
to the defamation cases. An early example is the Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnic.727 The case 
related to an article placed in Barron’s Online, a subscription website uploaded in the US, 
published by Down Jones and making references to Joseph Gutnic. The High Court in Australia 
upheld the application of the Australian defamation law to Barrons Online. It therefore held 
that Mr Gutnic could sue for defamation at his primary residence and the place where he was 
best known, that is where the damage to his reputation was most likely to have occurred. The 
ruling allowed the victims of the alleged defamation in Australia to issue proceedings for 
defamation on the internet against any defendant notwithstanding his/her location. The High 
Court explained that ‘if people wish to do business, or indeed travel to, or live in, or utilize the 
infrastructure of different countries, they can hardly expect to be absolved from compliance 
with the laws of those countries. The fact that the publication might occur everywhere does not 
mean that it occurs nowhere’.728 Similarly, in Harrods Ltd v Dow Jones Co. Inc.,729 Harrods 
Ltd, issued proceedings against Dow Jones in respect of an online article, which appeared in 
the US but not the European edition of the Wall Street Journal and its website for defaming the 
company in the UK. The website had only few visits from the UK, nevertheless the court 
allowed the claim to proceed in England as the victim was an English company with a well 
established reputation in the UK. 
 What these cases illustrate is the application of the objective territoriality principle 
under customary international law in civil and criminal context, which facilitates states’ 
application of their national laws to online activities. As noted by the International Group of 
Experts in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 ‘the effects doctrine is of particular import in the cyber 
context because cyber means lend themselves to causing effects in [s]tates where the operations 
in question neither originate nor culminate’.730 However, since the conditions imposed by the 
effects doctrine are not fully settled in international law, the International Group of Experts 
agreed that a state exercising effects-based jurisdiction with respect to cyber-related activities 
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and the personas who engage in them, must do so in a reasonable fashion and with due regard 
to the interests of other states.731 Accordingly, a state may exercise effects-based jurisdiction 
if (a) it has a clear and internationally accepted interest in doing so; (b) the effects which it 
purports to regulate must be sufficiently direct and intended or foreseeable; (c) those effects 
must be substantial enough to warrant extending the state’s law to foreign nationals outside its 
territory and (d) the exercise of effects-based jurisdiction does not unduly infringe upon the 
interests of other states, or upon foreign nationals, without a significant connection to the state 
that purports to exercise such jurisdiction.732  
 However, as noted previously, enforcement jurisdiction, unlike the prescriptive and 
adjudicative jurisdiction is strictly territorial.733 Indeed, the International Group of Experts in 
Rule 11 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed that ‘a [s]tate may only exercise extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction in relation to persons, objects and cyber activities on the basis of: (a) 
a specific allocation of authority under international law; or (b) valid consent by a foreign 
government to exercise jurisdiction on its territory’.734 This strict territoriality, echoes the Lotus 
approach whereby ‘the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a 
[s]tate is that […] it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another [s]tate’.735 
Accordingly, the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction on another state’s territory constitutes a 
violation of that state’s sovereignty, except when international law provides a specific 
allocation of authority to do so, or by the consent of the state concerned.736 This may sometimes 
be granted by means of a treaty, as is the case with the Cybercrime Convention, which permits 
state parties to ‘access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer 
data located in another [p]arty, if the [p]arty obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the 
person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the [p]arty through that computer 
system’.737 However, the strict territorial limits in the context of enforcement jurisdiction have 
proved problematic, as states’ law enforcement agencies often gain access to data stored 
outside of their territories without seeking and obtaining consent. This is also known as ‘data 
pulling’ and will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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Cyberspace is a relatively new domain of human activity, which undoubtedly 
contributed to the expanse in commercial, communications and social activity. By its very 
architectural design it can be described as borderless and ubiquitous. This aspect of cyberspace 
lends itself to unlawful activities, such as state sponsored mass cyber surveillance. The 
recognition of challenges and dangers posed by belligerent acts in this domain reinforces the 
need for a basic agreement among nations to govern it. To this day however, there is no 
consensus relating the most fundamental aspects, as to how the management of this domain is 
to be achieved. This is reflected in both the lack of an agreement regarding an internationally 
legally binding cyber treaty and emergence of customary international law rules for this 
domain. This chapter sought to provide reasons for this lack of consensus, which seems to be 
underpinned by the political power struggle in the context of internet governance and divergent 
domestic and international cyber security policies of the major players. On the one hand, the 
US and other like- minded states support the idea of ‘internet freedom’, which to a limited 
extent echoes the attitudes of the internet founders- Barlow, Clark and Berners-Lee. On the 
other hand, the Russians and the Chinese champion ‘internet sovereignty’ and try to lay claim 
to their ‘sovereign cyber territories’ seeking to establish greater state control, preferably via a 
treaty and with involvement from the UN through the ITU. Conversely, the US and its allies 
insist on continuance with the multistakeholder system, which involves private and government 
actors, together with ICANN. Yet, both the ITU and ICANN have their drawbacks. The latter 
is a typical state-dominated institution, with little experience of running a dynamic and 
constantly evolving internet and related digital technologies. With states, as its constituent 
members, decision-making regarding the day-to-day overseeing of the internet will almost 
inevitably be riddled with political goal scoring and bureaucracy. Equally, ICANN has been 
almost constantly criticized for lack of international legitimacy and the perpetuation of 
American dominance in the global telecommunications sector. It therefore seems that to present 
the future of cyberspace governance, as a choice between ‘internet freedom’ and ‘internet 
sovereignty’ is an oversimplification. Considering the almost total domination of the US in the 
telecommunication sector through the provision of the hardware (with all route servers, upon 
which the internet is dependent located on the US and allied territories), the software and its 
dominance by the giant ‘application’ companies, such as Google and Microsoft, it could be 
said that the ‘internet die has already been cast’. Nevertheless, state practice shows national 
control over the internet content. In this sense states have territorial jurisdiction over cyber 
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infrastructure and persons engaged in cyber activities on their territories together with cyber 
activities, which have a substantial effect on their territory on the basis of the effects doctrine. 
This to some degree resembles the legal regimes of the EEZ and continental shelf. However, 
no state may claim sovereignty over cyberspace per se, in the sense defined by Judge Huber in 
the Isle of Palmas Arbitration. The tendencies of some states evidenced by their application of 
national laws and standards to the transnational internet could eventually lead to the territorial 
fragmentation of the internet into national cyberspace, which would inevitably undermine 
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Cyber operations that amount to use of force, or to acts of hostilities, which are conducted 
during armed conflicts do not exist in a normative void. Existing international law, both jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello, applies to these type of operations. This view is shared by most states 
and acknowledged in two reports by United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on 
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunication Technologies in the Context 
of International Security (UN GGE) of 2013739 and 2015.740 In 2015 the UN GEE agreed on 
rules of behaviour in cyberspace also during peacetime, stating that nations should not use 
information and communication technologies to attack critical infrastructure and should not 
allow their territories to be used for internationally wrongful acts.741 In addition, it has been 
widely accepted that international human rights law applies equally online and offline.742 The 
disclosures of Edward Snowden in 2013 clearly articulated the breath of the cyber surveillance 
operations, which as will be shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis, is highly likely to amount to an 
unlawful interference with the right to privacy under international human rights treaties. 
Recently, the International Group of Experts acting on behalf of the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence and tasked with articulating rules of public international law 
governing cyber operations in peacetime agreed that bulk collection of internet traffic and 
cyber surveillance may implicate international law norms. 743  The proliferation of cyber 
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surveillance, other forms of peacetime cyber espionage (discussed in Chapter 1) and various 
deleterious cyber operations calls for closer international cooperation. One option, explored in 
this chapter, is regulation of state behaviour through a hard law instrument- an international 
treaty for cyberspace. 
This chapter aims to lay down the conceptual foundations for such an instrument. It 
proposes to model the treaty on the existing principles of the international law of the sea. The 
rationale for doing so is that some parallels can be drawn between differing forms of 
governance for the world’s resources contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982) and cyberspace and applied by analogy to that environment 
in order to formulate a new legal regime.  
This chapter is divided into five parts. Part one makes some comparisons between the 
historical development of the codification of the law of the sea and the those in the area of 
internet governance. Part two engages with the issue of cyberspace as a global common. Part 
three explores the utility of the application of the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind 
in the context of cyberspace governance. Part four picks up the discussion begun in Chapter 2 
regarding the concepts of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf their application 
to cyberspace, whilst part five offers some conclusions.  
 
 
1. THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
LAW TO THE PROBLEM OF CYBERSPACE GOVERNANCE THROUGH THE 
USE OF ANALOGY 
 
A question that should be addressed at the outset of this analysis is why should states seek to 
subject cyberspace to any form of multilateral regulation in the first place? The reasons are 
numerous, but in principle boil down to the three basic needs: sovereignty, security and 
economy.744 It has already been shown in the Chapter 2 that the future of the internet is in a 
state of flux resulting from a variety of competing interests in the power struggle for its control, 
at the centre of which are two opposing models of governance: the multistakeholder, 
championed by the US and the sovereignist supported by Russia and China. For the latter states 
greater say over ‘their’ segments of cyberspace may equate to having sovereign rights and 
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therefore allow a degree of autonomy, especially when it comes to the lucrative digital market 
place, dominated at present by American companies. As regards security, it has been observed 
that ‘the international community has a clear interest in developing a comprehensive, 
multilateral cyber security framework because the widespread use of the internet in every 
aspect of daily life has created an almost irreversible dependency on its technological benefits 
and because the conceptual underpinnings of existing legal frameworks are not readily 
adaptable to threats emerging in cyberspace.’745 Cyber attacks, cyber crime and economic 
espionage are a day-to-day reality. In addition, Edward Snowden 2013 disclosures revealed the 
scale and gravity of bulk collection and interception of digital communications of entire 
countries’ populations conducted by the Five Eyes agencies. Since then, other information 
contained in official inquiries,746 or unearth by other whistleblowers, academics, civil society 
and the private sector has provided more details about government surveillance.747 All this has 
significantly amplified the concern of governments in the sphere of security.  
 
 
(a) General: Use of Analogy in International Law 
 
The use of a legal rule by analogy has been described as the application of a rule, which 
covers a particular case to another case, which is similar to the first, but itself not regulated by 
that rule.748 This allows for a quick and effective way to close normative gaps, if a rule is seen 
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as just and/or useful for cases, which are similar.749 In international legal order this is seen as 
desirable, not only because international law lacks the normative density of a national legal 
systems, but because it also facilitates closing legal lacuna, often seen as counterproductive to 
achieving certain ends. The use of analogy can be found in decisions of international courts, as 
a valid tool to create new rules, or as an extension of existing rules to cases in international law 
and in the writings of publicists.750 Instances, where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
applied analogy include, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua751 and 
the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigerian case.752 In the Nicaragua 
case, the ICJ ‘explicitly made use of analogy as a method of legal reasoning when assessing 
the immediate effects of the withdrawal by the United States of its declaration under Article 
36(2) Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizing the ICJ’s jurisdiction.753 Article 
36(2) states that:  
 
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognise as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law; 
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of  
an international obligation; 
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an  
international obligation.754 
 
The ICJ concluded that the ‘US could not repudiate its declaration under Article 36(2) with 
immediate effect. This was based on the principle of good faith (bona fide), which leads by 
analogy to the application of the law of treaties, where the termination of a treaty requires a 
reasonable period of notice if the treaty in question does not contain a provision dealing with 
its duration’.755 
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In publicists’ writings, an analogous application of rules is made in disparate areas of law, 
for example applying rules of land warfare to air warfare and rules on the applicability of 
certain peacetime treaties during war to other peacetime treaties.756  Where a need arose to 
govern the high seas, scholars looked towards the regimes of land and in the case of governing 
the outer space, the legal framework of airspace was considered.757   
The use of analogy can only be triggered if three conditions are met within the existing 
legal order: (1) the creation of legal provisions must not be exclusively subjected to other 
enumerated sources of law; (2) similar cases have to be treated the same way legally; (3) there 
has to be a lacuna in the law, i.e., the case must not be covered by any rule of international law, 
or any general principle of law.758 In addition, the use of analogy must be justified in each 
specific case, by (1) comparing the regulated and the unregulated cases; (2) identifying the 
similarities between them and (3) rationally deciding that the similarities of the cases compared 
have to be seen, as being relevant for their legal evaluation and their differences as being 
relevant.759 This latter condition requires the undertaking of comparisons between the already 
regulated cases and the ones that are not covered by exiting rules, the identification of 
similarities and making a judgement that the similarities of the cases being compared are 
relevant for their legal evaluation and that their differences are irrelevant.760 
 
 
(b) The Law of the Sea and its Analogous Application to Cyberspace 
 
The United Nations Law Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982)761 is said 
to represent ‘an unprecedented attempt by the international community to regulate all aspects 
of the resources of the sea and uses of the oceans and thus bring a stable order to mankind’s 
very source of life’.762 The UN Secretary General described the UNCLOS 1982 after signing 
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it as ‘possibly the most significant legal instrument of (the 20th) century’.763  Broadly speaking, 
the treaty addresses navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal status 
of resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage of ships through 
narrow straits, conservation and management of living resources, protection of the maritime 
environment, a marine research regime and a binding procedure for settlement of disputes 
between states.764 A legal framework for cyberspace activities could reflect UNCLOS 1982 by 
analogy, thus setting out inter alia territorial limits, jurisdiction, the legal status of cyberspace 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, rules relating to mutual assistance on cyber security 
matters, protection of human rights and state responsibility.  
 The analogous application of the UNCLOS 1982 as a tool to model future cyberspace 
governance regime can be justified on at least two grounds. First, there is no international law 
treaty for cyberspace that deals in one document with cyber operations falling within and below 
the use of force threshold as set out in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. This 
therefore satisfies the first criteria for the use of analogy, as these activities are not exclusively 
subjected to other enumerated sources of law. In the case of cyber operations meeting the ‘use 
of force’ criteria it has been confirmed that both jus ad bellum and jus in bello provisions apply 
to such situations.765 However, the international community has thus far failed to agree on a 
hard law international instrument dealing with all those operations that meet the ‘use of force’ 
criteria, despite the attempts from the Shanghai Corporation Organization. As regards cyber 
activities that fall below this threshold, there is no treaty specifically dealing with them on the 
international level. Rather, there are a number of regional treaties that address cyber crime, 
including the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 766  the Arab Treaty on Combating 
Cybercrime 767  and the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data 
Protection.768 The latter, adopted in July 2014, is broader in scope and relates to such matters 
as electronic transactions, personal data protection, cyber security and cyber crime. No attempt 
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has yet been made to approach the issue of regulating cyber surveillance/cyber espionage on 
an international level through a binding treaty. This fulfils another requirement for use of 
analogy, as it exposes a lacuna in the law.  
Secondly, some comparisons can be drawn between the development of the international 
regime for the seas and that for cyberspace. These similarities seem to satisfy the requirement 
for the use of analogy, according to which like cases must be treated in the same way legally. 
The history of the development of the law of the sea is in some respects comparable to the 
current debate regarding the status and future of cyberspace. This is because, the seas in similar 
vein to cyberspace, had been subject to fragmented regulation769 (although for much longer 
than cyberspace), prior to the eventual codification in the UNCLOS 1982 and likewise, replete 
with criminal activities, such as piracy. Furthermore, one of the founding principles of the law 
of the sea was the idea of the ‘open seas’, which in time proved unsustainable, as states sought 
greater security and control over their ‘fixed and floating’ assets. Similarly, the current quest 
for the control over cyberspace, both domestically and through international and regional 
forums outlined in the previous chapter, shows that some states find the idea of ‘internet 
freedom’ and openness unacceptable and wish for greater control in this domain, often due to 
national security concerns. The quest for increased security and the distrust created by the 
revelations of mass surveillance and bulk data collection suggest cyberspace’s possible future 
segmentation, which may lead to its ‘balkanization’.770  
Thirdly, the current international regime governing the seas does not classify the maritime 
regions as a single environment, but has a menu of options to deal with its various constituent 
parts, such as territorial waters, high seas and the deep seabed.  The success of this framework 
is due to its flexibility to treat these areas differently. Some are subject to full sovereignty, as 
in the case of the territorial seas and air space above, others sovereign rights and jurisdiction, 
for example in the case of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, whereas such regions 
as the high seas are open to all states, whether costal or land locked.771 These arrangements 
proved successful in answering divergent needs of states and the environments they regulate 
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and therefore their possible application to cyberspace must not be overlooked in favour of a 
totally new regulatory regime, as advocated by some writers.772  
 
(i) The Development of the International Law of the Sea and Cyberspace Governance- 
Some Parallels  
 
The international law of the sea has its origins in determining the status and control over 
ocean space, which progressed to encompass a variety of interests and regimes including the 
deep seabed, high seas, fish stocks, maritime scientific research, military uses of the ocean and 
environmental protection.773 Several distinctive phases could be identified with regard to the 
history of sources of the international law of the sea, ranging from theoretical debates among 
scholars relating to the status of the oceans, the freedom of the seas doctrine, gradual 
codification of the law throughout the twentieth century to the ongoing regulatory efforts to 
meet such challenges, as climate change and high seas fishing.774  Early maritime history is 
dominated by the activities of the European sea powers, which not only developed naval 
technology that allowed them the exploration of far flung parts of the globe, but it also 
facilitated the establishment of the trade routes, which led to usurping control over activities 
on the oceans. Thus the initial Roman law, according to which the sea was free and common 
to all, gave way by the Middle Ages to various forms of appropriation and control by powerful 
states.775 It was the Papal Bulletin of Pope Alexander VI, given effect in the 1494 Treaty of 
Tordesillas, which divided the then world into an area of Portuguese expansion to the east and 
the Spanish to the west, which as a consequence impacted on the adjoining seas.776 Attempts 
                                              
772  see for example, Chris Reed, ‘Online and Offline Equivalence: Aspiration and 
Achievement’ (2010) 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology- proposing 
regulating cyberspace the same way that real space is regulated; Graham Greenleaf, 
‘Regulating Cyberspace: Architecture vs Law?’ (1998) 21 The University of New South Wales 
Law Journal- proposing new self-regulatory system for cyberspace; Warren Chik, ‘Customary 
Internet-tional Law: Creating a Body of Customary Law to Cyberspace. Part 1: Developing 
Rules for Transitioning Custom into Law’ (2001) 26 Computer Law and Security- arguing for 
cyberspace regime based on customary international law; Nicholas W. Cade, ‘An Adaptive 
Approach for an Evolving Crime: The Case for an International Cyber Court and Penal Code’ 
(2010) 37 Brooklyn Journal of International Law- advocating global cyber security system and 
cyber court. 
773 Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, (Hart Publishing 





to reconcile the competing interests thus created were made by some publicists, among them 
the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius and an Englishman John Selden. The main thrust of their work 
related to conceptualizing the status of the seas and the debate over the access and ownership 
of the oceans. The most significant contribution in this regard was made by Grotius in his 1608 
work Mare Liberum.777 His doctrine of the free seas was based on two assumptions, namely 
that the seas’ immeasurable vastness makes it impossible to occupy, control or exhaust by 
navigation and fishing, coupled with the general right to travel and trade expressed under the 
law of nations.778 In Chapter V of Mare Liberum, Grotius observed that under the law of 
nations the sea had at various times been given the status of property of no one (res nullius), a 
common possession (res communis) and public property (res publica). 779  These early 
deliberations regarding the status of the sea are not dissimilar to the current debates regarding 
cyberspace. As with the Grotian description of the seas, which in his view was impossible to 
confine within fixed boundaries, cyberspace was also at first considered as borderless, vast and 
uncontrollable by governments, as exemplified by the debate of the cyberlibertarians and 
cyberpositivists in the previous chapter of this thesis. Furthermore, similarly to the Grotian 
concept of the sea being a facilitator of exchange and interchange, cyberspace is also 
considered an enabler in terms of information flow, trade and communication. Grotius 
concluded that oceans could not be appropriated, because ‘that which cannot be occupied, or 
which has never been occupied, cannot be the property of anyone, because all property has 
arisen from occupation’. 780  He compared the sea to the air, which in his view was not 
susceptible to occupation and is for the use of all.  This reasoning has been widely accepted, 
as the freedom of the seas. It could be said that this stance is similar to that advocated by United 
States in relation to cyberspace, found in such proclamations as the one made by Mrs Clinton 
in her speech, Remarks on Internet Freedom 781 and the 2005 US Department of Defence 
Strategy for Homeland Defence and Civil Support (the Defence Strategy),782 referred  to in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis.  In the Remarks on Internet Freedom, the then Senator Clinton 
supported the free access to and free flow of information on the internet for everyone. Her 
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address bears some resemblance to the observations made by Grotius, according to which ‘for 
the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a 
possession of anyone and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from 
the point of view of navigation or of fisheries’.783 Similarly, the Defence Strategy in similar 
manner to the Grotian idea of ‘limitless sea’ refers to the idea of a limitless nature of cyberspace 
declaring that ‘the global commons consist of international waters, and airspace, space and 
cyberspace’784 and more recently reiterated by Mrs Clinton, who referred to it, as the ‘global 
network commons’.785  
The most substantive challenge to Mare Liberum came from English scholar John Selden, 
who in his work Mare Clausum (The Closed Sea) not only sought to assert the sovereignty and 
the dominion of the crown of England in British seas, but also to prove longstanding state 
practice of dominion over the oceans.786  It was the view of the ‘open seas’ however, that 
prevailed in the end and which was adhered to for the next 300 years. Over time, the absolute 
freedom of the seas was challenged, as it was incompatible with the states’ needs to defend 
themselves. Cyberspace, as an ‘open space’ has also been challenged in a variety of forums, 
including the two World Summits in 2003 and 2005 and the Conference in Dubai in 2012 
referred to in the previous chapter. 
With respect to regulating the seas, coastal states began gradually to assert their rights to 
control the waters adjoining their coasts.  At the end of nineteenth century the area of the sea 
adjacent to state territory emerged, gaining a similar legal status to that of land territory. 787 
This gave coastal states the power to exercise jurisdiction and control, initially for security and 
subsequently in relation to exploitation of resources, such as fisheries.788 However, as these 
emergent rights remained undefined, there was a clear need to accommodate them within the 
predominant paradigm of the freedom of the seas. Although various attempts were made by 
the League of Nations, no agreement was reached, most notable among these was the failure 
at the 1930 Hague Codification Conference. Following the creation of the International Law 
Commission by the United Nations, the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I) was held in Geneva in 1958 and resulted in the codification of customary law in 
four conventions, namely the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the 
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Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on the High Seas and the Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.789 This was a significant 
development, as ‘it provided the foundation for the contemporary law of the sea’.790 However 
it did leave some ‘gaps’, which states sought to fill in through rapidly developing at the time 
customary international law. Subsequent 1960 Geneva Conference (UNCLOS II) focused on 
two issues, the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits, but failed to reach agreement on 
the important issues, such as the limits of maritime zones. To some extent it could be said that 
the two-phase World Summit on the Information Society held in 2003 in Geneva and 2005 in 
Tunis, referred to in the previous chapter, bears some similarities to UNCLOS I and II, in that 
the WSISs were the first major attempt by the international community to start the process of 
negotiation regarding the legal mechanisms to manage cyberspace. However, the UNCLOS I 
was a major success, because it initiated the codification process, which both phases of WSIS 
did not achieve with regards to the codification of cyberspace.  
The 1960s witnessed a development of state practice in international law of the sea, which was 
‘filling in the voids’ left by the Geneva Conventions and purported to create new coastal state 
rights. An example of these developments was the quest of the coastal states for the 
establishment of other resource-type claims, such as the Exclusive Fishing Zones (EFZ). These 
were recognized in bilateral agreements, such as the 1964 London Fisheries Convention to be 
of 12 nautical miles (nm). Other important developments included the US attempt by way of a 
unilateral declaration, to exercise jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the 
subsoil and seabed of the contiguous continental shelf, through the so-called Truman 
Proclamation of 1945, 791  discussed further below. Additionally, in 1967 the Maltese 
Ambassador Arvid Pardo proposed to the United Nations General Assembly that both the 
seabed and the ocean floor should be given a status of ‘common heritage of mankind’.792 The 
reasons for this assignation was that the Geneva Conventions did not address these issues 
together with a growing interest among the international community to establish a distinct legal 
regime for these areas, spurred by technological advances made, which would have enabled 
unrestrained mineral exploration of the deep seabed. In 1970 the General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 2749 (XXV) tilted Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean 
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Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of Notional Jurisdiction, 793  which 
proclaimed the seabed and the ocean floor as part of the common heritage of mankind and 
called for Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).  In the same 
year the Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea proposed the development of the new 
regime, which would recognize the ‘right of the coastal states to avail themselves of the natural 
resources of the sea adjacent to their coasts’.794 Latin American states developed this concept 
further and endorsed an idea of 200nm over which sovereignty could be exercised with respect 
of the natural resources of the sea. This, together with the proclamation in the Montevideo 
Declaration and the debates over the EFZ, formed the bases for the recognition of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).  
One of the most important developments at the end of the Second World War was the 1945 
United States Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 795  also known as the 1945 Truman 
Proclamation. This was an attempt on the part of the US by way of a unilateral declaration, to 
exercise jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the 
contiguous continental shelf.796 The Truman Proclamation asserted that: 
 
[t]he exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of 
the continental shelf by contiguous nations is reasonable and just [because] continental 
shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus 
naturally appurtenant to it.797  
 
The Proclamation was described as ‘the first substantive claim by a coastal state to a distinctive 
off-shore resource zone, which was completely separate from the territorial sea’,798 albeit it 
remained undefined as to its outer limits.  
This period also marked an emergent jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
with two cases of particular note. In the Corfu Channel case, 799  the ICJ discussed the 
developing regime of territorial sea and in particular navigation rights and freedoms through 
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international straits during peacetime.800 In the Fisheries case801 the capacity of a coastal state 
to draw a so-called ‘straight baseline’ around the outer edge of the coast from which the 
territorial sea was proclaimed, was deliberated in the context of territorial sea regime.802  
In 1973 the United Nations commenced its third conference UNCLOS III, which resulted in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982),803 following a 
nine-year period of negotiations. The Convention achieved what the previous UNCLOS I and 
II failed to do, that is the setting of the limits of territorial waters to 12nm, within which ‘states 
are in principle free to enforce any law, regulate any use and exploit any resources’.804 Before 
the conclusion of the Convention was reached however, it was challenged by the US Reagan 
administration, who objected to Part XI. This Part relates inter alia to the deep seabed 
exploration and exploitation consistent with common heritage of mankind principle.805 The 
Administration argued that these provisions were unfavourable to American economic and 
security interests. Nevertheless, the Convention came into force in 1994 and has been ratified 
by 166 states, excluding the US.806 The UNCLOS 1982 can be regarded, as marking a turning 
point from the paradigm championed by Grotius that the sea was immeasurable and impossible 
to control, to one effectively controlling the ocean resources through adoption of a variety of 
legal mechanisms and finding compromise through a ‘package deal’ Convention.807  
The proceeding section drew a number of similarities between the historical developments 
of the codification of the law of the sea and the on-going discourse relating to a future 
cyberspace regime. This includes the determining of the status and control over these domains 
in the early stages, which meant in both cases turning away from the concept of an ungoverned 
space to greater sovereign controls. Whilst the UNCLOS 1982 is one of the principal legal 
frameworks regulating the maritime areas, there is an array of other treaties, state practice and 
instruments for the governance and management of the world’s oceans, which go beyond 
matters relating to state sovereignty and jurisdiction and reflect contemporary challenges, 
contributing to continued evolution of the law in this area. 808  Likewise, an ‘umbrella 
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convention’ for cyberspace setting out the rights and obligations of states might be a good 
starting point on a conceptual journey of cyberspace governance. Once the broad principles are 
defined, the detail may follow. The historical insight into the law of the sea illustrates how the 
international community successfully met the challenge posed by global governance of a new 
domain. Three related concepts warrant more detailed analysis in this context, namely the 
position adopted by some states that cyberspace is a global common; the utility (if any) of the 
common heritage of mankind principle; the regimes governing the exclusive economic zone 
and the continental shelf and their application to cyberspace. Each of these aspects of the law 
of the seas regulation will be addressed below.   
 
 
2. CYBERSPACE AS A GLOBAL COMMON 
 
It was proposed in the previous chapter that cyberspace could not in all probability be 
classed in international law as a terra nullius, because as an artificially constructed 
environment, private and public ownership rights have always played a part therein. 
Furthermore, despite it being considered initially by the cyberlibertarians to be an environment 
free from the ‘real’ world governmental laws and controls, these attitudes were duly dispelled 
and national regulation soon followed. Current state practice points to tendencies of many 
nations to both seek to protect their vital infrastructures from cyber attacks and to exert greater 
controls over information flows within their borders.809 In particular, China and Russia through 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization actively pursue the path of assert sovereignty rights 
over the internet and regard it as part of its sovereign territory, that is as an extension of the 
airspace, which in their view they are entitled to protect, as part of their ‘cyber territory’. 810 
Despite the fears that this quest for tighter cyberspace regulation and the underling ideology of 
asserting the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention may lead in the future to 
segmentation, states would have to entirely separate themselves from the global internet 
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network, in order to gain full sovereignty. It is doubtful that many would choose to pursue this 
course of action, but that does not mean that they will not continue to exert tighter controls 
therein. 
Assuming that cyberspace does not fall within the category of terra nullius, nor is a part of 
states’ sovereign territory (despite some movement in this direction), could it be considered a 
res communis? The idea that cyberspace is a global common has been mainly formulated and 
advocated by the US, although it is also featured in documents of other nations, such as the 
Canadian Cyber Security Strategy 2010.811 It is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the 
sovereign-based model championed by Russia and China. The strong support for the idea that 
cyberspace is a global common can be gleaned from inter alia, Remarks on Internet Freedom 
in 2010, in which Mrs Clinton called cyberspace a ‘global network commons’ and stated that 
‘the US stands for a single internet, where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and 
ideas’. 812  The US government’s view on cyberspace in the context of national security 
coincides with the description of ‘global network commons’ articulated by Mrs. Clinton. For 
example, the 2005 US Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support813 was stated to 
achieve the Defense Department’s main goal of securing the US from direct attack.814 To that 
end, it unveiled a ten-year timeframe, requiring ‘an active, layered defenses’,815 which ‘is 
global, seamlessly integrating US capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the global 
commons of space and cyberspace, in the geographic approaches to US territory, and within 
the United States’. 816  The subsequent 2008 US National Defense Strategy 817  lacks direct 
mention of cyberspace, as a ‘global network commons’, but continues the previous theme with 
oblique references to this domain as a global common.818  Similarly, the May 2011 Obama 
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Administration document The International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and 
Openness in a Networked World,819 stated that the US government’s main goal in cyberspace 
is to: 
 
[w]ork internationally to promote an open, interoperable, secure and reliable information 
and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, 
strengthens international security and fosters free expression and innovation. To achieve 
that goal, [the Administration] will build and sustain an environment, in which norms of 
responsible behavior guide states’ actions, sustain partnerships and support the rule of 
law in cyberspace.820  
 
In releasing International Strategy, the US unveiled its plans for the future of cyberspace, 
governed by the rule of law, where cyber security is addressed and which, at the same time 
views cyberspace, as a global political space. Furthermore, the Administration’s international 
cyberspace policy was said to ‘reflect (our) core commitments to fundamental freedoms, 
privacy and the free flow of information’.821 By combining economic, security, human rights 
and political concerns, the International Strategy gave support to the earlier, Secretary 
Clinton’s 2010 rhetoric contained in the Remarks on Internet Freedom.822  The same approach 
to cyberspace as a global common is also shared by some think-tanks, for example the US  
Centre of New American Security 2010 Report America’s Cyber Future: Security and 
Prosperity in Information Age, stated that sea, air, space and cyberspace all form global 
commons because they share four broad characteristics, namely (1) they are not owned nor 
controlled by any single entity; (2) their utility as a whole is greater than if broken down into 
smaller parts; (3) states and non-state actors with the requisite technical capabilities are able to 
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access and use them for economic, political, scientific and cultural purposes.823  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization seems also to support this view, as it claims in one of 
its Reports that ‘cyber domain could be considered, as one of the global commons, as it exists 
in an international space that is usable by everyone’.824 
 
 In terms of international law, for a resource to be so perceived, it must be part of 
enumerated domains, classified as the commons and satisfy the requirements of existing 
frameworks regulating those environments. Simply calling cyberspace a global common does 
not make it so. Therefore, what needs to be ascertained is whether, or not cyberspace falls 
within any of these regimes.  
It could be said that in international law, res communis, or ‘thing of the entire community’,825 
is the opposite to the idea of territorial sovereignty. International law lacks a specific definition 
of the term ‘global commons’, however the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development refers to them, as ‘natural assets outside national jurisdiction, such as the oceans, 
outer space and the Antarctic’.826 The concept of the global commons denotes limits to state 
sovereignty in certain parts of the world, as it opens these spaces to be used by the international 
community, but closed to exclusive appropriation by treaty, or custom.827 They therefore do 
not fall within the jurisdiction of any one country and are unique, in the sense that they have 
their own ‘geographical, economic, legal and administrative attributes’. 828  Further, the 
commons cannot be regarded as states, because they lack characteristics of statehood, such as 
permanent population and government. Therefore, as such, they are administered through a 
mixture of regulations at multiple levels, including multilateral treaty regimes, regional accords 
and national regulations.829 Thus, the areas of the high seas, the outer space and the Antarctic 
                                              
823 Centre for a New American Security, ‘America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in 
Information Age’, (2010)  <http://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/america-s-cyber-future-
security-and-prosperity-in-the-information-age#.VQb_0SjudFI>. 
824 Maj. Gen. Mark Rarrett, Dick Bedford, Elizabeth Skinner and Eva Vergles, ‘Assured 
Access to the Global Commons’, Supreme Allied Command Transformation (2011) 
<http://www.act.nato.int/globalcommons-reports>. 
825 Blacks’ Law Dictionary (West Group 1999), p. 1308. 
826 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Glossary of Statistical Terms, 
‘Global Commons’ <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1120>. 
827 Kamal Baslar, ‘The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law’, in 
Scott J. Shackelford, Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business and Relations 
(Cambridge University Press 2014).  
828 Christopher Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and 
Environmental Protection (University of South Carolina Press 1998) p. 222. 
829  supra note 89, p. 59. 
 146 
are regulated respectively by: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS), The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
use of Outer Space 1967 (The Outer Space Treaty) and The Antarctic Treaty 1959. These are 
disparate legal regimes, which apply differently to each domain they seek to govern, but with 
the common aim of ensuring the resources’ reasonable use and their sustainability. In this 
sense, they complement each other, because they confer rights and duties on all states. They 
also have three features in common, that is they allow for little, or no role for private parties in 
their governance, they are all controlled by a treaty and are subject to limits in terms of 
militarization, although in varied degrees. They also seek to protect individual states’ rights to 
use the domain of the common, provided that such use does not interfere with others’ 
freedom. 830  This gives every state such rights as the freedom to navigate, overfly, lay 
submarine cables and pipelines on the high seas,831 together with the ‘the exploration and use 
of outer space’.832 Some of the above mentioned conventions feature the principle of the 
‘common heritage of mankind’, which will be considered more fully later in this chapter.  Due 
to the rapid economic and technological developments in the late 20th and early 21st century, 
coupled with increasing international trade, the global commons have been confronted with 
new challenges and competing interest from a variety of stakeholders (states, non-state actors 
and international organizations) resulting in two different approaches to the issue of their 
governance and future, on the one hand the security/military and on the other hand, the 
environmental focus. The security and/or military perspective generally identifies three/four 
domains as global commons: the high seas, airspace, outer space and cyberspace (the latter 
mainly by the US).833 In the security discourse, the primary concern is safeguarding the access 
to these domains for commercial and military purposes. This is to some extent echoed in the 
policy stance of the US and other like minded states, reflected through the idea of ‘internet 
freedom’.  Conversely, the international organizations and groups with an  environmentalist 
focus, are increasingly concerned with the damage to the condition of the commons from 
                                              
830 Duncan Hollis, ‘Stewardship versus Sovereignty? International Law and the 
Apportionment of Cyberspace’ (2012) Cyberdialogue   
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038523>. 
831 Article 87(a)-(c) UNCLOS 1982, supra note 23. 
832 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (the Outer Space Treaty), 1967, 
18 UST 2410, art 1. 
833 Gerald Stang, ‘Global Commons: Between Cooperation and Competition’ (2013) 
European Union Institute for Security Studies 
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_17.pdf>. 
 147 
overuse and depletion of the natural resources (for example, ocean fish stocks) and damage 
done to these shared areas, such as Antarctica and the atmosphere.834 Their principle aim is to 
preserve the condition of these resources, in the spirit of sustainable development.835  
 As there is no overarching definition of the global commons, each of these domains 
and their governing regimes must be examined separately in order to determine if cyberspace 
fits into the legal definition of any of these environments. 
 
(a) The High Seas   
 
Despite the gradual erosion of the geographical extent of the high seas in favour of other 
maritime zones, such as the continental shelf, fisheries zones and the exclusive economic zone, 
they remain the largest of the maritime areas and retain many of the characteristics of the 
Grotian doctrine of the freedom of the seas.836 One such aspect, which continues to be adhered 
to, is the idea that high seas are beyond national appropriation and not subject to state 
sovereignty.  A considerable body of customary and conventional international law relating to 
the high sea was codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which was 
‘generally declaratory of established principles of international law’. 837  Eventually the 
provisions under the Geneva Convention were incorporated into the UNCLOS 1982, which 
deals with the high seas in Part VII. Article 86 provides a definition of the high seas, which are 
‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea, 
or and archipelagic state’.838 Article 89 precludes any state from seeking to subject any part of 
the high seas to its sovereignty, stating that ‘no state may validly purport to subject any part of 
the high seas to its sovereignty’.839 The provision regarding the freedom of the high seas is 
contained in Article 87(1), whereby: 
 
 [t]he high seas are open to all states, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of 
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and 
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by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and 
land-locked states: 
(a) freedom of navigation; 
(b)  freedom of over flight;  
(c)  freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines subject to Part VI; 
(d)  freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations; permitted 
under international law, subject to Part VI; 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; 
(f)  freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.840 
 
The list is not exhaustive and recognizes states’ capacity to engage in other activities consistent 
with the freedoms, but for peaceful purposes only, as specifically noted in Article 88. Further, 
since the freedom of the seas is no absolute, any activity must be conducted consistently with 
the 1982 UNLOSC and other rules of international law, having ‘due regard to the interests of 
other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas’.841  
 Part VII of the Treaty contains provisions, which address the state of ships and their 
obligation whilst on the high seas. Article 91 recognizes states’ rights to sail ships under their 
flag842 and that states must exercise jurisdiction and control over ships flying their flag.843 The 
Convention also lists activities that are strictly prohibited, namely piracy, slavery, drug 
trafficking and unauthorized broadcasting.  
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(b) The Outer Space 
 
The 1957 launch of the USSR’s artificial satellite Sputnik 1 marked the dawn of human activity 
in outer space. The event triggered a discussion among the international community regarding 
the development of principles and laws to govern that domain. In 1959 the United Nations 
created a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), whose mission was to 
‘review the scope of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, to devise 
programs in this field to be undertaken under United Nations auspices, to encourage continued 
research and the dissemination of information on outer space matters and to study legal 
problems arising form the exploration of outer space’. 844  COPUOS created two sub 
committees: the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee, which 
helped to negotiate and discuss a suite of international treaties relating to outer space including: 
The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the ‘Outer Space Treaty)’845 
and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (the ‘Moon Treaty’).846  
 
 The legal status of outer space and celestial bodies at the time of negotiation was subject of 
disagreement between opposing camps. At one end of the spectrum was the U.S., together with 
some Western states, who analogized outer space to the high seas and at the other, the Soviet 
block, preferring an analogy to airspace, which is subject to territorial sovereignty. 847  
Ultimately, a consensus was reached and the legal status of the outer space was crystallized in 
the 1961 General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), according to which ‘outer space and 
celestial bodies are free from exploration and use by all states in conformity with international 
law and are not subject to national appropriation’. 848 The 1967 Outer Space Treaty was 
subsequently arrived at and forms the bases of the international space regime. It codified the 
status of outer space, as free from state sovereignty by specifically proclaiming in Article II 
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that ‘outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means’.849 Article I provides that the exploration and use of outer space must be carried out 
‘for the benefit and the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
social development and shall be the province of all mankind’.850 Other important provisions 
relate to prohibition imposed on states relating to certain military uses, among them under 
Article IV ‘placing in orbit, installing on celestial bodies, or stationing in outer space nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction’.851 The Article further states that: 
  
[t]he Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties to the Treaty 
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and 
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military 
manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for 
scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use 
of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other 
celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.852 
 
Articles VI-VII assign states international responsibility: 
 
for national activities in outer space [whether such activities are carried on by 
governmental agencies, or by non-governmental entities and for ensuring that national 
activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present 
Treaty.853 
 
The 1979 Moon Treaty is another important instrument, which specifically provides that the 
Moon is not subject to sovereignty claim. Article 11(2) states that ‘the Moon is not subject to 
national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means’,854 whilst Article 11(1) proclaims the Moon and its natural resources, as common 
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heritage of mankind. 855  It obliges states ‘to establish an international regime, including 
appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon, as such 
exploitation is about to become feasible.’856 Similarly to the Outer Space Treaty, military 
activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies are also subject to restrictions and must be 
‘carried out in accordance with international law, in particular the Charter of the United 
Nations’.857 Any activity on the Moon may only be carried out for ‘peaceful purposes’,858 ‘any 
threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act’ is prohibited,859 as is 
placing or using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on or in orbit around the Moon, 
establishing military bases, or conducting weapons tests.860 
The regimes created by the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty confirm that the 
outer space and the celestial bodies cannot be subject to sovereign claim by states and similarly 
to the law of the sea, they also rely on governance by treaty. Furthermore, they specifically 
either limit and regulate military activities (the Moon Treaty), or altogether prohibit use of 




 Prior to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, seven states made territorial claims to 
parts of that continent between 1908-1943.861 During the International Geophysical Year 1957-
8, 12 countries established their bases on Antarctica, mainly for scientific research purposes. 
Subsequently the Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959.862 The Treaty comprises 14 Articles 
and obliges the countries active in Antarctica to consult on the uses of a whole continent. In 
Article 1 the Treaty specifically stipulates that ‘Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes 
only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the 
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as 
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well as the testing of any type of weapon.’863 The Treaty sets aside the potential for sovereignty 
disputes between Treaty parties by providing that no activities will enhance, or diminish 
previously asserted territorial claims and stipulates that no new, or enlarged claims can be 
made.864 This is set out in Article IV, which states that: 
 
1. [n]othing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
  a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of 
  or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
  a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of  
  claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether  
  as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica,  
  or otherwise; 
  prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its  
  recognition or non-recognition of any other State’s rights of or claim  
  or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a 
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an 
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present 
Treaty is in force. 
 
 
Thus, the Antarctic Treaty puts aside the potential for conflict over sovereignty by providing 
that nothing that occurs while the Treaty is in force will enhance or diminish territorial 
claims.865 Furthermore, Article V ‘prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive 
waste’, Article II protects the ‘freedom of scientific investigation’, whilst Article VII provides 
for inspection by observers, designated by any party, of ships, stations and equipment to ensure 
the observance of and compliance with the Treaty. The observers are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the state that they represent, by virtue of Article VIII.  
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The Treaty has 46 signatories866 and provides in Article XIII that any member of the 
United Nations can accede to it. It entered into force on 23rd July 1961 and since then has been 
recognized, as one of the most successful international agreements.867 It declares Antarctica as 
non-sovereign, putting aside any differences over territorial claims and providing for a 
disarmament regime, but at the same time enabling Treaty parties to protect their essential 
Antarctic interests.868 The governance regime, similarly to that of the high seas and the outer 
space, is treaty based and developed through multilateral negotiations. The two outstanding 
features of the Antarctic Treaty are the use for peaceful purposes only and the continent’s total 
de-militarization.  
 
(d) Cyberspace as a Global Common?  
 
Apart from the assignation of cyberspace as a global common by a handful of states, this 
categorization has been adopted by some journalists, especially in regards to the challenges of 
the internet governance.869 The academic opinion however, is divided on the issue. Some 
scholars believe that it does have such a status,870 others disagree and support only some 
aspects of such reasoning,871 whilst another group reject it entirely.872  
At the outset, it could be said that the ‘old’ global commons share some unique 
characteristics, namely (1) they cannot be subject to sovereignty; (2) they are all natural 
environments, which acquired the status of global commons by discovery; (3) they are all 




869 For example, Bill Davidow, ‘The Tragedy of the Internet Commons’ (May 2012) The 
Atlantic <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/05/the-tragedy-of-the-
internet-commons/257290/>; Dominic Basulto, “The ‘Doomsday’ Virus and the Tragedy of 
the Internet Commons” (July 2012) Washington Post  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/the-doomsday-virus-and-the-
tragedy-of-the-internet-commons/2012/07/>.  
870 Gerald Stang, ‘Global Commons: Between Cooperation and Competition’ (2013) 
European Union Institute for Security Studies 
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_17.pdf>; Kamlesh Bajaj, ‘Cyberspace as 
Global Commons: The Challenge’, (2012) Cyber Security 
<https://www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/Cyberspace%20as%20Global%20Common_DATAQ
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871 for example, Sean Kanuck, ‘Sovereignty Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International 
Law’ (2010) 88 Texas Law Review.  
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governed by international treaties; (4) each of these treaties provides for specific permissible 
uses, such as peaceful purposes and scientific research; (5) each prohibit certain belligerent 
behaviour of states, such as use of nuclear weapons; (6) each area that constitutes the common 
is well defined by its treaty, thus: (a) The Antarctic Treaty defines global commons as ‘south 
of 60 degrees South Latitude, including all ice shelves’;873 (b) high seas extend to ‘all parts of 
the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state’,874 therefore 
where a coastal state has claimed an EEZ of 200nm, the high seas commence from that point;875 
(c) the Outer Space Treaty proclaims global commons to be ‘all outer space, including the 
Moon and other natural celestial bodies’;876 finally (6) the global commons are shared by all.  
Cyberspace is often referred to as one, monolithic domain, when in fact it is formed of 
layers, which comprise the hardware (referred to as the physical layer), the logical 
infrastructure layer and the content layer.877 Some commentators point to a fundamental flaw 
in categorizing cyberspace as a common, drawing attention to the fact that at least some of 
cyberspace’s physical layer is located within sovereign territories, which makes it 
fundamentally incompatible with the idea of the ‘commons’. Thus, Kanuck wrote that: 
 
[e]very component of every information and telecommunications network around the 
world, under the sea and in the air is subject to proprietary interests-whether that of a 
private company, a sovereign government, or possibly both. Each copper wire, fiber-
optic cable, microwave relay tower, satellite transporter, or internet router has been 
produced or installed by some entity, whose legal successors not only maintain 
ownership of that physical asset but also expect protection of the same by sovereign 
authorities.878  
 
This is a compelling argument, which also reinforces another fundamental difference between 
the global commons and cyberspace: the former are entirely natural environments, whilst the 
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latter is a wholly artificial one. The global commons would continue existing without human 
support. Indeed, it could be argued that the human activities on the oceans, the outer space and 
the Antarctic are detrimental to the very existence of these spaces. In that sense, continued 
human presence therein has been termed as the ‘tragedy of the commons’, because the ‘freedom 
of the commons brings ruin to all’.879 The same cannot be said about the physical assets of 
cyberspace, which are entirely dependent on human management and maintenance. 
Admittedly, some parts of the physical infrastructure of cyberspace are located within the ambit 
of the global commons, such as the fiber-optic cables laid on the ocean floor, but this alone 
does not qualify them as a ‘common’, since proprietary rights have already been vested in 
them.  
Assuming that this is the case, could the content layer be classified as a global common? It is 
the information flow, the ether, which is so often characterized, as ubiquitous, ‘a common 
knowledge common’, or a ‘common pool of resources’, that has the ability to travel almost 
without restriction across borders and jurisdictions.  In all probability the ether itself may not 
be owned, however legal structures can be imposed on the means, by which wireless 
communications and media broadcasts are propagated, both by the national authorities and 
international organizations. The International Communications Union for example, performs 
such a role in allocating electromagnetic frequencies among users and proscribe unauthorized 
interferences. Equally, states have demonstrated willingness to restrict, censor and on some 
occasions, ban entirely the information flow and content by a variety of means, including 
filtering techniques, self-regulation and legislation. Such delimiting of what should, or should 
not form part of the content layer of cyberspace shows that it is not free from sovereign rights, 
unlike the global commons, which by definition must be. 
There are other differences between cyberspace and the domains of the global 
commons. As the latter were subject of discovery, a concerted effort was made by international 
community to subject them to a governance regime laid down in the treaties. Cyberspace has 
been constructed, not discovered and thus far lacks an internationally agreed governance 
structure solidified in an international document. Finally, whilst the areas of the global 
commons are designated for peaceful purposes, cyberspace has been and continues to be used 
for belligerent ends (alleged Russian attacks on Estonia and the Staxnet worm being the most 
frequently invoked examples). It is also subject to progressive militarization, both for defensive 
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and offensive purposes. For example, in 2011 the US Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn, 
observed that ‘the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare’ 
and that ‘many militaries are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace’.880  
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 International Group of Experts was also skeptical with respect of 
assimilating cyberspace to the high seas, international airspace, or the outer space in the sense 
of constituting a global common.881 The Group noted that although such characterization may 
be useful in other than legal context, adopting such a nomenclature for cyberspace would 
‘disregard the territorial features of cyberspace and cyber operations that implicate the principle 
of sovereignty’.882 The Group particularly observe that ‘although cyber activities may cross 
multiple borders, or occur in international waters, international airspace, or outer space, all are 
conducted by individuals or entities subject to the jurisdiction of one or more [s]tates’.883 
Nevertheless, there are clear unifying factors between cyberspace and the ‘old’ 
domains, one being that none of them is currently partitioned along territorial lines. This 
however, could be a matter of necessity rather than design. By their nature, the high seas and 
the outer space are impossible to carve up into separate territories. Admittedly Antarctica, 
being a continent, is subject to territorialization along the Wesphalian lines, as some states have 
already established their presence there. Therefore, the suspension of further sovereign claims 
has been achieved by agreement, rather than necessity. Similar reasoning could be applied to 
cyberspace. Although it may be argued that it is susceptible to segmentation, to do so would 
undermine its very purpose, thus ‘non-sovereignty’ could be partially a result of an 
international agreement and partially of an inability to totally enclose it within any given 
territorial boundary. 
 Another similarity between cyberspace and the global commons relates to the governance 
challenge. One of the reasons behind entrusting the global commons to the care of the whole 
of the international community, as shared resources, was a recognition that these spaces are 
just too big and too challenging to be looked after by any individual state alone and therefore 
their stewardship was entrusted to a collective.884 The same could be said of cyberspace. 
Governments have demonstrated an ability to regulate some aspects of cyberspace and its 
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effects within their territories. Arguably, states acting in isolation cannot effectively resolve 
challenges posed by such activities, as cyber crime.885 It was this realization that prompted the 
2001  Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which entered into force in 2004 and its 
open to any state. To date, the Convention has been ratified by forty-four states, including non-
Council of Europe members, such as Australia, Japan and the United States. Its Preamble 
specifically recognizes ‘the value of fostering co-operation with the other States parties to this 
Convention and it is ‘convinced of the need to pursue, as a matter of priority, a common 
criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cyber crime, inter alia, by adopting 
appropriate legislation and fostering international cooperation’.886 
In summary, the current mechanisms for the management of the global commons are a 
good starting point and a useful analogy for guiding any future cyberspace governance. 
However, the differences outlined above between the global commons and cyberspace are 
such, that cyberspace as a whole does not meet the internationally accepted legal criteria to be 
construed as a global common under the existing international law. This necessitates a sui 
generis regime for that domain.  
 
 
3. CYBERSPACE AND THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 
 
The term ‘global commons’ denotes international domains, which hold common-pool 
resources and include the high seas, the Antarctic and the outer space. ‘Common heritage of 
mankind’ by comparison, is a principle of international law, which applies to ‘the parts of the 
Earth and cosmos that can be said to belong to human posterity, without regard for geographical 
location. The term embraces the ocean floor and its subsoil and outer space’. 887  While 
cyberspace, on the face of it, seems not to be one of the areas of the global commons for the 
reasons outlined above, it will be shown here that the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind, applied by analogy, may be of value in this context.  
 Over time international law has developed a number of different types of legal regimes to 
govern natural resources, which include: (1) according states exclusive permanent sovereignty 
over some resources derived from the idea of territoriality; (2) sharing resources, for example 
international rivers and migratory species; (3) recognizing common property rights, as in the 
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case of high seas, where no one user has exclusive rights to resources and no one can exclude 
others from exploiting them; (4) recognizing property, as a common heritage of mankind, 
whereby all manage resources and share in the rewards of exploiting them, even if they are 
unable to participate in that exploitation.888  
 
(a) Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law 
 
The principle of common heritage of mankind (CHM) was adopted in Article 1 of the 1970 
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction 889 (also known as the Declaration of 
Principles 1970), which states that ‘the sea bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as an area), as well as the resources of 
the area, are the common heritage of mankind’.890  
 
The international treaties, explicitly mentioning the CHM are: 
  
(1)  The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which states in Article 1 that 
 
[t]he exploration and the use of outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development 
and shall be the province of all mankind.891 
 
(2) Article 11 of the 1979 Moon Treaty explicitly refers to CHM principle, by  
 stating that ‘The Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of  
 mankind’.892 
(3) Part XI of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which in Article 
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136 provides that ‘the area and the resources are the common heritage of mankind’.893 
The ‘area’ is defined in the Convention as ‘the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’894 and ‘resources’ are enumerated as 
‘subsoil, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the area at or beneath the seabed, 
including polymetallic nodules’;895 
 
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty does not refer to the CHM, but there is a broad consensus that the 
Treaty provides normative bases for its application to that environment.896 
 The common heritage concept is embodied in great detail in the 1982 UNCLOS, Part XI and 
as such, has been hailed as ‘one of the most advanced frameworks ever articulated, with the 
aim of achieving the equitable sharing of resources among states and peoples’.897 The elements 
often associated with the CHM principle include: (1) a prohibition of acquisition of, or exercise 
of sovereignty over the area or resources in question; (2) the vesting of rights to the resources 
in question in humankind as a whole; (3) reservation of the area in question for peaceful 
purposes; (4) protection of the natural environment; (5) an equitable sharing of benefits 
associated with the exploitation of the resources in question, paying particular attention to the 
interests and needs of developing states; and (6) governance via a common management 
regime.898  
  The CHM has been the subject of debate and controversy since it was first introduced 
in the 1960s and it remains so to this day. The uncertainty relates to its scope, content and 
status. This is for an number of reasons, one being that no one global forum reached a consensus 
on its meaning at the early development stages and consequently its ‘fleshing out’ was left to 
the commentators, who disagree about its legal status and elements. 899 In addition, CHM 
questions the regimes that apply to resources of global significance, irrespective of where they 
are situated and therefore challenges traditional international law concepts, such as acquisition 
of territory, sovereignty, sovereign equality and international personality as well as the 
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allocation of planetary resources and consent-based sources of international law.900 
 As regards its legal status, academic opinions vary as to whether it constitutes a principle of 
international law, a theory, a doctrine, or just a political and philosophical notion.901 Some 
confine it to the realm of ‘politics, philosophy and morality’, 902  others point out to the 
undeniable fact that the CHM is contained in international treaties,903 which have effectively 
prevented developed countries’ private enterprise from starting to exploit CHM spaces until 
now.904 There is some support for the argument that the common heritage principle, since it 
was introduced by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2574,905 sets out a fundamental and 
non-derogable norm, constituting jus cogens obligation.906 In fact, it was the subsequent 1970 
Declaration of Principles,907 which followed on from the original CHM that provided for the 
principles of non-appropriation, peaceful use, universal participation in its management and 
exploitation, equitable sharing in the benefits flowing from the exploitation of the seabed 
(especially benefiting developing countries), scientific cooperation and protection of the 
environment.908 However, whether these principles amount to jus cogens is uncertain, as they 
may merely be of  lex ferenda value.909  
 As for its content, an example of what the CHM comprises can be found in Part XI on 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.910 Part XI of the UNCLOS 1982 
represents a comprehensive legal regime, setting out the norms and institutional arrangements 
for regulating the seabed as common heritage of mankind, a fact which in itself was interpreted 
as a major landmark and an important departure from traditional liberal international law.911 
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Four norms comprise the CHM regime applicable to the seabed. Fist, Article 137 states that 
‘no state shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the area or its 
resources, nor shall any state or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof’.912 
Secondly, Article 140 (1) provides that: 
 
[a]ctivities in the area shall […] be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 
irrespective of geographical location of states, whether coastal, or land locked and taking 
into particular consideration the interests and the needs of developing states and of 
peoples who have not attained full independence or other self governing status […]913 
 
 and in subsection (2) calls for ‘equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits 
derived from activities in the area through any appropriate mechanism, on a non-discriminatory 
basis’.914 Thirdly, Article 141 obliges states to explore and exploit the area ‘exclusively for 
peaceful purposes’;915 and finally (d) Article 145 sets out a duty ‘to ensure effective protection 
for the marine environment from harmful effects which may arise from (activities) in the 
area’.916 
Article 156 established the International Seabed Authority, an organization through which all 
states ‘shall organize and control activities in the area’,917 a provision, which calls for common 
governance and management of the area.   
The regime set out in the 1979 Moon Treaty resembles Part XI of the UNCLOS 1982 
in the following ways. It prohibits occupation, or appropriation. Thus, Article 11(2) of the 
Moon Treaty provides that ‘the Moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means’. 918 It also considers 
utilization of the Moon and its resources to be for the benefit of the mankind. In this context, 
Article 4 provides for the ‘exploration and the use of the Moon [to be] a province of all mankind 
and shall be carried for the benefit and the interest of all countries’.919 Furthermore, it obliges 
peaceful use- Article 3 states that ‘the Moon shall be used by all parties exclusively for peaceful 
                                              
912 UNCLOS, supra note 23, art 137(1).  
913 ibid art 140(1).  
914 ibid art 140(2). 
915 ibid art 141. 
916 ibid art145.  
917 ibid art 157. 
918 The Moon Treaty, supra note 108, art 11(2).  
919  ibid art 4. 
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purposes’. 920  It protects the environment. 921  Finally, it makes provision for a common 
administration through setting up of ‘an international regime, including appropriate 
procedures, to govern the exploitation of natural resources of the Moon’.922  
 
 To summarise, the CHM principle is a product of the 1960s and 1970s political climate 
and incorporates several norms including non-appropriation, equitable sharing, peaceful 
purposes, environmental protection and cooperation in the management of common resources. 
The controversy surrounding the concept relates to its undefined content and legal status. 
However, its successful application to the areas specified in the treaties is a testament to its 
success and continued utility. It has also undergone a revival in recent years in the context of 
its proposed application to cyberspace governance. 
 
(b) Common Heritage of Mankind and Cyberspace Governance 
 
 Since there is no agreement among the international community regarding the nature of 
cyberspace, deciding on the legal framework that is acceptable to all states is inevitably going 
to be challenging. Achieving such framework could be informed and inspired through analogy 
to the principle of common heritage of mankind. Admittedly, the reality of state practice and 
the elements of the CHM are not a perfect fit, however that does not mean that the principle 
should not be a guide to inform the cooperation among states to resolve the current political 
impasse, resulting from the Dubai 2012 Conference, as outlined in the previous chapter. Before 
analysing how CHM relates to the current state practice in cyberspace, it is worth reiterating 
that the physical infrastructure of cyberspace, which is located within state’s territory is subject 
to that state’s territorial sovereignty. It is the content layer of cyberspace, which may benefit 
from applying CHM by analogy.  
 Despite the fact that there is no definition of CHM and therefore no agreement on its 
component parts, four core elements (some outline above) are commonly perceived to 
comprise the principle.  
The first dictates that the area under consideration cannot be subject to appropriation. 
Assuming that the internet’s methods of establishing communication are non-territorial, 
because names and addresses create a virtual space that is often independent of geography and 
                                              
920  ibid art 3. 
921  ibid art 7. 
922  ibid art 11(5). 
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usable by anyone without paying a fee,923 then the principle of non appropriation may be 
satisfied. It is true that private and public companies own the internet infrastructure, but it is 
doubtful that they own its content, which is created by everyone who uses the facility. This 
does not preclude state’s control and there are sufficient examples of practices, some of which 
were outlined in the Chapter 2 of this study, relating to content regulation. Such practices 
however do not equate with content ‘appropriation’. On the other hand, although the internet 
is decentralized, it is under a great influence of one state, namely the US. This is due to a 
number of factors, such as almost total domination over the internet service provision by the 
American technology giants, the US government’s having had the ultimate control over the 
entire world’s domain name and numbering system until October 2016924 and the internet 
architecture giving US intelligence agencies access to data of millions of non-US citizens. It is 
in this sense and through US privately own companies, such as cable owners, the hardware and 
software developers and the commercial enterprises (Google, Amazon, Instagram, Facebook, 
Ebay etc.,), which dominate the word telecommunication sector that the idea of non-
appropriation comes under strain. It is their almost total domination of that market place, which 
could be equated with ‘appropriation’. Even this logic however, should not preclude the CHM 
from forming the basic building block of future governance. In this sense, the idea of non-
appropriation could reinforce the aspirations behind internet governance articulated by the 
Working Group on Internet Governance, defined as ‘the development and application by 
governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, 
norms, rules, decision-making procedures and programmes that shape the evolution and use of 
the internet’.925 If the content layer of cyberspace were to have the status of the common 
heritage of mankind set out in a legally binding treaty, this could hypothetically preserve the 
internet as a open forum for exchange of information, while at the same time recognizing 
sovereign rights of states and involve all community from both developing and developed 
nations.926 
                                              
923 Milton Mueller, John Mathiason and Hans Klein, ‘The Internet and Global Governance: 
Principle and Norms for a New Regime’ (2007) 13 Global Governance 237. 
924 Edward Moyer, ‘US Hands Internet Control to ICANN’ (2 October 2016)  
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925 Report form the Working Group on Internet Governance, World Summit on the 
Information Society, Geneva 2003-Tunnis 2005 (3 August 2005), Doc. WSIS-II/PC-
3/DOC/5E, 3 para 10. 
926 Sugera-Serrano, supra note 158. 
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The second element of the CHM principle is that all countries must share in the management 
of the resources. For such management to become a reality in the context of cyberspace, a 
specialist agency would need to be established to coordinate shared management policies. 
International Seabed Authority (ISBA) could be seen as an example of an international 
institution with clear delineation of powers and responsibilities, which made it a successful 
guardian of deep seabed resources, that would have otherwise been open for exploitation by 
the states with the best technological leverage. By designating the area as a common heritage 
of mankind site, the international community recognized a need for establishing the 
International Seabed Authority as a central institution, through which according to Article 157 
(1) of the  UNCLOS 1982, ‘state parties shall organize and control activities in the area, 
particularly with a view to administering the resources of the area’.927 The ISBA does not have 
an absolute power over the seabed, rather its competence relates only to mineral resources on 
the seabed’s surface.  This means that activities that have an impact on the seabed, but which 
are unconnected with the mineral resources are unregulated by that organization. 928 
Consequently, the ISBA does not have any general environmental jurisdiction over the seabed. 
Although Article 145 of the  UNCLOS 1982929 expressly states that the authority shall adopt 
appropriate rules, regulations and procedures to protect the marine environment from damage 
from prospecting, exploring and mining resources on the seabed, it is only in the context of 
mitigating the environmental impact of mining the minerals and does not relate to all activities 
on the seabed. The ISBA structure is set out in the UNLOSC 1982 and made up of three 
principal organs, the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat. There are a further three bodies 
that make up the ISBA, that is the Enterprise, is an organ through which the ISBA carries out 
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prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine. environment. 
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its capacity to engage with seabed mining directly and two subsidiaries, Legal and Technical 
Commission and the Finance Committee. Decision-making is by consensus and only when that 
fails, decisions may be taken by vote. Applying by analogy some of these ideas and structures 
to the content layer of cyberspace by establishing a body modelled on the ISBA may help to 
diffuse the disproportionate influence over this domain by the US. The fact that such an 
authority will not have a general jurisdiction over all matters relating to the entirety of 
cyberspace, but be a guardian in protecting the content layer from exploitation by a handful of 
wealthy and technologically advanced states to the detriment of the rest of the international 
community, could contribute to equitable sharing. The International Telecommunications 
Union continues to be the UN organization of choice for some states, such as the Russian 
Federation and the People’s Republic of China to oversea the functioning of the internet. 
However, in the light of the US government’s handover of the naming of the domain name 
system to ICANN in 2016, the role of the ITU as the leading body overseeing the workings of 
the internet seems to have been side-lined and appears now to be even more aspirational then 
before. Nevertheless, the ITU continues in its role of allocating globally of the frequency bands 
of the electronic spectrum for various wireless telecommunications systems, such as mobile 
telephony or GPS.  Whether or not its role as a guardian protecting the content layer of the 
internet will ever materialize is highly speculative. The added uncertainty also relates to the 
ITU’s role as a standard setting body handling such issues as mass cyber surveillance and 
privacy protection. 
The third element of the CHM dictates that there must be an active sharing of the benefits 
reaped from the exploitation of the area resources.  This relates in many respects to the previous 
idea of shared management, but its main thrust is on making sure that developed and 
developing countries benefit equally. The 2003-2005 World Summit on the Information 
Society in the Declaration of Principles, referred to in the previous chapter, made a 
‘commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-orientated information 
society’930 central to its common vision of information society. This commitment arose out of 
                                              
930 Declaration of Principles of the World Summit on the Information Society, Building the 
Information Society: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium, 
Principle 1: 
 [w]e, the representatives of the peoples of the world, assembled in Geneva from 10-12 
December 2003 for the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, 
declare our common desire and commitment to build a people-centered, inclusive and 
development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize 
and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples 
to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and 
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the recognition contained in paragraph 10 of the Declaration, ‘that the benefits of the 
information technology revolution are today unevenly distributed between the developed and 
developing countries and within societies. We are fully committed to turning this digital divide 
into a digital opportunity for all, particularly for those who risk being left behind and being 
further marginalized’.931 This is why ‘the representatives of the people of the world’932 who 
gathered at the WSIS pledged to continue to ‘pay special attention to the particular needs of 
people of developing countries’933 through ‘building an inclusive information society, which 
requires new forms of solidarity partnership and cooperation among governments and other 
stakeholders, i.e. the private sector, civil society and international organizations’.934 The idea 
of equitable sharing, for example in the context of deep seabed mining, has long been contested 
by the US. Although the principle seems to be well suited in the context of cyberspace, its 
future may be confined to an aspiration, rather than reality and perhaps should be subsumed, 
at least for the time being, within the concept of common management, as a more realistic 
solution.  
Finally, the area subject to the CHM must be reserved for peaceful purposes. In this context, 
‘the militarization of cyberspace is not a risk, it is already a fact, with the armed forces of 
several states establishing cyber units and including cyber operations in their military doctrines 
and strategies’.935 Cyberspace, as a ‘fifth battlefield’, is a reality and the existing rules of jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello are not only applicable, through the notion of evaluative 
interpretation of treaties, but also flexible enough to meet the challenges of new cyber 
realities.936 It is in this sense that the CHM could serve a particularly useful purpose, as a 
principle to help foster cyberspace disarmament and promote knowledge, information and 
communication, education and political participation.937 
 
                                              
improving their quality of life, premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter 
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 The common heritage of mankind, as a set of principles could play a useful role in the 
future of internet governance. It is true to say that at present its constituent elements are not 
quite the perfect fit. However, it has a successful track record in the context of the exploitation 
of deep sea bed resources. Therefore, in spite of its limitations, the common heritage of 
mankind ‘applies reasonably well to the internet’s core resources’, albeit ‘it has not been 
mentioned to date in the context of internet governance negotiations’.938  
 
4. THE REGIMES GOVERNING THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE/  
CONTINENTAL SHELF AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO 
 CYBERSPACE  
 
There are examples in international law, where an alternative categorization of the Earth’s 
resources has been utilized providing a legal framework for areas that are neither a sovereign 
territory, nor a global common.  In fact, sovereignty and res communis, according to Hollis, 
operate as two poles, with a spectrum of other resources and governance frameworks lying 
between them.939 Two examples of such regimes are the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 
the Continental Shelf (CS). It is submitted that some aspects of cyberspace share the 
characteristics of EEZ/CS regimes and could be classified as such a hybrid domain for the 
purposes of legal classification. 
The rationale for establishing the EEZ was two-fold. First, it was dictated by the ambition 
of the southern states to obtain their fair share of coastal maritime living and non-living 
resources. Secondly, there was an expectation that it would address the tragedy of the ocean 
commons resulting from the unregulated exploitation of marine living resource through their 
enclosure within the 200nm zone and therefore better its management.940 It could be said that 
for over thirty years the EEZ/CS have successfully merged sovereign rights in relation to 
economic resources and jurisdiction in relation to these and other rights, such as environmental 
protection. They are distinct regimes that combine the characteristics of territorial sovereignty, 
with those of res communis.941   
The definitions of both the EEZ and the Continental Shelf contained in Article 55 and 
Article 77(1) of the 1982 UNCLOS respectively have been referred to in Chapter 2. The EEZ 
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940 Rothwell and Stephens, supra note 35, p.83. 
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is the water column, seabed and subsoil of a outer limit of 200nm, whereas the Continental 
Shelf is a shallow area of the seafloor adjacent to the coast, where the so-called continental 
margin slopes down gradually from the landmass into the sea until it begins to drop more 
sharply towards the deep ocean floor942 and also extends to 200nm. This creates some overlap 
between the two regimes. The precursor to the EEZ was the assertion by some states (mainly 
Iceland) of the fisheries jurisdiction in the Exclusive Fishing Zone, which until 1971 extended 
to 50nm.943 In parallel, other states, such as the US through the 1945 Truman Proclamation 
also claimed jurisdiction over economic resources on appurtenant continental shelves.944 State 
practice in the years prior to the negotiations of the UNCLOS 1982 firmly established 200nm 
as the breath of the EEZ, which was by that time generally recognized as part of customary 
law.  
The legal framework governing the EEZ is set out in Part V of the 1982 UNCLOS, whereas 
that applicable to the Continental Shelf, in Part VI.  A feature that is worth noting, is that the 
EEZ is a ‘claimable’ maritime zone.945  By contrast, the continental shelf is a resource zone 
that does not need to be claimed. In line with Article 57 of the 1982 Convention, the EEZ 
extends from the baseline of the territorial sea to cover the area not exceeding 200nm.  
 Part V of the UNCLOS 1982 draws a distinction between two categories of states, that is, 
coastal states and other states. The former are afforded (1) sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources of the seabed, subsoil and 
water column; together with (2) jurisdiction in relation to artificial structures, marine scientific 
research and environmental preservation and protection.946 Non-costal states have the freedom 
                                              
942 ibid p. 98. 
943 ibid. 
944 ibid. 
945 UNLOSC 1982, art 5 Breadth of the Exclusive Economic Zone: 
‘[t]he exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.’ 
946 UNCLOS art 56 Rights, Jurisdiction and Duties of the Coastal State in the     Exclusive 
Economic Zone: 
 1. [i]n the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:  
(a)  sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard 
to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, 
such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;  
(b)  jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention 
with regard to:  
 (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations 
    and structures; 
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of navigation and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and ‘other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms’.947  
 
(a) Sovereign Rights of Coastal States 
 
The sovereign rights in the EEZ of coastal states extend to both living and non-living resources.  
In the case of living resources these rights verge on absolute,948 since by virtue of 
Article 56 UNCLOS 1982, coastal states are given exclusive sovereign rights over fisheries 
and exclusive jurisdiction to regulate fishing in the EEZ.949 The rights allocated under Article 
62 UNCLOS 1982 relate to virtually every aspect of fishing, which places it under coastal 
state’s close scrutiny. For example, coastal states have sole discretion in setting allowable catch 
of the living resources in their zone.950 However, they are under a duty to ensure that the living 
resources are not exhausted by over exploitation through proper conservation and management 
measures.951  In principle, when the coastal nations do not have a capacity to harvest the entire 
allowable catch, they must give other states access to its surplus.952 This right, as noted by 
Rothwell and Stephens, in practice is not enforceable because ‘coastal state decisions 
determining the allowable catch, the extent of harvesting capacity and the allocation of 
surpluses, fall within one of the few exceptions to the compulsory dispute resolution system 
set out in Part XV’.953  
There is a total overlap between the regimes of the EEZ and the CS regarding the non-living 
resources found in the seabed and subsoil. Both regimes confer on coastal states exclusive 
rights of exploitation and exploration for non-living seabed resources, such as hydrocarbons 
and minerals, without any obligation of conservation, or judicious use.954 In this sense, the 
rights over the non-living resources are full and exclusive, as they place no requirement on 
                                              
(ii) marine scientific research; 
   (iii)  the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
947 ibid, art 58(1). 
948 Rothwell and Stephens, supra note 35, p.88. 
949 UNCLOS, art 62(4):  
[n]ationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with 
the conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions established in the 
laws and regulations of the coastal State. 
950 UNCLOS, art 61. 
951 UNCLOS, art 61(2). 
952 ibid, art 62(2). 
953 Rothwell and Stephens, supra note 35, p. 88. 
954 ibid p.89. 
 170 
these countries to share access, not to mention any benefits, from their exploitation, as could 
be gleaned from the wording of Article 77 UNCLOS.955  
 
(b) Jurisdiction of Coastal States 
 
Article 56 of the UNCLOS 1982 confers on states jurisdiction in relation to specified activities, 
namely (1) establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (2) marine 
scientific research (3) the protection and preservation of marine environment and (4) other 
rights and duties as specified under the Convention.956 
With regard to artificial islands, installations and structures, the jurisdictional rights 
under the regime of EEZ (Article 60) substantially overlaps with that set up under the CS 
(Article 80). According to Article 60, states have exclusive jurisdiction to construct, authorise 
and regulate the construction and operation of artificial islands, installations and structures for 
economic purposes.957 Moreover, they also have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to customs, 
                                              
955 UNCLOS, art 77 Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf 
 1. [t]he coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 
 2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal 
State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one 
may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State. 
 3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on 
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.  
 4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-
living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging 
to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either 
are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant 
physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.  
956 UNCLOS, art 56(1)(b).  
957 UNCLOS, art 60 Artificial Islands, Installations and Structures in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone 
 1. [i]n the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to 
construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of: 
   (a) artificial islands; 
   (b)  installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 
and   
         other economic purposes; 
   (c)  installations and structures which may interfere with the 
 exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.  
 2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, 
installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, 
health, safety and immigration laws and regulations. 
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fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.958 This provision allows facilities 
to be constructed to take advantage of all economic resources both in and on the seabed and 
the water column.959 Of particular note is the fact that coastal states jurisdiction extends only 
to those installations and structures, which have economic purpose, with no mention made to 
military installations. However, since there is no restriction on jurisdiction for economic 
purposes only on artificial islands under Article 60(1)(a) and no definition of ‘artificial islands’, 
‘installations’ and ‘structures’, states presumably may regulate any substantial infrastructure 
within the EEZ notwithstanding its purpose.960  
The provisions of jurisdictional rights regarding the marine scientific research stipulate 
that other states and international organizations may only carry out such activities within the 
EEZ with the consent of the relevant coastal state,961 which shall in normal circumstances grant 
the consent.962 This may however be withheld, if the marine research relates directly to the 
search for living and non-living resources and/or involves the construction, operation or use of 
artificial islands, installations and structures.963 
Finally, coastal states have extensive rights and powers to protect the entire maritime 
environment within the EEZ in an integral manner. Part XII UNCLOS confers on these nations 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in relation to three heads of maritime pollution: 
pollution from seabed activities and in relation to artificial structures,964 pollution by dumping, 
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961 UNCLOS, art 246 Marine Scientific Research in the Exclusive Economic Zone and on the 
Continental Shelf 
 1. [c]oastal States, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, have the right to regulate, 
authorize and conduct marine scientific research in their exclusive economic zone 
and on their continental shelf in accordance with the relevant provisions of this 
Convention. 
2. Marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental 
shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State. 
962 UNCLOS, art 246(3). 
963 ibid, art 246(5)(a),(c). 
964 UNCLOS, art 208 Pollution from Seabed Activities Subject to National Jurisdiction 
1 [c]oastal States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed 
activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations 
and structures under their jurisdiction, pursuant to articles 60 and 80. 
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which cannot be carried out ‘without express prior approval of coastal state’965 and incidental 
pollution from vessels.966 
 
(i) ‘Creeping Jurisdiction’  
 
The extent, to which the UNCLOS  1982 grants sovereign and jurisdictional rights to coastal 
states categorises the EEZ zones as as sui generis, not to be assimilated with the concepts of 
territorial sea or the high seas. 967  The invention of these mechanisms, together with the 
codification of the whole of the maritime regime in a single international treaty achieved within 
one generation, has been recognized as one of the major successes of the United Nations.968  
Indeed, most countries (125 out of 152 coastal states) and those who are not party to the 
UNCLOS 1982, have claimed the EEZ. However, in recent years a number of coastal states 
have tried to gradually extend the scope of their jurisdiction in the EEZ, a phenomenon 
described as ‘creeping jurisdiction’. The term in the maritime context, sometimes also referred 
to as ‘Craven’s Law’,969 denotes a dichotomy between the territorial sea and the high sea and 
suggests ‘that any coastal state extension of jurisdiction into the contiguous high sea, even if 
functionally limited, tends over time to extend to include more claims, until it becomes the 
functional equivalent of a territorial sea, in substance, if not in name’.970 The word ‘creeping’ 
in this context denotes the idea of unilateral action directed at upsetting a legal framework 
adhered to by the majority of other states.971 In the sphere of maritime law, the transgression 
of states’ competences relates to ‘spatial creeping’ beyond 200nm limit. There is some 
evidence of state practice to suggest that since the UNCLOS 1982 came into force a number 
of states made attempts at claiming jurisdiction over the living resources beyond the 200nm 
limit. There is some evidence of activities of few nations in the period following the signing of 
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Common Heritage?’ (2007) 39 George Washington International Law Review 467. 
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the 1982 Convention, which illustrates instances of ‘creeping jurisdiction’ undertaken both 
unilaterally and as part of multilateral action. Examples of unilateral state action include the 
introduction in 1990 of a new concept in the law of the sea by Chile (the mar presencial, or 
‘presential’ sea), which allowed that country, in a designated large zone beyond the Chilean 
EEZ, to assume enhanced presence, so that it could participate in activities undertaken by 
others, while at the same time trying to control them.972 Similar legislation was enacted by 
Argentina in 1991 and its subsequent behaviour confirmed that these unilateral actions have 
some impact in extending the competence beyond the 200nm zone. Multilateral practices 
include coastal states’ undertaking measures, which restrict the rights of third states with 
respect of living resources outside their 200nm limit. The establishment of pockets of high seas 
totally surrounded by maritime zones by a small number of coastal states, such as the Donut 
Hole in the Bering Sea, which is totally enclosed within the maritime zones of the Russian 
Federation and the U.S, not only undermines the effectiveness of maritime living resources 
management system, but also has a spill over effect into other areas of the law of the sea, such 
as fisheries.  
However, not everyone agrees that creeping jurisdiction has undermined the freedom of the 
high seas. There are some authors, who are quite critical of the concept and consider this notion 
as ‘conceptually unproven, probably invalid and largely irrelevant’.973  
 
(c) The Applicability of the EEZ/CS Regimes to Cyberspace Governance 
 
The importance of cyberspace in national security terms, its prolific use as a  
domain replete with criminal, espionage and subversive activities led some states to realize that 
to continue without closer international cooperation to govern this domain is unsustainable. In 
this regard, as already outlined in the previous chapter, some members of the Shanghai 
Cooperation, namely the governments of Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, submitted 
in 2011 to the UN Secretary General Draft Code of Conduct for Information Security, which 
was rejected by the US and subsequently re-drafted and re-submitted it in January 2015.974 As 
with its predecessor, the revised Code called for ‘enhanced state cooperation in addressing 
common threats and challenges in the information space in order to establish an information 
                                              
972 ibid. 
973 Robert Krueger, ‘An Evaluation of the United States Ocean Policy’, (1971) 17 McGill 
Law Journal 603.  
974 Draft International Code of Conduct for Information Security, supra note 72. 
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environment that is peaceful, secure open and founded on cooperation’975 and emphasised 
throughout the need to maintain international peace and security. Several earlier attempts at 
regulating cyberspace through a treaty were made, including French proposals for adopting a 
‘Charter for International Cooperation’ made in 1996.976 Fundamental disagreements among 
governments relating to the nature of cyberspace and the modalities for its governance have 
made such cooperation nothing more than a ‘pipe-dream’977 and fueled continued skepticism 
among some scholars.978  
On the domestic level, some states such as the United States has long recognized the need for 
norm development in the sphere of cyber security and in such  documents as the International 
Strategy for Cyberspace979 set out the vision for the future of cyberspace. Accordingly, secure 
cyberspace, inter alia:  
 
[r]ewards innovation and empowers individuals; it connects individuals and strengthens 
communities; it builds better governments and expands accountability; it safeguards 
fundamental freedoms and enhances personal privacy; it builds understanding, clarifies 
norms of behavior, and enhances national and international security. To sustain this 
environment, international collaboration is more than a best practice; it is a first 
principle’.980  
 
To achieve these goals, the document pledges that: 
 
[t]he United States will work internationally to promote an open, interoperable, secure, 
and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international 
trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and 
innovation […] it we will build and sustain an environment in which norms of responsible 
                                              
975 ibid, paragraph 1 Purpose and Scope. 
976 Jack Goldsmith and Timothy Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless 
World (OUP 2008). 
977 Adam Segal and Matthew Waxman, ‘Why a Cybersecurity Treaty is a Pipe Dream’ (2011) 
Council on Foreign Relations <http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/why-cybersecurity-treaty-
pipe-dream/p26325>. 
978 for Example, Jack Goldsmith, ‘Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View’ (2011) 
<http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Goldsmith.pdf. 
979 White House, ‘International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness 
in the Networked World’ (2011), supra note 81. 
980 ibid. 
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behavior guide states’ actions, sustain partnerships, and support the rule of law in 
cyberspace.981  
 
 In the light of the continued lack of consensus regarding a possible legal regime, one 
solution could be through applying the modalities of the EEZ/CS by analogy to meet half way 
the needs of the opposing ‘cyber sides’, that is the states, who wish to continue with the existing 
model of governance based on multistakeholder system and those wishing for greater state 
involvement, supporting the sovereign based approach. The EEZ/CS share some parallels with 
cyberspace, in that fundamentally full sovereignty is not possible either by design (in case of 
the EEZ/CS through a treaty), or the nature of its construct (cyberspace’s main component, the 
internet relies on reticulation of networks, whose architecture defeats the notion of states’ 
control through total border sealing). As noted above, the sovereign rights that are enjoyed by 
coastal states in the EEZ/CS are extensive. Similar provisions could be made in an umbrella 
treaty regime for cyberspace, so that states would have sovereign rights for specific purposes, 
such as economic and commercial exploration and exploitation of activities in their designated 
‘exclusive cyber zones’. However, the content layer, designated the status of the common 
heritage of mankind, could be protected against unlawful exploitation through inter alia mass 
surveillance and bulk collection activities of the most technologically advanced states. Equally, 
states would have to manage and preserve their digital resources in the same manner as some 
coastal states are obliged to do with respect to living resources in the EEZ/CS environments. 
Furthermore, individual states could have greater leverage over the individual service providers 
and search engines through conferring on them jurisdiction in relation to specified activities. 
In case of the EEZ/CS in certain instances specified in Article 56 of the UNCLOS 1982 
jurisdiction is conferred exclusively on coastal states to conduct, authorize and regulate certain 
artificial constructs. Similarly, this could apply to all national telecommunications, where 
internet provision is subsumed within exclusive national jurisdictions. For example, in the UK 
the responsibility for the planning, assignment, management, development and regulatory 
framework of telecommunications is borne by OFCOM, an Independent Regulator and 
Competition Authority for the UK Communications Industry.982 Its range of complex technical 
coverage includes the bandwidth, or frequency range allocated for land based ground terminals 
to Earth orbiting satellites, together with their operating protocols for world- wide 
                                              
981 ibid. 
982 OFCOM http://www.ofcom.org.uk/. 
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communications. Allocating such an authority with powers to manage development and 
regulatory framework for the UK ‘exclusive cyber zone’ may give greater autonomy, whilst at 
the same time force other states to act within that zone only by strictly respecting international 
law, including human rights obligations.  
States’ have extensive powers within both the EEZ and CS zones, but that power is strictly 
limited beyond it. However, evidence has shown some disregard of this delimitation in the 
form of use of maritime resources beyond the specified limit.  To avoid the dangers of ‘creeping 
jurisdiction’ in cyberspace, lessons could be learned from the practical application of 
jurisdictional provisions in the 1982 Convention with respect to specifically delineating the 
scope and extent of states’ jurisdictional competences, to avoid spill over effects. In the words 
of one commentator ‘states’ exclusive jurisdictions can only creep forward if the contraposed 
community interests withdraw before them. A failure of will should not be disguised behind 
pseudo-law’. 983  Furthermore, should any fine-tuning be required, this could be achieved 
through multilateral, regional or bilateral agreements among states. Equally, any dangers of 
‘jurisdictional creep’ should serve as an incentive to become a party to the treaty. 
Achieving the solution for cyberspace governance through a treaty modelled on the UN 
Law of the Sea Convention, which recognizes different areas, such as the ‘global common 
knowledge area’ akin to the high seas and ‘exclusive cyber zones’, similar to the exclusive 
economic zone, avoids treating cyberspace as a single environment and accommodates 
differing needs of nations. Like the UNLOSC 1982, cyberspace treaty could also be a ‘package 
deal’.  In this way, states wishing for greater sovereignty rights could enjoy such rights within 
their own boarders and have almost unfettered jurisdiction, whereas the common areas could 
continue to be run by the amalgam of private/public partnership. 
 Maritime life, the deep sea bed, electricity and radio frequencies are all naturally occurring 
Earthly phenomenon. Each is a natural raw material and converted by mankind for subsequent 
use. This commonality of being a product of nature lends support to the idea propagated in this 
chapter that the radio frequencies, which make communication via the internet possible should 
be given a status similar to the non-living resource in the EEZ regime and the content layer of 
cyberspace that of the common heritage of mankind and be based on similar principles that 
underpin this principle.  
 
                                              
983 L. Goldie, ‘International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution’ (1970) 9 Columbia 




This chapter has argued that the global governance of cyberspace is possible through 
modelling an international convention regulating state-to-state cyber activities on the already 
existing regimes, in particular the law of the sea. The governance of this domain requires 
greater coordination of sovereign states to tackle hostile and unlawful cyber operations, such 
as cyber crime, cyber espionage and mass surveillance through an international up- to- date 
legal framework. 
There is a commonality between the nature of already existing taxonomy of various regimes 
of the sea and the developments in the sphere of cyberspace. It could be said that both 
environments are not monolithic but are comprised of various segments. Chapter 1 identified 
that cyberspace is considered to consist of three layers. The physical layer, as far as legal 
taxonomy is concerned, is the least problematic. When located within state’s territory, it is 
subject to territorial sovereignty. Even if parts of the infrastructure, such as cables, are located 
within the area of high seas, they are still subject to sovereign rights. Chapter 2 argued that 
cyberspace does not fall within the criteria of terra nullius and asserting of territorial 
sovereignty over the entirety of cyberspace per se to the exclusion of all other states is in all 
probability not achievable. This chapter built on these assumptions and contended that 
cyberspace’s content layer does not fall within any of the regimes of the ‘old’ global commons. 
Assuming that cyberspace is not a terra nullius, res communis, nor a sovereign territory, 
analogy was made to other hybrid regimes of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. 
It has been concluded that by examining the practice of states in cyberspace, it seems that this 
domain bears more characteristics of the legal regimes of the EEZ, CS, than to the res nullius, 
res communis, or the sovereign territory. The chapter expanded this reasoning by proposing a 
legal framework for cyberspace that would adopt the concept of exclusive economic zone, 
investing in states sovereign rights and jurisdiction within their ‘exclusive cyber zones’. 
Continued freedom and unrestricted information flow of the internet could be safeguarded by 
analogizing the common parts of the content layer of cyberspace to the regime of the deep sea 
bed and regarding it as the common heritage of mankind. Such underpinning would reinforce 
the principles already articulated by the WSIS, outlined in Chapter 2, of common management 
of the shared parts of the internet, equitable sharing, equal access, non-militarization, protection 
of on-line privacy. 
The success achieved by the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 shows that gaining consensus 
to codify a multifaceted area is not only desirable, but achievable. Similarities could be drawn 
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between the early approaches taken to the vast expanses of the oceans and cyberspace, which 
were both initially considered as free and open, in Grotian Mare Liberum and in Barlow’s 
Declaration of Independence respectively. State practice dictated a need for international law 
to devise differing maritime regimes for different spaces that emerged over the centuries and 
thus a checkerboard of territorial sea, the high seas, the deep seabed and other areas, such as 
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf were created, each with a distinct legal 
regime, but all subsumed within one umbrella Law of the Sea Convention. Admittedly, the 
oceans and the seas were subject to human activities for centuries and therefore the legal regime 
arose incrementally, unlike cyberspace, which by comparison is very new and riddled with 
disagreement and controversy. Furthermore, the obvious difference between these 
environments is that the former is natural, the latter entirely man made and underpinned by 
private enterprise. Nevertheless, both are used for commercial, economic and military 
purposes. Cyberspace, being a crucial part of civilian and military infrastructure of most 
nations, is coming under a ferocious strain from harmful activities emanating from state actors. 
It is also subject to increasing state control. At the same time, its very architecture dictates 
interconnectivity, which means that no single state could claim exclusive sovereignty over it. 
This calls into question categorization of cyberspace as a global common. The internet is 
largely an American invention and classifying it as a global common reflects a broader 
ideological approach of that country relating to the governance of the ‘old’ global commons, 
which is by and large perceived from a military perspective and therefore dictates continued 
access.  
Greater state cooperation is desirable and needed but questions, such as what legal 
framework may best suit the state-to-state relationships in cyberspace remain unanswered. This 
chapter proposed a ‘package deal’ convention modelled on the UNCLOS 1982 to close this 
normative gap. Continued international disagreement casts doubt over a successful treaty being 
negotiated any time soon. However, both the success of the system for regulation of the seas 
as a whole and the provisions relating to the EEZ/CS in particular could be a guiding template 
for such an instrument. Moreover, lessons learned from the successful negotiations of other 
regimes regulating the outer space and the Antarctic must not be forgotten, for together with 
the law of the sea they share three fundamental principles: governance by treaty, limits on 
militarization and minimal involvement of private parties. The next chapter of this thesis will 
focus on mass cyber surveillance and transborder data access to show that they constitute 
violation of international human rights and the principle of territorial sovereignty. This 
emergent practice of states is one of the reasons why a hard law solution is urgently needed. 
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Its feasibility of coming to fruition will be the subject of discussion in Chapter 5. The next 
chapter will turn to the question of the lawfulness of mass untargeted cyber surveillance of the 
selected Five Eyes states and ‘pulling off data’ without consent by the Law Enforcement 


















































The previous chapters of this thesis argued that far from being an unclaimed territory, or a 
global common, cyberspace is a domain susceptible to state regulation and therefore subject to 
exercise of sovereign powers. Chapter 3 discussed some of the methods of asserting territorial 
sovereignty in that environment, through various methods of censoring the information content 
and blocking of cross-border data flows. Another way, examined in this chapter, is states 
exercising their domestically mandated powers of surveillance to intercept and bulk collect 
data that flows through their territories and intercept them abroad. The chapter also examines 
states exercising of enforcement jurisdiction by directly accessing data stored on servers, or in 
a cloud located in a foreign territory for the purposes of criminal investigation. These practice 
is also known as transborder searches. This chapter with demonstrate that together with 
unrestricted and untargeted cyber surveillance, certain methods of transborder data searches 
breach individuals’ right to privacy within and outside territories of the states involved in these 
activities. The chapter will also discuss that some forms of transborder data searches may also 
breach the international law principle of territorial sovereignty. 
The chapter consists of five parts. Part one sets out its scope and will focus on the activities 
of the Five Eyes coalition of states, with an emphasis on the US National Security Agency 
(NSA) and the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). This part will also 
discuss the legality of the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) accessing data located outside 
their jurisdictions without recourse to the existing Mutual Legal Assistance processes (MLA) 
in the light of international law principles of sovereign territoriality, conducted inter alia on 
the basis of Article 32 of the Cyber Crime Convention 2001.984 It will also consider the 
lawfulness of these practices in the light of the right to privacy of communication contained in 
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR)985 (Article 17), the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR)986 (Article 8)  and the Convention for 
                                              
984 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention, Budapest 23 
November 2001), ETS 185. 
985 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
986 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) 1950. 
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the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981 
(Convention 108) 987  (Article 1). Part two shall address certain mass cyber surveillance 
programmes (such as PRISM, Tempora, Upstream and Boundless Informant) and the right to 
privacy of communications under the aforementioned key international and regional legal 
instruments, namely the ICCPR, the American Convention on Human Rights 1969 (ACHR)988 
(Article 11) and the European Convention on Human Rights.  As cyber surveillance and 
transborder searches affect the right to privacy of those who are both within and outside the 
territories of the Five Eyes and state parties to the Budapest Convention, part three makes a 
case for extraterritorial application of human rights treaties in the extraterritorial context. Part 
four demonstrates that cyber surveillance and transborder searches constitute an interference 
with the right to privacy under international law, whilst part five examines limitations to that 
right and justifications for conducting surveillance, including on national security grounds. 
This part outlines the legal parameters and applies those to some of the cyber surveillance 
programmes mentioned previously. The chapter concludes by finding no grounds for 
justification of mass untargeted communications surveillance and consequently renders these 
activities unlawful under international human rights law. 
 
PART I: GENERAL 
 
1.  Cyber Surveillance and Transborder Searches 
 
The technology available to some states, in particular the US and the UK, makes it 
possible for the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of these and other countries to 
monitor, access, store and use an incredible amounts of data produced every day by millions 
of people world-wide for a variety of purposes from within the confines of their own territories.  
This chapter focuses on two such methods, that is surveillance of communications and 
unrestricted access to data located on servers in foreign countries and/or in ‘a cloud’ (also 
referred to as transborder data searches).  
To analyse the legality of cyber surveillance operations, four programmes run predominantly 
by the NSA and GCHQ have been selected as the focal point for consideration in this chapter. 
                                              
987 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data 1981, CETS No. 108. 
988 American Convention on Human Rights, (adopted at the Inter American Specialized 
Conference on Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969).  
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These are PRISM, Tempora, Boundless Informant and Upstream and form the focus of the 
analysis for the following reasons. First, they enable these intelligence agencies to intercept all 
communications as they transit through their territories and then share it with their Five Eyes 
partners. This gives an open access to conduct surveillance on the previously unheard of scale 
of everyone in almost every country in the world. Secondly, Tempora and PRISM are 
representative of the true technical capacity of GCHQ and the NSA. Thirdly, at least some of 
the surveillance programmes seem to operate pursuant to domestic legislation, which is 
important from the point of view of legal scrutiny and will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Finally, the ability to share the collected data among the Five Eyes intelligence agencies means 
that even if their national legal frameworks restrict direct surveillance of communications of 
their own nationals, they could have access to that data because it had been intercepted by the 
partner agencies. This practice has been termed ‘collusion for circumvention’.989 
This second method known as transborder data searches is defined as ‘unilateral access [to] 
computer data stored in another party without seeking mutual assistance’ 990, pursuant to 
criminal investigations, including on the basis of the Cyber Crime Convention 2001.991 It will 
be shown that both these methods pose a serious threat to the right of privacy of 
communications and as discussed in the next, may also in some circumstances undermine the 
principles of territorial sovereignty under international law. 
 
a. Transborder Searches as Breach of Territorial Sovereignty 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, territorial sovereignty is an exclusive right of a 
state to exercise its powers within the boundaries of its territory.992 The concept of jurisdiction 
is closely related to that of territorial sovereignty, according to which, a state may not perform 
any government functions in the territory of another state without the latter’s consent.993 It 
follows that in exercising of enforcement jurisdiction for the purposes of criminal justice, any 
investigatory measures taken outside the domestic jurisdiction to obtain extraterritorially 
                                              
989 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Mass Surveillance. Report’ Doc 1374 
(21 April 2015) < http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fileid=21694&lang=en>.  
990 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) ‘T-CY Guidance Note 3 
Transborder Access to Data (Article 32)’ (5 November 2013),< http://coe.int/TCY>,  
paragraph 3.2, p. 6. 
991 Convention on Cybercrime 2001, supra note 1. 
992 Island of Palmas case (1928) 2 RIAA 829. 
993 ibid. 
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located evidence must be in compliance with international law obligations to seek consent of 
the state concerned and be supported by domestic legislation and procedures.994 Such consent 
may be based for example on bi-, or multilateral agreements, or when this right derives from 
international customary law. However, if there is no positive rule, a well established principle 
declared by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in The Case of the Lotus995 
(Lotus Case) provides that, states have the right to do whatever is not prohibited by 
international law.  
A number of international and regional cybercrime instruments contain cooperation 
provisions and either set out broad, general obligations on states to cooperate996 and/or provide 
for particular cooperation mechanisms, including extradition and mutual legal assistance 
(MLA).997 By far the most widely used method of cooperation in cybercrime investigations is 
the latter process. MLA are the classical treaty-based mechanisms allowing for foreign law 
enforcement cooperation in ongoing criminal investigations, while respecting the jurisdiction 
and national sovereignty. As legally binding tools, the MLA provide the rules, through which 
third country authorities can lawfully issue requests for assistance in relation to gathering 
evidence from foreign jurisdictions. 998  Yet, in the context of obtaining/securing digital 
                                              
994 Michael Evans, International Law (Oxford University Press 2010), p. 331. 
995 The Case of the S.S. Lotus, Fr. v Turk, 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10. 
996 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime’, 
(February 2013) < https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-
capacity/system/files/Comprehensive%20Study%20on%20Cybercrime.pdf>. The study lists 
for example the Commonwealth of Independent States Agreement (September 1995), art. 5; 
Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 1, art. 23; The Agreement Between the Governments 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of Ensuring the 
International Information Security (16 June 2009), art 3-5; African Union Convention on 
Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 2014 (EX.CL/846 XXV), art 28(2). 
997 ibid. These include Commonwealth of Independent States Agreement, art 6; Council of 
Europe Convention on the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse (25 October 2007) CETS No. 201, art 25, 17; Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 
1, art. 25, 27 and the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences, art. 
32, 34. 
998 ‘Cooperative Study on Cybercrime', supra note 13, p. 201. The global survey conducted in 
2013 reported that ‘the use of formal cooperation mechanisms in transnational cybercrime 
cases is predominant over other forms of cooperation […] over 70 per cent of law enforcement 
authorities reported that formal mutual legal assistance was most often used to obtain a range 
of evidence types from other jurisdictions. Less-used mechanisms were reported to include 
informal police cooperation, direct contact with a service provider, and the use of 24/7 contact 
points’. 
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evidence, the MLA methods have been criticised for being inefficient and ineffective. This is 
mainly because of a long processing time of requests (often taking a year), very short time of 
data availability and the fact that states may simply not answer a request to cooperate. The 
Cybercrime Committee’s detailed assessment of the functioning of the MLA based on replies 
from 36 state parties to the Cybercrime Convention and three observer states attested to this 
reality stating that: 
 
[t]he MLA process is considered insufficient in general and with respect to the 
obtaining electronic evidence in particular. Response times to requests of six to 
twenty-four months appears to be the norm. Many requests and thus 
investigations are abandoned. This adversely effects the positive obligation of 
governments to protect society and individuals against cybercrime and other 
crime involving electronic evidence.999  
 
As a result of the insufficiency of the MLA mechanisms, many LEAs increasingly abandon the 
formal channels in favour of informal access. Given the apparent scale of the problem, the 
question that needs to be addressed is whether the current trend of conducting transborder 
searches outside the MLA is lawful under international law and whether these searches comply 
with human rights obligations. The first question will be considered in this part of the chapter, 
whilst the second in part three. It must be noted at the outset that not all transborder searches 
are illegal. Therefore, a distinction has to be made between two methods of obtaining evidence, 
namely those relating to generally accessible data in a server, or in ‘a cloud’ of a foreign 
country (transborder searches of open source data) and those that are not freely available, for 
example when only accessed via a password, also know as protected data (transborder searches 





                                              
999 Cybercrime Convention Committee, T-CY, ‘T-CY Assessment Report. The Mutual Legal 
Assistance Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime Adopted by the T-CY of 
its 12th Plenary’ ( 2-3 December 2014), 
<https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/TCY/2014/T-
CY(2013)17_Assess_report_v50adopted.pdf>, p. 14. 
 185 
 
i. Transborder Search of Open Source Data 
 
This category of data is comprised of all data, which are not subject to any special pre-
conditions and can be accessed by everyone, including LEAs of a foreign country. The 
Cybercrime Convention represents the first agreement in international law regarding the 
question of transborder search generally and in the context of open source data in particular. 
Article 32 of the Convention ‘Transborder Access to Stored Computer Data with Consent or 
Where Publically Available’ provides: 
 
[a] Party may, without the authorisation of another Party: 
a. access publically available (open source) stored computer data, regardless of 
where the data is located geographically; or  
b. access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer 
data located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary 
consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the 
Party through that computer system.1000 
 
Therefore, the transborder search of an open source data is not only explicitly permitted by 
Article 32(a), but appears to be widely practiced without creating controversy and objection by 
states. That being the case, the T-CY acknowledged that ‘Article 32 is the most relevant 
provision with regard to unilateral transborder access to data. Transborder access to publically 
available data (Article 32(a)) may be considered accepted international practice and part of 
international customary law even beyond the Parties to the Budapest Convention.’1001 Article 
32(a) simply codifies this existing practice and it could be concluded that this search method 





                                              
1000 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 1, art 32.  
1001 Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), ‘Report of the Transborder Group Adopted 
by the T-CY. Transborder Access and Jurisdiction: What are the Options?’  (6 December 
2012), para 293, p. 56. <http:/www.coe.int/TCY>.  
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ii. Transborder Search of Protected Data 
 
The type of data that the LEAs are most interested in from the point of view of criminal 
investigation are rarely freely available online. The current practice of the LEAs of obtaining 
such data includes two models. The first is accessing data on computers of other states pursuant 
to Article 32(b) (transborder access with consent), whilst the second goes beyond the methods 
envisaged by the Budapest Convention 1002 and may involve directly approaching internet 
service providers in foreign countries by way of court orders. Both of these methods are 
controversial and, as will be shown below, are highly likely to be in breach of the principle of 
territorial sovereignty and and human rights laws. 
 
 Transborder Searches of Protected Data with Consent  
 
According to Article 32(b) the precondition for direct access by the LEA of a foreign country 
to data stored in another state is to obtain the ‘lawful and voluntary consent of the person who 
has the lawful authority to disclose the data’. Viewed from the perspective of practice in the 
field of international agreements and treaties in the context of law enforcement 1003  and 
                                              
1002 ibid. According to paragraph 9 at p. 5 ‘current practice regarding direct law enforcement 
access to data as well as access via [i]nternet service providers and other private sector 
entities […] illustrate that law enforcement authorities (LEA) of many states access data 
stored on computers in other [s]tates in order to secure electronic evidence. Such practices 
frequently go beyond the limited possibilities foreseen in Article 32b (transborder access with 
consent) and the Budapest Convention in general’.  
1003 for example, European Union Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (27 
November 2008) on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, art 11 ‘Processing of personal data received from or 
made available by other Member States’ provides that:  
[p]ersonal data received from or made available by the competent authority of another 
Member State may, in accordance with the requirements of Article 32(b), be further 
processed only for the following purposes other than those for which they were trans-
mitted or made available:  
(a)   the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties other than those for 
which they were transmitted or made available;  
(b)   other judicial and administrative proceedings directly related to the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences 
or the execution of criminal penalties;  
(c)   the prevention of an immediate and serious threat to public security; or  
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according to the principle of national sovereignty this means obtaining such consent by way of 
an authorisation of an independent court, or judicial authority. However, neither the Budapest 
Convention, nor its Explanatory Report1004 explicitly provide that the appropriate consent must 
come from such a body, nor do they define who is the person with the authority  to disclose the 
data. The only indication in the Explanatory Report is to the service providers as such 
authority.1005 This seems to be in conflict with, inter alia, the EU data protection laws, in 
particular Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (Data Protection Directive (DPD)). On 25 May 2018 the DPP will be 
replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation. (GDPR).1006 By Articles 25 and 26 of the 
DPD, consent can only be given by data subjects1007 and therefore private service providers 
                                              
(d)  any other purpose only with the prior consent of the transmitting Member 
State or with the consent of the data subject, given in accordance with 
national law (emphasis added) 
The competent authorities may also further process the trans mitted personal data for 
historical, statistical or scientific purposes, provided that Member States provide appropriate 
safeguards, such as, for example, making the data anonymous.’  
1004The Council of Europe Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, (23 
November 2001), ETS 185.  
1005 ibid, paragraph 294, p. 53: 
Article 32 (Trans-border access to stored computer data with consent or where publicly 
available) addresses two situations: first, where the data being accessed is publicly 
available, and second, where the Party has accessed or received data located outside of 
its territory through a computer system in its territory, and it has obtained the lawful 
and voluntary consent of the person who has lawful authority to disclose the data to the 
Party through that system. Who is a person that is ‘lawfully authorised’ to disclose data 
may vary depending on the circumstances, the nature of the person and the applicable 
law concerned. For example, a person’s e-mail may be stored in another country by a 
service provider, or a person may intentionally store data in another country. These 
persons may retrieve the data and, provided that they have the lawful authority, they 
may voluntarily disclose the data to law enforcement officials or permit such officials 
to access the data, as provided in the Article.  
 
1006 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679. The GDPR will be directly 
applicable in all EU Member States without the need for implementing national legislation.  
1007 Directive 95/46/EC art 26: 
1.  [b]y way of derogation from Article 25 and save where otherwise provided by 
domestic law governing particular cases, Member States shall provide that a transfer 
or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an 
adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25(2) may take place on 
 188 
cannot lawfully disclose them. Article 29 Working Party commented on this point in the 
following terms:  
 
 [a]ccording to [the] Directive 95/46, consent can only be given by data subjects.  
 Therefore, companies acting as data controllers usually do not have the ‘lawful  
 authority to disclose the data’, which they possess […] They can normally only 
 disclose the data upon prior presentation of a judicial authorisation/warrant or any  
 document justifying the need to access the data and referring to the relevant legal 
 basis for this access, presented by a national law enforcement authority according  
 to their domestic law that will specify the purpose for which data is required. Data 
 controllers cannot lawfully provide access or disclose the data to a foreign law 
 enforcement authorities that operate under different legal and procedural framework 
 from both a data protection and a criminal procedural point of view.1008   
 
Frequently, LEAs cooperate with service providers, or other private sector entities to obtain 
access to data stored abroad.1009 Reportedly, in some European states, a number of US-based 
service provides with branch offices in Europe have made voluntary arrangement  (‘criminal 
compliance programmes’) between their European offices and the LEA of specific European 
governments, to disclose data under certain conditions and without requiring these European 
LEAs to go through a mutual legal assistance procedure via the US Department of Justice.1010 
                                              
condition that: 
(a)  the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed 
transfer;’ 
1008 Council of Europe Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Article 29 Working 
Party’s Comments on the Issue of Direct Access to Third Countries’ Law Enforcement 
Authorities to Data Stored in Other Jurisdiction, as Proposed in the Draft Elements for an 
Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime’ (5 December 2013) 
(Ares.2013) 3645289-05/12/2013, p.3 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/otherdocument/files/2013/20131205_wp29_letter_to_cybercrime_committ
ee.pdf>. 
1009 Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), ‘Transborder Access to Data and 
Jurisdiction: Options for Further Action by the T-CY’ Report Prepared by the Ad-hoc 
Subgroup on Tranborder Access and Jurisdiction Adopted by the 12th Plenary of the T-CY 
(2-3 December 2014), p.44 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/TCY/2014/T-
CY(2014)16_TBGroupReport_v17adopted.pdf>.  
1010 ibid. The conditions for voluntary compliance with requests may typically include: 
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Given the loophole created by the ambiguous meaning of ‘lawful authority’ and the possibility 
for accessing data through such methods as ‘criminal compliance programmes’, a provisional 
conclusion can be reached that transborder searches with consent pursuant to Article 32(b) are 
likely to violate the international law principle of territoriality, when LEAs carry out 
investigations in foreign jurisdictions without seeking prior approval of appropriate state 
organs. This is because, as discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, states cannot exercise 
unauthorised extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. It is worth reiterating that the the 
International Group of Experts responsible for the drafting of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed in 
Rule 11 that: 
 
[a] [s]tate may only exercise extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in relation to 
persons, objects and cyber activities on the basis of:  
 (a) a specific allocation of authority under international law; or 
 (b) valid consent by a foreign government to exercise jurisdiction on its  
 territory.1011 
 
The comment to Rule 11 explains that ‘the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction on another 
[s]tate’s territory constitutes a violation of that [s]tate’s sovereignty (Rule 4) except when 
international law provides a specific allocation of authority to exercise enforcement jurisdiction 
extraterritorially or when the [s]tate in which it is to be exercised consents’. 1012  The 
commentary states that ‘the consent may be granted on an ad hoc basis or by means of a 
treaty’.1013 The International Group of Experts agreed that a state’s law enforcement authorities 
may not hack into servers [i.e. modify or alter computer software and/or hardware to 
                                              
 the request would need to be lawful and come from a competent authority that has 
jurisdiction over the case being investigated, based on clear legal framework to 
investigate cyber crime; 
 the data requested may need to be related to the territory of the requesting LEA (such 
as IP addresses, the country top-level domain of a webmail account); 
 the conduct investigated would also constitute an offence in the USA;  
 only data owned and controlled by the providers-such as traffic data and subscriber 
information- would be disclosed but not consent generated by users;  
 the criminal justice system of the state is trusted to respect international human rights 
and rule of law standards, including the protection of privacy.  
1011 Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge University Press 2017) Rule 11, p. 66. 
1012 ibid, para 1. pp. 66-67. 
1013 ibid, para 7, p. 68. 
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accomplish a goal that is outside of the creator’s original objective] in another state to extract 
evidence or introduce so-called white worms to disinfect bots [i.e. a self-replicating malware] 
there that are being used for criminal purposes without the territorial state’s agreement.1014 The 
International Group of Experts also commented that sometimes consent to enforcement 
jurisdiction may be grated by means of a treaty, as is the case with Article 32(b) of the 
Cybercrime Convention.1015 The Group observed that ‘in this case, [s]tates that are Parties to 
the Convention have consented in advance to the acquisition of the computer data by the 
process set forth therein. Thus, lit. (b) [of Rule 11] is satisfied.’1016 This is rather surprising 
bearing in mind the controversy surrounding Article 32(b) and the notion of consent, in 
particular in relation to who is lawfully authorised to give such consent. As noted above, both 
the EU data protection laws and Article 29 Working Party are adamant that consent can only 
be given by data subjects and not by the companies acting as data controllers. However, 
evidence suggests that the decisions regarding the disclosure of personal data and the 
assessment of their probative value for the purposes of criminal investigations appear to be 
‘outsourced’ to data controllers. This does not comply with the requirement for appropriate 
judicial authorisation and verification of such requests. Article 29 Working Party was very 
specific on this issue- a private sector entity functioning as data controller would not be able to 
disclose data voluntarily, but only upon presentation of a judicial order.1017  
The Russian Federation, has been particularly vocal on the issue of violation of territorial 
sovereignty through actions on the basis of Article 32(b), which was the reason for that country 
refusing to join the Budapest Convention. 1018 A representative of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs speaking at the India Conference on Cyber Security and Cyber Governance in 2013 
was emphatic on the Russian Federation’s stance regarding the Budapest Convention, stating 
that Article 32(b) in particular contradicts and violates Council of Europe Convention 108 and 
national laws of many states, including Russia’s.1019 This is because Article 32(b) access-  
 
                                              
1014 ibid. 
1015 ibid, para 9, p. 68. 
1016 ibid. 
1017 T-CY Report, ‘Transborder Access to Data and Jurisdiction: Options for Further Action 
by the T-CY’, supra note 26, p. 6. 
1018 Boris Vasiliev, Office of the Special Coordinator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
‘Sovereignty, International Cooperation and Cyber Security’, CYFY 2013 Conference 
Transcript < http://cyfy.org/speaker/boris-vasiliev/>. 
1019 ibid. 
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[…] takes place without any notification to the competent authorities of the state and 
the territory on which the source of information is. This creates conditions for illegal 
entry into the information space of the other countries and so [..] violates the [rights] of 
states that are in it. Article 32(b) also creates a fertile ground for violation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular right to privacy’.1020  
 
The Cybercrime Committee did not go so far as to declare Article 32(b) to be illegal. 
However it did described the provision as an exception to the principle of territoriality, because 
it permits ‘unilateral transborder access without the need for mutual assistance under limited 
circumstances’.1021 The T-CY recognized that: 
 
[p]ractice, procedures as well as conditions and safeguards vary considerably between 
different Parties. Concerns regarding procedural rights of suspects, privacy and the 
protection of personal data, the legal basis for access to data stored in foreign 
jurisdictions or ‘in the cloud’ as well as national sovereignty persist and need to be 
addressed’.1022   
 
However, the T-CY did not agree with the view of the Article 29 Working Party that service 
providers can never voluntarily disclose personal data, as this would discount emergency 
situations, controller’s becoming aware of an offence, or ISP being attacked.1023 The 2012 T-
CY report showed that the legislation and practices of a number of states go beyond the 
provisions of Article 32(b) in terms of direct transborder access to data, or access via private 
sector entities. 1024 The disparity in practice among states in situations where LEAs primarily 
access stored computer data directly was illustrated by examination of domestic legal 
frameworks of a small sample of states.1025 What became apparent from this study is that most 
                                              
1020 ibid. 
1021 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee, ‘T-CY Guidance Note 3. 





1024 T-CY Report, ‘Transborder Access and Jurisdiction: What are the Options?’, supra note 
18, p. 11. 
1025 ibid, pp. 32-44. These are Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Serbia 
and US.  
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countries do not have very clear rules on transborder access. What rules there are, vary 
considerably in scope. At one end of the spectrum, some domestic laws allow access to data 
stored on remote systems. In Serbia for example, transborder access through lawfully obtained 
password and with consent is lawful on the presumption that data would temporarily, or 
permanently be stored within the territorial jurisdiction of the Serbian authorities. 1026 The 
Portuguese Law on Cybercrime1027 allows for an ‘extension’ of a lawfully authorised computer 
search obtained during an investigation to apply to remote systems located within and outside 
Portuguese borders. This means that it is lawful for a Portuguese law enforcement officer to 
access data physically stored in a remote system in a foreign state if a proper order was obtained 
from a prosecutor, or a judge.1028  Conversely, other states, such as Norway, have only general 
provisions relating to the LEA access to evidence, including electronic evidence.1029 There are 
few specific rules, which state that LEAs may obtain customer information directly from the 
service provider without a court order.1030 Nothing is said about the possibility of conducting 
the searches transborder. At the other end of the spectrum is the  Dutch Cyber Crime Act, which 
in its explanatory note explicitly stipulates that searches on systems outside the Netherlands 
are not allowed and that this can only be conducted through methods of public international 
law, which in practice means that LEAs should resort to MLA.1031  
In addition to these disparate state approaches, the T-CY recognized that there is a practical 
need for law enforcement to have timely access to data stored extraterritorially, thus attempting 
to relax the remaining constraints on the foreign LEA.  To that end, the T-CY proposed an 
Additional Protocol supplementary to the Cyber Crime Convention putting forward five new 
draft elements: 
 
1. transborder access with consent without the limitation to data stored ‘in another Party’ 
2. transborder access without consent but with lawfully obtained credentials 
3. transborder access without consent in good faith or in exigent or other circumstances   
4. extending a search without the limitation in its territory in Article 19.3 
                                              
1026 ibid, p. 42. 
1027 Portuguese Law on Cybercrime No. 109/2009. 
1028 supra note 18, p. 38.  
1029 The Norwegian Criminal Procedures Act 1981; the Dutch Code of Penal Procedures 2006 
was drafted to conform to the Budapest Convention. 
1030 Norwegian Electronic Communications Act ss. 2-9. 
1031 T-CY  2012 Report, supra note 18, p. 34. 
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5. the power of disposal as connecting factor.1032  
 
These proposals were however swiftly rejected by a number of EU bodies, including the Article 
29 Working Party and the representatives of national and European data protection authorities. 
The conclusion reached was that all five draft elements may expand extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
breach the key principles of data protection, some ignore national jurisdiction and sovereignty 
(draft element 1 and 4), are too vague (e.g. the legal meaning of ‘lawfully obtained credentials’ 
in draft element 2), provide for no guarantee of upholding the concepts of necessity and 
proportionality (e.g. ‘good faith’ and ‘exigent or other circumstances’ in draft element 3) and 
breach the principle of territoriality (draft element 4 and 5).1033 The attempt at amending Article 
32(b) has thus far largely failed, which led the T-CY to conclude that the ‘negotiations of a 
Protocol on transborder access to data would not be feasible’.1034  
In the light of the above findings, it could be said that under international law, transborder 
searches with consent of service provider undertaken under Article 32(b) by the LEAs in 
principle breach territorial sovereignty and therefore are not lawful under international law. 
This, at least for the time being, creates a lacuna in the law, as there seems to be lack of a 
positive rule prohibiting these searches. The question is therefore whether such access could 
be allowed on the basis of the principle set out in the Lotus case.1035 Accordingly, international 
law leaves to states ‘a wide measure of discretion which is limited only in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules [and in the absence of such rules] every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable’.1036 The upshot of the Lotus approach is 
that if no limits are established, a state remains free to act as it wishes. This, it is submitted, 
cannot apply in the context of Article 32(b) searches for two reasons. First, the T-CY 
recognized that Article 32(b) creates a situation that needs to be further addressed. In particular, 
its 2014 Report acknowledged the need for clearer and more transparent regulation of 
transborder access. 1037  Therefore, despite the setbacks described above to the Additional 
                                              
1032 Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), ‘(Draft) Elements of an Additional Protocol 




1033 Article 29 Working Party Comments, supra note 25, p. 7. 
1034  T-CY 2014 Report, supra note 16, pp 12-13. 
1035 The Lotus, supra note 12. 
1036 ibid, paragraphs 16-17. 
1037 T-CY 2014 Report, supra note 16. 
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Protocol, the work relating to the establishing of the parameters to the operation of Article 
32(b) is ongoing. Secondly, some states, most notably the Russian Federation, object 
completely to Article 32(b) and if more states voice similar views, this could eventually 
become a positive rule casting doubt on the legality of Article 32(b) access in its current form. 
Until such time, as an international consensus is reached regarding the parameters of the lawful 
searches with consent, foreign LEAs must always seek the necessary approvals of state 
authorities to avoid both breaches of international law and procedural difficulties relating to 
the probative value of evidence obtained illegally. 
 
 Transborder Searches of Protected Data without Consent 
 
There also appears to be an emerging practice on the part of some LEAs outside the provisions 
of Article 32 Budapest Convention, which involves the retrieval of protected data without the 
consent, or authorisation of the affected country’s authorities and/or the data controller, which 
may violate the principle of territorial sovereignty. Two examples of this practice are the recent 
cases of Re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corporation 1038  (Microsoft Ireland) and the so-called FBI-Apple Encryption 
Dispute.1039  
The Microsoft Ireland case concerned an order made by the US Department of Defence 
by way of a search warrant under the US Stored Communications Act 19861040 (SCA) that 
sought to compel Microsoft to disclose the content of emails in connection with criminal 
investigation concerning drug trafficking. The emails were stored by Microsoft’s wholly 
owned subsidiary in a data centre in Dublin, Republic of Ireland. Microsoft refused to comply 
and disclose the contents of the account on the basis that the US court could not enforce such 
an order as the data were stored extraterritorially and were not owned by Microsoft, but rather 
belonged to the email user. Therefore, the Company contended, the order represented a conflict 
of laws and an impermissible exercise of extraterritorial authority. Notwithstanding, the order 
was granted in the US Magistrate court by Judge Francis, who decided that the warrant obliged 
                                              
1038  In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account: Controlled and 
Maintain by Microsoft Corporation, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
1039 In the Matter of the Search Warrant of an Apple iPhone Seized during the Execution of a 
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California Licence Plate 35KGD203. 
1040 U.S.C § 2703. The 1989 Stored Communications Act allows the government to obtain a 
warrant that compels an Internet Service Provider to disclose customer information, emails 
and other data on showing a probable cause. 
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Microsoft to produce the requested information irrespective of its location.1041 The reason for 
granting the order was that the government’s request was not based on a conventional warrant, 
but rather on a hybrid- part subpoena and part warrant. The Judge reasoned that the SCA 
warrant acts as a subpoena and therefore does not require the government to conduct a physical 
search and seizure. In cases of a subpoena, the location of the requested documents is irrelevant, 
what matters is that the party on whom such an order was served has control over the 
information sought. Therefore requiring an Internet Service Provider, such as Microsoft, to 
produce its records held abroad ‘does not implicate principles of extraterritoriality’,1042 but is 
merely an extension of the court’s power toward a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction. 
As the data is ‘within Microsoft’s control’, the request would not be an extraterritorial 
application of US law. The Judge also stressed that clearly US Congress had intended the 
Stored Communications Act to compel electronic communications providers to disclose any 
information under their control, including information stored abroad,1043 as such orders could 
not have been meant to apply only to data stored in the United States.1044 Had that been the 
original intention of the Congress, criminals could simply provide false information and have 
their data sored overseas thereby avoiding the reach of US law enforcement altogether.1045 
Furthermore, if SCA warrants did not allow for the production of data stored abroad, the 
government would have to resort to the US-Ireland Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
(MLAT),1046 which procedures the Judge noted, are lengthy, cumbersome and unreliable.1047 
Based on this reasoning, an order was entered against Microsoft for the continuing refusal to 
comply with the subpoena and the Company appealed to the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in 2014, but with no success as the decision of the Magistrate was 
affirmed. Another appeal followed, this time to the US Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit 
and an Amicus Brief was filed by Digital Rights Ireland, Liberty and Open Rights Group in 
                                              
1041 supra, note 55. 
1042 ibid, p 472. The Judge stated that ‘it has long been the law that a subpoena requires the 
recipient to produce information in its possession, custody, or control regardless of the 
location of that information’, citing In re Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 
667 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
1043 ibid. 
1044 ibid, pp. 474-5. 
1045 ibid, p. 474. 
1046 U.S.-Ireland Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance January 18 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13137 
(2001). 
1047 supra, note 55, pp. 474-75. 
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support of Microsoft. 1048  The Brief criticised the United States for ignoring the Mutual 
Assistance Treaty, which provides precisely for this type of situations, namely to balance the 
interests of the United States in law enforcement matters with those of Ireland in data privacy 
protection.1049 The submission emphasised that under Irish law the data content of the email 
account maintained in Ireland belongs to the author and the owner of the account and may not 
be exported from Ireland by a Microsoft subsidiary.1050 Therefore, the decision of the US 
District Court requiring Microsoft to do that notwithstanding Irish law was wrong, as it 
disregarded the MLAT, i.e. treated it as non-obligatory. 1051  Consequently, if the District 
Court’s decision were to be allowed to stand,  MLAT simply would not have to be adhered to, 
in the absence of some further pronouncement from the US Congress to the contrary.1052 As 
the aim of mutual assistance mechanism is to facilitate inter-state cooperation with a view of 
respecting territorial sovereignty of states, by- passing these obligation would not only 
constitute a breach of international law but also remove the balancing of states’ interests from 
the authorities mandated to do so under the MLATs and simply shift it to the IPSs. In 2016 the 
Court of Appeal agreed that Microsoft did not have to handover the data.1053 It was held that 
the US Stored Communications Act does not authorise US courts to issue and enforce against 
US based service providers warrants for seizure of customers’ email contents that are stored 
exclusively on foreign servers. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal considered that the proper 
channels for obtaining data pursuant to conducting criminal investigations abroad remain 
through the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, despite the US government’s plea that this is too 
cumbersome. The decision can therefore be seen as a victory for the protection of privacy of 
many Europeans, bearing in mind that as much as 90% of their personal data is processed by 
US services and 82% of Facebook’s European data passes through Ireland.1054   Admittedly, 
                                              
1048 Brief of Amici Curiae Digital Rights Ireland Limited, Liberty and the Open Rights Group 
in Support of the Appellant Microsoft Corporation (15 December 2014) 14-2985-cv. 
1049  ibid, p. 3. 
1050 ibid, p. 4. 
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the law enforcement needs are of legitimate state interest. However, had the US won the case 
on appeal, the result would have meant that any data centre, whose headquarters are located in 
the US, could be ordered to surrender their customers’ information to any US LEAs on the 
latter showing a probable cause in a US court. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal made it 
clear that:  
 
[the US] Congress did not intend the SCA’s warrant provisions to apply 
extraterritorially. The focus of those provisions is protection of a user’s privacy  
interests. Accordingly, the SCA does not authorise a US court to issue and enforce an  
SCA warrant against a United States-based service provider for the contents of a  
customer’s electronic communications stored on servers located outside the United  
States. The SCA warrant in this case may not lawfully be used to compel Microsoft  
to produce to the government the contents of a customer’s e-mail account stored  
exclusively in Ireland.1055 
 
This is undoubtedly a landmark decision. In the words of Microsoft’s president and chief legal 
advisor Brad Smith, ‘it ensures that people’s privacy rights are protected by the laws of their 
own countries, it helps ensure that the legal protection of the physical world apply in the digital 
domain and it paves the way for better solutions to address both privacy and law enforcement 
needs.’1056 Furthermore, it brought into a sharp focus the need for legal solutions on domestic 
and international level that would address both the protection of privacy and the needs of law 
enforcement. 
Another example of an attempt by a LEA to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in 
contravention of territorial sovereignty relates to the cases concerning the encryption dispute 
between the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Apple. Following Edward Snowden 
disclosures in 2013 some technology companies began integrating encryption of digital 
communications into their products and enabling this as a default setting, for example Apple 
iOS 8 and Google Android.1057 This creates a particular problem for law enforcement, who 
may obtain a court order to search and seize nearly anything, except for the encrypted data 
which will not be accessible without a pass code. This is the basis of the dispute  in the In a 
                                              
1055 supra note 70.  
1056 supra note 71. 
1057 ibid. 
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Matter of the Search Warrant of an Apple iPhone1058 (The San Bernardino case), where the 
FBI applied for a court order to compel that Company to gain access to a password protected 
iPhone recovered from a suspected terrorist in connection with San Bernardino attacks on 15 
December 2015. The case is one of the highest profile clashes in the debate regarding 
encryption and data privacy between the US government and a technology company. It was 
dropped on the first day of its court hearing, as the FBI, it is claimed, was assisted by a third 
party to gain access to the phone’s data. It nevertheless is the basis of a continued debate 
between technology firms and law enforcement authorities. The latter claim that the use of 
encryption tools by such companies as Apple hinders criminal investigations and effective 
prevention of terrorist attacks.1059 The dispute also brought to the public attention a number of 
similar orders served on Apple under the All Writs Act 1789. One of these orders seeks to force 
the Company to design a new operating system that would allow to disable iPhone’s certain 
security features. 1060  Apple refused, thus being subject of court proceedings. Its legal 
arguments are based on an unreasonable burden that the nature of the assistance would cause 
the Company, the fact that the order itself is based on an antiquated legislation and that the end 
result of complying would fundamentally undermine the trust in the security system of Apple 
products, at the same time making iPhone derived data irresistible to criminals, terrorists and 
hackers. The case is not argued on the basis of possible violations of international law. 
Nevertheless, one conclusion from this perspective is that if Apple were to be compelled by 
the US courts to introduce an operating system, whereby the encrypted data could be easily 
accessed by any LEA, this would effectively open the data of anybody in the world to their 
scrutiny, thus discarding the need for the official MLA mechanisms. The result could be far 
reaching- any LEA in a given state would be able to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in 
another’s territory without seeking official consent. The successful outcome for the FBI could 
also have very serious global ramifications for human rights. The the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein speaking out in support of Apple, described the 
order made by the US authorities as tantamount to ‘unlocking a Pandora’s Box that could have 
                                              
1058 supra note 56. 
1059 CNBC, ‘Apple vs FBI: All You Need to Know’ (29 March 2016)  
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extremely damaging implications for the human rights of many millions of people, including 
their physical and financial security’.1061  
 Cyberspace has facilitated an avalanche of personal data and made it be available for 
access and exploitation by both the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies. The 
functions of these agencies have become blurred as far as fighting cyber crime and 
safeguarding national security are concerned. As a consequence, the tasks that they perform 
are no longer circumscribed by easily discernible legal boundaries.  The Snowden documents 
revealed that LEAs routinely access on massive scale data stored abroad, which inevitably 
breaches the principle of territorial sovereignty. In addition, there is a push on the part of some 
governments to compel data controllers in third countries to surrender the information held in 
their data centres on production of court orders or through undermining encryption standards. 
All these developments set dangerous global precedents and raise concerns with regard to 
privacy protection, which will form the basis of the discussion in the next part of this chapter.  
 
PART II: THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS 
 
1. The Right to Privacy 
 
The legal right to privacy is said to be ‘amongst the essential ingredients of modern 
human rights law’.1062 Its general aim is to set limits of how far society and the state can intrude 
into a person’s affairs.1063 The next part of this chapter will focus on the right to privacy of 
communications under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1996 (ICCPR), 
                                              
1061 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Apple-FBI Case 
Could Have Serious Global Ramifications for Human Rights: Zeid’ (4 March 2016) 
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1062 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (Pearson Education Limited, 2010), p. 
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the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) and the American Convention of 
Human Rights 1969 (ACHR).  
 
A. International Law and The Right to Privacy of Communications 
 
A number of legal frameworks at international level set out that all individuals have the right 
to respect for their private life, home and correspondence. The 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) expressly refers to this right in Article 12.1064 The Declaration was 
only intended as a proclamation of basic rights and fundamental freedoms and its purpose was 
described as ‘setting a common standard of achievement for all peoples in all nations’. 1065 
Therefore it is a non legally binding instrument. However, an explicit and binding obligation 
of protection for the right to privacy on all member-states is contained in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1996 (ICCPR), Article 17.1066 
The UN Human Rights Committee’s (HRC), a body of independent experts that monitors the 
implementation of the ICCPR by its state parties, is tasked with providing a guide to the 
Covenant’s interpretation. This the Committee does through issuing non-country specific and 
non-legally binding general comments, with the purpose  to, inter alia, promote the effective 
implementation of the Covenant, clarify its requirements and stimulate the activities of state 
parties as well as international organizations in the promotion and protection of human 
rights.1067 The HRC’s analysis of the content of the right to privacy contained  in General 
Comment 16 asserts that Article 17(1) not only prohibits states from invading a person’s 
                                              
1064 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 
A(III), art. 12 states that: 
[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
 home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.  
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interferences and 
attacks. 
1065 ibid. 
1066 ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 17 states that: 
1. [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his  
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour 
and reputation.  
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or   
attack. 
1067 Ghandi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication: Law 
and Practice (Ashgate Publishing 1998) p. 25. 
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privacy, but also sets out positive obligations to take positive national measures to protect it,1068 
including  adequate complaints systems, as well as remedies for privacy violations. The 
meaning of privacy for the purposes of Article 17 has not been defined in either the General 
Comment 16, nor the case law of the HRC.1069 However,  the Committee did recognize its 
infringement in the context of confidentiality and integrity of correspondence.1070 Furthermore, 
the protection in law against interference with privacy of correspondence has explicitly been 
made in paragraph 8 of the General Comment 16, which states that: 
 
[c]ompliance with article 17 requires that the integrity and  
 confidentiality of correspondence should be guaranteed de jure and de facto. 
 Correspondence should be delivered to the addressee without interception and  
without being opened or otherwise read. Surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, 
interception of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of communications, wire-
tapping and recording of conversations should be prohibited.1071 
 
The Committee’s case law has interpreted the term ‘correspondence’ as comprising not only 
written letters, but also other forms of communication, such as telephonic, facsimile and e-
mail. (Angel Estrella v Uruguay).1072 The HRC also commented on such matters as telephone 
tapping in its Concluding Observations on Poland, 1073  interception of postal articles, or 
                                              
1068 UN HRC, ‘CCPR General Comment No.16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) The Right to 
Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence and the Protection of Honour and 
Reputation’ (8 April 1988) UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, para 1:  
Article 17 provides for the right of every person to be protected against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence as well as 
against unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. In the view of the Committee 
this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks whether 
they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons. The obligations 
imposed by this article require the State to adopt legislation and other measures to give 
effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well at to the 
protection of his right. 
1069 Sarah Joseph and Mellissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 534. 
1070 General Comment No. 16, supra note 85. 
1071 ibid. 
1072 Angel Estrella v Uruguay (74/80). In that case a prisoner received 35 out of 100 censored 
letters and HRC found that he should be allowed under necessary supervision to correspond 
with his family and reputable friends without interference. 
1073 UN HRC, Concluding Observations on Poland (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.110. 
The HRC noted at paragraph 22 that: 
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telegrams in the Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe1074 and wide powers of surveillance 
of electronic communications for the executive as a way of combating terrorism in its 
Concluding Observations on Sweden.1075 In that case the HRC stated that: 
 
[t]he [s]tate party shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the gathering, 
storage and use of personal data not be subject to any abuses, not be used for purposes 
contrary to the Covenant and be consistent with obligations under article 17 of the 
Covenant. To that effect, the [s]tate party should guarantee that the processing and 
gathering of information be subject to review and supervision by an independent body 
with necessary guarantee of impartiality and effectiveness.1076  
 
Thus, electronic surveillance falls within the meaning of the term ‘correspondence’ under 
Article 17 and may be compatible with that Article, if it is strictly controlled and overseen by 
independent, preferably judicial, bodies. 1077 General Comment No. 16 also addresses the 
gathering and holding of personal information on computers, data banks and other devices, 
whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, which must be subject to 
appropriate state regulation and safeguards.1078  
                                              
[a]s regards telephone tapping, the Committee is concerned (a) that the Prosecutor 
(without judicial consent) may permit telephone tapping; and (b) that there is no 
independent monitoring of the use of the entire system of tapping telephones.  
1074 UN HRC, Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe (1998) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.89. 
The HRC stated at paragraph 25 that: 
[t]he Committee notes with concern that the Postmaster-General is authorised to 
intercept any postal articles or telegrams on grounds of public security or the 
maintenance of law and to deliver these items to a specified State employee. The 
Committee recommends that steps be taken to ensure that interception be subject to 
strict judicial supervision and that the relevant laws be brought into compliance with 
the Covenant.  
1075 UN HRC, Concluding Observations on Sweden (2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6. 
1076 ibid, paragraph 18. 
1077 Joseph and Castan, supra note 86, p. 548. 
1078  General Comment No.16, supra note 85, para 10: 
[t]he gathering and holding of personal information on computers, databanks and other 
devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be 
regulated by law. Effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that 
information concerning a person's private life does not reach the hands of persons who 
are not authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for purposes 
incompatible with the Covenant. In order to have the most effective protection of his 
private life, every individual should have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form, 
whether, and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data files, and for what 
purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain which public [authorities] 
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Article 17(1) ICCPR prohibits ‘unlawful’ and ‘arbitrary’ interference with privacy. 
General Comment 16 interpreted the term ‘unlawful’ to mean ‘that no interference can take 
place except in cases envisaged by the law’.1079 This means that interference with privacy is 
permissible, but only if is authorized by states and if it takes place on the basis of law, which 
itself must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.1080 The HRC has 
elaborated on the meaning of ‘law’ for the purposes of Article 19 ICCPR (freedom of opinion 
and expression) stating that “‘law’ must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an 
individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the 
public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion”.1081 Furthermore, the HRC interpreted the 
term ‘arbitrary interference’ stating that: 
 
[t]he expression ‘arbitrary interference’ is also relevant to the protection of the right 
provided for in Article 17. In the Committee’s view the expression ‘arbitrary 
interference’ can also extend to interference provided under the law. The introduction 
of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided 
by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.1082 
 
It is of note that the concept of arbitrariness is generally understood to be wider than that of 
unlawfulness in international law. For example, in the context of loss or deprivation of 
nationality, a measure will be arbitrary if it does not  comply with certain conditions, such as 
serving a legitimate purpose, being the least intrusive instrument to achieve the desired result 
and being proportional to the interest to be protected.1083 Equally, for a measure not to be 
                                              
or private individuals or bodies control or may control their files. If such files contain 
incorrect personal data or have been collected or processed contrary to the provisions 
of the law, every individual should have the right to request rectification or elimination. 
1079 ibid, paragraph 3. 
1080 ibid. 
1081 UN HRC, General Comment No. 34 on Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (Article 19 
ICCPR) (21 July 2011), para 25, p. 6. < 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf>.  
1082 General Comment No. 16, supra note 85, p.4. 
1083 UN HRC, ‘Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality. Report of the 
Secretary General’ (19 December 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/25/28, p. 4.  
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arbitrary, adequate procedural standards must be in place, such as an effective administrative 
or judicial review, an opportunity to appeal the decision and provision of remedies.1084  
There are a number of cases where the HRC found unlawful and arbitrary interference with 
privacy of correspondence, including the intrusion into private telephone communications 
(Concluding Observations on the Russian Federation),1085 phone-tapping and legal privilege 
communications (Concluding Observations on Jamaica, 1086  Cornelis van Hulst v 
Netherlands)1087 and censorship of prisoner’s letters (Pinkney v Canada).1088 These cases show 
that even if the interference conforms to the Covenant, it can only take place pursuant to the 
‘relevant legislation [authorizing the interference] [which] must specify in detail the precise 
circumstances in which such interference may be permitted,’1089  whilst a decision to make use 
of such authorized interference must be made only by the authority designated under the law 
and on a case-by-case basis.1090  
 
B. Regional Human Rights Systems and The Right to Privacy of Communications  
 
a. The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
At the European level, the main legal instrument, which aims to guarantee civil and political 
rights is the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)1091 and its additional 
Protocols. The Convention sets out the right to privacy in Article 8.1092 The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) adopted a wide approach to circumscribing the contours of the ‘right 
                                              
1084 ibid, pp. 14-17. 
1085 UN HRC, Concluding Observations on the Russian Federation (1995) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.54. 
1086 UN HRC, Concluding Observations on Jamaica, (1997) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.83. 
1087 Cornelis van Hulst v Netherlands (9003/00). 
1088 Pinkney v Canada (27/78). 
1089 General Comment No. 16, supra note 85, para 8. 
1090 ibid. 
1091 ECHR, supra note 3, art 8. 
1092 ibid, art 8:  
1. [e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
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to private life’. Similarly to Article 17 ICCPR, Article 8(1) ECHR explicitly refers to the right 
to respect of correspondence as an autonomous interest (along with home and family), which 
has been interpreted as the right to uninterrupted and uncensored communications with 
others.1093 In this regard, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is in line with the HRC interpretation 
of the term ‘correspondence’ and covers all forms of communications, including telephone, 
facsimile and email.  
The extent of the interference with the right to privacy in the context of states’ secret 
surveillance operations has been subject of an extensive analysis of the ECtHR on a number of 
occasions in the past. A series of early cases dealing with the interception of telephone 
conversations applying various surveillance techniques by law enforcement agencies helped to 
develop consistent principles in relation to interference with the right protected by Article 8. 
The cases of Klass and Others v Germany,1094 Malone v United Kingdom,1095 Halford v United 
Kingdom1096 and Liberty v United Kingdom1097 established,  inter alia, that wiretapping of 
telephone conversations constitutes an interference with the right to privacy and the use of 
covert surveillance technologies invariably engaged Article 8, as the notion of ‘private life’ 
and ‘correspondence’ extends to the interception of telephone communications and so-called 
‘metering’ practices.1098 The finding that the notion of ‘correspondence’ covers telephone 
                                              
1093 David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Ed Bates, et al, Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2009) p. 380. 
1094 Klass and Others v Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 214.  
1095 Malone v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14. 
1096 Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
1097 Liberty & Others v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 1. In that case, a number of civil 
liberties organizations complained that their telephone and electronic communication had been 
intercepted for seven years by the UK. Ministry of Defense pursuant to the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985. The Act allowed for no limitations on the type of communications 
that could be intercepted, granting virtually unrestricted rights to capture all external 
communications. Nor did the Act indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of this wide 
discretion, or the manner, in which it was to be exercised. In particular, there was an absence 
of publicly available procedures as to the selection, sharing, storing and destruction of the 
intercepted material. The applicants claimed that once captured, the data was then filtered using 
an electronic search engine. The search terms, devised by officials were used, but the only legal 
requirement was that the data could be searched, listened to, or read if it fell within very broad 
categories, such as detection of crime or prevention of terrorism. The ECtHR held that there 
were no statutory limitations on the type of information collected, or the way in which it could 
be used, shared or stored and therefore there was a violation of Article 8. 
1098 Malone, supra note 112. ‘Metering’ involved the use of a meter to register the number 
dialed on a particular telephone as well as the time and duration of each call. The ECtHR 
held that there had been an interference with Article 8, as the notion of ‘private life’ and 
‘correspondence’ extended to interception of telephone communications and the metering 
practices. 
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conversations had been extended in Halford v United Kingdom1099 to include the interception 
of office telephone calls. Subsequently, in Liberty v United Kingdom1100 the ECtHR explicitly 
stated that e-mail, in addition to written, telephone and facsimile communications, are also 
included in the ambit of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ within the meaning of Article 8 
ECHR.  
The Court’s subsequent jurisprudence established that not only the direct interception, but also 
the collection and storage of personal information in relation to an individual’s use of the 
telephone, email and internet amounts to interference with private life and correspondence. 
Thus, in  Copland v United Kingdom,1101 the ECtHR concluded that the collection and storage 
of personal information relating to the applicant’s use of the telephone, email and internet 
without her knowledge amounted to an interference with her right to respect for private life 
and correspondence.1102 Likewise, Article 8 rights were breached, when the Court found that 
storage of communications amounted to interference in the cases of Leander v Sweden1103 and 
Amann v Switzerland.1104 In Leander, the ECtHR held that ‘both the storing and the release of 
[secret police-register information], coupled with a refusal to allow [the applicant] an 
opportunity to refute it, amounted to an interference with his right to respect for private life’.1105  
In Amann the ECtHR found that the interception and/or storage of a communication constitutes 
a violation and the ‘subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding’,1106 
nor did it matter ‘whether the information gathered on the applicant was sensitive or not or as 
to whether the applicant had been inconvenienced in any way’.1107  
The Court also found interference with Article 8 in a number of cases relating to the storage of 
electronic data on government databases. In S. and Marper v the United Kingdom1108 the 
applicants’ fingerprints, cellular and DNA samples were to be held indefinitely in a database, 
following criminal proceedings against them. The ECtHR held that Article 8 had been violated 
as the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of the fingerprints, cell 
                                              
1099 Halford, supra note 113. 
1100 Liberty, supra note 114. 
1101 Copland v United Kingdom (2007) 45 EHRR 858.  
1102 European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet-New Technologies (June 2015), 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_New_technologies_ENG.pdf>. 
1103 Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433. 
1104 Amann v Switzerland (2000) (App. No. 27798/95). 
1105 Leander, supra note 120, para 22. 
1106 Amann, supra note 121, para 69. 
1107 ibid, para. 70. 
1108 S. and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 1169. 
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samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences, failed to strike 
a fair balance between the competing private and public interests, as they were disproportionate 
to the aims achieved.1109 A violation of Article 8 was also found in the case of Shimovolos v 
Russia,1110 concerning the collection of information in the so-called ‘surveillance database’ of 
a human rights activist’s movements by train or air within Russia. The Court observed that the 
creation and maintenance of the database and the procedure for its operation were governed by 
a ministerial order, which had never been published or otherwise made accessible to the public. 
Therefore, the domestic law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of 
exercise of the discretion conferred on the domestic authorities to collect and store information 
on individual’s private lives in the database. Nor did it set out in a form accessible to the public 
any indication of the minimum safeguards against abuse. 1111 The Court continued to find 
violation of Article 8 in similar fashion in such cases as M.K v France1112 and Brunet v 
France. 1113 In the former, the ECtHR held that the retention of the data in question had 
amounted to disproportionate interference with his right to privacy. In the latter judgment, the 
Court considered that the French state had overstepped its discretion, as the retention could be 
regarded as a disproportionate breach of the applicant’s right to privacy and was not necessary 
in a democratic society. Likewise, an infringement of Article 8 was found in Robathin v 
Austria,1114 where the applicant’s documents and electronic data were searched by the police 
following a criminal investigation. The interference related to the fact that the search concerned 
all of his electronic data rather than that relating solely to case under investigation. As there 
were no substantiating reasons given for such an all encompassing search, the Court held that 
the seizure and examination of all the data had gone beyond what was necessary to achieve the 
legitimate aim. 
 The recent judgments in Roman Zakharov v Russia 1115   and Szabo and Vissy v 
Hungary, 1116  decided by the ECtHR Grand Chamber in 2015 and 2016 respectively, 
consolidated the Court’s previous case law in relation to secret surveillance. The case relates 
solely to Russia’s domestic legal framework aimed at the state’s nationals and in that sense 
                                              
1109 European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet-New Technologies, supra note 119, p. 1.  
1110 Shimovolos v Russia (App. No. 30194/09) 21 June 2011. 
1111 European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet-New Technologies, supra note 119, p. 2.  
1112 M.K v France (2013) (App. No 19522/09)  
1113 Brunet v France (2014) (App. No. 21010/10).  
1114 Robathin v Austria (2012) (App. No. 30457/06). 
1115 Roman Zakharov v Russia (2015) (App. No. 47143/06). 
1116 Szabo and Vissy v Hungary (2016) (App. No. 37138). 
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does not address extraterritorial surveillance, nor transborder searches of protected data. 
Nevertheless, it is now the leading authority on the approach the ECtHR takes when assessing 
such measures and therefore may be indicative of a stance that the Court may adopt to cases 
concerning blanket extraterritorial surveillance and searches. Zakharov concerned a system of 
secret interception of all mobile telephone communications in the interest of crime prevention 
and national security in Russia. The applicant complained that Russian network operators were 
required by law (Order No. 70) to install equipment enabling law enforcement agencies to carry 
out operational search activities, without prior judicial authorization.1117 This permitted blanket 
interception and was unsuccessfully challenged by the complainant,  Mr Zakharov at national 
level. He therefore brought the case before the ECtHR arguing three grounds, namely that these 
methods of surveillance infringed his Article 8 rights, that parts of the Russian laws were not 
accessible to the public1118 and that there were not sufficient remedies available to him1119 
(Article 13 ECHR). The Ground Chamber of the ECtHR unanimously found that there was a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR. This was based on a number of systematic faults with the Russian 
laws, including the fact that the interception was exceedingly broad in scope, accessible to both 
the secret services and the police, whilst its enabling laws did not provide for adequate and 
effective guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse. The case is of importance for a 
number of reasons.  
First, the Grand Chamber considered the question of admissibility of Mr Zakharov’s 
case. This preliminary stage requires from the applicant to show that he/she was personally and 
directly a victim of violation (Article 34)1120 of the Convention rights and that he/she has 
suffered a ‘significant disadvantage’ (Article 35).1121 If the applicant fails to satisfy this criteria, 
                                              
1117 supra note 132. 
1118 ibid, paragraph 180, p. 43. 
1119 ibid, paragraph 216, p. 53. Zakharov argued that ‘the questions of notification of 
surveillance measures and of the effectiveness of remedies before the courts were 
inextricably linked, since there was in principle little scope for recourse to the courts by the 
individual concerned unless the latter was advised of the measure taken without his or her 
knowledge and was thus able to challenge their legality retrospectively’.  
1120 ECHR, supra note 3, art 34: 
[t]he Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organization 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. 
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right.  
 
1121 ECHR, supra note 3, art 35(3): 
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the ECtHR will not normally review a member state’s relevant law and practice in the abstract. 
However, the Court has shown a degree of flexibility in this regard in the past. In Klass v 
Germany,1122 it was found that the mere existence of laws and practices, which permitted and 
established a system of secret surveillance entailed a threat of surveillance for all those to whom 
the legislation might be applied. It was therefore held that an applicant could be a ‘victim’  in 
a situation where a violation is a result of the mere existence of secret measure or legislation 
permitting such measure, without having to show that it has in fact been applied to him/her.  
1123  In Kennedy v United Kingdom1124 the ECtHR stated that in order to assess whether an 
individual could claim an interference as a result of the mere existence of legislation permitting 
secret surveillance, the Court had to have regard to the availability of any remedies at the 
national level and the risk of secret surveillance measures being applied to the person 
concerned.1125 Where there is no possibility to challenge the secret surveillance measure at 
domestic level, widespread suspicion and concern among the general public that such powers 
are being abused cannot be said to be unjustified. In such cases, even where the actual risk of 
surveillance is low there is a greater need for scrutiny by the ECtHR.1126 In Zakharov the Court 
adopted the Klass and the Kennedy approaches1127 and formulated a uniform and foreseeable 
approach to the circumstances as to when an applicant can claim a victim status. Thus, it 
stipulated that the applicant ‘could claim to be a victim of violation of Article 8 occasioned by 
the mere existence of legislation, which allowed a system of secret interception of 
communications, without having to demonstrate that such measures were in fact applied to 
him’,1128 under certain conditions. First, he/she must show that he/she either belongs to a group 
of persons targeted by the secret surveillance measure, or that it directly affects all users of 
                                              
[t]he Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under 
Article 34 if it considers that:  
[…] 
(b)   the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for 
human rights as de ned in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an 
examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be 
rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic 
tribunal.  
 
1122 supra note 111. 
1123 ibid, paragraph 36. 
1124 Kennedy v United Kingdom (2010) (Application No. 26839/05). 
1125 ibid, paragraph 124. 
1126 ibid.  
1127 Zakharov, supra note 132, p. 41. 
1128 ibid, paragraph 171, p. 41. 
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communications services. Secondly, the Court will take into account the available remedies at 
national level and adjust the degree of its scrutiny depending on the effectiveness of the 
remedies. 1129 Undoubtedly, the judgment has clarified the position with respect of who is 
permitted to bring a claim before the ECtHR, 1130  as the Court resolved the seemingly 
conflicting approaches and decided that the mere existence of laws and practices, which 
permitted and established a system for effecting secret surveillance of communications entailed 
a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation might be applied.1131 Thus, the 
mere threat1132 of secret surveillance measures is now sufficient to allow standing. It could be 
said that the Grand Chamber adopted a broad and liberal approach to this issue, because it 
examined the relevant legislation authorizing these measures not from the point of specific 
surveillance of Mr Zakhorov as the victim, but in the abstract. The ECtHR noted that the 
Russian legal framework provided for a system, under which any person using mobile phone 
services could have their communications intercepted, without ever being notified of the 
surveillance and as such, the legislation affected all users.1133 In addition, Russian law did not 
provide for effective remedies for a person who suspected that they may be subject to 
surveillance.1134  As a result of these findings, Mr Zakharov did not have to demonstrate that, 
                                              
1129  The Court at paragraph 171 specified these conditions in the following way: 
 (a) ‘the Court will take into account the scope of the legislation permitting secret 
surveillance measures by examining whether the applicant can possibly be affected by it, 
either because he or she belongs to a group of persons targeted by the contested legislation or 
because the legislation directly affects all users of communications services by instituting a 
system where any person can have his or her communications intercepted’; and (b)’the Court 
will take into account the availability of remedies at the national level and will adjust the 
degree of scrutiny depending on the effectiveness of such remedies’.  
1130 Before the Zakharov judgment, there were two lines of case law. The first, required the 
applicant to show a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the security services had compiled and 
retained information concerning his/her private life (Esbester v United Kingdom, Redgrave v 
United Kingdom, Christie v United Kingdom, Matthews v United Kingdom.  In these cases, 
the applicants alleged actual interception of their communications and in Esbester, Redgrave, 
Mathews and Christie, they also made general complaints about legislation and practice 
permitting secret surveillance measures.) The ‘reasonable likelihood’ requirement favoured 
the government’s position. The second line of cases, including Klass v Germany and 
Kennedy v UK, suggested that the sole existence of laws and practices, which permitted and 
established a system for effecting secret surveillance of communications entailed a threat of 
surveillance for all those to whom the legislation might be applied. Thus, the mere menace of 
secret surveillance measures was sufficient to allow standing and therefore this approach 
favoured the applicant.  
1131 Zakharov, supra note 132, para 168, p. 40. 
1132 ibid, para 171, p. 41. 
1133 ibid, para 175, p. 42. 
1134 ibid, para 176, p.42. 
 211 
due to his personal situation, he was at risk of being subjected to secret surveillance.1135 He 
was entitled to claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention, despite not being able to 
demonstrate that he was subject to a concreate measure of surveillance-the mere existence of 
the legislation allowing this amounted to an interference with his rights  under Article 8.1136 
This suggests that the ECtHR willingness to consider a case such as this in abstracto (that is 
without the applicant’s need to show ‘significant disadvantage’ under Article 35), will make it 
easier (provided that all domestic avenues have been exhausted) to bring future challenges to 
state surveillance to the Strasbourg Court on condition that he/she can show the existence of 
legislation allowing for surveillance that affects all users of services in question and the lack 
of effective means to challenge the law at domestic level.1137  
The second important aspect of this judgment is the enumeration of the criteria, 
according to which the Court will assess secret surveillance. These the Court enumerated as 
(a) the accessibility of the domestic law; (b) the scope and duration of the secret surveillance 
measures; (c) the procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using, 
communicating and destroying the intercepted data; (d) the authorization procedures, the 
arrangements for supervising the implementation of secret surveillance measures; (e) any 
notification mechanisms and (f) the remedies provided for by national law.1138 Having applied 
these to the Russian legal framework in Zakharov, 1139 the Court took issue with its many 
aspects. In particular, it criticized the fact that the legislation allowed interception of 
communications for broad ‘national, military, economic, or ecological security purposes’. 1140 
Since the law enforcement authorities had direct access to all mobile telephone 
communications and related communications data, the Court observed that ‘any system, such 
as the Russian one, which enables the secret services and the police to intercept directly the 
communications of each and every citizen without requiring them to show an interception 
authorization to the communications service provider, or to any one else, is particularly prone 
to abuse’,1141 which calls for greater safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse. Other aspects 
of the interception regime were also considered,1142 but importantly the ECtHR viewed the 
                                              
1135 ibid, para 177, p.42. 
1136 ibid, para 179, p. 42. 
1137 ibid, para 179, p. 42. 
1138 ibid, para 238, p. 60. 
1139 ibid. 
1140 ibid, para 248, p. 62. 
1141 ibid, para 270, p. 69. 
1142 These included ‘(a) the circumstances in which public authorities are empowered to 
resort to secret surveillance measures are not defined with sufficient clarity; (b) provisions on 
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remedies available to challenge the interception under the Russian legal system inadequate, in 
that they were available only to persons, who were able to submit proof of interception. 
Obtaining such evidence was impossible in the absence of any notification requirement 
therefore an ability to retrospectively challenge a surveillance measure was practically 
meaningless.1143  
The third aspect of the Zakharov judgment worthy of note is the fact that it has updated and 
consolidated the Court’s previous extensive jurisprudence on surveillance, stressing the 
requirements of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ in Article 8(2). It could be said therefore that 
this case is not a departure from the Court’s previous decisions, but it reaffirms and highlights 
the dangers of bulk, untargeted surveillance conducted without proper independent oversights.  
Thus, the Court reiterated the need for the authorization warrants, which must be very specific 
and targeted at particular individuals or premises based on a reasonable and verifiable suspicion 
against the person concerned, stressing in particular the need for factual indictors for suspecting 
that a given individual is planning, committing or having committed a criminal act or one 
endangering national security. 1144 The requested interception must meet the requirements of 
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ in a democratic society, including whether it is proportionate 
to the aim pursued by verifying, for example whether it is possible to achieve that aim by less 
restrictive means (Klass,1145 Association for European Integration and Human Rights and 
Ekimdziehiev v Bulgarian1146). In Zakharov, the Court acknowledged that the interception 
requests were reviewed before national courts. However, the authorizations were based on 
information pertaining to criminal offence or activities endangering national, economic or 
ecological security. There was no need under the domestic law for them to be supported by any 
                                              
discontinuation of secret surveillance do not provide sufficient guarantees against arbitrary 
interference; (c) the domestic law permits automatic storage of clearly irrelevant data and is 
not sufficiently clear as to the circumstances in which the intercept material will be stored 
and destroyed after the end of the trial; (d) the authorisation procedures are not capable of 
ensuring that secret surveillance measures are ordered only when ‘necessary in a democratic 
sociality’; (e) the supervision of interception,  as it is currently organized, does not comply 
with the requirement of independence, powers and competence which are sufficient to 
exercise an effective and continuous control, public security and effectiveness in practice; (f) 
the effectiveness of remedies is undermined by the absence of notification at any point of 
interceptions, or adequate access to documents relating to interception’.  Paragraph 302. 
1143 Zakharov, supra note 132, para 300, p. 78. 
1144 ibid, paragraph 260-20, p. 65. 
1145 supra note 111. 
1146 Association of European Integration and Human Rights and Ekmdzhiev v Bulgaria (227) 
(App. No. 62540/00). 
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other evidence.1147 The only criteria for rejection of the interception request was the lack of 
signature of a competent person. As Russian courts never had to verify whether there was a  
‘reasonable suspicion’ relating to the person concerned, there was no need to apply the 
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ test.1148 Therefore the legislation permitting the interception 
of communications for broad national security, or military purposes, without an indication of 
the particular circumstances, under which an individual’s communications may be intercepted, 
simply did not justify the use of such measures, even if the legislation required prior judicial 
authorization.  
 The ECtHR took an equally robust stance regarding domestic surveillance measures in 
the Hungarian case of Szabo and Vissy v Hungary, 1149  which was decided shorty after 
Zakharov. The case concerned surveillance powers of the Hungarian intelligence agencies 
under the Police Act 1994 (s. 7/E(3)), including interception of electronic or computerized 
communications on anti-terrorist grounds, without the consent of the person concerned. These 
powers were subject to ministerial, rather than judicial authorization. They were not linked to 
a particular crime and required a general warrant, which had to relate only to premises, persons 
concerned or ‘a range of persons’, being therefore potentially executable against any person in 
Hungary. Given that the scope of the measures could include virtually everyone in that country, 
the ordering was entirely in the guise of the executive without an assessment of whether 
interception was strictly necessary. Since new technologies enabled the Hungarian government 
to intercept vast amounts of data concerning even persons outside the original range of 
operations and because there was an absence of any effective remedial measure, the ECtHR 
concluded that there has been a violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
The Zakharov and Szabo decisions could be viewed as seriously undermining of bulk, 
untargeted surveillance regimes. In Zakhorov not only did the ECtHR list and refer to the recent 
cases of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner1150 and Digital Rights Ireland 1151 (both discussed elsewhere in this chapter), 
but it also made several explicit references to the Snowden revelations in the judgment 
                                              
1147 Zakharov, supra note 132, p. 66. 
1148 ibid, para 263, p. 67. 
1149 Szabo, supra note 133. 
1150 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015] ECJ.  
1151 Joined Cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitilinger and Others 
[2014] ECJ.  
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itself. 1152  These judgments are an indication of the ECtHR antagonism towards mass 
surveillance and signal that the Court may take an uncompromising approach to the 
surveillance practices of the UK GCHQ, domestic and extraterritorial alike, when reaching its 
decisions in three currently pending cyber surveillance cases of Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism and Alice Ross v UK,1153 Big Brother Watch and Others v UK,1154 and 10 Human 
Rights Organizations v UK.1155 
b. The Inter-American Human Rights System 
 
The origins of this system lie in two distinct but related instruments:- (a) the OAS Charter 
system of human rights, which relies on the OAS Charter and the American Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man 1948; and (b) the American Convention on Human Rights 1969, 
binding on those member states, which have voluntarily become parties to the Convention.1156 
The right to privacy is contained in Article 11.1157  These two systems operate through inter-
                                              
1152 Zakharov, supra note 132.  Direct references were made to the text from the Director of the 
European Union Agency for Human Rights discussing Snowden and in the separate opinion 
issued by Judge Dedov.   
1153 Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v UK (App. No. 62322/14). The case 
concerns the applicants’ allegations regarding breach of Article 8 and 10 rights through 
interception, storage and exploitation of internet and telephone communications by the UK 
government agencies, including GCHQ, as revealed by Edward Snowden. 
1154 Big Brother Watch and Others v UK (App. No. 58170/13). This case has been brought 
before the ECtHR by three NGOs and an academic, alleging breach of Article 8 right on the 
basis that they are likely to have been subjects of surveillance by the UK intelligence 
agencies, following the revelations of Edward Snowden. 
1155 10 Human Rights Organizations v UK (9 April 2015) (Index No.: IOR 60/1415/2015). 
Amnesty International states that ‘the Applicants are 10 non-governmental human rights 
organizations based both within and outside the United Kingdom - the American Civil 
Liberties Union, Amnesty International, Bytes for All, the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, 
the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, the Legal Resources Centre, Liberty, Privacy 
International. Their complaints to ECHR are concerned with mass bulk interception, 
collection, inspection, distribution and retention of communications on a vast, unprecedented 
scale. The UK Government carries out such activity itself and also receives the product of 
such activity carried out by the US Government. The Applicants complain of violations of 
their rights both in relation to the content of their communications and the associated 
metadata.’ Amnesty International 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior60/1415/2015/en/>. 
1156 Rehman, supra note 79, p. 272. 
1157 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art 11: 
1. [e]veryone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, 
his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or 
reputation. 
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related organ, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR) and the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights (IACtHR). Both organs are mandated with deciding 
individual complaints concerning human rights violations and the Commission also engages in 
human rights monitoring and promotion activities.1158 It is important to note that the US has 
signed but not ratified the ACHR, hence the IACtHR and IACommHR have no jurisdiction to 
hear cases against that country. Nevertheless, the protection of privacy in Article 11 ACHR 
applies to most Latin American states. In addition, the US has signed and ratified the Charter 
of the Organization of American States and therefore in the view of the IACommHR it is bound 
at international level by the American Declaration.1159  
In a similar vein to the ICCPR, the ACHR in Article 11 prohibits ‘arbitrary or abusive 
interference with [individual’s] private life or correspondence’. The American Declaration also 
refers to the notion of private life in Article 5, which provides that ‘every person has the right 
to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his 
private and family life’. Moreover, Article 10 of the Declaration states that ‘every person has 
the right to the inviolability of his correspondence’.1160 Article 11 ACHR is also phrased in a 
similar way to Article 8 ECHR. In addition, the Inter-American Commission has been 
influenced in its approach by the decisions of the ECtHR in interpreting the ambit of Article 
11. Although the jurisprudence of the IACtHR is not as well developed as that of the Strasbourg 
Court, it did consider the question of interference with the right to privacy in two cases relating 
to the lawfulness of telephone wiretapping. In Donoso v Panama1161 the IACtHR concluded 
that telephone conversations, whether private or business related, fall within the ambit of 
Article 11. Therefore, the interception of telephone communications without the consent of the 
callers constituted an interference with the right to privacy. In Escher v Columbia,1162 the Court 
                                              
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. 
1158 The Commission holds thematic hearings on specific issues, publishes studies and reports, 
requests the adoption of precautionary measures to protect individuals at risk and has 
established a number of thematic rapporteurships to closely monitor certain human rights 
themes. Individuals, groups of individuals and non-governmental organizations recognized in 
the OAS may submit complaints (petitions) concerning violations of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948, American Convention on Human Rights and other 
regional human rights treaties. 
1159 Roach v United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. Comm’n HR. 
1160 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.AS. Res. XXX, adopted by the 
Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), Article X. 
1161 Donoso v Panama, Judgement, IACtHR (Ser. C) No. 193 (27 January 2009), para 193,  
1162 Escher v Columbia, Judgement IACtHR (Ser. C) No. 200, para 114. 
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enumerated the protected aspects of telephone conversations, namely their content, as well as 
all related information, such as the caller, the recipient, time and duration of the call. 
 
 All the above human rights instruments have some unifying features, in that (a) they 
refer to the right to privacy of correspondence, which has been interpreted by at least two 
judicial organs (the HRC and the ECtHR) to cover electronic surveillance and interception of 
communications by state agencies; (b) they all use the term ‘interference’ to describe the 
prohibited action, except for the American Declaration, but none refer to what type of 
interference is prohibited; and (c) in all four documents the right to privacy is qualified, rather 
than absolute. At least some treaties, for example Article 8(2) ECHR, enumerate permissible 
limitations of this right, whilst others, such as ICCPR, do not. 
 
 
C. Domestic Legal Bases Permitting Interception of Communications  
 
All governments are under a duty to protect citizens within their borders from acts of terrorism 
and criminality. To that end, they may carry out surveillance both within and beyond their own 
territory on the basis of their domestic legal frameworks. However, these frameworks must 
comply with states’ human rights obligations and meet the minimum standards, defined by the 
international human rights treaties and as interpreted by the relevant judicial organs.  
Cyber surveillance is a new challenge to the right of privacy of communications set out 
by international law. The scale and scope of surveillance has been made possible because of 
an a-territorial nature of cyberspace as it mandates borderless routing and storage of 
information, allowing states to conduct interception of communications from within their own 
territories and then share it. This calls into question the extent to which an individual may rely 
on human rights protection. Historically, governments were restricted in their exercise of 
communications surveillance in another country. If such operations were conducted, this would 
inevitably breach the principles of state sovereignty and give affected persons protection under 
their domestic laws. The expeditious technical progress in digital communications, coupled 
with the post 11 September 2001 (9/11) shift in focus from surveillance of the foreign powers 
and states to the interception of communications of all individuals, means that the privacy 
rights of all concerned (foreign nationals, nationals and stateless persons alike) have been 
compromised to a significant degree. This is not only because of the scope and the breath of 
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surveillance methods through such programmes as Tempora and Boundless Informant,1163 but 
also due to the highly integrated nature of communications networks. This integrated nature 
means that many of the agencies sweep up all data indiscriminately, justifying this on the basis 
of the technical difficulties between distinguishing foreign and domestic communications.1164  
On inspection of the legislative interception powers of the Five Eyes partners, it 
becomes clear that there is a disparity in treatment of individuals based on their nationality 
and/or location.  In most of the countries concerned greater procedural protection of privacy 
rights is given to the citizens as opposed to non-citizens, or non-nationals. The particular 
domestic statutes that expressly regulate intelligence agencies surveillance powers are: (a) the 
UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), 5;1165 (b) the US 18 U.S.C § 2511(2), 
the so-called Wiretap Act;1166 (c) South African Regulation of Interception of Communications 
and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 2002 (RICA), ss. 2-11;1167 (d) 
Australian Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, s 6;1168(e) Canadian 
Criminal Code of Canada (Invasion of Privacy) 1985 Part VI; 1169  and (f) New Zealand  
Government Communication Security Bureau Act 2003, s. 15.1170 As a general rule, these laws 
make the interception of domestic communications by state agencies illegal, unless authorized 
                                              
1163 Glenn Greenwald and Ewan MacAskill ‘Boundless Informant: The NSA’s Secret Tool to 
Track Global Surveillance Data’ (11 June 2013)   The Guardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-
datamining>. The Guardian exposed that Boundless Informant data contained in a top secrete 
NSA document showed that in March 2013 the NSA collected 97bn pieces of intelligence 
from computer networks worldwide. The largest amount of information was gathered from 
Iran, with more than 14bn reports in that period, followed by 13.5bn from Pakistan, 12.7bn 
from Jordan (one of the US closest Arab allies), 7.6bn form Egypt and 6.3bn from India. 
Boundless Informant details and maps by country the amount of information it collects from 
computer and telephone networks, mainly metadata.  
1164 supra note 180. According to The Guardian, a spokesman for the NSA said that ‘current 
technology simply does not permit us to positively identify all of the persons or locations 
associated with a given communication (for example, it may be possible to say with certainty 
that a communication traversed a particular path within the internet. It is harder to know the 
ultimate source or destination, or more particularly the identity of the person represented by 
the TO:, FROM:, or CC:, field of an e-mail address or the abstraction of an IP address’. 
1165 Parliament of the United Kingdom, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 c. 23 
(Royal Assent 28 July 2000), s. 5.  
1166 US 18 U.S.C § 2511(1). 
1167 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related 
Information Act 2002, Part 1.   
1168 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, s. 6. 
1169 Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1985), 164. 
1170 Government Communication Security Bureau Act 2003, s. 15. 
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by appropriate judicial, or executive authority on such grounds as serious criminal or terrorist 
activities.  
 
a. Domestic Legal Frameworks Authorizing Foreign Surveillance and the 
Principle of Non-Discrimination 
 
The two sets of domestic laws with regard to conducting cyber surveillance abroad discussed 
next are those of the US and UK.  
In the US the applicable legislation that allows for acquisition of foreign intelligence 
information is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 (FISA), (as amended by of the 
FISA Amendment Act 2008 (FAA)) and by the Executive Order 12333.1171 Section 702 of 
FISA ‘Procedures for Targeting Certain Persons Outside the United States Other than United 
States Persons’ (50 USC Sec. §1881a) states that: 
 
[t]he Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize jointly, 
for a period of up to 1 year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of 
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign 
intelligence information. 
 
As an amendment to the 1978 FISA, section 702 (§1881a) introduced new power for the US 
government entities to gather foreign intelligence information for national security purposes 
and acquire data of non-US persons believed to be located abroad. As such, it is the 
foundational authority by which the NSA collects, retains, analyses and disseminates foreign 
intelligence information. 1172 The principle application of §1881a is the collection of 
communications by foreign persons that occur wholly outside the United States. 1173 This 
provision is used for making the so-called PRISM orders, which are directed at specific private 
companies to compel disclosure of content of communications, so long as it is targeted at a 
                                              
1171 Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (As Amended by Executive 
Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 13470 (2008)), < https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-
12333-2008.pdf>. 
1172 Richard A. Clarke et al., The NSA Report. Liberty and Security in a Changing World. The 
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies. (Princeton 
University Press 2014).  
1173 ibid. 
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sufficient percentage (51%) of foreign people. 1174  It is also the basis for the ‘Upstream’ 
Collection Orders, allowing the NSA to work with telecommunication companies to copy, scan 
and filter internet and phone traffic through their physical infrastructure 1175  Section 702 
specifically prohibits intentionally targeting of Americans, so when intercepting their 
communications, the government officials must operate under at least a modicum of judicial 
oversight (i.e. have a warrant showing a probable cause), lest they are guilty of a felony.1176  
Likewise,  UK RIPA makes a nationality distinction by differentiating between 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ surveillance. 1177  Section 20 defines ‘external communication’ as 
‘means of communication sent or received outside the British Islands’.1178 The section does not 
directly define ‘internal communication’, but it could be said that this means communication, 
which is neither sent, nor received outside the British Islands. In case of ‘internal 
communication’, section 8 RIPA specifies that an interception warrant must be issued to permit 
lawful interception, it must describe one person as the ‘interception subject’, or identify a 
‘single set of premises’, for which the interception is to take place.1179 Section 8(2) requires a 
warrant, which must set out ‘the addresses, numbers, apparatus or other factors, or combination 
of factors, that are to be used for identifying the communications that may be or are to be 
intercepted’.1180 In case of ‘external’ communication, RIPA s. 8(1) and (2) does not apply, 
which means that there is no need to identify any particular person who is to be subject of the 
interception, or a particular address that will be targeted.  
Similar distinctions between surveillance conducted on citizens and foreign nationals 
are made under the New Zealand section 15A of the Government Communications Security 
                                              
1174 Electronic Frontier Foundation, ‘Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 





1178 RIPA, supra note 182, s. 20. 
1179 ibid, s. 8(1)(a) and (b):  
[a]n interception warrant must name or describe either— 
(a) one person as the interception subject; or 
(b) a single set of premises as the premises in relation to which the 
interception to which the warrant relates is to take place. 
1180 ibid, s. 8(2):  
[t]he provisions of an interception warrant describing communications the 
interception of which is authorized or required by the warrant must comprise one or 
more schedules setting out the addresses, numbers, apparatus or other factors, or 
combination of factors, that are to be used for identifying the communications that 
may be or are to be intercepted. 
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Bureau Act 2003 (amended in 2013),1181 section 9 of the Australian Intelligence Services Act 
20001182 and section 273 of the Canadian National Defense Act 2015.1183  
 The discriminatory nature of s 702 FAA 2008 and s 8 RIPA 2000 is clear, but it is just 
a part of a wider US and its Five Eyes partners’ policy stance post 11 September 2001, which 
places emphasis on citizenship as a basis for fundamental rights.1184  This therefore requires 
that the rights of non-citizens be clarified under international law. The fundamental recognition 
that all persons by virtue of their essential humanity are equal and should enjoy all human 
rights without discrimination is contained in Article 2(1) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights;1185 Articles 21186 and 261187  of the ICCPR;  Articles 11188 and 21189 of the 
International Covenant of on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1976 (ICESCR); and Article 
141190 of the ECHR. In  General Comment No. 15 in relation to the rights under the ICCPR, 
the Human Rights Committee explained that the rights in the Covenant apply to everyone, 
irrespective of their nationality and the general rule is that each one of these rights must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens. 1191  The ICESCR likewise 
established that governments shall take progressive measures to the extent of available 
resources to protect the rights of everyone regardless of their citizenship. 1192  Thus, the 
fundamental principle dictates that human rights are presumptively owed to citizens and non-
citizens alike, unless a particular treaty (or customary rule) allows for differential treatment. 
Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR permit states to draw distinctions between citizens and non-
citizens, but only with respect to three categories of rights, namely political rights, freedom of 
                                              
1181 The Government Security Communications Bureau (GCSB) can apply for an interception 
warrant under s. 15A of the Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003 
(amended 2013).  
1182 Intelligence Services Act 2001, s. 8. 
1183 The National Defence Act 2015 give powers to the Communications Security 
Establishment Canada (CSEC), section 273.64(1). 
1184 Marko Milanovic, ‘Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 1: Do Foreigners 
Deserve Privacy?’ (25 November 2013) EJIL: Talk! <http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-
surveillance-and-human-rights-part-1-do-foreigners-deserve-privacy/>.  
1185 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 81, art 2(1).  
1186 ICCPR supra note 2, art 2(1). 
1187 ibid, art 26.  
1188 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS 993 (ICESCR), art 1.  
1189 ICESCR, ibid art 2. 
1190 ECHR, supra note 3, art 14. 
1191 UN HRC, ‘General Comment No. 15. The Position of Aliens under the Covenant’ (1986) 
UN Doc HRI/Gen/1/Rev.9/(Vol.1) para 1-2.  
1192 ICESCR, supra note 205, art 2.  
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movement and economic rights in developing countries. Thus, under Article 25 ICCPR, the 
right to participate in public affairs, to vote, to hold office and to have access to public services 
is guaranteed to citizens only.1193 Similarly, Article 12(4) ICCPR provides that no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country, 1194 whilst the ICESCR Article 2(3) 
allows developing counties to ‘determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic 
rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals’.1195 States therefore may not draw 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens as to social and cultural rights, with exception of 
the right to public participation and of movement. Having said that, international law, as well 
as state practice consistently sanctions discrimination and distinctions on the basis of 
nationality, which means that some discrimination on these grounds would be permissible.1196 
The HRC in its General Comment No. 18 clarified this by stating that:  
 
[n]ot every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, 
if the criteria for such a differentiation are reasonable and objective  
and if the aim is to achieve a purpose, which is legitimate under the  
[International] Covenant [of Civil and Political Rights]1197  
 
and is proportional to the achievement of that objective.  
 
The ‘objective and reasonable justification’ is also the criteria that the European Court 
of Human Rights requires a state to satisfy in order to show that the difference in treatment was 
not discriminatory. In Burden v United Kingdom1198 the Strasbourg Court held that: 
 
 [a] difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and  
reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate  
aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between  
the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. The Contracting State  
enjoys a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent  
                                              
1193 ICCPR, supra note 2, art 25.  
1194 ibid, art 12(4).  
1195 ICESCR, supra note 205, art 2(3).  
1196 General Comment No. 15, supra note 208, paras 23-30. 
1197 UN HRC, ‘General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination’ (1989) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 para 13. 
1198 Burden v United Kingdom (2008) ECHR 357 [GC]. 
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differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment.1199 
 
States are obliged to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do not 
discriminate in purpose, or effect on grounds of nationality and the principle of non-
discrimination must be observed in all matters, in particular in those concerning liberty, 
security and dignity of the person, equality before the courts and due process of law, as well as 
international cooperation in judicial and police matters.1200 In guaranteeing certain rights to 
citizens only, the US and the UK laws breach the provisions of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment under the ICCPR and the ECHR, which as will be shown in the next part of this 
chapter, cannot be justified on objective and reasonable grounds. Indeed: 
 
[t]he unique position of the United States [and the United Kingdom] with regards to the 
physical infrastructure of the internet and the fact that the private companies based in 
the US collect and store huge amounts of data of persons residing anywhere in the world 
makes the exclusion of ‘non-US [and UK] persons’ from any legal protection against 
mass surveillance simply intolerable-it may well lead to the destruction of the internet 
as we know it.1201 
 
 This therefore calls for clarification as to whether and how human rights treaties apply to 
foreign cyber surveillance, that is their extraterritorial scope, as discussed next. 
 
PART III:   DO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES APPLY TO EXTRATERRITORIAL 
CYBER SURVEILLANCE AND THE TRANSBORDER ACCESS TO 
DATA?   
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis made a number of observations in relation to the transnational 
nature of cyberspace. In particular, it noted that the early proponents of internet freedom, such 
as Johnson and Post,1202 argued that states will never be able to exercise effective authority in 
that domain due to its a-territorial nature. This proved not to be the case, as governments do 
                                              
1199 ibid, para 60. 
1200 UNCHR, (Sub-Commission), ‘Report by Special Rapporteur David Weissbrodt’ (2003) 
UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, para 28. 
1201 ‘Mass Surveillance’, supra note 6. 
1202 David Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 
48 Stanford Law Review, p. 1367. 
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assert their rights to regulate online activities within their own borders through such methods 
as censorship. This chapter has shown that they also exercise powers of communications 
surveillance granted by their national laws (outlined above) with respect to foreigners, who are 
not located in their territories. Furthermore, the law enforcement agencies (LEAs), including 
those states, who are a party to the Cybercrime Convention 2001, are able to access information 
stored in other territories by- passing the requirements of the Mutual Assistance Treaties. The 
interoperability of the intelligence agencies of the Five Eyes (and their affiliates) and the law 
enforcement agencies at the technical and operational levels raise questions as to how and when 
states may be liable under international law for their cyber surveillance activities, which may 
have impact beyond their borders. Since the Snowden revelations, the issue of the application 
of human rights treaties to cyber surveillance has become particularly vexatious.  It is also one 
of the most fundamental and problematic aspects of the future of internet governance that the 
international community must give serious consideration to.  
In this context, two problems arise. First, can human rights treaties apply to 
extraterritorial cyber surveillance? Secondly, how can states’ exercise of enforcement 
jurisdiction in order to gather evidence so as to prosecute certain crimes, be brought in line 
with their human rights obligations?   
 
1. Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
 
The jurisdictional scope of application of the ICCPR, the ECHR and the ACHR are set 
out in Article 2(1), 1203  Article 1 1204  and Article 1 1205  respectively. The jurisdictional 
                                              
1203 ICCPR, supra note 2, art 2(1):  
 [e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure  
 to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights  
 recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as  
 race, colour, sex, language, religion, political, or other opinion, national, or  
 social origin, property, birth, or other status.  
1204 ECHR, supra note 3, art 1: 
 [t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their  
 jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention. 
1205 ACHR, supra note 5, art 1:  
1. [t]he States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and 
freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any 
discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other 
social condition. 
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competence of a state is primarily territorial.1206 States may be liable for violations committed 
outside their territory, but the extent to which they will be accountable in respect of such acts 
or omissions is not entirely settled. Two opposing positions have been taken to the question of 
extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties, namely a narrow and an expansive one. 
The former, held by the US executive branch has consistently rejected the view that the ICCPR 
places human rights obligations on that country outside its territory. The latter position, 
expressed by international courts and tribunals,1207 firmly attests to the fact that in certain 
circumstances states do have human rights obligations outside their frontiers. Each view will 
be outlined below. 
 
a. The Narrow View 
 
The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. The first time that the US government articulated 
the stance that the Covenant cannot apply extraterritorially was in a 1995 statement it made to 
the Human Rights Committee.1208 The US asserted that the wording of its Article 2 restricted 
its scope to persons who are simultaneously under the United States jurisdiction and within its 
territory. The subsequent administrations reiterated this view in the Consolidated Second and 
Third Periodic Report to the Human Rights Committee.1209  The position taken by the US 
                                              
  2. For the purposes of this Convention, ‘person’ means every human being 
1206 Bankovic and Others v Belgium (2007)  EHRR 57.  
1207 That is, the International Court of Justice, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
and the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and domestic courts of such countries as the United Kingdom. 
1208 UN HRC, Fifty -Third Session, Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting, 
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (24 April 1995). The US government’s position was made clear in 
paragraph 20: 
 Mr. Klein had asked whether the United States took the view that the Covenant did not 
apply to government actions outside the United States. The Covenant was not regarded 
as having extraterritorial application. In general, where the scope of application of a 
treaty was not specified, it was presumed to apply only within a party’s territory. Article 
2 of the Covenant expressly stated that each State party undertook to respect and ensure 
the rights recognized ‘to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’. That dual requirement restricted the scope of the Covenant to persons 
under United States jurisdiction and within United States territory. During the 
negotiating history, the words ‘within its territory’ had been debated and were added 
by vote, with the clear understanding that such wording would limit the obligations to 
within a Party’s territory.  
1209 UN HRC, Consolidation of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, CCPR/C/USA/3 (28 November 2005). According to the Report: 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states the basic rules for the 
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government is based on an an interpretation of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT),1210 which requires that treaties should be read ‘in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning […] of [their] terms’.1211 Since, on this interpretation, an obligation arises 
only if both conditions in Article 1 ICCPR are satisfied, namely that an individual must be 
‘within its territory’ and ‘subject to its jurisdiction’, extraterritorial application of ICCPR has 
been ruled out. 
Both the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 31 and case law, together with the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories Advisory Opinion of 2004 (the Wall Advisory 
Opinion)1212 and Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v 
Uganda)1213 rejected this interpretation.1214 In its 1995 Report the HRC stated  that: 
 
                                              
interpretation of treaties. In Article 31(1), it states that: 
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.  
Resort to this fundamental rule of interpretation leads to the inescapable conclusion that 
the obligations assumed by a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Covenant) apply only within the territory of the State Party.   Article 
2(1) of the Covenant states that ‘[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any 
kind.’ Hence, based on the plain and ordinary meaning of its text, this Article 
establishes that States Parties are required to ensure the rights in the Covenant only to 
individuals who are both within the territory of a State Party and subject to that State 
Party's sovereign authority. 
1210 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
1211 ibid, article 31(1):  
 [a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary  
 meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the  
 light of its object and purpose. 
1212 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Reports 163 (9 July). 
1213 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Uganda), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 1 July 
2000, [2000] ICJ Reports 111. 
1214 Marco Milanovic, ‘Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 2: Interpreting the 
ICCPR’ (2015) EJILTalk!, p. 3. < http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-surveillance-and-human-
rights-part-2-interpreting-the-iccpr/>. 
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[it] does not share the view expressed by the Government [of the United States] that the 
Covenant lacks extraterritorial reach under all circumstances [because] such a view is 
contrary to the consistent interpretation of the Committee on this subject, that in special 
circumstances, persons may fall under the subject-matter jurisdiction of a [s]tate party 
even when outside that state’s territory.1215  
 
This criticism the Committee repeated in its 2006 and 2014 reports,1216 observing that the US 
restrictive approach on the issue conflicted with international authorities and that the US holds 
this position ‘despite the contrary opinions and established jurisprudence of the Committee and 
the International Court of Justice’.1217 Although the US sustains the view that it is under no 
obligation to comply with Article 17 ICCPR outside its own geographical territory, the next 
part of this chapter will show that this position is very much in the minority.  
 
 
                                              
1215 Report of the UN Human Rights Committee, (1994) UN Doc 5/50/40, para 284. 
1216 Concluding Observations of the UN HRC on the US Repot Under the ICCPR, (2006) 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3; Concluding Observations of the UNHRC on the US Report Under the 
ICCPR, (2014) CCPR/C/USA/4. Both Reports state in paragraph C. 4, Applicability of the 
Covenant at National Level, that:  
  [t]he Committee regrets that the State party continues to maintain its position that the 
Covenant does not apply with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction but outside 
its territory, despite the contrary interpretation of article 2(1) supported by the 
Committee’s established jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice and state practice. The Committee further notes that the State party has only 
limited avenues to ensure that state and local governments respect and implement the 
Covenant, and that its provisions have been declared to be non-self-executing at the 
time of ratification. Taken together, these elements considerably limit the legal reach 
and the practical relevance of the Covenant (art. 2).  
The State party should:  
(a)  Interpret the Covenant in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to its terms in their context, including subsequent practice, and in the light of its 
object and purpose and review its legal position so as to acknowledge the extraterritorial 
application of the Covenant under certain circumstances, as outlined inter alia in the 
Committee’s general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal 
obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant;  
1217 UN HRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States of 
America’, 87th Sess. 10-28 July 2006 (18 December 2006). UN Doc 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1  
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b.  The Expansive View 
 
 As already noted, the jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily territorial.1218 However, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), together with all major human rights courts and bodies, 
such as the UN HRC, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the 
European Court of Human Rights agree that in some circumstances human right obligations 
may apply extraterritorially. This means that a state is bound by international human rights law 
in relation to individuals, who may be not within its borders, but who are under its jurisdiction. 
To that end, a broadly similar approach, based on ‘effective control’, has been adopted to 
determine jurisdiction. Thus, the HRC held that: 
 
a [s]tate [p]arty must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the [International] 
Covenant [of Civil and Political Rights] to anyone within the power, or effective control 
of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the [s]tate [p]arty.1219  
 
Similarly, the IACHR established that to determine whether a person is within a state’s 
jurisdiction ‘the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality, or presence within a 
particular geographical area, but on whether under specific circumstances, the State observed 
the rights of a person subject to its authority and control’.1220 In conceptualizing when and how 
the international human rights obligations may arise outside a state’s territory, two types of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction were distinguished, namely the spatial and the personal model. The 
spatial model sees jurisdiction as effective overall control over a geographical area, whereas 
the personal, as a physical control over an individual. The spatial model was articulated by the 
ECtHR in Loizidou v Turkey,1221 where the Court held that state’s responsibility was engaged 
when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, it exercised effective control of 
an area outside its national territory. Similar approach was adopted by the ICJ in the Wall 
Advisory Opinion 1222  and in DRC v Uganda, 1223  who found that the ICCPR applies 
                                              
1218 supra note 224. 
1219 UN HRC ‘General Comment No. 31. The Nature of the General Obligations Imposed on 
State Parties to the Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add1326 May 2004, para 
10. 
1220 Alexandre v Cuba, Case 11.589, (1999) IACHR Report No. 109/99, para 37.  
1221 Loizidou v Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99. 
1222  Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 229. 
1223 DRC v Uruguay, supra note 230.   
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extraterritorially, where a state is occupying territory of another state. Whilst the spatial model 
has its merits, particularly in its clarity and setting some limits on states’ obligations, it also 
has some drawbacks.1224 As noted by Milanovic, ‘a state is perfectly capable of violating the 
rights of individuals without controlling the actual area’, for example by using drones for 
targeted killing thus disposing of the need to have troops on the ground.1225  
The jurisprudence of the international human rights courts has additionally recognized that 
states have human rights obligations when exercising physical control over an individual. In 
Lopez Burgos v Uruguay1226 the HRC held that state parties are liable for the actions of their 
agents on foreign territory, as it would be ‘unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility 
under Article 2 of the [ICCPR] as to permit a [s]tate [p]arty to perpetrate violations of the 
Covenant on the territory of another [s]tate, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory’.1227  In its General Comment No. 31 the Committee established that: 
 
a [s]tate [p]arty must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone 
within the power or effective control of that [s]tate [p]arty, even if not situated within 
the territory of the [s]tate [p]arty…regardless of the circumstances in which such power 
or effective control was obtained.1228  
 
However, by far the most varied jurisprudence regarding the personal model is that of the 
Strasbourg Court. In Al-Skeini v UK1229 the ECtHR stressed the primary territorial nature of 
jurisdiction under the ECHR but recognized exceptions to that principle, namely where state 
agents exercise authority and control extra-territorially and when a state exercises effective 
control of an area outside national territory. State agent authority is particularly pertinent in 
military operations, where physical authority and control is exercised in formal detention 
centres, as was the case in the British controlled facilities in Al-Skeini. However, the exercise 
of authority was also held to have occurred outside of a formal detention centre in Öcalan v 
Turkey.1230 The case concerned the handover in Kenya to Turkish authorities of an individual 
                                              
1224 Marko Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the 
Digital Age’ (2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal 81, pp. 114-115.  
1225 ibid, p. 113. 
1226 UNHRC Lopez Burgoz v Uruguay, Communications No 52/1979 (17 July 1979) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979. 
1227 ibid, paras 12.2-12.3 
1228 supra note 236, para 10. 
1229 Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom [GC] (7 July 2011) ECHR 2011. 
1230 Öcalan v Turkey (2003) 41 EHRR 985. 
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suspected in Turkey of terrorist-related crimes.  The ECtHR noted that he was effectively under 
Turkish authority and therefore within its jurisdiction, even though Turkish officials at the time 
of the arrest exercised their authority outside Turkey. In addition and most notably, the ECtHR 
has recognized that the extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of state agent authority, or 
control is not limited to situations of the physical custody over an individual, but may be 
engaged when state agents exercise authority and control over an individual’s rights, as was 
the case in Jaloud v the Netherlands.1231 That case concerned a fatal shooting of Azhar Sabah 
Jaloud, who at the time was passing through a checkpoint manned by personnel under the 
command and direct supervision of a Netherlands Royal Army officer in Iraq. The ECtHR 
found that the Netherlands exercised its jurisdiction on the basis that Dutch troops asserted 
‘authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint’ because they exercised 
authority and control over his right to life at that moment. This gave rise to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, despite not having the physical control over Mr Jaloud. It could be said that the 
case marks the ECtHR moving away from an approach, whereby jurisdiction is found on the 
basis of pure factual authority, towards one based on the exercising of authority and control 
over an individual’s rights.  
 
c. Applicability of Human Rights Treaties to Extraterritorial Cyber Surveillance 
 
It is submitted that if a state may be found to have human rights obligations, because it 
exercises authority and control over an individual’s right to life as proposed in Jaloud, then by 
analogy the exercise of control over his/her right to privacy of communications should also 
give rise to state’s extraterritorial obligations in cases of foreign cyber surveillance. Such an 
interpretation seems necessary, as the ‘effective control’ test is unsuitable, outdated and narrow 
in the context of state sponsored cyber surveillance operations. This is so because it has been 
articulated by the international human rights courts and bodies long before digital technologies 
began to play such a pervasive role in the lives of millions of individuals around the world. 
Furthermore, it is inadequate for the cyber and communications realm, as it places the emphasis 
on the exercise of physical control over persons, or territory, which is difficult to relate to 
cyberspace.1232 The shortcomings of the effective control approach centre around the fact that 
some state intelligence services, particularly the NSA, exert effective remote, rather than 
                                              
1231 Jaloud v the Netherlands (2014) (App. No. 47708/08).  
1232 Peter Margulies, ‘The NSA in the Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights and 
International Counterterrorism’ (2014) 82 Fordham Law Review 2137. 
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physical, control over much of the communications of foreign nationals abroad. 1233   This 
occurs through the eavesdropping on those communications, filtering, or altering their content 
and breaking many forms of encryption by installing ‘back doors’ engineered in many software 
systems.1234 The NSA has also the capacity to gain control of computers not directly connected 
to the internet due to implantation of transmitting devices in computers manufactured in the 
US and elsewhere. 1235  In addition, the US has relationships with internet and 
telecommunication companies that facilitate surveillance and thereby the capacity to directly 
access the undersea cabled together with other carriers of internet and telephonic 
communications. 1236 The US virtual power is unprecedented 1237 and the narrowly defined 
standard requiring physical control means that states interfering with the right to privacy would 
continue to exploit this gap by circumventing their human rights obligations. There can be no 
doubt therefore that the ‘effective control’ test must be adapted to suit the realities of cyber 
surveillance operations.  
A number of legal scholars made suggestions in this regard and their overall tenet seems 
to hinge on the control of communications, rather than the physical control over areas or 
individuals. Thus, Nyst argues that when data or communications are intercepted within a 
state’s territory, the state should owe obligations to those individuals regardless of their 
location on the basis of ‘interface-based jurisdiction, 1238  that is not to interfere with 
communications that pass through its territorial borders.1239 This approach is broadly in line 
with that proposed by Milanovic, who distinguishes between the overarching positive 
obligation of states to secure or ensure human rights and extends even to preventing human 
rights violations by third parties and negative obligations of states to respect human rights that 
only requires states to refrain from interfering with the rights of individuals without sufficient 
justification.1240 This model conceptualizes jurisdiction as a negative duty to refrain from 
interference and would apply to all potential violations of negative obligations, for example to 
                                              
1233 ibid, p. 2151. 
1234 ibid. 
1235 ibid. 
1236 ibid.  
1237 ibid. 
1238 Carly Nyst, ‘Interface Based Jurisdiction Over Violations of the Right to Privacy’ (21 
November 2013) EJIL:Talk! <http://www.ejiltalk.org/interference-based-jurisdiction-over-
violations-of-the-right-to-privacy/>. 
1239 ibid. 
1240 supra note 241, p. 126. 
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refrain from interfering with privacy.1241 In this sense, human rights treaties would apply to 
most, if not all foreign surveillance activities.1242 Both these approaches have their merits, in 
as much as they recognize the weaknesses of the personal and spatial models and emphasise 
the negative duty of states not to interfere with the protected rights. However, the nature and 
scope of the Five Eyes surveillance seems to go beyond the interception, collection and storage 
of data. The partnership between the US and its allied services allows governments to easily 
engage in the so-called ‘collusion for circumvention’.1243 For example, GCHQ is allowed to 
spy on anyone but British nationals, whilst the NSA on anyone but Americans.1244 Information 
sharing partnerships enable each agency to circumvent its respective national restrictions 
protecting their countries’ citizens, since they are able to access the data collected by others.1245 
This reciprocity has important ramifications on the domestic level if it is strategically used to 
circumvent domestic legislation and limits on the governments’ ability to tap its own citizens’ 
communications.1246 In this context, the negative duty not to interfere with privacy would only 
be discharged if the interference is also understood as the ‘collusion for circumvention’, 
encompassing such information sharing arrangements. This at present is not entirely clear and 
therefore calls for a model of jurisdiction, which is capable of meeting such challenges. A 
sound candidate may be the ‘virtual control’ test, proposed by Margulies.1247 This test would 
make the ICCPR and other human rights treaties applicable when a state can assert ‘virtual 
control’ over an individual’s communications, even though it lacks control over the territory, 
in which the individual is located, or over the ‘physical person’ of that individual.1248 ‘Virtual 
control’ in this context means the ability to intercept, store, analyse and use communications. 
Although it could be argued that mere surveillance does not constitute physical control over an 
individual, it may constitute virtual control, in that it stifles not only his/her right to privacy, 
but also has a chilling effect on other human rights, such as free expression, freedom of 
conscience and religion, free assembly, association and health, to name but a few. It therefore 
does affect and control individuals’ behaviour. Although the ‘virtual control’ approach has 
been criticised for being new and ‘without support in patters of generally shared legal 
                                              
1241 ibid. 
1242 ibid, p. 129. 
1243 ‘Mass Surveillance’, supra note 6, paras 30-3. 
1244 ibid. 
1245 ibid. 
1246 ibid.  
1247 supra note 249, p. 2139. 
1248 ibid.  
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expectations about personal jurisdiction’, 1249  it has a number of advantages. First, it 
corresponds to the notion of control developed and required by the human rights courts and 
bodies,1250 outlined above. Secondly, it responds to the jurisdictional challenges of human 
rights obligations in surveillance cases, because the intelligence agencies under scrutiny are 
perfectly capable of controlling lives and private information with the press of the button.1251 
Thirdly, it is in line with the ECtHR reasoning in Jaloud v the Netherlands, where more 
expansive approach was taken and extraterritorial jurisdiction was established because of the 
state agents’ exercise of authority and control over the individual’s right to life, which made 
their physical proximity non critical. Fourthly, such an approach would ensure equal treatment 
of all individuals, irrespective of their nationality or physical location. This is because 
establishing ‘virtual control’ over someone’s communications would not depend on where the 
interference takes place, but whether or not a state can assert control over an individual’s 
communications, even though it lacks authority or control over the territory, or his physical 
person. Finally, it could also mean that governments’ ‘collusion for circumvention’ 
arrangements may fall within their obligations not to interfere with the privacy rights, as they 
would have an obligation derived from the human rights treaties in relation to the effected 
rights of all individuals, whose communications fall within their control, inside and outside 
their territories.  
Nevertheless, it still remains unclear how cyber surveillance may trigger the 
extraterritorial application of human rights law. A number of treaty bodies engaged with the 
issue of extraterritorial surveillance shortly after the 2013 Snowden disclosures. The Human 
Rights Committee for example suggested that extraterritorial surveillance does implicate the 
ICCPR, when addressing the NSA surveillance pursuant to s 702 of FISA conducted through 
PRISM and Upstream, stating that ‘the Committee is concerned about the surveillance of 
communications in the interest of protecting national security conducted by the National 
Security Agency (NSA) conducted both within and outside the United States’.1252 The United 
                                              
1249 Jordan J. Paust, ‘Can You Hear Me Now? Private Communications, National Security 
and the Human Rights Disconnect’ (2015) 15(2) Chicago Journal of International Law, p. 
625. 
1250 Ilina Georgieva, ‘The Right to Privacy Under Fire-Foreign Surveillance Under the NSA 
and the GCHQ and Its Compatibility with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8 ECHR’ (2015) 31(80) 
Utrecht Journal of International and European Law p. 104. 
1251 ibid. 
1252 UN HRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States 
of American’ (April 2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, para 22.  
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Nations Office of the High Commissioner also addressed extraterritorial surveillance noting 
that: 
[d]igital surveillance […] may engage a State’s human rights obligations if that 
surveillance involves the [s]tate’s exercise of power or effective control in relation to 
digital communications infrastructure, wherever found, for example through direct 
tapping or penetration of that infrastructure. Equally, where the [s]tate exercises 
regulatory jurisdiction over a third party that physically controls the data, that [s]tate 
also would have obligations under the Covenant.1253  
 
Similarly, Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC observed that: 
 
[s]tate’s jurisdiction is not only engaged where [s]tate agents place data interceptors 
on fibre-optic cables travelling through their jurisdictions, but also where a [s]tate 
exercises regulatory authority over the telecommunications or internet service 
providers that physically control the data.1254  
 
These approaches seem to broadly correspond with the legal scholarship articulating 
jurisdiction being triggered on the basis of states’ control over the individual’s rights to privacy. 
However, they leave unanswered the question of what degree of control is necessary to 
establish that a state exercises ‘power or effective control in relation to digital communications 
infrastructure’. In Jaloud the ECtHR indicated its approach to the issues of authority and 
control based on the actual exercise of such powers over an individual’s rights. Whether or not 
it will apply this, or similar approach to the pending surveillance cases remains to be seen. 
There can be no doubt that as currently defined, the ‘effective control’ test of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is not well suited for application to cyber surveillance operations. 
Cyberspace is a transnational environment where information is deliberately routed through a 
number of jurisdictions to reach its destination. When interference is conducted remotely, 
physical control over an area, or an individual ceases to be relevant. At the very least, it leaves 
a gap that intelligence agencies can exploit to circumvent the obligations under the human 
                                              
1253 UN GA, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/37, para 34.  
1254 UN HRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson QC’ (2014) UN 
Doc A/69/397, para 41.  
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rights treaties through the use of intelligence sharing agreements. What becomes important in 
this context is the ‘virtual control’ over the individuals’ right to privacy, notwithstanding where 
they are located, or their nationality. How these obligations may apply to cases of cyber 
surveillance remains unclear, especially bearing in mind the ‘inevitable ripple effects on other 
scenarios such as extraterritorial use of lethal force through for example drone strikes’1255 if a 
more permissive approach to this issue were to be adopted. This makes the task of the Human 
Rights Committee when drafting new general comment on Article 17, discussed in Chapter 5 
of this thesis, particularly challenging.  
 
Therefore, a strong case can be made for the extraterritorial application of human rights 
treaties to cyber surveillance. Arguably, similar analysis applies to transborder data searches 
by the LEAs. Since these activities may too trigger human rights obligations under the 
international human rights framework, the next part will consider whether access to data by the 
LEAs of the state parties to the Cybercrime Convention also breaches their human rights 
obligations. 
 
      2.     Transborder Access to Data as a Violation of the Right to Privacy  
 
The European Court of Human Rights case law in relation to breach of the right to privacy 
under Article 8 ECHR in the context of the law enforcement (LEAs) acting within the territory 
of their own states is well established and recently consolidated in Zakharov v Russia 1256  and 
Szabo v Hungary,1257 discussed in the previous part of this chapter. This part of the chapter will 
show that in a situation, where LEAs of one state capture external communications of another, 
international obligations under the ICCPR, ECHR and Convention 1081258 are also triggered 
and may amount to a violation.  
 The legality of transborder searches of protected digital data by the LEAs without 
recourse of MLAs has not yet been examined by the ECtHR. However, the Court will consider 
a similar issue relating to interception of external communications, including on the internet  
                                              
1255 Marko Milanovic ‘UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules that Non-UK Residents Have 
No Right to Privacy under the ECHR’ (2016) EJIL: Talk! < https://www.ejiltalk.org/uk-
investigatory-powers-tribunal-rules-that-non-uk-residents-have-no-right-to-privacy-under-
the-echr/>. 
1256 supra note 132. 
1257 supra note 133. 
1258 supra note 4. 
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in Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v UK.1259  The matter has already been 
addressed by the ECtHR in Liberty v UK 1260  in the context of telephone and electronic 
telecommunications conducted by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) between 1990-97 on the 
basis of the Interception of Communications Act 1985. The Act granted virtually unfettered 
discretion to the MoD to capture external communications and conferred a wide discretion on 
the extent, to which these communications could be listened to, or read. However, the statute 
did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope, or manner of exercise of the discretion and 
was therefore not ‘in accordance with the law’ under Article 8(2).  The Court emphasized that: 
 
‘in accordance with the law’ requires that the impugned measure should not 
only have some basis in domestic law, but also that such basis should be 
compatible with the rule of law and accessible to the person concerned ‘who 
must moreover, be able to foresee its consequences for him.1261  
 
The Court held that the the Act did not indicate: 
 
with sufficient clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the 
scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the [s]tate to 
intercept and examine external communications [….] and in particular, it did not, as 
required by the Court’s case law, set out in a form accessible to the public any indication 
of the procedure to be followed for selecting for examination, sharing, storing and 
destroying intercepted material.1262  
 
As a result of this ruling, the mere existence of legislation providing for interception of 
communications, including outside state’s territory, which allows for secret monitoring 
amounts in itself to an interference with Article 8 irrespective of any measures actually taken. 
Worthy of note is the fact that the Court applied the same conditions under Article 8 to this 
type of interceptions and did not consider that separate procedural rules from those articulated 
in Weber should apply to the interception of external communications. 
                                              
1259 Alice Ross v UK, supra note 170. 
1260 Liberty v UK, supra note 114. 
1261 ibid, para 59. 
1262 ibid, para 69. 
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It is submitted that these principles are applicable to transborder searches under Article 
32(b) Cybercrime Convention and by way of court orders served on an ISPs, because the 
operational methods of data gathering by the LEAs resemble those conducted on the basis of 
the Interception of Communications Act 1985 in Liberty v UK.  Therefore, they too are likely 
to amount to interference with the right to privacy of communications protected in Article 8 
ECHR and 17 ICCPR. First, these types of interceptions fall within the scope of ‘private life’ 
and ‘correspondence’ (General Comment 16, Estrella v Uruguay, Wieser v Austria1263). In 
Wieser, the ECtHR made it clear that Article 8 applies to data stored by private companies. The 
issue of legal obligation on the part of an ISP to divulge to the police the personal details 
attached to an IP address without the consent of the subscriber is currently under consideration 
by the ECtHR in Benedict v Slovenia1264 and Ringler v Austria.1265 Secondly, the transmission 
of the obtained data to other authorities has been recognized as representing a further, separate 
interference with that rights in Weber.1266  Both Article 8(2) and 17 ICCPR dictate that an 
interference, such as that exercised via Article 32(b), may be justified if it is ‘in accordance 
with the law’, necessary and proportionate1267 Thus, in Halford1268  a telephone interception 
was held not to be in accordance with the law because ‘domestic law did not provide any 
regulation of the interception of calls’. In MM v United Kingdom,1269  the Court found a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR because there existed no statutory system to regulate surveillance 
powers, whilst the guidelines applicable at the relevant time were neither legally binding nor 
directly publically accessible. These observations pertain Article 32(b) searches. Until the 
Snowden exposures in 2013, the scale of the intrusion of the LEAs into personal data under the 
control of data processor in other jurisdictions was not commonly known, let alone the legal 
frameworks authorizing this. In fact, they seem to be deployed in a domestic legal vacuum and 
                                              
1263 Wieser v Austria (2008) 46 EHRR. The Court considered that the search and seizure of 
electronic data constitute an interference with applicants’ right to respect for their 
‘correspondence’ within the meaning of Article 8. Having regard to […] the case law extending 
the notion of ‘home’ to a company’s business premises, the Court sees no reason to distinguish 
between the first applicant, who is a natural person and the second applicant, which is a legal 
person, as regards the notion of ‘correspondence’.   
1264 Benedict v Slovenia (App. No. 62357/14), Communicated to the Respondent Government 
in April 2015. 
1265 Ringler v Austria (App. No. 2309/10) Communicated to the Respondent Government in 
May 2013. 
1266 Weber and Saravia v Germany (2006) (App. No. 54934/00), para 79. 
1267 General Comment No.16; Donoso; Escher; Malone; Liberty; Halford; MM v UK; 
Zakharov. 
1268 Halford v UK, supra note 113, para 50-51. 
1269 MM v United Kingdom (2012) (App. No. 24029/07).  
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as such, do not fulfill the criteria of public availability, foreseeability and scope of operations, 
including the nature of offences and procedural safeguards. Equally, the searches are difficult 
to justify on the grounds of necessity and proportionality. The evidence from the Cybercrime 
Committee suggests that the transborder searches and ‘data pulling’ seem to be unrestricted, 
thus providing LEAs virtually unfettered discretion, as long as the transfers are pursuant to 
criminal investigations. Yet, in Zakharov,1270 the ECtHR emphatically stated that blanket 
access to all information, without specifying particular reasons, the categories of persons and 
crimes, which also lack supporting evidence to be reviewed by an independent authority, do 
not fulfill the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Of particular note in this context 
is also the case of Digital Rights Ireland,1271 where the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) annulled Directive 2006/24/EC,1272 which set out rules for the retention of metadata 
by private companies for the purposes of their later use by law enforcement agencies. The 
Luxemburg Court observed that the mere retention, even if the data were never used, interfered 
with the fundamental right to privacy under the European Charter of Human Rights (Article 
7). It was accepted however that the retention for the purposes of their subsequent transmission 
to the competent national authority satisfied the objective of fighting crime and public security, 
but did not comply with the principle of proportionality.  
In addition to the protection of the right to privacy of individuals under the ECHR, 
Council of Europe Convention 108 offers guarantees specifically with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data. The Convention entered into force in 1985 and has been signed 
and ratified by 45 out of 47 member states of the Council of Europe, as well as some non-
members such as Uruguay. It is the first binding international instrument, which protects 
individuals against abuses that may accompany the collection and processing of personal data 
and seeks to regulate the transfrontier flow.1273 The Convention’s scope of application relates 
to all fields of automated personal data processing and therefore relates to data protection in 
the area of police and criminal justice.1274  The purpose of the Convention is to ‘secure in the 
                                              
1270 Zakharov, supra note 132. 
1271 Digital Rights Ireland, supra note 168. 
1272 Parliament and Council Directive 2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L105) 54 (EC). 
1273 Council of Europe, Details of Treaty 108, <http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/treaty/108>. 
1274 Explanatory Report, ETS 108, Automatic Processing of Personal Data Convention, para 
33, art 3 – Scope: 
[a]ccording to paragraph 1 the convention applies to the public as well as the private 
sector. Although most international data traffic occurs in the private sector, the 
convention is nevertheless of great importance for the public sector and this for two 
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territory of each party for every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for 
his rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data relating to him’. 1275   Restrictions on the rights under the 
Convention are possible only if higher interests are at stake, such as state’s security and 
defense. In 2001 an Additional Protocol was adopted and introduced provisions on transborder 
data flows to non-parties.1276 The Protocol describes transborder data flows as transfers of 
personal data to a recipient that is subject to the jurisdiction of a state, or organization that is 
not Party to the Convention,1277 such as the US.  It stipulates that transborder transfers of data 
may only take place if states ensure an adequate level of protection for the intended data 
transfer. The ECtHR has referred to Convention 108 on several occasions and highlighted the 
concordance between the extensive interpretation of ‘private life’ under Article 8 ECHR and 
that under Article 1 of Convention 108.1278 The Court’s case law interpreting Article 8 ECHR 
therefore complements Convention 108. This can be seen in Article 5 of Convention 108, 
which sets out the principle of the lawfulness of automatic processing of data, but without 
defining what constitutes unlawful processing, which must be read in the light of what 
constitutes the interference permitted by the ECHR.1279  
It follows that, since what constitutes interference under Article 5 of Convention 108 must be 
read in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR jurisprudence, it could 
be concluded that it is likely that transborder searches of protected data by the law enforcement 
agencies without the recourse to the MLA breach Article 5 of Convention 108.  
  
                                              
reasons. First, Article 3 imposes obligations on the member [s]tates to apply data 
protection principles even when they process public files – as is usually the case – 
entirely within their national borders. Secondly, the convention offers assistance to 
data subjects who wish to exercise their right to be informed about their record kept 
by a public authority in a foreign country.’  
1275 Convention 108, supra note 4, art 1. 
1276 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Regarding Supervisory 
Authorities and Transborder Data Flows, CETS No. 181, 2001.  
1277 ibid, art 2.  
1278 Amann v Switzerland supra note 121; Rotaru v Romania (2000) (App. No. 28341/95); 
Haralambie v Romania (2009) (Application No. 21737/03). 
1279 European Court of Human Rights, ‘National Security and European Case-Law, Report of 




PART IV:  CYBER SURVEILLANCE AS AN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS 
 
 Reports on NSA and GCHQ activities exposed three substantial ways in which the US 
and UK governments (together with other partners from the Five Eyes) are possibly infringing 
the right to privacy under the ICCPR, ECHR and the ACHR. These are (1) the gathering, 
examining and storing of emails (PRISM); (2) tapping underwater fibre-optic cables, thus 
intercepting all internet traffic routed via the UK (Tempora); and (3) recording digital and 
telephone metadata (Fairview and Bondless Informant). There are no decided cases thus far 
from the HRC, the ECHR, or the IACtHR pronouncing on the issue of legality of these 
measures. Nevertheless, the ‘post-Snowden’  decisions by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Zakharov and Szabo, together with those of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in Digital Rights Ireland 1280  and Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner 1281  shed important light on the issue. Furthermore, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 68/1671282 and a number of important Reports on international and regional levels 
have all unequivocally condemned mass surveillance and bulk collection of electronic 
communications.1283 These developments will now be considered as a good indicator of the 
direction that the global policy pertaining the legality of cyber surveillance may be taking. 
 
1. UN General Assembly Resolution 68/167 
 
Following the Snowden disclosures in 2013, the General Assembly, being deeply 
concerned that electronic surveillance, interception and collection of personal data may 
negatively impact human rights, has adopted by consensus Resolution 68/167, The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age, strongly supporting the right to privacy and calling on all countries 
to take measures to end activities that violate this ‘fundamental tenet of a democratic 
                                              
1280 Digital Rights Ireland, supra note 168. 
1281 Schrems, supra note 167. 
1282 UN GA Resolution, Right to Privacy in Digital Age (21 January 2014) UN Doc 
A/Res/68/167; see also UN GA, Resolution Right to Privacy in Digital Age (10 February 
2015) UN Doc A/Res/69/166; UN GA, Resolution Right to Privacy in Digital Age (16 
November 2016) UN Doc A/C.3/71/L.39/Rev.1. 
1283 OHCHR Report, supra note 270; Report of the Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC, 
supra note 271; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Mass Surveillance’, 
supra note 6. 
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society’. 1284  The Resolution emphasizes that ‘unlawful or arbitrary surveillance and/or 
interception of communications, as well as unlawful or arbitrary collection of personal data, as 
highly intrusive acts, violate the right to privacy and to freedom of expression.’1285 Deep 
concern was also expressed ‘at the negative impact that surveillance and/or interception of 
communications, including extraterritorial surveillance and/or interception of communications, 
as well as the collection of personal data, in particular when carried out on a mass scale, may 
have on the exercise and enjoyment of human rights’.1286 The Resolution called upon all states 
‘to protect the right to privacy, including in the context of digital communications’1287 and to 
that end, to ‘ensure that relevant national legislation complies with their obligations under 
international human rights law’.1288 Further, the Resolution requested the then United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Dr. Navanethem Pillay, to submit views and 
recommendations to the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council on ‘the right to 
privacy in the context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance’, including ‘on mass 
scale’,1289 discussed next.  
 
 2. The Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
The Report, titled The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age,1290 was published on 30 June 
2014. The High Commissioner warned that globally, ‘mass surveillance [is] emerging as a 
dangerous habit rather than an exceptional measure’.1291 It also reaffirmed that government 
surveillance must respect the right to privacy and made a number of vital points on the issue, 
including that (a) mass surveillance constitutes an interference with privacy; (b) as does  the 
collection and interception of metadata; as well as (c) their retention. Each of these points will 




                                              
1284 UNGA Resolution 68/167, supra note 299. 
1285 ibid, p. 2. 
1286 ibid. 
1287 ibid.  
1288 ibid. 
1289 ibid, p. 3. 
1290 OHCHR Report, supra note 270.  
1291 ibid. 
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a. Mass Surveillance Necessarily Interferes with Privacy 
 
Having recalled the HRC General Comment 16, which requires that the integrity and 
confidentiality of correspondence should be guaranteed de jure and de facto, the High 
Commissioner concluded that ‘any capture of communications data is potentially an 
interference with privacy’,1292 ‘the mere possibility’ of communications being captured creates 
an interference with privacy and ‘the very existence of a mass surveillance programmes  thus 
creates an interference with privacy.’1293 The High Commissioner based these observations on 
the ECtHR jurisprudence in such cases as Malone1294 (interception was interpreted to include 
‘either targeted or mass surveillance of communications, the recording or bugging of an 
individual’s telephone communications and interference with postal mail), Liberty1295 (mass 
monitoring or recording of public telecommunications, including telephone, facsimile and 
email) and Copland1296 (interception and storage of emails).  
 
b. The Interception or Collection of Metadata Interferes with the Right 
to Privacy 
 
The High Commissioner’s Report rejected the claim that ‘the interception or collection of data 
about a communication, as opposed to the content of the communication, does not on its own 
constitute an interference with privacy’.1297 The High Commissioner was explicit on this point, 
stating that ‘the aggregation of information commonly referred to as ‘metadata’ may give an 
insight into an individual’s behaviour, social relationships, private preferences and identity that 
go beyond even that conveyed by accessing the content of a private communication’.1298 Dr 
Pillay supported this point by referring to the recent landmark judgment of the CJEU in Digital 
Rights Ireland. 1299 The significance of this case stems from it being a successful challenge to 
the validity of the European Union (EU) 2006 Data Retention Directive. The Directive’s main 
objective was to harmonize EU member states’ provisions concerning the retention of certain 
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data, which are generated or processed by providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks.1300 It contained a mandatory 
data retention framework, whereby all Internet Service Provides (ISPs) and telecommunication 
service provides operating in Europe were compelled to collect and retain such information as 
a subscriber’s incoming and outgoing telephone numbers; IP addresses; date, time and duration 
of communication; type; equipment used for the communication; location and other key data. 
These data were to be retained for period of between six months to two years. However, the 
content of communications was excluded from the ambit of the Directive. The information was 
to be gathered in order to assist the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of 
serious offences, such as organized crime and terrorism. The Directive not only lacked 
safeguards limiting governments’ collection and access to individuals’ data, but also omitted 
controls over what information can be used. The Irish High Court and the Austrian 
Constitutional Court asked the CJEU to examine the validity of the Directive, in particular in 
the light of the two rights under the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, namely the 
right to respect for private life and the protection of personal data (Article 7 and 8 respectively). 
In declaring the Directive invalid, the CJEU ruled that the bulk retention of ‘all traffic data’ 
relating to ‘all means of electronic communication’ from ‘practically the entire European 
population, including those in respect of whom there was no suggestion that they had a 
connection, ever indirect, or remote, with serious crime’,1301 interfered in a particularly serious 
manner with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal 
data.1302 The fact that data were retained and subsequently used without the subscriber being 
informed, was likely to generate in the persons concerned a feeling that their lives were the 
subject of constant surveillance. The CJEU then examined whether such an interference with 
the fundamental rights was justified. The Court acknowledged that the retention of data for the 
purposes of their possible transmission to the competent national authority genuinely satisfied 
an objective of general interest, i.e. the fight against serious crime and ultimately public 
security.1303 However, by adopting the Directive, the EU legislature had exceeded the limits 
imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality.  
 
                                              
1300 Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release, ‘The Court of Justice Declares the 
Data Retention Directive to Be Invalid’ (8 April 2014) <http://www.curia.eruopa.eu.>.  
1301 Digital Rights Ireland, supra note 168, paras. 56-58. 
1302 ECJ Press Release, supra note 317, p. 1. 
1303 ibid. p. 2. 
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c. Retention of Data Amounts to Interference 
 
The OHCHR Report also rejected the view that the right to privacy is only interfered with, 
when a state accesses, consults, or uses the data that it collects. Accordingly, ‘even the mere 
possibility of communications information being captured creates an interference with 
privacy’.1304 This conclusion is in keeping with the Strasbourg Court case law. The Court has 
consistently held that not only the interception, but also storage of communication constitutes 
interference with the right to privacy.1305 It did not matter that the database of the surveillance 
information did not contain any sensitive information about the applicant’s private life.  
 
3. UN Special Rapporteur  
 
In September 2014 the UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC presented his Report to the 
UN General Assembly.1306 Building on the work of his predecessors, Martin Scheinin1307 and 
Frank La Rue,1308 his Report is categorical in finding that bulk access to communications, mass 
surveillance of content and metadata, its retention and the use of automated mining algorithms 
with no prior suspicion or any legal/executive authorization amounts to ‘systematic 
interference with the right to respect of the privacy of communications and requires a 
correspondingly compelling justification’.1309 Furthermore, the Report emphasized that ‘the 
use of mass surveillance technology effectively does away with the right to privacy of 
communications on the internet altogether’.1310 It also recalled that the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 69/167 confirmed the legal right to respect for the privacy of digital 
communications and therefore ‘the adoption of mass surveillance technology undoubtedly 
impinges on the very essence of that right’. 1311  Noting that the ‘very existence of mass 
surveillance programmes constitutes a potentially disproportionate interference with the right 
                                              
1304 OHCHR Report supra note 270, para 20. 
1305 UN HRC General Comment No.16, supra note 85; M.K. v France, supra note 129; Brunet 
v France, supra note 130; Shimovolos v Russia, supra note 127.  
1306 Report of the Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC, supra note 271. 
1307 UN HRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin’ (28 December 
2009) UN Doc A/HRC/13/137. 
1308 UN HRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right 
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to privacy’, the Report concluded that ‘it is incompatible with the existing concepts of privacy 
for States to collect all communications or metadata all the time indiscriminately. The very 
essence of the right to privacy of communications is that infringements must be exceptional 
and justified on a case-by-case basis’.1312 The Report therefore put an onus ‘on those states 
deploying bulk access surveillance technologies to explain promptly, precisely and publicly, 
why this wholesale intrusion into collective privacy is justified for the prevention of terrorism 
or other serious crime’.1313 
 
4. The Council of Europe 
 
In the already mentioned report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe The Rule of Law on the Internet and in the Wider Digital Age,1314 it was noted that 
European data protection law is founded on a set of basic principles and remedies that are 
‘special reflection of the general rule of law principles developed by the European Court of 
Human Rights’. 1315  The report observed that revelations of Edward Snowden made it 
‘increasingly clear that massive and indiscriminate surveillance programmes are not in 
conformity with European human rights law and cannot be justified by the fight against 
terrorism or other important threats to national security’.1316 It further considered that ‘such 
interferences can only be accepted if they are strictly necessary and proportionate to a 
legitimate aim’.1317 
 In another report, that of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Right  issued in 
2015 and titled, Mass Surveillance serious concerns were likewise expressed about mass 
surveillance and large scale intrusion practices disclosed since June 2013 by Edward 
Snowden.1318 In particular, the report noted the development in several countries (including the 
Five Eyes) of ‘massive surveillance-industrial complex, which risks escaping democratic 
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controls and accountability and threatens the free and open character of our societies’.1319 The 
Committee was not only of a view that the surveillance practices endanger fundamental rights, 
including the right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR. It expressed deep concernes about the 
threats to internet security by the practices of certain intelligence agencies of seeking out 
systematically, using and even creating ‘back doors’ and other weaknesses in security 
standards and implementation, which could easily be exploited by terrorists, cyberterrorists and 
other criminals.1320 Recognizing the need for transatlantic cooperation to fight terrorism and 
other organized crimes, the Committee stressed that this must be based on mutual trust and 
respect for human rights and the rule of law. This can only be achieved by rebuilding trust 
through putting into place a legal and technical framework at national and international level, 
which in particular protects the right to privacy.1321 The Report made a number of proposals 
regarding the regulation of intelligence and law enforcement agencies activities on a regional 
level, which will be further discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
5.  The IACHR Special Rapporteur 
 
On 27 June 2014 the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights released a report titled Freedom of Expression on the 
Internet.1322 The Report’s main concern was freedom of expression.  It therefore identified four 
guiding principles that states should follow, when developing the digital environment, namely 
access, pluralism, non-discrimination and privacy. The last guiding principle of privacy is 
closely related to Article 11 ACHR and obliges states to both respect the privacy of individuals 
and to make sure that third parties do not act in ways that could arbitrarily affect that right.  
 
6. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
In 2015 the Court of Justice of the European Union declared in another of its landmark rulings, 
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner1323 that data transfers of EU citizens from Facebook 
                                              
1319 ibid, page 1.  
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1322 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur Freedom of Expression and the 
Internet’ (31 December 2013) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 
1323 Schrems, supra note 167. 
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European subsidiary, under the US Safe Harbour scheme are not safe and should be suspended 
on the ground that the US does not afford adequate level of protection of personal data. The 
case was referred to the CJEU by Maximilian Schrems, who complained that following the 
Snowden exposures in relation to the activities of the NSA, his Facebook data transferred from 
the Irish subsidiary to the US for processing is unsafe, as the US law does not offer sufficient 
protection against surveillance by the public authorities of data transferred to that country.1324 
Of particular note was the Court’s finding that US national security, public interest and law 
enforcement requirements prevail over the safe harbour agreement, so that the US companies 
are bound to disregard, without limitation, the protective rules laid down by that scheme where 
they conflict with these requirements.1325 As such, the scheme enables interference by the US 
public authorities with the fundamental rights of the Europeans. The Court also held that the 
process of transfer of all EU citizens’ data to the US was beyond what was necessary and 
proportionate to the protection of national security. The legislation authorizing the transfers 
was not limited to what was strictly necessary, as it authorized on a generalized basis storage 
of all of the personal data of all the persons without any differentiation, limitation or exception 
being made. Furthermore, the persons concerned had no administrative or judicial means of 
redress enabling in particular the data relating to them to be accessed, rectified, or erased. The 
Court therefore declared the safe harbour scheme invalid. It has since been replaced by another 
non-legally binding agreement, called the Privacy Shield, addressed in Chapter 5.  
 
7. The Legal Contours of the Interference with the Right to Privacy of Digital 
Communications 
 
Drawing from the above jurisprudence and soft law sources, some basic parameters can be set 
out regarding what constitutes interference with privacy of digital communications. This 
includes: 
a) interception of data by public authorities of every form of communications, 
including electronic email (HRC General Comment 16, HRC Concluding 
Observations on Sweden, Liberty);  
b) use, sharing and storage of data (Leader, Weber, Amann, Marper, Estrella v 
Uruguay,); 
                                              




c) either targeted (Malone), or mass surveillance of communications, including email 
(Liberty and Copland); 
d) bulk collection and retention of metadata by service provides in order for it to be 
passed on to government authorities (Digital Rights Ireland); 
e) the mere existence of legislation allowing secret surveillance (Klass, Kennedy, 
Weber, Zakharov);  
f)  interception of personal information pertaining to the telephone and internet usage, 
including both content and metering (Malone, Copland, Liberty, Klass, Escher v 
Columbia);  
g) all nature of correspondence- not only purely personal- business, or professional 
type may constitute part of an individual’s private life (Kopp, Donoso v Panama);   
h) systematic collection and storage of information by authorities on databases (HRC 
General Comment 16, M.K v France and Brunet) as well as on so called 
‘surveillance databases’ (Shimovolos); 
i) the ‘pulling’ of data based on Article 32(b) of the Cybercrime Convention by the 
law enforcement agencies from servers located in another country without formal 
mutual assistance arrangements, may be incompatible with Article 8 ECHR, Article 
17 ICCPR and Article 1 Convention 108;  
j) untargeted search of all electronic data (Robathin); 
k) the transfer of personal data of all EU residents by social sites, such as Facebook, 
to US servers under the now invalidated Safe Harbour Agreement violates the right 
to privacy, as it does not provide sufficient level of protection of personal 
information (Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner); 
l) the retention by service providers of all traffic and location data to make it available 
for the purposes of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime by 
LEAs constitutes an interference with private life and the right to protection of 
personal data (Digital Rights Ireland); 
m) domestic legal framework providing for secret interception of all mobile phone 
communications violates Article 8 (Zakharov, Szabo).  
 
Assessed against these principles it can be concluded that it is highly likely that (a) the 
gathering, examination and storage of emails under the PRISM interception programme 
constitute interference with the right to privacy (HRC General Comment 16, HRC Concluding 
Observations on Sweden, Liberty, Leader, Weber, Amann, Marper and Estrella v Uruguay,); 
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(b) interception of all internet traffic (both internal and external) routed via the UK on the basis 
of the Tempora programme likewise interferes with the right to privacy (Liberty and Copland); 
(c) as does recording of digital and telephone metadata pursuant to Fareview and Bondless 
Informant (Malone, Digital Rights Ireland). Support for these conclusions can also be found 
in the above-mentioned Reports from the Human Rights Commissioner, the UN Special 
Rapporteurs and the Report of the Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights, all relaying on the ICCPR and ECHR and their respective jurisprudence and concluding 
interference with the protected right. It is worth reiterating that the Reports robustly condemn 
electronic surveillance, in particular observing that capture, collection, retention and even the 
mere possibility of communication being captured creates an interference with privacy, with a 
potential chilling effect on other rights, including those of expression and association,1326 not 
to mention the very existence of a mass surveillance programmes, which in itself creates 
interference. There has been no suggestion from the OHCHR, or the Special Rapporteurs 
however that the surveillance is inherently incapable of justification. Indeed, the onus would 
be on the state to demonstrate that such interference is neither arbitrary, nor unlawful1327 and 
according to Ben Emmerson QC any justification would have to be compelling.1328 This is 
subject of consideration in the next part of this chapter. 
   
PART V: JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
The right to privacy is subject to legitimate limitations, which means that if a state 
successfully shows that the restriction is within the prescribed limits, that restriction would be 
permissible and not amount to violation. Whether or not the interference with privacy of both 
domestic and foreign surveillance activities by the Five Eyes intelligence agencies may be 
justified must be assessed in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 ICCPR, Article 8 





                                              
1326 OHCHR Report, supra note 270, para 20; Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC supra 
note 271; CoE Commissioner Report, supra note 6. 
1327 ibid. 
1328 Special Rapporteur, Ben Emmerson QC, supra note 271, para 9. 
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1. Limitations:  Articles 17 ICCPR, 8 ECHR and 11 ACHR 
 
According to Article 17 ICCPR an interference with an individual’s right to privacy is only 
permissible under international human rights law if it is neither unlawful, nor arbitrary.  
In contrast with other ICCPR provisions (for example Article 19), Article 17 does not spell out 
the elements for a test of permissible limitations. Nevertheless, such permissible limits have  
been considered to be similar to other enumerated limitations in the ICCPR.1329  Moreover, the 
HRC set out some parameters with regard to states’ ability to interfere with the right to privacy. 
First, any interference authorised by states can only take place on the basis envisaged by the 
law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.1330 
This means that the interference that is permissible under national law may still be unlawful if 
that law is in conflict with the provisions of the ICCPR.1331 Secondly, the law which allows for 
interference must be precise and circumscribed, so as not to give decision makers too much 
discretion in authorising interference with privacy. 1332  Thirdly, the interference must be 
authorised only by the authority designed under the law and solely on a case –by-case basis.1333 
The term ‘arbitrary interference’ in Article 17 was interpreted by the HRC by introducing the 
concept of reasonableness. The Committee stated that arbitrary interference must not be 
unreasonable and explained that:  
 
[it] can also extend to interference provided for under the law. The introduction of the 
concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by 
law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant 
and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.1334  
 
                                              
1329 Joseph and Castan, supra note 86, p. 538. 
1330 General Comment No. 16, supra note 85; para 3:  
[n]o interference can take place except in case envisaged by the law. Interference 
authorised by [s]tates can only take place on the basis of law, which itself must 
comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant. 
1331 OHCHR Report, supra note 270, para 21. 
1332 General Comment No. 16, supra note 85; para. 8:  
‘[e]ven with regard to interferences that conform to the Covenant, relevant legislation 
must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such interferences may be 
permitted. A decision to make use of such authorised interference must be made only 
by the authority designated by the law and on a case-by-case basis’ 
1333 ibid. 
1334 ibid. para 4. 
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 The notion of reasonableness was also elaborated on in the case of Toonen v Australia,1335 
where the HRC stated that it ‘interprets the requirement of reasonableness to imply that any 
interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the 
circumstances of any given case.1336 The requirement of proportionality has not been directly 
addressed though by the HRC in the context of Article 17. However, in its General Comment 
27 the Committee commented on the nature of permissible restrictions and made the following 
observations in respect to the requirement of proportionality: 
 
 […] restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be  
 appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive  
 instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function; they must 
 be proportionate to the interest to be protected […] The principle of proportionality has  
to be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions but also by the 
administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law.1337 
 
Thus, it could be said that a state may in principle interfere with the privacy of individuals, but 
only if (a) the interference takes place pursuant to detailed national legislation; (b) where it is 
authorised by a relevant authority on a case-by-case basis; (c) it is not arbitrary; (d) reasonable 
in particular circumstances and (e) proportional to the ends sought. The requirements of 
reasonableness and proportionality are closely related and in the context of the HRC’s 
interpretation of Article 17, both seem to imply that a restriction may only be put in place in 
least intrusive manner and if absolutely necessary.  
 
Unlike Article 17 ICCPR, Article 8(2) ECHR enumerates the grounds, which allow 
states to place limitations on privacy rights. The Article permits public authority to interfere 
with that right, provided such interference is ‘in accordance with the law’, ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ and in pursuit of ‘legitimate aims’. The ‘legitimate aims’ under Article  
8(2) are- national security; public safety or the economic well being of the country; prevention 
of disorder or crime; protection of health and morals and the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  
                                              
1335 Toonen v Australia (488/92)  
1336 ibid, para 8.3. 
1337 UN HRC, ‘General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement (Art 12)’ (2 November 
1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 9, paras. 14 and 15. 
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In similar manner to Article 17 ICCPR, Article 11(2) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights also refers to ‘arbitrary’ or ‘abusive’ interference with private life. It does not 
contain an explicit clause justifying restrictions, nevertheless limitations are implied in the 
provisions of that Article and would be authorised by the Inter-American Commission.1338 The 
Inter American Court of Human Rights interpreted the scope of Article 11(2) in a number of 
cases. In Donoso v Panama1339 the IACtHR stated that in order to be non-abusive and non-
arbitrary, any state restrictions on the right to privacy must ‘serve a legitimate purpose and 
meet the requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality which render [them] 
necessary in a democratic society’.1340 In Donoso1341 and Escher v Columbia1342 judgments the 
Court has also confirmed that there is a legality requirement, which means that restrictions 
must be ‘statutorily enacted’. Moreover, in the context of law authorising the interception of 
telephone communications, the IACtHR held that such law ‘must be precise and indicate the 
corresponding clear and detailed rules, such as the circumstances in which this measure can be 
adopted, the persons authorised to request it, to order it and to carry it out and the procedures 
to be followed’.1343 The Inter American Commission has been influenced in its approach by 
the decisions of the ECtHR.1344   Both the Inter American Court and the Inter American 
Commission made it clear that any discretion given to the State has to be construed 
narrowly.1345 
 
In summary, the approaches to limitations of privacy right outlined above share three 
common features, namely that (a) the interference must be in accordance with the law; (b) it 
must serve a legitimate aim and (c) be necessary in a democratic society. In addition, the 
Strasbourg Court and the HRC consider the issue of proportionality of the interference in 
securing the legitimate aim as central to the determination of legality. The question that will 
now be addressed is whether the interference with the right to privacy through the use of cyber 
surveillance programmes may be justified on these bases. 
 
                                              
1338 ibid. 
1339 Donoso v Panama, supra note 178.  
1340 ibid, paragraph 56. 
1341 ibid. 
1342 Escher v Columbia, supra note 179, para 130. 
1343 ibid, paragraph 114. 
1344 ibid.  
1345 Steve Clark v Granada, Case 10.325, Report No. 2/96, IACHR, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 Doc. 
7 at 113 (1996). 
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a. ‘In Accordance with the Law’ 
 
The first requirement is that the restriction imposed on the right to privacy is ‘in accordance 
with the law’, which will only be met when three conditions are satisfied: (a) the impugned 
measure must have some basis in domestic law; (b) the quality of the law must be such as to 
be accessible to the person concerned and (c) must have foreseeable consequences  
 
i. Legal Basis 
 
 The requirement that the interference with privacy can only occur if conducted pursuant to 
national laws have been confirmed by the three courts- the HRC, IACtHR and ECtHR.  
The HRC in its General Comment 16 observed that ‘[t]the term ‘unlawful’ means that 
no interference can take place except in cases actually envisaged by the law. In addition, any 
interference authorised by [s]tates can only take place on the basis of law that itself must 
comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.’1346  
The IACtHR in Donoso and Escher cases likewise stated that any restriction must be 
statutorily enacted. In Donoso the IACtHR observed that: 
 
[t]he right to privacy is not an absolute one and so, it may be restricted by the 
[s]tates provided that their interference is not abusive or arbitrary; accordingly, 
such restriction must be statutorily enacted, serve a legitimate purpose, and meet 
the requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality which render it 
necessary in a democratic society.1347  
 
Applying these conditions to the facts in Donoso, the IACtHR held that the Panamanian State, 
due to the lack of adequate, accurate and clear legislation to regulate interference with 
telephone communications, failed to fulfil its obligation to adapt its domestic legislation to 
secure the right of Mr. Donoso not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with his private life.  
                                              
1346 General Comment No.16, supra note 85, para 3. 
1347 Donoso v Panama, supra note 178, para 56. 
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On the European level, the Strasbourg Court similarly concluded that any interference 
with privacy must be on the basis of domestic laws.1348 For example in Malone, the UK 
government surveillance activities were performed under a broad set of administrative rules. 
The Court was not clear what legal standards applied and disapproved of the UK government’s 
ability to change the parameters of its surveillance activities as it saw fit. The ECtHR stressed 
that the law must indicate the scope of any discretion with regard to the interception of 
communications and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give an individual 
protection against arbitrary interference.  
Public admissions as to the existence of PRISM, Tempora, Upsteam and Boundless 
Informant are rarely made by government officials, not to mention the legal basis pursuant to 
which they operate.  
The existence of PRISM and Upstream have been officially confirmed by the US 
government1349 to be operated on the basis of the US FAA s 702 (US Code §1881(a) and the 
Executive Order 12333. The FAA adopts different rules for international communications 
depending on whether the target of the surveillance is a United States person or non-United 
States person.1350  Thus, if the government targets a US person who may be both inside and 
outside of the US, the surveillance is permissible only if it is intended to acquire foreign 
intelligence information and if the Foreign Intelligence Court (FISC) issues a warrant based on 
a finding that there is a probable cause to believe that the US person is an agent of a foreign 
power.1351 However, when the target of foreign intelligence surveillance is a non-US person 
who ‘is reasonable believed to be located outside the United States’, the government need not 
have probable cause to believe that the target is an agent of a foreign power and need not  obtain 
an individual warrant from the FISC, even if the interception takes place inside the US.1352 In 
fact, s 702 authorises the FISC to approve annual certifications submitted by the Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence that identify certain categories of foreign 
intelligence targets whose communications may be collected, subject to FISC-approved 
targeting and minimisation procedures, that is procedures that must be ‘reasonably designed 
                                              
1348 Malone v UK, supra note 112, paragraph 67; Huvig v France (1990) (App. No. 
11105/87), para 28; Krusin v France (1990) (App. No. 11801/85), para 27; Khan v the United 
Kingdom, (2000) (App. No. 35394/97), para. 26. 
1349 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President of Review of 
Signals Intelligence’ (17 January 2014) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence>. 




[…] to minimize the acquisition and retention and prohibit the dissemination of unpublicly 
available information concerning unconsenting Unites States persons’.1353 The categories of 
who may be target of interception are broad and the certifications typically specify international 
terrorists and individuals involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 1354 
Reports  as to how s 702 powers have been used in practice attest that this type of surveillance 
does lack legitimate legal basis. For example, according to the 2014 report on Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board Hearing on Section 702 of the FISA Amendment Act:   
 
[t]he surveillance under FAA [is not] predicated on probable cause or an 
individualised suspicion. The targets need not be agents of foreign powers, 
engaged in criminal activity, or connected even remotely with terrorism. Rather, 
the FAA permits the [US] government to target any foreigner located outside of 
the US so long as the pragmatic purpose of the surveillance is to acquire ‘foreign 
intelligence information’.1355  
 
This gives the US government sweeping authority to monitor the communications of foreigners 
abroad. However the targeting and the minimization procedures indicate that the US authorities 
had implemented these powers in a manner that guarantees that the NSA will acquire and retain 
purely domestic communications as well on the basis of s 702.1356 The former NSA director 
Keith Alexander publically acknowledged that  the NSA uses s 702 data not only for the 
purposes of foreign information gathering, but also to access Americans’ communications 
without a warrant through a ‘back door search loophole’ using ‘US personal identifiers’, for 
example email addresses associated with someone in the US.1357 This means that the US is 
using a statute that was intended to permit broad access to American’s international 
communications as a tool to engage in wide surveillance of American’s purely domestic 
                                              
1353 50 U.S.C §§ 1801 (h) (1), 1821 (4) (A). 
1354 ibid. 
1355 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Hearing on 
Section 702 of the FISA Amendment Act’ (19 March 2014)  
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/ACLU2.pdf >.   
1356 ibid. 
1357 Ron Wyden, Senator for Oregon, ‘Wyden, Udall on Revelations that Intelligence 




communications.1358 A similar sweeping access to communications of Europeans has been 
declared as not ‘in accordance with the law’ in Digital Rights Ireland case.1359 There the CJEU 
held that although the aim of the Data Retention Directive might have been legitimate, its 
implementation was not proportionate to the intended objective. This is because the Directive 
failed to stipulate clear and precise rules on the extent of the interference with the protected 
rights, as it applied to all traffic data and all users of all modes of electronic communications 
for an unspecified length of time. It was also not sufficiently specific about the conditions of 
data storage and the obligations of the security agencies accessing the data. Likewise, the broad 
powers under s 702 that are used to intercept communications of US and non-US persons alike 
do not ‘indicate the scope of any legal discretion conferred on the competent authority and the 
manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure 
in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference’.1360 Such 
use of s 702 is therefore highly likely not to fulfil the requirement of ‘in accordance with the 
law’. 
Even more oblique then the NSA use of s 702 is its surveillance on the basis of the Executive 
Order 12333 (EO), as amended. The original EO 12333 was signed by President Ronald Regan 
in 1981 and established broad new surveillance authorities for the intelligence community 
outside the scope of public law.1361 It has been amended three times (by the EO 13284 in 2003, 
EO 13555 in 2004 and EO 13470 in 2008).1362 The EO 12333 is said to serve often as an 
alternative basis of authority for surveillance activities, above and beyond s 702 FAA. 1363 
Indeed, little is known even to the US state officials how the NSA uses the EO 12333 to 
conducts its surveillance operations abroad. For example, Senator Dianne Feinstein, the Chair 
of the US Senate State Intelligence Committee commented in 2013 that ‘[the Intelligence 
Committee] does not receive the same number of official reports on other NSA surveillance 
activities directed abroad pursuant to legal authorities outside of FISA (specifically Executive 
Order 12333), but I intend to add to the [C]ommittee’s focus on those activities’.1364 The extent 
                                              
1358 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 372. 
1359 Digital Rights Ireland, supra note 168. 
1360 Malone, supra note 112, para 67.  
1361 Electronic Privacy Information Centre, ‘Executive Order 12333’  
<https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/12333/>. 
1362 supra note 188. 
1363 supra note 378.  
1364 United States Senator for California, Diane Feinstein, ‘Feinstein on NSA Compliance’ 
(16 August 2013) < https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2013/8/feinstein-
statement-on-nsa-compliance>. 
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of the collection and storage of communications of both Americans and foreigners pursuant to 
the EO 12333 is simply not known.1365 
Tempora is authorised by certificates issued under s 8(4) of RIPA, granted to GCHQ, 
which relates to ‘external communications’, i.e. communications that are either sent or received 
outside the British Islands. GCHQ has confirmed that Tempora has 10 ‘basic’ certificates, 
which creates a ‘broad, overall legal authority, which has to be renewed at intervals’.1366 These 
include a global certificate, which gives GCHQ authority to intercept any transatlantic cable 
data, as long as the purpose of the intercept falls within one of a number of very broad 
categories, such as terrorism, organized crime and the economic well-being of the UK.1367 This 
is the basis of a legal challenge of GCHQ cyber surveillance in the case currently pending 
before the ECtHR of Big Brother Watch v UK. 1368  The applicants argue that the UK 
surveillance measures are not in accordance with the law, because the law permits blanket 
monitoring of external communications provided that one party is outside the British Isles. 1369 
In addition, the certificates are often framed only in very broad terms (usually referencing 
national security grounds), with no reference to the scope, or duration of the interception. As 
such, the ‘generic interception of external communications by GCHQ merely on the basis that 
such communications have been transmitted by transatlantic fibre-optic cables is an inherently 
disproportionate interference with the private lives of thousands, perhaps millions of 
people’.1370 
Based on the available information and official admissions from governments, it could 
be said that at least some of the programmes of the Five Eyes (such as PRISM, Upstream and 
Tempora) have been and continue to be run pursuant to the domestic legal frameworks, which 
have been published. Their purpose is so broadly defined, that they fail to provide the precise 
basis for the interception and no grounds whatsoever for the receipt, analysis, use and storage 
of data received from foreign intelligence agencies. However, there is also a whole host of 
                                              
1365 see for example John Napier Tye,’Meet the Executive Order 12333: The Reagan Rule 
that Lets the NSA Spy on Americans’ (18 July 2014)  
< https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-
that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-
d0de80767fc2_story.html?utm_term=.e2177132821a >. Tye, a former Obama State 
Department Official, called for greater scrutiny of the EO 12333.  
1366 Ewan MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davis and James Ball, ‘The Legal 
Loophole that Allow GCHQ to Spy on the World’ (21 June 2013) The Guardian. 
1367 Big Brother Watch v UK, supra note 171, p. 14. 
1368 ibid. 
1369 ibid. 
1370 ibid, at Complaints.  
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other surveillance systems in existence, including MUSCULAR, OPTIC NERVE, MYSTIC, 
OPERATION SOCIALIST, GEMALTO HACKING and THREE SMURFS (Dreamy, Nosey 




The criteria of ‘legal basis’ is not just limited to the requirement that the law must be published 
on national level, but that it meets the standard of clarity and precision sufficient to enable 
those affected to regulate their conduct with foresight of the circumstances in which intrusive 
surveillance may occur.1371 The Human Rights Committee stressed in its General Comment 16 
that legislation authorising interference with private communications ‘must specify in detail 
the precise circumstances in which such interference may be permitted.’1372  
This approach is also reflected in the case law of the ECtHR, according to which for domestic 
law to be accessible, it must give an individual an indication of the applicable legal rules, 1373 
that have to be sufficiently precise, detailed and foreseeable. 1374 Thus, in Silver v United 
Kingdom,1375 specific orders and instructions given to by the British Home Secretary to prison 
governors did not meet the accessibility test because they were not published and therefore not 
available to the prisoners, nor was their content explained. In Malone, the ECtHR stated that 
national laws must indicate the scope of the discretion conferred on the competent public 
authority and the ‘manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate 
aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary 
interference’.1376 Similarly, in Huvig v France the ECtHR observed that national laws must 
indicate ‘with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion of 
public authorities in exercising an intrusive power’.1377 Furthermore, the Court mindful of the 
role that surveillance may play in undermining privacy, has developed a robust set of principles 
relating to how national legislation has to ensure lawful surveillance. These principles were set 
out in the core of the Court’s case law concerned with interception of communications and 
wiretapping (albeit prior to introduction of mass cyber surveillance programmes), including 
                                              
1371 Report of the Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC, supra note 271, para 36. 
1372 General Comment No. 16, supra note 85, para 8. 
1373 Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (1979) (App. No. 6538/74), para 47. 
1374 Vogt v Germany (1996) (App. No. 17851/91). 
1375 Silver and Others v United Kingdom 1983) (App. No. 5947/ 72), paras 87-93. 
1376 Malone, supra note 112, para 68. 
1377 Huvig, supra note 365, para 35. 
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the already referred to cases of Huvig, Malone, Klass, Kopp, Khan, Copland, and recently 
reaffirmed in Zakharov. In essence, the national laws under which interferences, including 
surveillance of communications, may be legitimate shall define: (a) the categories of people 
liable to have their communications monitored; (b) the nature of the offences which may give 
rise to an interception order; (c) limits on the duration of such monitoring; (d) the procedures 
to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; (e) precautions to be taken 
when communicating the data to other parties; and (f) circumstances in which data obtained 
may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.1378 
Viewed in the light of these detailed rules, mass surveillance programmes significantly 
challenge the accessibility requirements of Articles 17 ICCPR, 8 ECHR and 11 ACHR. These 
criteria have not been met, as the domestic laws (such as FAA and RIPA) fail to set out the 
scope of the discretionary powers of the NSA and GCHQ, nor is the manner of their activities 
outlined in any detail. In the UK, there is no legislation (or other legal provisions) that can be 
said to give ‘citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the 
authorities are empowered to resort’ to the measures.1379 Further, the legislation seemingly 
authorising bulk interception programmes, (PRISM, Tempora) neither sets limits to the 
categories of persons who may be subject to surveillance, nor the duration of the interception. 
To that end, Ben Emmerson QC observed that the detailed legal and administrative frameworks 
for mass surveillance often remain classified and little is still publicly known about the ways, 
in which captured data are operationalized.1380 Moreover, the programmes often operate under 
outdated domestic laws, which were designed to deal with more rudimentary forms of 
                                              
1378 Huvig, ibid; Kruslin v France (1990) (App. No. 1180/85/), para 35. The ECtHR stated at 
para. 34 in Huvig v France that: 
[a]bove all, the system does not for the time being afford adequate safeguards against 
various possible abuses. For example, the categories of people liable to have their 
telephones tapped by judicial order and the nature of the offences which may give rise 
to such an order are nowhere defined. Nothing obliges a judge to set a limit on the 
duration of telephone tapping. Similarly unspecified are the procedure for drawing up 
the summary reports containing intercepted conversations; the precautions to be taken 
in order to communicate the recordings intact and in their entirety for possible 
inspection by the judge (who can hardly verify the number and length of the original 
tapes on the spot) and by the defence; and the circumstances in which recordings may 
or must be erased or the tapes be destroyed, in particular where an accused has been 
discharged by an investigating judge or acquitted by a court. The information provided 
by the Government on these various points shows at best the existence of a practice, 
but a practice lacking the necessary regulatory control in the absence of legislation or 
case-law. 
1379 Big Brother Watch, supra note 171, p. 48. 
1380 Report of the Special Repporteur Ben Emmerson QC, supra note 271, para. 37. 
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surveillance and have not been modified to date to reflect the increased technical 
capabilities.1381 In some cases, states have ‘intentionally sought to apply older and weaker 
safeguards regimes to ever more sensitive information’. 1382  In this regard, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights commented that ‘secret rules and secret interpretations-even 
secret judicial interpretations-of law do not have the necessary qualities of law’1383 and cannot 
serve as the basis for the legality of surveillance programmes. Above all, none of the national 
legislation expressly mentions and therefore authorises cyber surveillance programmes- it is 
simply admitted (or has not been robustly denied) by the national authorities that they operate 
pursuant to these statutes.  
A recent 2015 UK case, Liberty v GCHQ, 1384 heard by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) 
confirmed that the country’s national legal framework authorising cyber surveillance breaches 
the requirement of accessibility. The issue before the IPT was the legality of intelligence 
sharing operations between the UK and the US of electronic communications intercepted in 
bulk. The challenge was brought by Liberty, Privacy International and other civil liberties 
groups, who claimed that GCHQ’s receipt of private communications intercepted by the NSA 
through mass surveillance programmes, PRISM and Upstream, was illegal. The IPT declared 
that ‘the regime governing the soliciting, receiving, storing and transmitting by the UK 
authorities of private communications of individuals located in the UK, which have been 
obtained by the US authorities pursuant to PRISM and/or Upstream contravened Articles 8 or 
10 [of the ECHR]’.1385 The IPT stated that the government’s regulations were illegal because 
the public were unaware of safeguards that were in place and that the details of those safeguards 
were only revealed during the legal challenge at the IPT. However, the ruling appears to suggest 
that the illegality related to those operations which were conducted between 2007-2014 and 
that GCHQ’s access to NSA intelligence was lawful from that time onwards because secret 
policies governing the UK-US relationship were made public. Liberty disagrees that the limited 
safeguards revealed during the IPT proceedings are sufficient to make GCHQ’s mass 
surveillance and intelligence sharing lawful and has challenged the Tribunal’s decision at the 
ECtHR, which is now pending decision.  
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 Foreseeability requires that national law must be ‘sufficiently clear in terms of providing 
citizens with adequate indication of the circumstances and conditions in which public 
authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with 
the right to respect for private life and correspondence’.1386 In Doegra v the Netherlands1387 
the ECtHR stated that a rule is foreseeable ‘if it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable 
the person concerned-if need be with appropriate advice- to regulate his conduct’.1388  
When applying these principles to the relevant provisions of the RIPA and FAA Acts, 
it appears that this condition, in similar vein to the accessibility criteria, has been disregarded 
too, both in relation to domestic and foreign surveillance. 
In the UK, section 8(4) RIPA provides that interception warrants do not have to specify a 
person or premises, if they refer to the interception of communications outside the UK and if 
an authorising certificate has been issued by a Secretary of State. This seems to be the basis 
upon which the UK Government authorises GCHQ to run Tempora. This inevitably introduces 
an element of unforseeability, for the interception is both indiscriminate and deliberately 
unpredictable. The statutory regime that applies to the external communications warrants 
breaches this criteria because the restrictions and safeguards that apply to internal 
authorisations are not applicable to external warrants and are not approved by a judge or an 
independent authority, whether before or after they have been issued.1389  Furthermore, the 
safeguards in RIPA that relate to external warrants are deficient. For example, the ‘national 
security’ basis upon which the warrants are granted do not define with any precision the nature 
of the offences that may give rise to an interception or examination of communications, or the 
categories of people liable to have their communications intercepted. There is no effective limit 
on the  interception and the law does not set out the procedures to be followed for examining 
the communications or the precautions to be taken when supplying them to third parties, such 
as the NSA.1390 The circumstances, in which the communications must be destroyed, whilst 
specified, are so broad as to effectively permit the retention of enormous amounts of 
intercepted information, which means that they do not meet the criteria relating to interception 
                                              
1386 Malone, supra note 112, para 67. 
1387 Doerga v the Netherlands (2004) (App. No. 50210/99).  
1388 ibid, para. 50. 
1389 Big Brother Watch, supra note 171, p. 49 
1390 ibid, p. 54. 
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of external communications as set out in Liberty v UK  and therefore are incompatible with 
Article 8.    
However, the blanket surveillance of foreign communications under s 8(4) RIPA is only part 
of the problem relating to the UK laws giving surveillance powers. Whilst the critical piece of 
legislation authorising interception is RIPA, there are other parallel statutory frameworks in 
place, which authorise interception and acquisition of communications data within the UK, 
without the same degree of attention, analysis and oversight as RIPA.1391 Among them, the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 (WTA), which by sections 48 and 49 grants the Secretary of 
State and the Commissioners of Revenue and Customs very broad powers to authorise the 
interception of wireless and other communications.1392 In principle both RIPA and WTA may 
be used to intercept the same communications. 1393  Other non-RIPA powers of public 
authorities and law enforcement agencies stem from some 65 different statutory mechanisms 
authorising 46 different public bodies to have access to, or require production of 
communications data,1394 for example the Telecommunications Act 1984 s. 94.1395 As regards 
these powers, David Anderson QC observed that there is little, or nothing in the public domain 
that explains how frequently they are used and that at least some or perhaps many agencies and 
departments exercise these powers without any published codes of practice in place. When 
recommending consolidation and reform to the UK government, Anderson stated that ‘obscure 
laws-and there are few more impenetrable than RIPA and its satellites-corrode democracy 
itself, because neither the public to whom they apply, nor even the legislators who debate and 
amend them, fully understand what they mean’.1396 Similar conclusion was reached by the 
recent Independent Surveillance Review, commissioned in March 2014 by the then Coalition 
Government to assess the legality, effectiveness and privacy implications of UK surveillance 
programmes by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). The Report, titled A Democratic 
Licence to Operate, published in July 2015 highlighted the inadequacies in law and oversight 
                                              
1391 David Anderson QC, ‘A Question of Trust. Report of the Investigatory Powers Review’, 






1395 Telecommunications Act 1984, s. 94 grants the Secretary of State a power to give 
‘directions of a general character’ to an individual to the extent that they are ‘necessary in the 
interests of national security or relations with the government of a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom’. 
1396 David Anderson QC, supra note 408, para 13.31, p. 252. 
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and urgently called for new legislation to provide an up to date democratic mandate for digital 
intelligence. It concluded that the present arrangements are too complex to be understood by 
the citizen and have contributed to the public credibility gap that must be addressed.1397  The 
Review set out ten tests that any legislation must pass before it can be regarded as giving the 
police and the intelligence services a democratic licence to operate, namely the rule of law, 
necessity, proportionality, restraint, effective oversight, recognition of necessary secrecy, 
minimal secrecy, transparency, legislative clarity and multilateral cooperation.1398 
                                              
1397 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, ‘A Democratic Licence 
to Operate. Report of the Independent Surveillance Review’ (2-15 July 2015) ISSN 1750-
9432. 
1398 ibid. p.104. The ten tests for the intrusion of privacy that any new legislation or 
regulation must be seen to pass before the UK Parliament are: 
1. rule of law: all intrusion into privacy must be in accordance with law through processes 
that can be meaningfully assessed against clear and open legislation, and only for 
purposes laid down by law.  
2. necessity: all intrusion must be justified as necessary in relation to explicit tasks and 
missions assigned to government agencies in accordance with their duly democratic 
processes, and there should be no other practicable means of achieving the objective.  
3. proportionality: intrusion must be judged as proportionate to the advantages gained, not 
just in cost or resource terms but also through a judgment that the degree of intrusion 
is matched by the seriousness of the harm to be prevented.  
4. restraint: it should never become routine for the state to intrude into the lives of its 
citizens. It must be reluctant to do so, restrained in the powers it chooses to use, and 
properly authorized when it deems it necessary to intrude.  
5. effective oversight: an effective regime must be in place. Effectiveness should be 
judged by the capabilities of the regime to supervise and investigate governmental 
intrusion, the power it has to bring officials and ministers to account, and the 
transparency it embodies so the public can be confident it is working properly. There 
should also be means independently to investigate complaints.  
6. recognition of necessary secrecy: the ‘secret parts of the state’ must be acknowledged 
as necessary to the functioning and protection of the open society. It cannot be more 
than minimally transparent, but it must be fully democratically accountable.  
7. minimal secrecy: the ‘secret parts of the state’ must draw and observe clear boundaries 
between that which must remain secret (such as intelligence sources or the identity of 
their employees) and all other aspects of their work which should be openly 
acknowledged. Necessary secrecy, however, must not be a justification for a wider 
culture of secrecy on security and intelligence matters.  
8. transparency: how the law applies to the citizen must be evident if the rule of law is to 
be upheld. Anything that does not need to be secret should be transparent to the public; 
not just comprehensible to dedicated specialists but clearly stated in ways that any 
interested citizen understands.  
9. legislative clarity: relevant legislation is not likely to be simple but it must be clearly 
explained in Codes of Practice that have Parliamentary approval, are kept up-to-date 
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There also seems to be a disregard for foreseeability in the framework of the US FAA, 
s 702 relating to gathering information on a suspected overseas targets.1399 Any foreign national 
outside the US can be a target of surveillance under s 702 FISA as long as the government’s 
purpose is to obtain foreign intelligence.1400 The Act fails to provide any criteria whatsoever 
or clarification of the grounds for the interception. It therefore seems that a reasonable belief 
by the intelligence/security agencies that a person is abroad may trigger a one-year spying 
authorisation.1401 
 
b.  Legitimate Aim- National Security 
 
The general principle under the provisions of ECHR is that once a court is satisfied that any 
restriction has legal basis, i.e. meets the requirement of ‘in accordance with the law’, it will go 
on to consider whether the restriction is for one of the specified aims. Similar position is taken 
under the ICCPR and ACHR, although unlike the second paragraph of Article 8, Articles 17 
and 11 do not enumerate specific grounds for limitations.  
In justifying cyber surveillance programmes the governments of the Five Eyes often 
rely on the national security grounds, particularly fighting or preventing the terrorism threat. 
As already mentioned, the interests of national security have been expressly recognized in 
Article 8(2) ECHR and in the ECtHR case law. Thus, in Klass, the Strasbourg Court accepted 
that secret surveillance measures fall within the national security exception, since democratic 
societies find themselves threatened by highly sophisticated forms of espionage and terrorism 
and need to undertake secret surveillance to counter such threats.1402 However, in Weber the 
Court emphasised that employing secret surveillance in the fight against terrorism and 
espionage for the sake of national security may undermine, or even destroy democracy 
therefore it requires adequate safeguards against abuse. The Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson 
QC, whilst agreeing that preventing terrorism is clearly a legitimate aim, emphasised that the 
                                              
and are accessible to citizens, the private sector, foreign governments and practitioners 
alike.  
10. multilateral collaboration: government policy on intrusion should be capable of being 
harmonized with that of like-minded open and democratic governments.   
1399 Anitai Etzioni, ‘NSA-National Security v Individual Rights’ (2015) 30 Intelligence and 
National Security), pp. 101-136. 
1400 Georgieva, supra note 267, p.120 
1401 ibid. 
1402 ibid, p. 316. 
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activities of intelligence and law enforcement agencies must still comply with international 
human rights law.1403 It is difficult to disagree with Emmerson’s view that ‘merely to assert-
without particularization-that mass surveillance technology can contribute to the suppression 
and prosecution of acts of terrorism does not provide an adequate human right law justification 
for its use. The fact that something is technically feasible and that it may sometimes yield useful 
intelligence, does not by itself mean that it is either reasonable or lawful’.1404 The question that 
arises in this context is therefore how effective are mass surveillance programmes in preventing 
and fighting serious crime and terrorism, addressed next.  
 
i. The Effectiveness of Cyber Surveillance Programmes in Fighting Terrorism 
 
Shortly after the flood of revelations regarding surveillance activities of the NSA came to the 
fore, President Obama’s administration hastened to defend them as legal and essential to US 
national security and counterterrorism. During his 2013 Berlin visit the President himself  
declared that at least 50 terrorist threats have been averted and lives have been saved.1405 In 
addition, General Keith Alexander, the then director of the NSA, testified at the hearing of the 
US House Intelligence Committee that: 
[t]he programmes are immensely valuable for protecting our nation and securing the 
security of our allies. In recent years the information gathered from these programmes 
provided the US government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential 
terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world. FAA 702 contributed in 
over 90 percent of these cases. At least 10 of these events included homeland-based 
threats. In the vast majority, business records, FISA reporting, contributed as well.1406  
Also the Representative Michael Rogers, in the same hearing before the Congress stated that 
                                              
1403 Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC, supra note 271, para. 11. 
1404 ibid. 
1405 Huffington Post, ‘Obama Says NSA Programs Saved Lives’ (19 June 2013) 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/obama-nsa-programs_n_3464425.html>. 
1406 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Hearing of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence on How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans, and Why 




‘54 times [the NSA programmes] stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here in Europe-
saving real lives’.1407 Other supporters of electronic mass surveillance programmes claim that 
they significantly contributed to tracking Bin Laden1408 and led to significant decline in Al 
Qaeda’s electronic communications.1409            
Notwithstanding these assurances, the ‘terrorism’ justification has been soundly rejected as 
devoid of evidence. In 2013 in Klayman v Obama1410 a federal judge found that the US 
government was unable to ‘cite a single case in which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata 
collection actually stopped an imminent terrorist attack’.1411 President Obama’s own Review 
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies admitted that mass surveillance was 
not essential to preventing terrorist attacks and information used to detect plots could readily 
have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional court orders.1412 Furthermore, at 
least one study, conducted by the New American Foundation in 2014, challenged the claims 
regarding the effectiveness of mass surveillance and asserted that they are exaggerated, or even 
misleading. The Study scrutinized the records of 225 individuals recruited by Al-Qaeda and 
other like-minded groups, such as Al-Shabab, charged with acts of terrorism since 9/11. It 
demonstrated that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from 
local communities and targeted intelligence provided the initial impetus for investigations in 
                                              
1407 ibid. 
1408  Etzioni, supra note 416, p. 110. 
1409 ibid. 
1410 Klayman v Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d. 1 (2013). 
1411 Lawrence Hurley, ‘US Court Hands Win to NSA over Metadata Collection’ (28 August 
2015), Reuters < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-surveillance-
idUSKCN0QX1QM20150828>. The decision that the NSA mass collection of phone 
metadata was unconstitutional was reversed however by the US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia on in August 2015.   
1412 Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communication Technologies, ‘Liberty and Security in a Changing World’ (12 December 
2013), p. 104< https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-
12_rg_final_report.pdf>.  The Report found inter alia that: ‘NSA believes that on at least a 
few occasions, information derived from the section 215 bulk telephony meta-data program 
has contributed to its efforts to prevent possible terrorist attacks, either in the United States or 
somewhere else in the world. More often, negative results from section 215 queries have 
helped to alleviate concern that particular terrorist suspects are in contact with co-
conspirators in the United States. Our review suggests that the information contributed to 
terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to 
preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using 
conventional section 215 orders’.   
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the majority of cases, while the contribution of the NSA bulk surveillance programmes to these 
cases was minimal.1413 In particular, the study found that the surveillance of non-US persons 
outside the US under s. 702 of the FISA Amendment Act played a role in 4.4% of terrorism 
cases, whilst surveillance under an unidentified authority played a role in 1.3% of the examined 
cases.1414 The Report concluded that the main problem with the approach that officials take to 
US counterterrorism is not that they need even greater amounts of information from the bulk 
surveillance programmes, but that ‘they do not sufficiently understand or widely share the 
information they already possess that was derived from conventional law enforcement and 
intelligence techniques’.1415 According to the Report, had the information that the intelligence 
agencies already had been utilized correctly, in cases of such attacks as the 9/11 and the 
Mumbai bombings, these and other crimes could have been prevented. Admittedly, the findings 
of this Report are uncorroborated by other evidence. However, the inescapable conclusion is 
that even if they were to be dismissed for this reason, mass surveillance and bulk data collection 
(operational at an unprecedented scale since at least 2007) is disproportionate in the light of 
the number of attacks and terrorist plots that the US authorities to date admitted they prevented, 
namely 54. 
c.  Necessity 
Article 8(2) ECHR provides that in addition to being lawful and serving a legitimate purpose, 
the restriction must be necessary in a democratic society. This requires from a state to show 
that the action, which it has been taking is in response to a pressing social need and that the 
interference with the protected rights is not greater than necessary to address that pressing 
social need. This is also known as test of proportionality. In applying this test, the Strasbourg 
Court will balance the severity of the restriction placed on the individual against the legitimate 
aim to be protected.             
 A similar approach has been adopted by the Human Rights Committee, which in 
Canepa v Canada stated that ‘arbitrariness within the meaning of Article 17 is not confined to 
procedural arbitrariness, but extends to the reasonableness of the interference with the person’s 
                                              
1413 Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Emily Schneider, Baily Cahall, ‘Do NSA’s Bulk 
Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?’ (13 January 2014), New American Foundation 
<https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/1311-do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-
terrorists/IS_NSA_surveillance.pdf>. 
1414 ibid, p. 2. 
1415 ibid. p. 4. 
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rights under Article 17 and its compatibility with the purposes, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant’.1416 
i. Proportionality  
When assessing necessity of having laws granting domestic authorities the powers to act in 
national security interests, a balance must be struck between the seriousness of the interference 
and the right to privacy (Leander v Sweden1417). In other words, the measure in question must 
by proportionate to the aims achieved. In striking this balance the Strasbourg Court has allowed 
states a broad margin of appreciation and elaborated on how proportionality should be assessed 
through a number of cases. In Leaden, for example the Court accepted that states should enjoy 
wide discretion, both in assessing the existence of a pressing social need and in choosing the 
means of achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security.1418 Similarly, in Klass, 
the ECtHR agreed with the fact that the sophistication of modern terrorism mandated some 
secret surveillance over post and telecommunications necessary in exceptional circumstances. 
Therefore, it permitted a degree of discretion to the national legislature with respect to 
organizing and controlling such systems. This however does not mean that states are allowed 
an unlimited license of interception. Rather, they must satisfy the Court that adequate and 
effective safeguards are in place. In Peck v U.K. the Strasbourg Court stipulated that the margin 
of appreciation enjoyed by national authorities in the exercise of surveillance powers depends 
on the nature and seriousness of the interest at stake and the gravity of the interference.1419
 According to the sources leaked by Snowden, NSA and GCHQ have the technical 
ability and capacity to access, store and analyze huge volumes of communications between 
entirely innocent people, as well as targeted suspects derived from, among other methods, the 
tapping of fibre-optic cables. Britain’s technical capacity to access world’s communications 
has allegedly made GCHQ an intelligence superpower, which by 2010 was able to boast the 
biggest internet access of any member of the Five Eyes alliance.1420 Tempora alone is said to 
                                              
1416 Giouse Canepa v Canada, Communication No. 558/1993, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (1997), para. 11.4. 
1417 Leander v Sweden, supra note 120. 
1418 ibid, paragraph 59. 
1419 Peck v the United Kingdom (2003) (App. No. 44647/98), para. 77. 
1420 Ewan MacAskill, Julian Gorger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davis and James Ball, ‘GCHQ Taps 
Fibre-Optic Cables for Secret Access to World’s Communications’ (21 June 2013) The 
Guardian. 
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give access to 2 billion internet users globally each day and additional technical work is 
ongoing to expand its capacity to ingest data from new super cables carrying data at 100 
gigabites a second.1421 GCHQ’s justification for collecting this information all the time is to 
combat sophisticated forms of terrorism, as well as against child exploitation networks and in 
the field of cyber defence. 1422  In particular, GCHQ officials claim that it has directly 
contributed to the arrest and imprisonment of a terrorist cell in the Midlands, who were 
planning coordinated attacks, the arrest of five Luton based individuals plotting acts of terror, 
as well as the arrest of three London based would- be attackers targeting the Olympics.1423 At 
first blush,  assessed in the light of the Klass judgment, these successful preventative measures 
seem to give reasons for the government to resort to ‘secrete surveillance of subversive 
elements’. 1424  Bearing in mind that the internet has been increasingly used by terrorist 
organizations for communication, propaganda, research, planning, publicity, fundraising and 
recruiting purposes,1425 GCHQ,  the NSA and their partner agencies, may well be acting within 
the broad margin of appreciation that the courts allow. After all, they need to keep in line and 
abreast of the nefarious activities of terrorist and criminal groups, which have increasingly been 
taking place on-line. It is also true to say that the body of jurisprudence from the ECtHR has 
on occasions deemed surveillance legislation both compatible and proportionate with the 
human rights obligations. For example in Weber, the Strasbourg Court found that the German 
statute in question (the ‘G 10’) did not violate Article 8 because a series of conditions were 
satisfied including the factual indications relating to suspecting a person of planning, 
committing or having committed certain serious criminal offences.1426 The Court emphasized 
however, that the so-called ‘exploratory’ or general surveillance is not permitted.1427 In Weber 
only a small percent of communications were intercepted and the surveillance was limited to a 
precise number of specified countries.1428 This was reiterated in Zakharov-mass surveillance is 
not allowed, being disproportionate and unnecessary. State authorities must have ‘reasonable 
and verifiable suspicion about the person concerned’, including factual indicators before an 
interception warrant is granted. Even if it were accepted that PRISAM and Tempora operate 




1424 Klass v Germany, supra note 111, para. 48. 
1425 Ian Brown and Douwe Dorff, ‘Terrorism and the Proportionality of Internet Surveillance’ 
(2009) 6(2) European Journal of Criminology, p. 119. 




for the legitimate purpose of national security and fall within the wide margin of discretion 
needed due to the increased terrorist attacks committed in Europe in the past few years, the 
surveillance under these programmes does not seem to be restricted to particular individuals, 
groups, or even countries.  As they lack any specified targets, they do not meet the Zakharov 
criteria of reasonable and verifiable suspicion, process vast amounts of data and run for 
unspecified duration. For these reasons the operation of Tempora by GCHQ has been 
challenged on the grounds of being disproportionate and (as discussed above for lacking 
legitimate basis) in Big Brother Watch. The application, currently before the ECtHR, states 
that: 
[i]ntercept[s] of communications simply because of the means by which [they have] 
been transmitted [are] excessively broad and insufficiently linked with the ostensible 
purposes for which such intercept[s] occur[s]. For example, communications sent by 
persons and from locations not under suspicion are intercepted and then subjected to 
the search machinery, rendering their communications liable to be further analyzed, 
reported upon and subject to further action.1429  
Official justifications regarding proportionality of bulk collections are very rare. One of such 
statements is from the UK Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (a body 
responsible for holding all UK security intelligence agencies to account) to the Independent 
Surveillance Review, according to which: 
GCHQ bulk interception capability is used primarily to find patters in, or characteristics 
of, online communications, which indicate involvement in threats to national security. 
The people involved in those communications are sometimes already known, in which 
case valuable extra intelligence may be obtained […] In other cases, it exposes previous 
unknown individuals or plots that threaten our security which would not otherwise be 
detected.1430  
However, this statement viewed from the perspective of the parameters laid down in General 
Comment 31, Canepa v Canada, Leanden, Weber, Klass and Zakharov (to name but a few 
                                              
1429 Big Brother Watch, supra note 171, p. 61. 
1430 The RUSI Report, supra note 414, p.19. 
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legal authorities), indicates that GCHQ’s bulk interception described above bears all the 
hallmarks of exploratory surveillance, rather then targeted surveillance- the exact opposite of 
what the ECtHR and other human rights courts and bodies deems as proportionate.  
 ii.  Existing Legal Safeguards 
The assessment of necessity for foreign surveillance measures would not be complete 
without taking into account existing legal safeguards against abuse, since the judicial bodies, 
such as ECtHR takes a holistic approach to reaching the decisions when considering the legality 
of state surveillance. In Klass, the ECtHR stated that it: 
[m]ust be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there exists 
adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. This assessment has only a relative 
character: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and 
duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the 
authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise them and the kind of remedy 
provided by the national law.’1431  
In Telegraph Media Nederland Landelijke Media BV v the Netherlands,  the ECtHR stated that 
‘in a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful 
consequences for democratic society as a whole it is in principle desirable to entrust 
supervisory control to a judge’.1432 Two aspects of the domestic powers granting surveillance 
are of particular note in the light of these observations. First, there appears to be no substantive 
limitation to restrict the scope of the intelligence agencies’ operations. For example, under s 
702 of the US FAA there is no restriction on surveillance with regard to non-US persons located 
aboard. In theory, these could derive from at least two sources- US constitutional protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment1433 and international law 
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1433 The right to protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is contained in the Bill of 
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 271 
obligations stemming from Articles 17 ICCPR and 11 ACHR. The first category does not offer 
much hope for non-US persons residing abroad, as the the Fourth Amendment can only be 
invoked by the US citizens and foreigners, who have developed such ties with the United States 
that they form part of the national community. This is because the Fourth Amendment was not 
‘intended to apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign territory 
or in international waters’.1434 Consequently,  foreigners subject to the US surveillance abroad, 
who have no other connections with the United States are, in principle, not entitled to the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment and will not be able to bring a legal challenge to the 
unlawful searches and seizures in the US courts.1435 The second limitation on the scope of s 
702 powers is the right to respect the right to privacy in Article 17 ICCPR. This too continues 
to be robustly rejected the the US administration. First, US specifically declared that Articles 
1-27 ICCPR are not self-executing, which means that they do not have any effect in domestic 
law unless legislation is passed to give them such effect.  Secondly, the US denies the 
Covenant’s extraterritorial application, as discussed in the previous part of this chapter. The 
end result is that non-US persons residing abroad may not rely on the ICCPR in US courts to 
challenge s 702 powers.                
Similar approach has been recently adopted by the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), 
which overseas the working methods of the intelligence agencies in Human Rights Watch v the 
Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (HRW v Secretary of State).1436 
The case related to the interception, storage and use of information and communications by 
GCHQ of two groups of applicants-those resident in the UK and those who were not. Regarding 
the latter, the IPT ruled that the UK ‘owes no obligation under Article 8 ECHR to persons 
[who] are situated outside its territory in respect of electronic communications between them, 
which pass through that state’.1437 
Additionally, a series of criticisms have been directed at the quality of the independent 
supervision when granting surveillance orders by both the British Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal (IPT) and the American Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). The FISC 
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was created in 1987 and its purpose was to hear applications for and grant orders approving 
electronic surveillance anywhere within the Unites States.1438 The original intention of the US 
Congress was the setting up of a system of approving individualized warrants for foreign 
surveillance of specified individuals in the context of national security. With the passage of s 
702 of FAA, these powers have been exponentially extended, resulting in FISA Court approval 
of mass surveillance. The Court’s sphere of competence includes granting of surveillance 
orders under s 702 (§188a), but there is no requirement for a separate judicial approval of the 
FISC order for each individual exercise of §1881a. The American defenders of mass 
surveillance point out that Americans are given special protection, because of the requirement 
for a FISA court order for a targeted surveillance. Consequently, the procedural safeguards for 
non-US persons located abroad are considerably weaker then before s 702 FAA was 
introduced, as there is no need for the authorities to show in each individual case that the target 
of the acquisition was a foreign power  or it’s official.1439 The position was summarized by the 
former US national intelligence director, James Clapper in these terms: 
Section 702, authorizes surveillance directed at non-US persons located overseas who 
are of foreign intelligence importance. At the same time, it provides a comprehensive 
regime of oversight by all three branches of Government to protect the privacy and civil 
liberties of US persons. Under section 702, the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence may authorize annually, with the approval of the Foreign 
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Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), intelligence collection targeting categories of 
non-US persons abroad, without the need for a court order for each individual target.1440  
In other words, the FISA court places no limitations whatsoever in relation to intelligence 
gathering of non-US nationals abroad (i.e. most of the world’s population). It is also not a 
forum, which will hear complaints about bulk collection. That being the case, both Special 
Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC1441 and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 1442 
emphasized that states are bound by the ICCPR obligations in the situation, where they 
penetrate the infrastructure located outside their territorial jurisdictions. In addition, as already 
noted in this chapter, Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination on grounds of, inter 
alia, nationality and citizenship. As discriminating on the grounds of nationality and/or location 
does not seem to be justified, states must afford the same privacy protections for nationals, 
non-national and all those within and outside their jurisdictions. Asymmetrical privacy 
protection regimes are a clear violation of the requirements of the Covenant.  
 The UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) established under RIPA, is the only 
judicial body independent of the UK government authorized to hear complaints about 
surveillance conducted by the intelligence agencies, including GCHQ. It too does not provide 
an adequate remedy for those, who are neither British citizens, nor residents, as clearly shown 
by its rejection to hear an interception complaint in HRW v Secretary of State.1443 However, an 
individual within the UK may file a complaint, which may only concern search operations, or 
targeted surveillance activities, therefore generalized surveillance programmes, such as 
Tempora do not qualify to by subject of IPT review.      
 The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that the legality of the 
NSA/GCHQ surveillance practices is highly doubtful under international human rights law. 
There are a number of indicators outlined above, which show that both foreign and domestic 
cyber surveillance programmes are not ‘in accordance with the law’, are arbitrary and 
disproportionate to the aims achieved. In addition, individuals affected by the interference have 
no meaningful and effective remedies in the domestic courts. Therefore, on the basis of the 
available information relating to these programmes, successful justification of the interference 
with the right to privacy of correspondence seems unlikely. It can therefore be concluded that 
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mass bulk collection and interception programmes operated both domestically and abroad 
interfere with the right to privacy under Article 17 ICCPR, Article 11 ACHR and Article 8 
ECHR. 
 CONCLUSION 
Cyberspace has created a means for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to have an 
unrestricted access to vast amounts of digital information. This chapter focused on two such 
methods, namely transborder data searches and cyber surveillance techniques. With respect to 
transborder data searches by law enforcement agencies (LEAs), the chapter noted that many 
LEAs engage in unrestricted, blanket data cross-border transfers. The Cyber Crime Convention 
Article 32 has been designed to facilitate this process to a certain extent, but recent evidence 
shows that it is deficient for a number of reasons. First, the Convention does not specify that 
the ‘lawful consent’ must be granted by an appropriate state organ. This leads to unilateral 
transfers, occasioned by consent of private companies (ISPs). Secondly, it has been shown that 
the current practice of states tends to ignore official channels of authorisation when exercising 
enforcement jurisdiction abroad, which breaches the principle of territorial sovereignty and the 
right to privacy under the ICCPR, the ECHR and Convention 108. However, not all transborder 
searches breach the territoriality principle and privacy laws. Open source data searches, as 
provided for in Article 32(a) Budapest Convention are lawful and recognized as part of 
customary international law. This calls for Article 32(b) Cyber Crime Convention to be 
reformed and this work is now underway.  However, no consensus has yet been reached as to 
how this provision is to be amended. The chapter also discussed cyber surveillance activities 
of intelligence services and assessed them in the light of Articles 17 ICCPR, 8 ECHR and 11 
ACHR. It argued that mass surveillance programmes interfere with the interests protected 
under these legal frameworks and therefore pose serious threat to individuals’ right to privacy, 
including of all those individuals who are not within the Five Eyes territories, especially on 
American, or British soil. The chapter discussed when states may be liable under international 
law for their surveillance activities, the effect of which may be felt beyond their borders. It 
illustrated that the narrowly defined territorial limitations on human rights protection based on 
nationality (e.g. s 702 FISA), or geographical distinctions (s. 8(4) RIPA) are meaningless when 
applied to highly integrated global communications networks. Although international human 
rights jurisprudence recognizes that there are certain circumstances when extraterritorial 
human rights obligations will be engaged based on the ‘effective control’ test, the chapter has 
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highlighted its limitations in the cyber domain and proposed a ‘virtual control’ test, understood 
as a remote control over an individual’s right to privacy. The chapter then considered 
restrictions on the right to privacy as international and regional human rights treaties recognize 
that governments have a legitimate interest in limiting this right, especially on the grounds of 
national security. However, by examining the justifications put forward by some governments 
(especially the US and the UK) it became apparent that measures they employ lack legal bases 
and are disproportionate, whilst the claimed contribution to fighting, or preventing terrorism 
and crime is highly dubious. These findings led to the conclusion that the Five Eyes cyber 
surveillance practices breach the right to privacy under the ICCPR, ACHR and ECHR. 
Although the gravity of the problem has been recognized at international and regional levels, 
with the UN General Assembly passing a number of resolutions on the right to privacy in the 
digital age, both cyber surveillance and transborder data searches persist. An increasing number 
of terrorist attacks in recent years propel governments to enact more powers of surveillance on 
a domestic level to show that they are discharging their duties as far as national security 
protection is concerned. This does not align well with the pro-privacy views taken by 
international human rights organizations, NGOs and other groups and calls for solutions to 
mass surveillance and greater protection of human rights online, which will be discussed in the 

























One of the starkest lessons that can be learned from the 2013 Snowden disclosures is the need 
for a global legal solution regarding surveillance. Chapter 4 of this thesis unequivocally 
demonstrated that cyber surveillance breaches international human rights law and that so far 
the key states engaged have not made a convincing case to justify the continued operation of 
their mass surveillance programmes. Despite numerous calls from the UN international 
organizations and human rights courts and bodies condemning these practices, there is no 
consensus to date on how to bring them in line with human rights law. This is partly due to the 
continued lack of agreement as to the future of internet governance and the focus on cyber 
security, which does not prioritize human rights protection. In addition, in recent years the 
emerging state practice shows decisive tendencies towards greater securitization as a response 
to the malignant terrorist attacks. This creates a clear gap between the international institutions 
calling on states to take decisive action to comply with their human rights obligations on the 
one hand and many governments clearly in favour of continuing mass surveillance, on the other 
hand. The aim of this chapter is to bridge this gap. 
There are a number of technical and legal safeguards that can be implemented. The 
former, known as privacy-enhancing technologies are at the forefront of technological 
measures reducing privacy risks and consists of policy, encryption, filtering and anonymity 
tools to improve users’ privacy control and remove unnecessary personal identifiers from sent 
data.1444 These technical methods are beyond the scope of this chapter, which will focus on 
five legal options, namely (a) the adoption of new hard law instruments on an international and  
(b) regional levels; (c) updating and supplementing the existing privacy norms under Article 
17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR; (d) harmonizing data protection laws; (e) continued use of soft 
                                              
1444 Rolf H. Weber and Dominic N. Staiger, ‘Privacy versus Security. Identifying the 
Challenges in a Global Information Society’, in Joanna Kulesza and Roy Balleste (eds.), 
Cybersecurity and Human Rights in the Age of Surveillance (Rowman and Littlefield 2016), 
p. 78.    
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law instruments and confidence building measures. The chapter is divided into two parts. Part 
one analyses a governance model based on a multilateral, international cyber security treaty 
regulating state-to- behaviour in cyberspace in relation to all forms of harmful cyber operations 
falling below the use of force threshold under Article 2(4) Charter of the United Nations. This 
option reflects the governance structures proposed in Chapter 3 of this study based on the UN 
Law of the Seas Convention 1982 (UNCLOS), in particular the application of the principle of 
the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) to the internet and considers how international 
human rights framework may fit into this discourse. This part also puts forward another hard 
law instrument, regional in scope, which aims to specifically regulate economic and political 
cyber espionage.  Such a multilateral ‘no-spy’ treaty, called the Intelligence Codex, was 
proposed by the Council of Europe in 2015 to regulate intelligence gathering activities among 
European states and to date remains the only tangible response from an international 
organization that attempts to address mass surveillance.1445 This part of the chapter evaluates 
the feasibility of these two hard law solutions coming to fruition. It also discusses Universal 
Periodic Review Mechanism and the need for updating privacy norms under the existing 
international law instruments, focusing on Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR. In addition, 
it emphasises the need for greater harmonization of data protection rules and identifies the 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data 1446  (Convention 108) as the best candidate to set a global 
benchmark in this regard. Part two focuses on a complementary approach to address the 
problem of surveillance and data transfers through soft law instruments. It identifies the 
advantages of non-legally binding guidelines and agreements on the UN and regional levels, 
such as the new Privacy Shield. It also discusses the use of diplomatic means to curtail 
untargeted mass surveillance though confidence building measure for cyberspace.  
The picture that emerges is of a legal landscape that is highly fragmented, comprising outdated 
privacy laws and peppered with international and regional non-legally binding instruments of 
varying importance and utility. The lack of international regulation of signals intelligence 
gathering, the continued disagreements among the international community regarding the 
future stewardship of the internet and the trends towards the adoption of more surveillance 
                                              
1445 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, Resolution 2045 (21 April 2015). 
1446 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, opened for signature 28 January 1981, in force 1 
October 1985 ETS 108. 
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powers on a domestic level all point to the conclusion that there are no ‘quick fixes’ to the 
problem of mass surveillance. Having evaluated the various options, the chapter concludes that 
the most realistic solution must be through a combination of updating the existing international 
and domestic privacy laws, continued ‘globalization’ of Convention 108 and the use of 
diplomacy to encourage a negotiated agreement. This may in future lead to the development of 
an international hard law instrument to regulate state behaviour in cyberspace (including mass 
untargeted surveillance) and/or to the eventual emergence of customary law norms in this area.  
 
PART I:  REGULATION OF STATES’ ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE THROUGH 
A HARD LAW INSTRUMENT  
 
 
A. International Level 
 
a. Solution 1-  An International Legally Binding Treaty for Cyberspace Based 
    on the UN Law of the Sea Convention 1982 and the Common  
Common Heritage of Mankind 
 
 
Treaties, defined in Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969  as 
‘[a]n international agreement between [s]tates in written form and governed by international 
law’1447 are, beside customary international law, the main sources of obligations. They are 
express agreements among states, whereby the participating parties bind themselves legally 
and are expected to fulfil their commitments, in line with the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.1448   
The efforts to construct a global coordination and policy making framework for the 
internet begun in the mid- 1990s and to date remain unsuccessful.1449 There is no single state, 
or international body formally in overall charge of ensuring compliance with the law in respect 
                                              
1447 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. 1155, p. 331, art 2(2). 
1448 Vaughan Lowe, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 64-65. 
1449 Milton Mueller, et al., ‘The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and Norms of a 
New Regime’ (2007) 13 Global Governance 237. 
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of the way the internet works.1450 Nor is there an overall treaty applicable to the internet, 
although as already mentioned in Chapter 2 there are international and regional treaties together 
with national laws that are applicable to the activities on the internet.1451 Some states, including 
France1452 and Russia1453 made a number of attempts to introduce a cyber security treaty in the 
1990s. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) proposed  such an instrument twice- in 
2011 and 2015. The treaty, known as the Draft Code of Conduct for Information Security, 1454   
was to set out the rules of the road in respect to such issues as cyber crime, cyber espionage, 
hostile activities or acts of aggression, proliferation of information weapons and related 
technologies.1455 However, as discussed in Chapter 2,  a global agreement to this treaty is 
unlikely.  
 There is no doubt that the Snowden disclosures of government sponsored mass surveillance 
added a further layer of distrust among the international community, which makes reaching an 
agreement on how to reduce mass surveillance problematic. One conceptual solution, which 
advocates protecting the internet in the interest of the present and future generations, originally 
proposed in 1997,1456  was recently reiterated in the UN by the Republic of Malta. This solution, 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this study, sees the stewardship of cyberspace based on the premise 
                                              
1450 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Rule of Law on the Internet 
and in the Wider Digital World’ (2014) 
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentI
d=09000016806da51c > p.36 
1451 see Chapter 2 of this thesis, p. 61.   
1452 Kristen Eichensehr, ‘The Cyber-Law of Nations’, (2015) The Georgetown Law Journal, 
p. 355. In 1996 France proposed a ‘Charter for International Cooperation on the Internet’.  
1453 ibid. In the late 1990s Russia circulated a draft ‘arms control treaty for cyberspace’ 
among UN Security Council members but the United States and its allies dismissed the draft 
treaty. 
1454 UNGA, ‘Letter Dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, 
the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the UN Addressed to the Secretary 
General’ (2011) UN Doc A/66/359; UNGA, ‘Letter Drafted 9 January 2015 from the 
Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the UN Addressed to the Secretary-General’ (13 January 2015) 
UN Doc A/69/723. 
1455 ibid. 
1456 Statement by Dr Alex Sceberras Trigona Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Malta Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malta to the United Nations, World 
Summit on International Society Review Process, New York (15 December 2015) 
<https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Documents/pr152897a.pdf>.   
Applying the Common Heritage of Mankind to the internet’s critical infrastructure was first 
proposed by the Republic of Malta in 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia at the World Internet 
Forum.  
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of the Common Heritage of Mankind. 1457  The idea was put forward in December 2015 by Dr 
Trigona, Special Envoy of Malta’s Prime Minister, who addressed the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York at the High Level Meeting reviewing developments after 10 years since 
the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+10). He reiterated that the legal concept 
of the Common Heritage of Mankind should be applicable to the internet by analogy with 
Article 136 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (UNCLOS 1982).1458 Noting that 
it is becoming increasingly apparent that the internet governance problems cannot be solved 
on a national basis alone, but must be dealt with globally, a reliable legal framework such as 
that of the Common Heritage of Mankind is needed. He also emphasised that the internet has 
moved a long way from the paradigm based on Barlow’s Declaration of Independence and 
therefore it cannot be treated as res nullius, a no-man’s land where everyone could be 
independent.1459 Instead, cyberspace (particularly the internet), must be seen as res comunis 
omnium, that is a common good with common rules, especially for the next billion users. 
Designating the internet as the Common Heritage of Mankind is also dictated by privacy 
concerns and in that sense the Common Heritage of Mankind is the best framework for all 
stakeholders. 1460  The Maltese proposal, called ‘Protection of the Internet as Part of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind’ seems to be gaining some traction already. During a Cyber 
Warfare Conference in Estonia in May 2015 the NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers cited 
the Maltese 1967 initiative proclaiming the sea-bed and its subsoil beyond national 
jurisdictions as Common Heritage of Mankind in Article 136 UNCLOS 1982 as a hopeful 
equivalent for an analogous Law of the Internet.1461  
 
i. The Feasibility of an International Treaty for Cyberspace 
 
The specifics of applying the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) to the internet were 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis and the normative regime applicable to the seabed in the 
UNCLOS 1982 were applied by analogy. The outcome of that analysis was that the Common 
Heritage of Mankind, as a legal concept fits well to the internet. This is because in line with 
the main tenets of the CHM, the internet is a global resource that should not be appropriated 




1460 ibid.  
1461 ibid.  
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by any single state, should be subject to a common management system, be managed for the 
benefit of all mankind and be used for peaceful purposes only. In addition, Common Heritage 
of Mankind as a legal concept has been in operation for decades and has a proven track record 
in relation to preserving not only the maritime resources of the seabed but it has also been 
extended to other areas and resources. It can be found in the Outer Space Treaty 1967, the 
Moon Treaty 1979, the Antarctic Treaty 1959 and the UNESCO ‘s Treaty on the Human 
Genome 1997. Thus, a new legal regime for cyberspace could in theory be devised by analogy 
to at least this aspect of the UNCLOS 1982. It is difficult to predict that such a global regime 
be successfully realised at this point in time, bearing in mind the distrust generated by the 
revelations of mass surveillance. Past examples of devising new regimes to govern the existing 
environments, such as the UNCLOS 1982, attest that it is in principle possible. However, 
creating new international legal framework is slow.  Furthermore, the process is bound to be 
protracted for a number of reasons, namely (a) the continued lack of agreement among the 
international community; (b) the uncertainty as to which international organization should be 
in charge of the process of treaty making, monitoring and enforcement; (c) the time it takes to 
reach an international agreement and; (d) the uncertainty as to how exactly human rights 
obligations are to apply through such a treaty, as evidenced by the international politics of 
internet governance and cyber security. Each of these obstacles will be discussed in turn below.  
 
 
 Continued Lack of Agreement Among the International Community 
 
Despite the failed attempts at introducing an internationally binding treaty in the form of the 
Draft International Code of Conduct for Information Security by the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, the political process regarding internet governance, which has been underway 
since the ITU-hosted Wold Summits on the Information Society 2003 and 2005, continues. 
Nevertheless, the disagreements as to who should be in charge of the internet and how to govern 
it remain unsettled. 
This inability to reach consensus as to how the cyberspace is to be governed is largely 
due to the two competing ideologies envisioned for the running of the internet, discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. The idea of ‘internet freedom’ reflected in the multistakeholder 
approach, continues to be championed by the US and most European countries. This model is 
rooted in the free flow of information and freedom of expression. It favours the involvement 
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of a variety of actors, including private companies, such as (ICANN) and (IANA), academics, 
as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations. Conversely, ‘internet 
sovereignty’ supported by, among others, Russia and China, sees greater involvement of states 
and seeks to subject cyberspace to the traditional understanding of international order, with 
particular emphasis on such international law principles as sovereignty and non-intervention. 
This approach also envisages a greater role for the United Nations organizations, such as the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which seems to have been side-lined again by 
the US government’s 2016 decision to give up its control over the domain name system to 
ICANN, discussed below in more detail. In addition to these long standing differences of 
opinion, the political fallout from the Snowden disclosures in 2013 has seriously undermined 
the chances of an agreement regarding an international cyber treaty. To begin with, the 
revelations that the NSA spied on even its closest allies have affected state-to-state 
relationships with the Brazilian, German and Indian authorities expressing their outrage in the 
immediate aftermath. 1462 The trend for more ‘technological sovereignty’ and ‘data 
nationalization’ has also intensified, with Brazil and the European Union announcing plans to 
lay a $185 million fibre-optic cables between them and thereby thwart US surveillance.1463  
Furthermore, the enactment by the People’s Republic of China’s government of the new Cyber 
Security Law in November 2016, which will come into force on 1 June 2017, illustrates the 
entrenched positon this country takes on the issue of cyberspace governance. By introducing 
the Cyber Security Law, China made a decisive move towards more stringent regulations for 
network security. This new legislation reflects a long standing Chinese policy, which reinforces 
that country’s aims at protecting ‘internet sovereignty’, with the focus on the critical 
information infrastructure. Critical information infrastructure, being left undefined in the 
Cyber Security Law, may include any services needed for public communication and 
information, power, transportation, finance, public service, as well as any infrastructure that 
could endanger national security, welfare, ‘popular livelihood’, or public interest if destroyed 
                                              
1462 The Guardian, ‘Brazilian President: US Surveillance a Breach of International Law’ (24 
September 2013) < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/24/brazil-president-un-
speech-nsa-surveillance>; Spiegel Online, ‘The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin’ (27 
October 2013)< http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-
merkel-cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html>; The Hindu, ‘India Among Top 
Targets of Spying by NSA’ (23 September 2013) 
<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-among-top-targets-of-spying-by-
nsa/article5157526.ece>. 
1463 supra note 2, para 108. 
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or hacked.1464 The new law provides the Chinese government with sweeping authority to 
regulate and monitor internet services.1465 It is said to be the first fundamental legislation 
exclusively focusing on network security protection in that country. 1466 It has three main 
aspects (1) co-operation with authorities- network operators must cooperate with and provide 
technical support and assistance to the public and state security authorities for reasons of 
national security and criminal investigation; (2) data localisation- operators of critical 
information infrastructure must store personal and other important business data within China; 
data are not allowed to be transferred out of the Chinese territory unless it is ‘truly necessary’ 
and specified security assessments have been conducted and satisfied; and (3) restrictions on 
key network products- this aims at encouraging the use of Chinese manufactured software and 
hardware instead of their foreign equivalent, as a result of foreign hacking and spying incidents 
of recent years.1467 The Cybersecurity Law mainly serves to increase Chinese government’s 
ability to control domestic internet activity and means that the multi-national businesses and 
internet companies operating in that country will be subjected to broad and poorly defined array 
of regulations and potential punishments. For example, businesses could face confiscation of 
between one and ten times their ‘illegal gains’ due to the restrictions placed on the amount of 
personal identifiable information that can be collected. 1468  The law could be seen as an 
indication of the direction that China has been pursuing for some time now towards the heavily 
regulated Chinese internet and technology sector. The enactment of the this legislation also 
reflects and reinforces that country’s policy stance regarding censoring of the internet content, 
discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, as it extends the monitoring to the infrastructure, which 
will have implications for technical standards and network interoperability.1469  This indicates 
that China’s cyberspace could become increasingly isolated and detached from the global 
internet in the coming years.1470 It also evidences the lack of interest by the Chinese authorities 
                                              
1464 Chris Mirasola, ‘Understanding China’s Cybersecurity Law’ (8 November 2016), 
Lawfare 
 < https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-chinas-cybersecurity-law>. 
1465 ibid. 
1466 Lexology, ‘China’s Cyber Security Law-More Stringent Regulations for Network 









in engaging in a dialogue with the Western powers regarding negotiations of a cyber treaty, 
who insist on free and open internet.   
 
 
 What International Organization?  
 
It remains unclear which organization could take a leading role as a standard setting body. In 
this regard, it is doubtful that either of the two principal organizations, that is the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) could form the foundation for a universal regulatory regime. 
The ITU has been the international body of choice for some states, such as Russia and China, 
who wish to assert greater UN role in cyberspace. However, the ITU has not only been 
criticized for being unable to adjust to the rapid changes in the cyberspace environment, but 
also for being ill equipped to regulate other, non-technical aspects of cyberspace such as 
international and criminal law.1471 Furthermore, the idea for an enhanced role of the ITU to 
play a part in regulating critical aspects of the internet was firmly rejected by the US at the 
2012 World Conference on International Communications in Dubai (outlined in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis). However, on 1st October 2016  the US government made a concession by officially 
relinquishing its power over the internet address system to ICANN. 1472 Until that date, the US 
Department of Commerce had the ultimate authority over how the Domain Name System, one 
of the internet’s most important components, is controlled. The US government oversaw all 
domain names for websites and individual IP addresses for internet users, which included 
assigning the operations of high level domain names such as ‘.com’ and ‘.uk’.1473 This arguably 
“gave Washington the power to make entire countries ‘go dark’ on the internet by removing 
them from the central naming system”.1474 The handover of this authority to ICANN was 
supported by the Obama administration, who viewed the change as the only way to prevent the 
                                              
1471 Jutta Brunnee and Tamar Meshel, ‘Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: International 
Environmental Law Lessons for Cyberspace Governance’ (2015) 58 German Yearbook of 
International Law, p. 158. 
1472 Richard Waters, ‘US Gives up Its Remaining Control Over the Internet’ (1 October 2016) 
Financial Times <https://www.ft.com/content/66291afc-87f8-11e6-8cb7-e7ada1d123b1> 
1473 Bryan Lynn, “Did the US Just ‘Give Away’ Control of the Internet?’ (3rd October 2016) 
<http://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/did-the-us-government-just-give-away-control-of-the-
internet-to-icann/3535200.html> 
1474 supra note 29. 
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tendencies by some governments to separate their own networks and thereby eventually 
Balkanizing the global system. The handing over of control to ICANN will make little 
difference to the end user, as that organization has been involved with the running of the 
internet since the facility was created in 1998.1475 ICANN will remain to be domiciled in Los 
Angeles, California,  but it will be accountable to multiple stakeholders, including countries, 
businesses and groups offering technical expertise, who wish to have a greater say over the 
internet. The transformation is a big change, as it marks a transition from an internet governed 
by one nation to a mulitstakeholder governed internet and as such is a vital act of international 
diplomacy.1476  However, it is also a move on the part of the US to resist the Russian and the 
Chinese calls for the domain name system to be controlled by the International 
Telecommunications Union, thus shifting the control to ICANN  and not the UN.1477 
 
 The Time Factor 
 
 A treaty centred around the protection of cyberspace designated as a ‘common good’ or a 
‘common resource’ in line with the Maltese proposal is in principle sound, but such a 
conceptual framework is highly likely to take a long time to develop. The obstacles that would 
have to be overcome, apart from the state security interests, include the general reluctance of 
states to engage in the treaty making process, as well as the entrenched reticence of some states 
(particularly the US) to subject cyberspace to an international legal regime, as exemplified by 
that country’s reluctance regarding the involvement of the International Telecommunications 
Union, outlined in the previous paragraph. In addition, since cyber technologies develop and 
change rapidly, any international treaty may already be outdated before it comes into force.  
 
 Human Rights Obligations and Cyber Treaty  
 
Finally, there is the problem of how exactly are the human rights obligations to apply to states 
through such a treaty. The protection of human rights online has been at the peripheries of the 
                                              
1475 Dave Lee, “US Ready to ‘Hand Over’ the Internet’s Naming System” (18 August 2016) 
BBC News < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37114313>. 
1476 ibid. 
1477 ibid.  
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internet governance1478  discourse since the World Summit for Information Society 2003 and 
2005 (WSIS I and II).1479 Not until 2013 Snowden revelations, did the protection of privacy 
and other fundamental rights come to the forefront of the global internet governance 
discussions. Consequently, calls for setting of international norms in relation to interception of 
communications and data, have intensified. In 2013 the former President of the Republic of 
Brazil, Rousseff made a compelling case in her speech at the opening of the 68th session of the 
United Nations General Assembly for the creation of ‘multilateral mechanisms for the 
worldwide network that are capable of ensuing principles such as freedom of expression, 
privacy of individuals and respect for human rights.’1480 In addition, a joint statement from 
Pakistan on behalf of a group of countries1481 made at the 24th session of the UN Human Rights 
Council,1482  highlighted the need to protect the right to privacy as an essential element of free 
speech citing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. The statement 
made explicit links between the allegations of mass surveillance and the need for reforming 
global internet governance, stating that ‘the existing mechanism like the Internet Governance 
Forum established under paragraph 72 of the World Summit on Information Society-Tunis 
Agenda have not been able to deliver the desired results’.1483 It also called for ‘a transparent 
international system with adequate international framework of internet governance including 
appropriate safeguards’.1484 
                                              
1478 World Summit on Information Society, ‘Tunis Agenda for Information Society’ (2005) 
WSIS-05/Tunis/Doc/6(Rev. 1)-4, <http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html>.  
1479 ibid. The Tunis Agenda called ‘upon all stakeholders to ensure respect for privacy and 
the protection of personal information and data, whether via adoption of legislation, the 
implementation of collaborative frameworks, best practice and self-regulatory and knowledge 
measures by business and users’. 
1480 Statement by H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the 
Opening of the General Debate of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
(24 September 2013)  
< https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf>. 
1481 UN Human Rights Council, Joint Statement on Right to Privacy, 24th Regular Session 
(September 2013)  
< https://www.apc.org/en/system/files/HRC24_Pakistan_20130919.pdf >. Pakistan spoke on 
behalf of Cuba, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia, Iran 
and China.  






Human rights concerns have also featured to some extent as an area of consideration in 
the discourse relating to cyber security, for example in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization’s (SCO) Draft International Code of Conduct for Information Security (the Draft 
Code) 1485 of 2011 and 2015. These instruments were chiefly concerned with security issues 
and human rights protection (in particular privacy) was not intended to be their main objective. 
The 2011 Draft Code paid scant attention to issues pertaining human rights, whilst its later 
2015 version side-lined the these matters in favour of state sovereignty, territoriality, national 
security and regime stability in the digital space.1486 Having said that, the 2015 Draft Code 
‘made a nod in the right direction’ as it did encourage states to pledge respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. To that end, it introduced a new section (section 2(7)) calling on 
states to recognize that ‘the rights of individual in the offline environment must also be 
protected in the online environment’.1487 It also made an express reference to the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966. However, it referenced only Article 19 (freedom 
of opinion and expression), with particular emphasis on restrictions available to states with 
regards to that right. This seems to underpin the Shanghai Cooperation Organization states’ 
belief in their right to exercise control over any digital content within their territories and at 
their discretion.1488 Conspicuous by its absence in the 2015 Draft Code is the reference to the 
right to privacy (Article 17 ICCPR). This is rather surprising, bearing in mind that privacy has 
been very prominent on the UN agenda since the 2013 Snowden disclosures and before the re-
drafted Code was resubmitted to the UN General Assembly in 2015.  It could be said that this 
evidences the unwillingness of the SCO countries to deal with state cyber surveillance. 
Moreover, it does not inspire much confidence that the international community will come to 
an agreement regarding a global treaty for cyberspace, as it reinforces the difference in 
priorities among the SCO countries on the one hand and the UN and human rights organizations 
on the other hand. Even if the lack of detailed reference to human rights protection was to be 
put aside, the fact remains that the revised 2015 Draft Code is unlikely to find a global support. 
The Code emphasises state sovereignty and territoriality in the digital sphere above all else and 
is replete with national security and regime stability rhetoric. For example, it makes a stronger 
reference to equal rights of states then its predecessor (the 2011 Code) by emphasising that 
                                              
1485 supra note 11. 
1486 ibid. 
1487 Draft Code 2015, supra note 11, section 2(7). 
1488 Sarah McKune ‘An Analysis of the International Code of Conduct for Information 
Society’ (29 September 2015) < https://citizenlab.org/2015/09/international-code-of-
conduct/>. 
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‘states must play the same role in and carry equal responsibility for, international governance 
of the [i]nternet, its security, continuity and stability of operations and its development’.1489 
This is underpinned by the call to ‘prevent other States from exploiting their dominant position 
in information and communications technologies’. 1490Although its long-term future as an 
international treaty is unpredictable it could be an instrument laying down rules of state 
behaviour at a regional level for the group of like-minded states. 
 On the intergovernmental level, an agreement that international human rights law 
applies to the online environment was reached long before the 2013 Snowden disclosures. The 
UN 2012 Human Rights Council Resolution titled The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment 
of Human Rights on the Internet,1491 put human rights framework for the internet on the agenda 
at the highest echelons of the UN human rights agencies.1492 The Resolution, revised in June 
2016,1493 affirmed that the same rights people have offline must also be protected online and 
noted the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance held in Sao 
Paulo in April 2014, which acknowledged, inter alia, the need for human rights to underpin 
internet governance.1494 The Resolution also recognized that for the internet to remain global, 
open and interoperable, it is imperative that states address security concerns in accordance with 
their international human rights obligations, in particular with regard to freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and privacy.1495 These Resolutions also stressed the importance of 
applying a comprehensive human rights based approach when providing and expanding access 
to the internet and for the internet to be open, accessible and nurtured by multi-stakeholder 
participation. Nevertheless these and other UN Resolutions, including on the Right to Privacy 
in the Digital Age,1496  seem only to scratch the surface.  They are couched in a general 
language and in the words of one commentator, are ‘far removed from the techno-legal and 
                                              
1489 supra note 11, section 2(5). 
1490 Ibid. 
1491 UN Human Rights Council, ‘The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights 
on the Internet’ (16 June 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/20/8. 
1492 Marrianne Franklin, ‘(Global) Internet Governance and Its Discontents’, in Joanna 
Kulesza and Roy Balleste (eds.), Cybersecurity and Human Rights in the Age of 
Cybersurveillance’ (Rowman and Littlefield 2016), p. 112. 
1493 UN Human Rights Council, ‘The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights 
on the Internet’ (27 June 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/32/L.20. 
1494 ibid. 
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1496 UN General Assembly Resolution 68/167, ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ (18 
December 2013) UN Doc A/RES/68/167; UN General Assembly Resolution 69/166, ‘The 
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ (18 December 2014) UN Doc A/RES/69/166. 
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political practicalities of bringing human rights law and norms to bear on the complex, dense 
policy domain that encompasses both formal and informal decision making about how the 
internet is run and how people interact and produce content’.1497 More specifically, the issues 
of implementation (how exactly) is the human rights framework to fit into the internet 
governance agenda, who is going to be accountable and how for the human rights violations, 
what international court or forum is to hear the complaints of violations, would such decisions 
be legally binding or not, what would constitute legal remedies and how to access them- all 
remain unanswered.  
 
A concluding observation that can be derived on the basis of the preceding discussion 
is that it is unlikely that the international community will in the foreseeable future reach an 
agreement regarding the adoption of a new, legally binding international treaty for cyberspace, 
which answers both the security and privacy needs. Therefore, the next section will consider 
other options, such as modernizing the existing privacy laws under Article 17 ICCPR, the the 
Universal Periodic Review mechanism, expanding the data protection regime through 
‘globalizing’ of Convention 108 and regulating state intelligence gathering activities through 
a regional multilateral treaty.  
 
 
b. Solution 2- Reliance on the Existing International Human Rights Treaties to  
   Protect Online Privacy 
 
Following the Snowden disclosures a coalition of states led by Germany proposed to enshrine 
digital privacy in an international human rights treaty by means of a new additional protocol 
for the ‘digital sphere’ to the Article 17 ICCPR. 1498 The idea was put forward at the 35th 
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners in Warsaw, 
Poland.1499 A subsequent resolution to update Article 17 ICCPR and ‘create globally applicable 
                                              
1497 supra note 49, p. 113.  
1498 Ryan Gallagher, ‘After Snowden Leaks, Countries Want Digital Privacy Enshrined in 
Human Rights Treaty’, (September 2013) 
<http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countr
ies_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html> . The coalition comprised Austria, Hungary, 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 
1499 35th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Resolution 
on Anchoring Data Protection and the Protection of Privacy in International Law, (23-26 
September 2013, Warsaw, Poland) <https://icdppc.org/wp-
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standards for data protection and the protection of privacy in accordance with the rule of law’ 
was overwhelmingly supported by the privacy authorities at that conference.1500  The only 
country that did not approve the resolution was the US. Nevertheless, the opening of the 
negotiations on the additional protocol to Article 17 ICCPR conducted by the Special 
Rapporteur on Privacy, Professor Cannataci has begun. 1501 The additional protocol is not 
envisaged, however, as ‘one new global all-encompassing international convention covering 
all of privacy or Internet governance’.1502 The Special Rapporteur recognized that there is no 
need to create an entirely new privacy regime, since one already exists under the ICCPR Article 
17. He adopted a realistic approach, expecting that protection of privacy could be increased by 
incremental growth of international law through the clarification and eventually, the extension 
of existing legal instruments, which will be considered next. 
 
i. Modernizing Article 17 ICCPR 
 
 One solution of how to bring state sponsored untargeted cyber surveillance within the rule of 
law is through the process of modernization of Article 17 ICCPR. This could be done by the 
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) updating its the General Comment No. 16 to Article 17 
ICCPR issued in 1988, which has not kept pace with the rapid developments in surveillance 
and information technologies.  
The past practice of the Human Rights Committee set a precedent for revising or 
replacing general comments.1503 The Committee has been motivated by the need to provide 
                                              
content/uploads/2015/02/International-law-resolution.pdf>; 37th International Conference of 
Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Resolution on Cooperation with the UN Special 




1501 UN HRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, Joseph A. 
Cannataci’, (8 March 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/64. 
1502 ibid. 
1503 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘Privacy Rights in the Digital Age. A Proposal for a 
New General Comment on the Right to Privacy under Article 17 of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights’ (2014) < 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-report-iccpr-web-rel1.pdf>. In 2011 
General Comment No. 10 (written in 1983) was replaced with General Comment No. 34 on 
Article 19, protecting the right to freedom of expression, whilst in 2013 General Comment 
No. 8 issued in 1982 was replaced with General Comment No. 35 on Article 9, protecting 
liberty and security of the person. 
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greater detailed and authoritative guidance on a content of a particular article, as well as the 
need to ensure that general comments reflect the changing realities and incorporate 
developments in the law.1504 General Comment No. 16 is no exception. Although it sets out the 
core concepts contained in Article 17, it has lagged behind the technological developments in 
modern communications and surveillance practices. Consequently, new general comment on 
Article 17 ICCPR must provide explicit articulation of what is the right to privacy of 
communications in the digital sphere and spell out the content of this right to ensure its effective 
protection and enforcement. Currently some of the General Comment No. 16 shortcomings 
relate to the lack of explicit recognition of such matters as banning untargeted, mass 
surveillance; 1505  bulk metadata collection and retention; 1506  protecting metadata; 1507 
intelligence services/law enforcement access to communications data held by third party 
service providers and internet companies including in a ‘cloud’; the relationship between 
private companies and governments;1508 biometric data gathering (through for example finger 
printing, facial recognition software) and transborder access to non-publically available data 
circumventing the requirements of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. In addition, some 
matters must be settled beyond doubt, such as extraterritorial application of human rights and 
equal treatment of citizens and foreigners (discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis), as well as 
specifying the circumstances when the right to privacy may be restricted. This last point relates 
to the fact that the privacy protection under Article 17 is not absolute. However, at present 
neither  Article 17, nor General Comment No. 16 provide a list of specific limitations to the 
right to privacy, unlike other provisions in the ICCPR, such as Article 19(3), which does. 1509 
                                              
1504 ibid. 
1505 Roman Zakharov v Russia (App No 47143/06) 2015 ECHR 1065; Szabo and Vissy v 
Hungary (App No 37138/14) 2016. 
1506 Joint Cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitilinger and Others 
[2014] ECJ. The CJEU declared that the EU Data Retention Directive, which compelled all 
internet and telecommunication service provides operating in Europe to obtain and retain a 
subscriber’s incoming and outgoing telephone and internet metadata for the period of six 
months to two years, invalid.  
1507 Copland v the United Kingdom (App No 62617/00) (2007) ECHR; Malone v UK (App 
No 8691/79) 1985 7 EHHR 14; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue’ (16 May 
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/27. 
1508 C-362/14 Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (6 October 2015). The 
CJEU held that Facebook’s data transfers for its Irish subsidiary to the US headquarters under 
the Safe Harbour agreement were unsafe, because US law does not offer sufficient protection 
against surveillance by that country’s public authorities.  
1509 Other provisions of the ICCPR, which set out specific limitations are: Article 12(3)-on 
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence; Article 18(3) on the 
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The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue and Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin both agreed that 
the right to privacy should be subject to the same permissible limitations test as the right to 
freedom of movement, as set out in General Comment 27. 1510  
 Modern technologies allow for a far reaching intrusion of privacy and international law 
must reflect this. The process of reforming General Comment No. 16 has been commenced, 
when the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy has been mandated with this task in 2015. 
There are other solutions to curtail mass surveillance that may be undertaken 
contemporaneously with the process of reforming Article 17 ICCPR, namely the process of the 
Universal Periodic Review, a regional non-spy legally binding agreement and the expansion of 






                                              
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Article 21 on the right to peaceful 
assembly and Article 22(2) on the right to freedom of association.  
1510 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Frank La Rue’ (16 May 2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/27, para 29; UNHRC ‘Report by Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism’ (17 May 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/46. The Special Rapporteurs suggested that the 
limitations to the right to privacy are subject to the test of permissible limitations set forth by 
the HRC in its General Comment No. 27 to Article 12 (freedom of movement), namely:  
a) any restrictions must be provided by the law;  
b) the essence of a human right is not subject to restrictions;  
c) restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society; 
d) any discretion exercised when implementing the restrictions must not be 
unfettered;  
e) for a restriction to be permissible, it is not enough that it serves one of the 
enumerated legitimate aims; it must be necessary for reaching the legitimate aim; 
f)  restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must 
be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive 
instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must 
be proportionate to the interest to be protected  
g) any restrictions must be consistent with the other rights guaranteed in the 
Covenant. 
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ii. Universal Periodic Review  
 
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a process that involves a periodic review of the human 
rights records of all 193 UN member states.1511 The UPR was established on 15 March 2006- 
at the time when the Human Rights Council was created by the UN General Assembly in 
resolution 60/251.1512 The resolution mandated the Council to ‘undertake a universal periodic 
review, based on objective and reliable information, of the fulfilment by each [s]tate of its 
human rights obligations and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage 
and equal treatment with respect to all [s]tates’.1513 The main goal of the review, which is based 
on equal treatment for all countries, is the improvement of the human rights situation in every 
country with significant consequences for people around the globe.1514 The process is designed 
to prompt, support and expand the promotion and protection of human rights. In order to 
achieve this,  the UPR involves assessing states’ human rights records and addressing their 
violations wherever they occur.1515 In addition, the review ‘aims to provide technical assistance 
to states and enhance their capacity to deal effectively with human rights challenges and to 
share best practice in the field of human rights among [s]tates and other stakeholders’.1516 The 
reviews are conducted by the UPR Working Group, consisting of the 47 members of the Human 
Rights Council and each review is assisted by groups of three states known as ‘troikas’, who 
serve as rapporteurs. 1517 The troikas for each state are selected through a drawing of lots 
following elections for the Council membership in the General Assembly.1518 The review is 
based on (a) information provided by the state undergoing the review, which may be in a form 
of a ‘national report’; (b) information contained in the reports of independent human rights 
experts and groups, known as Special Procedures, human rights treaty bodies and other UN 
entities; (c) information from other stakeholders including national human rights institutions 
and non-governmental organizations.1519 The reviews are conducted through an interactive 
discussion between the state undergoing the process and other UN member states, which take 
                                              
1511 UN HR Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Basic Facts about the UPR’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx>. 
1512 UN GA, Resolution 60/251. Human Rights Council UN Doc A/Res/251 (3 April 2006). 
1513 ibid. 
1514 supra note 68.  
1515 ibid. 





place during a meeting of the UPR Working Group.1520 The range of human rights obligations 
that are addressed relate to the extent to which states respect their human rights obligations set 
out in (a) the UN Charter; (b) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (c) human rights 
instruments to which the state is party (human rights treaties ratified by the state concerned); 
(d) voluntary pledges and commitments made by the state (for example national human rights 
policies and/or implemented programmes) and (f) applicable international humanitarian 
law.1521 As a result of the review by the Working Group, the troika  (with the involvement of 
the state undergoing the process and the assistance of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights), prepares the ‘outcome report’.1522 The report is a summary of the discussion 
and consists of questions, comments and recommendations made by states to the country under 
review, together with that country’s responses. Following the process whereby the reviewed 
state can either accept or note recommendations made to it, the report is then adopted at the 
plenary session of the Human Rights Council.1523 During the session, the state under review 
may reply to questions and issues that were not sufficiently addressed during the Working 
Group and respond to any recommendations that were raised by states during the review.1524 
Following the final outcome, the state must implement any recommendations made and during 
the second review is expected to provide information on the steps taken in order to implement 
the recommendations made at the first review.1525 The international community will assist in 
implementing the recommendations and conclusions regarding capacity-building and technical 
assistance in consultation with the country concerned.1526 If a state is not cooperating with the 
UPR, the Human Rights Council will decide on the measures it would need to take in case of 
persistent non-cooperation.1527 
 Since its first meeting in 2008, all 193 UN member states have been reviewed twice 
within the first and second UPR cycles. The third cycle included the review of the human rights 
record of the United Kingdom and was held on 1 May 2017.1528 Among the issues raised were 








1527 ibid.  
1528 UN HR Office of the High Commissioner, ‘United Kingdom’s Human Rights Record to 




the proposal to replace the Human Rights Act 1998 with a new British bill of rights; the impact 
of existing counter-terrorism measures; procedures to authorize surveillance, including mass 
surveillance; data retention and upholding the right to privacy.1529 The troika for the review of 
the UK were Albania, Ethiopia and Mongolia.1530 Following the UPR, the UK received 227 
recommendations, which it neither accepted nor rejected out of hand.1531 Instead, the UK 
decided to reserve its position on all 227 recommendations until the September 2017 Human 
Rights Council session, where it will announce which recommendations it is accepting and 
which it is rejecting.1532 The Human Rights Council will then present its recommendations and 
the UK will have to formally respond. This would be however only the beginning of the UK 
obligations, as the country would have to work to implement the recommendations it has 
accepted.1533 As the UPR is a peer-review process central to the UN’s human rights system, 
failure to accept the recommendations made during the review and to demonstrate sufficient 
progress to its peers could be damaging to the UK’s reputation as a leader in human rights and 
international affairs.1534 It could also erode the perception of the UPR process itself-the only 
mechanism by which the human rights record of all UN member states are regularly reviewed. 
 The United States had undergone the process of UPR in 2010 and 2105.1535  In its 2010 
review the US accepted 171 out of 240 recommendations. Among them were the 
recommendation to ‘legislate appropriate regulations to prevent the violations of individual’s 
privacy as well as eavesdropping of communications by its intelligence and security 
organizations’ and to ‘guarantee the right to privacy and stop spying on its citizens without 
authorization’.1536 Notwithstanding these acknowledgements, the US government continued its 
                                              
1529 ibid. Other issues raised included, the realisation of rights enjoyed through EU 
instruments post-‘Brexit’; ensuring the rights to freedom of expression and association; 
addressing discrimination against minority ethnic communities and preventing social 
profiling; measures to safeguard gender equality; combating trafficking in women and girls; 
domestic violence and violence against women; the impact of austerity measures including 
on the right to adequate housing; the impact of Immigration Act 2016.  
1530 ibid.  
1531 UNA-UK, ‘UK’s Universal Periodic Review Shines a Light on Human Rights Concerns’ 
(2 May 2017) < https://www.una.org.uk/news/uk’s-universal-periodic-review-shines-light-
human-rights-concerns >. 
1532 ibid.  
1533 ibid. 
1534 ibid. 
1535 UNHRC, ‘Draft Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. United 
States of America’ (21 May 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/W.6/22/L.20. 
1536 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. United States 
of America’ (4 January 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/16/11. 
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surveillance practices, domestic and extraterritorial, which also became the subject of the 2015 
UPR. Among the recommendations submitted to the US as the result of that review were those 
made by Brazil, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, relating to data privacy 
and surveillance, including extraterritorial surveillance.1537 The strongest and most specific 
recommendations are worth citing and called on the US to:  
   
 [r]espect international human right obligations regarding the right to privacy when  
 intercepting digital communications of individuals, collecting personal data or  
 requiring disclosure of personal data from third countries. (Germany) 
 
 Ensure that all surveillance policies and measures comply with the international human 
 rights law, particularly the right to privacy, regardless of the nationality or location of  
 those affected, including through the development of effective safeguards against abuse  
 (Brazil). 
 
 Strengthen the independent federal-level judicial and legislative oversight of  
 surveillance activities of all digital communications with the aim of ensuring that the  
 right of privacy is fully upheld, especially with regard to individuals outside the  
 territorial borders of the United States (Hungary). 
 
 Review their national laws and policies in order to ensure that all surveillance of digital 
 communications is consistent with its international human rights obligations and is  
 conducted on the basis of a legal framework which is publically accessible, clear,  
 precise, comprehensive and non-discriminatory (Liechtenstein).  
 
 Take all necessary measures to ensure an independent and effective oversight by all  
 Government branches of the overseas surveillance operations of the National Security 
 Agency, especially those carried out under the Executive Order 12333 and guarantee  
 access to effective judicial and other remedies for people whose right to privacy would  
 have been violated by the surveillance activities of the United States (Switzerland).1538 
 
                                              
1537 supra note 92. 
1538 ibid, paras 5.295-312.  
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These are no doubt positive developments. Through the UPR mechanism, concerns relating 
to surveillance laws and practice can be raised by states in many other countries in the world 
and the recommendations made are a sign that the right to privacy is receiving a deserved 
attention within the UPR processes. In this sense, this mechanism complements other 
developments within the UN, such as the establishment of the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to privacy, to monitor and assess all states’ compliance with thier 
obligations relating to the right to privacy. 
  
 
B. Regional Level  
 
a. Solution 3- Regulation of Mass Surveillance Through a Regional Legally Binding  
       Treaty 
 
Current state practice suggests lack of universal support for international surveillance norms 
aimed at regulating states’ gathering of signals intelligence in cyberspace. However, that does 
not necessarily mean that achieving reduced surveillance, foreign and domestic, is always 
going to be impossible. At this stage, in the absence of international treaty and clear customary 
norms, a regional legally binding treaty could be an operationally viable way forward for a 
group of like-minded states. Indeed, in 2015 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) in its Resolution 2045 among other solutions to stop violations of human 
rights, urged its member and observer states to adopt an ‘intelligence codex’ (the Codex)- a 
binding multilateral European treaty to regulate the activities of intelligence agencies for the 
purposes of the fight against terrorism and organized crime. 1539 The need for a legal framework 
on the national and international level was made quite clear by the Council of Europe (CoE). 
Not only is it important to rebuild trust among transatlantic partners, member states of the CoE, 
as well as between citizens and their governments, 1540   but it was also recognized that 
surveillance practices endanger other human rights, which are the cornerstone of democracy ( 
Article 10-freedom of information and expression; Article 6-right to fair trial; Article 9-
freedom of religion). In addition, the PACE explanatory memorandum stated that: 
 
                                              
1539 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2045, supra note 3. 
1540 ibid, para 13, p. 8. 
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[t]he political problems caused by ‘spying on friends’ and the possible collusion 
between intelligence services for the circumvention of national restrictions show the 
need for states to come up with a generally accepted ‘codex’ for intelligence agencies 
that would put and end to unfettered mass surveillance and confine surveillance 
practices to what is strictly needed for legitimate security purposes.1541  
 
Most importantly it was proposed that: 
 
[s]uch a codex would lay down precisely what is allowed and what is prohibited 
between allies and partners; it would clarify what intelligence agencies can do, how 
they can co-operate and how allies should refrain from spying on each other [...] it 
would be a signal that governments are willing to provide some degree of transparency 
in the conduct of their surveillance programmes and guarantee citizens’ rights to 
privacy to the extent possible.1542  
 
Four simple rules were suggested for governing co-operation among the intelligence agencies, 
which should form the cornerstone of the Codex. First, any form of mutual political, economic 
espionage must be prohibited without exception.1543 Secondly, any intelligence activity on the 
territory of another member state would only be carried out with that state’s approval and 
within a statutory framework, that is for a specific reason of preventing crime/terrorism.1544 
Thirdly, the tracking, analysing and storing of mass data is strictly prohibited if that data is 
from non-suspected individual from a friendly state. Only information pertaining to 
legitimately targeted individuals may be collected on an exceptional basis for specific 
purposes, whilst any data that is stored but not needed for these purposes must be immediately 
destroyed. 1545  Finally, the intelligence agencies would be banned from forcing 
telecommunication and internet companies to grant them unfettered access to their massive 
databases of personal data  without a court order.1546 Resolution 2045 adopted by the Council 
of Europe specified that ‘the codex should include a mutual engagement to apply the same 
                                              
1541 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Explanatory Memorandum, ‘Mass 
Surveillance. Who is Watching the Watchers?’ (21 April 2015), para 115, p. 50  
1542 ibid. 





rules to the surveillance of their own nationals and residents and to share data obtained through 
lawful surveillance measures solely for the purposes, for which they were collected.’1547  It was 
also proposed that the ‘Intelligence Codex’ would adapt the safeguards devised by the 
European Court of Human Rights for surveillance.1548  The question that arises in this context 
is therefore what would be the advantage of the Codex over and above the existing ECHR 




i. The Intelligence Codex and the European Convention on Human Rights  
 
The primary argument for adopting a multilateral treaty to regulate the operations of state 
intelligence agencies, such the Intelligence Codex, is the fact that the existing privacy 
framework in Article 8 ECHR in relation to surveillance consists of only the minimum 
standards. 1549  The PACE report recognizes that the jurisprudence developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) must be supplemented by more specific rules reflecting the 
realities of the technical capabilities of modern surveillance, as the existing rules are merely a 
point of departure for European states. 1550  In this sense the Codex would provide more 
extensive guarantees. A number of points, where the ECtHR falls short of precise rules 
applicable to cyber surveillance illustrate the need for a separate, more detailed legally binding 
treaty.  These include, but are not limited to: (a) defining ‘communications surveillance’; (b) 
adopting and adapting standards set out by the ECtHR in relation to legality standards (‘in 
accordance with the law’) to foreign surveillance measures; (c) adopting more stringent 
standards as to what constitutes a ‘legitimate aim’ in relation to mass surveillance; (d) 
providing for mandatory judicial authorisation of surveillance; (e) providing that the 
complaints mechanism should include an obligatory user notification. Each of these will be 




                                              
1547 ibid.  
1548 ibid, para 97, p. 80. 
1549 ibid, p. 57.  
1550 Ibid.  
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 Defining ‘Communications Surveillance’ 
 
In the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, some governments sought to defend their 
activities by distinguishing between the automated collection and scanning of private 
communications on the one hand and those communications being scrutinized by human 
beings, on the other hand.1551 The argument put forward was that automated collection or 
monitoring is not surveillance at all and as the collected data was not scrutinized by humans, 
no privacy invasion occurred.1552 In S and Marper v UK1553  the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
held that ‘the mere retention and storing of personal data by public authorities, however 
obtained, are to be regarded as having direct impact on the private-life interest of an individual 
concerned, irrespective of whether subsequent use is made of the data’.1554 The ECtHR has not 
specifically yet considered what is the definition of ‘communications surveillance’ in the 
digital context.  The Intelligence Codex could build on the Court’s ruling in S and Marper to 
avoid any future ambiguity. A definition put forward by privacy organizations and security 
experts at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in September 2013, which is contained in 
the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
Surveillance (The Necessary and Proportionate Principles), 1555  may also prove useful. 
Accordingly: 
 
[c]ommunications surveillance includes not only the actual reading of private 
communications by another human being, but also the full range of monitoring, 
interception, collection, analysis, use, preservation and retention of, interference with, or 
access to information that includes, reflects, or arises from a person’s communications in 
the past, present, or future.1556 
                                              
1551 Necessary and Proportionate Coalition, ‘Necessary and Proportionate Global Legal 
Analysis’ (2014) < https://necessaryandproportionate.org/global-legal-analysis>, p. 12. 
1552 ibid.  
1553 S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50. 
1554 ibid, para 121. 
1555 supra note 108. The Necessary and Proportionate Principles were written by over 40 
human rights organizations and security experts, including: Access, Article 19, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Open Rights Group, Privacy International, Bits of Freedom, Association 
for Progressive Communications. The Principles were endorsed by the UK’s Liberal 
Democratic Conference, as well as European, Canadian and German Parliaments. They were 
cited, among others, by the US President Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies Report and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.   





As discussed in Chapter 4 of this study, in a number of cases including Klass,1557 Malone,1558 
Weber, 1559  Liberty, 1560  Rotaru, 1561  Zakharov 1562  and Szabo, 1563  the Strasbourg Court has 
developed minimum standards, which domestic law must meet in order to be compatible with 
Article 8 ECHR.1564 Among them is the   requirement to specify the categories of people liable 
to have their communication intercepted.  In collecting information, state authorities often build 
a human network around an individual of interest to them by gathering telephone and/or 
internet metadata related to other persons with whom that individual may be in contact and 
who are usually one or two stops (‘hops’) away from him/her. This is known as ‘contact 
chaining’. National legislation would usually set out these powers in terms of ‘relevance’ for 
the investigation of terrorism or crime.1565 The Strasbourg Court has not yet addressed this 
issue in the context of interception of internet metadata,1566 but in this case the ‘relevance’ 
                                              
1557 Klass and Others v Germany (App No 5029/71) (1978).  
1558 Malone, supra note 64. 
1559 Weber and Saravia v Germany (App No 54934/00) (2006). 
1560 Liberty and Others v UK (App No 58243/00) (2009) 48 EHRR. 
1561 Rotaru v Romania (App No 28341/95) (2000) ECHR 2000-V. 
1562 supra note 62. 
1563 ibid. 
1564 Weber v Germany, supra note 116. These include:  
(1)  the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order;  
(2)  definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped 
and a limit on the duration of telephone tapping;  
(3)  the procedures to be followed for examining, using and storing of data 
obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other 
parties; and  
(4)  the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes 
destroyed.   
1565 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission), ‘The 
Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies’ Study No. 719/2013 (15 December 
2015) 
< http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2015)011-
e>. In some jurisdictions, for example in the US, the access to stored telephony metadata will 
be granted on the basis of ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ individually approved by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under s 215 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
1566 ibid, para 98, 81. The Venice Commission explained contact chaining in the following 
terms: 
 [t]he bulk metadata are analysed to identify communications patterns. This usually  
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criterion gives potential for expanding the net of surveillance greatly to cover huge numbers of 
people without any connection whatsoever to crime or terrorism.1567 There is therefore a need 
for contact chaining to be regulated by placing strict limits on the power to query collected 
bulk metadata.  
 
 Legitimate Aim 
 
The Zakharov and Szabo cases illustrate the Court’s acknowledgement that the legal threshold 
of ‘national security’ is dangerously broad especially in the context of mobile/electronic 
communications, which contrasts with its earlier more permissive approach in Weber and 
Kennedy. The ECtHR now favours a stringent test based on reasonable suspicion and this 
criterion should be adopted in the Intelligence Codex, as a legal requirement for all domestic 
surveillance powers. As for  allowing the collection of signals intelligence for ‘economic well 
being of the nation’, it has been feared that this ground has been used as an excuse to justify 
state’s conducting economically motivated cyber espionage. 1568 The problem is that there 
seems to be no limits set out by the ECtHR jurisprudence regarding when data may be collected 
pursuant to this ground. One view was that to avoid nations acting for nefarious purposes 
cloaked in ‘economic well being of a nation’, this criterion must be supplemented by clear 
prohibition of economic espionage, buttressed by effective oversight and prohibitions on letting 
government departments, or administrative agencies concerned with promoting trade, task the 
signals intelligence agencies.1569  
 
 Judicial Authorisation 
 
In order to comply with the ECHR a secret surveillance programme must be subject to 
independent supervision, which may be either judicial or non-judicial.1570 In the past cases, the 
ECtHR held that judicial authorisation is ‘in principle’ desirable and ‘offer[s] the best 
                                              
takes the form of checking whether previously identified suspect telephone numbers 
(X) are in contact with other numbers (Y) and then whether Y is in contact with other 
numbers (Z). 
1567 ibid, para 10, p. 57. 
1568 ibid. 
1569 ibid para 73, p. 73. 
1570 Weber supra note 116; Klass supra note 114; Zakharov supra note 62; Szabo and Vissy v 
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guarantee of independence, impartiality and a proper procedures’,1571 but stopped short of 
requiring this in all circumstances. In Klass the ECtHR found that oversight by a non-judicial 
body was allowed, where that body is sufficiently ‘independent of the authorities carrying out 
the surveillance’.1572 Yet,  the issue of impartiality in cases where authorisation has been in the 
guise of a non-judicial bodies, such as an official of the Post Office, gave the Court reasons for 
concern. 1573  An opportunity to require that all states must provide that only judicial 
authorisation would suffice arose lately in Zakharov, but the Court held that ‘control by an 
independent body, normally a judge with special expertise, should be the rule and substitute 
solution, the exception warranting close scrutiny’.1574 Szabo was yet another confirmation that 
judicial control of secret surveillance is preferable, but not obligatory.1575 In the sphere of mass 
surveillance, the key defect therefore of the current authorisation regime is the Court’s repeated 
reticence to make the requirement of judicial authorisation mandatory across jurisdictions.  
 
 Complaints Mechanism 
 
 Under Article 13 ECHR individuals have a right to an effective remedy in their national courts 
in cases where a public authority has infringed their rights under the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights .1576 Part of this entitlement is the right of citizens to be informed 
of their data being collected and/or that they have been subject of surveillance, known as user 
notification.1577 The issue of whether and when an individual may expect to be informed is far 
                                              
1571 Klass, supra note 85, para 87. 
1572 ibid para 56. 
1573 Kopp v Switzerland (App No 23224/94) (1999) 27 EHRR 91, para 74: 
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 be assigned to an official of the Post Office’s legal department, who is a member of  
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1574 Zakharov, supra note 62, para 77. 
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of a member of the executive (the Minister of Justice) did not provide the necessary 
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1576 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 213 UNTS 222, art 13:  
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from settled. In Klass, the ECtHR found that states are not required to disclose that they have 
ordered or conducted surveillance in a particular case, nor must they notify a person after the 
surveillance has ceased.1578 The ECtHR considered that is was not feasible in practice to 
require subsequent (post interception) notification in all cases.1579 However, in the more recent 
cases the ECtHR showed a clear tendency towards the establishment of this as a right. 1580  For 
example, in Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria1581 the ECtHR held that the missing notification of the 
individual after surveillance violated both Article 8 and Article 13 ECHR. However, the Court 
fell short of finding that notification was a necessary requirement of domestic surveillance laws 
in general, stating that authorities should issue a notification to an individual who had been 
secretly monitored.1582   
 
There are a number of important matters either not addressed or left unclear by the 
ECtHR regarding secret surveillance rules, supporting the case for detailed norms applicable 
to foreign and domestic practice of surveillance powers, which ought to to be set out in a 
separate legally binding document. The argument in favour of a hard law regional instrument 
such as the Intelligence Codex from the protection of human rights perspective is compelling, 
as it could not only incorporate the rules of the ECHR as interpreted in the ECtHR 
jurisprudence as a minimum standard, but also ‘fill in the gaps’ where more detailed technical 
standards are necessary. Above all the Codex could introduce identical procedural standards as 
set out in Weber and reiterated in Zakharov for all cyber surveillance (domestic and 
extraterritorial alike) thus putting a stop to an unjustifiable distinction between these types of 
operations presently applied by many states to SIGINT collection. In this sense, it could both 
harmonize and govern state surveillance in accordance with the rule of law. This kind of 
solution was supported by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE, Nils Muižnieks in 
2014 when he stated that: ‘[m]ember [s]tates should bring the activities of national security and 
intelligence agencies within the overarching legal framework’.1583 He stressed that ‘[u]nless 
                                              
Rights to Communications Surveillance’ (2014) 
<https://necessaryandproportionate.org/global-legal-analysis>, p. 24. 
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there is increased transparency on the rules under which these services operate democratically, 
extraterritorially and in cooperation with each other- their activities cannot be assumed to be 
in accordance with the rule of law’.1584 Needles to say, such a solution will only be meaningful 
so long as the states, which are the most active in the surveillance sphere, particularly the US, 
are willing participants. Bearing in mind that the US would have to become a party to the 
ECHR and be subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, this seems unlikely. Still, a European 
treaty setting out detailed technical and legal standard setting out ‘the rules of the road’ for 
security and law enforcement organizations, including intelligence sharing arrangements, in 
conformity with Article 8 ECHR could be a promising start.  
 
 
ii. The Intelligence Codex and Political Realism 
 
The 2015 proposal from the Council of Europe to regulate the activities of intelligence 
agencies in an interconnected global environment of cyberspace is the first, concrete proposal 
of this kind. Viewed from a realistic perspective of international relations, the success of the 
Intelligence Codex coming to fruition will no doubt be plagued with difficulties. Nevertheless, 
there are many advantages of this type of solution, not least of which is its originating from 
and being negotiated in the Council of Europe. This is because the CoE has a successful track 
record regarding the negotiation of international treaties, as demonstrated by the Convention 
on Cybercrime 2001 (the Budapest Convention) and Convention 108, both of which deal with 
activities conducted in the cyber environment. These two Conventions began life as regional, 
European instruments, but in time became international, albeit not universal, since both allow 
for accession by non-European countries. Thus, the Budapest Convention has been ratified by 
49 parties, among them four non-Council of Europe states who signed it (the US, Canada, 
Japan and South Africa) and five, including the US which also ratified it.1585 Similarly,  the 
membership of Convention 108 is not purely confined to the Council of Europe members 
states. The process of ‘globalization’ of that treaty beyond its European origins has been 
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1585 Council of Europe Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185, Convention on 
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underway since the start of this decade, when Uruguay accessed it in 2013.1586 In this sense, 
the Intelligence Codex could not only be a regional treaty, but also be opened to other non-
European states to accede to and thus potentially have wider than Europe reach. 
It is still unclear however how the Codex has been received by states. To date, there is little 
reaction to it, although the Dutch government has already expressed its reservations. These 
mainly relate to the proposed prohibition on the exercise of mutual political, economic 
espionage, as being unrealistic.1587  
Admittedly, as discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, states have shown no real appetite 
to regulate espionage, as there is no specific treaty regarding traditional forms of peacetime 
espionage, or cyber espionage. Historically, international law has been rather ambivalent 
regarding regulation of electronic surveillance, which falls within the broader concept of 
peacetime espionage, for a number of reasons.1588 First, espionage is a tool widely deployed by 
states to protect their own core national security interests, regarding such fundamental aspects 
as gathering evidence of hostile intent or a planned terrorist  attack originating abroad. 1589 
Secondly, states are very secretive about their espionage capabilities. Therefore discussing 
ways and means to limit espionage conducted on other states without revealing certain 
information about their own capabilities means not only publically admitting in their 
engagement, but also losing an advantage over other states.1590 Thirdly, a group of states with 
superior surveillance capabilities, such as the US, the UK, France Russia, China and Israel have 
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to date resisted (and will in all probability continue to do so)  excessive regulation of 
surveillance called for by the countries, who are not as technically advanced. These former 
nations also tend to have significant political and economic power on the international stage 
and therefore are in a strong position to control the direction of actions in the United Nations 
and elsewhere.1591  Fourthly, the recent state practice from some Western democracies points 
to a divergent policy stance from that of the UN and major human rights organizations, leaning 
towards adopting more surveillance powers at the expense of privacy. A number of countries 
have recently passed new pro-surveillance laws as a legislative response to the stream of 
terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere. A case in point are the new statutes in the UK, France 
and the US. The UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016 presents a serious potential for breach of 
human rights on the basis of, inter alia, its powers for bulk communication data retention, 
compromising encryption by the government insisting on ‘backdoors’/preventing end-to-end 
encryption, bulk thematic warrants and providing for insufficient safeguards in relation to 
intelligence sharing.1592 The Act legislates for some of the most sweeping surveillance powers  
in Europe and has therefore prompted criticism from the Special Rapporteur Cannataci, who 
observed that the Act ‘prima facie fails the benchmark set by the [CJEU]  in Schrems and 
ECtHR in Zakharov’.1593 France has also enacted new digital surveillance law in the aftermath 
of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the ‘Loi Renseignement’ (Surveillance Act), described as the 
‘French Patriot Act’,1594 whilst in the US the Senate overwhelmingly passed the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act  (CISA)1595 in October 2015. This state practice seems to pay little 
attention to the repeated calls from the UN General Assembly to: 
 
[t]ake measures to put an end to violations of [the right to privacy, including in the 
context of digital communications] and to create the conditions to prevent such 
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1593 Report of the Special Rapporteur Cannataci, supra note 58, para 39, p. 14. 
1594 Ben McPortland, ‘What Has France Actually Done to Fight Terrorism’ (19 July 2016) 
The Local, < http://www.thelocal.fr/20160719/what-has-france-done-to-fight-terrorism>. 
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violations, including by ensuring that relevant national legislation complies with their 
obligations under international human rights law.1596 
 
 In many respects therefore, the UN policy efforts and those of some Western governments 
seem to form ‘parallel universes’. However, one aspect that appears to be in favour of at least 
some states agreeing to a regional, legally binding ‘non-spy’ agreement is the marked shift in 
focus in relation to who is the subject of surveillance. Historically signals intelligence efforts 
abroad were concentrated on gathering data about decision-making by foreign 
governments.1597 Collecting was amounts of information on private individuals was not wide-
spread and costly. Consequently, public pressure to curtail espionage was minimal, as it was 
not seen to effect average citizens abroad.1598 This is no longer the case and may well contribute 
to some degree of interest in the proposed Intelligence Codex. 
Thus far, the Codex has met with only one response (the Netherlands) out of the 47 CoE 
member states. In the absence of more responses from all the member states it is difficult to 
speculate what the future of the Codex may be. The Codex is contained in Resolution 
2045(2015) and Recommendation 2067(2015) proposing that the Committee of Ministers, (the 
CoE decision making body composed of foreign ministers of the contracting parties) initiates 
it. However, PACE resolutions and recommendations are non-legally binding. 1599 
Recommendations contain proposals addressed to the Committee of Ministers and their 
implementation is within the competence of the foreign ministers of all member states 
comprising the  Committee. They may either support the Codex and begin the process of 
negations, or reject it, as was the case with the Dutch authorities. If the Codex is rejected, the 
attempt to exert influence by the PACE on Council of Europe member states to ban mass 
surveillance will undoubtedly be undermined. However, in view of the deep concerns and 
condemnation of these practices by the PACE, opting out  could lead to  triggering Article 52 
ECHR procedures.1600  Pursuant to this provision the Secretary General, a senior official of the 
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CoE, may require all 47 CoE member states to report on how their mass surveillance practices 
comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and make their replies public. This 
could lead to more political pressure being put on governments to carefully consider the stance 
they may take regarding the proposed Codex. This is particularly pertinent in the case of all 
those counties, where draconian counter terrorism measures have been recently enacted, or are 
in the process of being adopted, such as the UK. 1601  An example of the effectiveness of Article 
52 ECHR initiative is the inquiry into secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees 
involving Council of Europe Member States in 2005. 1602  The PACE Reports uncovered 
evidence of human rights violations and helped to put pressure on governments, leading to high 
profile international and national enquiries, which sought to bring those responsible to justice 
and led to developments of international law.1603 The PACE has already requested that the 
Committee of Ministers draft its suggested Intelligence Codex and draw up guidelines for the 
47 European governments the Council represents.1604 Furthermore,  the author of the Mass 
Surveillance report, Rapporteur Omitzigt recommended that Article 52 inquiry be launched in 
the wake of the ‘BND/NSA scandal’ in 2015.1605 The allegations that the foreign intelligence 
agency of Germany (the BND) conducted surveillance on its European allies for the NSA 
caused Rapporteur Omtzigt to reiterate that ‘the Intelligence Codex laying down the rules of 
fair play applicable to the secret services of like-minded countries is urgently needed’ and 
urged national parliaments to start serious negotiations on the issue.1606 Omtzigt’s concerns 
that the surveillance powers will grow further, whilst political oversights keep diminishing, 
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resulting in a ‘runaway surveillance machine’,1607 is a warning that all European states must 
heed.   
The Codex is a positive development. It urges that any form of political, economic and 
diplomatic espionage as well as mass surveillance be prohibited. Its main weakness is the fact 
that it is regional in scope and even if favourably received by the Council of Europe member 




b. Solution 4- Creating an International Legal Framework for Data Protection  
 
 
The globalization of data processing due to the trans-border nature of the internet and the 
Snowden revelations contributed to an increased interest in and growing calls for creating an 
international legal framework for data protection.1608  
Data protection law is focused mainly on the management of personal information1609 
and specifically regulates all, or most stages in the processing of certain kinds of data.1610 It 
addresses the ways in which data is gathered, registered, stored, exploited and disseminated.1611 
It primarily aims to safeguard certain interests and rights of individuals (as against corporations 
or other legal/juristic persons) in their role as data subjects-that is when data about them is 
processed by others.1612 The main rules of data protection law embody a set of procedural 
principles, such as  that personal data should be collected by fair and lawful means, that the 
amount collected should be limited to what is necessary to achieve the specified purpose and 
that that purpose must be legitimate and not used in ways that are incompatible with purpose 
limitation.1613  
                                              
1607 The Guardian, ‘Mass Surveillance is Fundamental Threat to Human Rights, Says 
European Report’ (26 January 2015) 
< https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/mass-surveillance-threat-human-rights-
council-europe>. 
1608 Christopher Kuner, ‘The European Union and the Search for an International Data 
Protection Framework’ (2014) Gronigen Journal of International Law, pp. 55-71.  
1609 ibid. 
1610 Lee A. Bygrave, Data Privacy. An International Perspective (Oxford University Press 
2014), p. 1. 
1611 ibid. 
1612 ibid. 
1613 ibid.  
 311 
There are a variety of data protection legally binding and non-legally binding 
instruments (the latter dealt with elsewhere in this chapter) that have been enacted at 
international and regional levels. These present a fragmented legal landscape and add to the 
challenges for realising an international framework for data protection. 
On the international level,  Article 17 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
1966 protects the processing of personal data and makes some reference ‘to gathering and 
holding of personal information on computers and data banks’. 1614 However, Article 17 ICCPR 
does not deal or even mention data protection and is now in a need of modernization, as 
previously discussed.  On the regional level, the three data protection regimes that will be 
subject of focus in this section, are (a) the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 
108); 1615  (b) the European data protection legal framework; and (c) the African Union 
Convention of Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (AU Convention).1616   
 
i. The ‘Globalization’ of Convention 108 
 
The Council of Europe was one of the first international bodies to begin developing normative 
responses to the threats posed by computer technology to privacy related interests.1617 It has 
established a framework of specific principles setting standards for personal data protection 
and to date remains the only international organization to have drafted a multilateral treaty 
dealing directly with data privacy, namely Convention 108. The Convention was adopted in 
order to reconcile the right to privacy with the right to information and to ensure the same level 
of protection of these rights beyond national borders.1618  It remains the only legally binding 
international instrument in this field, with a worldwide scope of application as it is open for 
accession by any country, including countries that are not members of the Council of Europe, 
that have data protection legislation compliant with the Convention.1619 The treaty has 48 
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signatories 1620  and its international scope has been expanding in recent years with non-
European countries, such as Uruguay, Cape Verde, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia either 
having already acceded to it, or in various stages of the process since 2013, which illustrates 
its potential for becoming a global standard. 
Convention 108 complements and reinforces the right to respect for private life 
enshrined in Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights. It covers all operations carried 
out on the internet, such as collection, storage, alteration, erasure, retrieval and dissemination 
of personal data.1621 It also provides for the lawful and fair obtaining and processing by public 
and private sector.1622 It seeks to regulate transfrontier data flow to third countries, prohibiting 
such transfers to states and organizations that do not provide adequate levels of protection.1623  
With new data protection challenges, it became clear that Convention 108 should be 
modernized and this process has been undertaken by the Consultative Committee of the 
Convention (T-DP) since 2011. The recent rulings in Schrems,1624 Zakharov and Szabo brought 
into a sharp focus the fact that its modernization and global promotion is more than ever of 
great necessity. Consequently, the Draft Modernized Convention 108 (the Draft Convention) 
was published in September 20161625 and once adopted will provide for additional obligations 
on state parties. Some of the innovations of the modernized Convention include the explicit 
requirement that data processing shall be proportionate,1626  provision of  an obligation on data 
controllers to declare data breaches1627 and transparency of data processing.1628 The additional 
individuals’ safeguards include the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on 
automatic processing without having their views taken into consideration, the right to know 
the reasons underlying the processing1629 and the right to object to it.1630 The Draft Convention 
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also improves the competences of the T-PD to allow a stronger follow up and evaluation of the 
implementation of the Convention. 1631 Finally, the future mutual assistance as regulated in 
Chapter IV of the Draft Convention will be the sole task of national supervisory authorities,  
enabling their greater cooperation.1632  
The steady global expansion of national data privacy laws in the last 45 years and the 
work carried out to modernize Convention 108 makes it perhaps the only prospect for a 
universal standard in the field of data privacy.1633 The main factor in favour must be the lack 
of other candidates, making the Convention the only realistic prospect.1634 Other regimes have 
been developed, most notably in the European Union. These count for some of the most 
ambitious, comprehensive and complex in the field. 1635   Data protection is a binding 
fundamental right under Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights1636 and Article 16 of 
the Treaty of the European Union. 1637  The central instrument, Data Protection Directive 
(DPD)1638 was created to regulate the progression of personal data within the EU and provides 
the rules for data protection in the public and private sphere based on the principles of purpose 
limitation, data minimization and the rights of data subjects. The DPD will be replaced in 2018 
by the General Data Protection Regulation1639 as part of the EU data protection reforms. This 
regime introduces some of the most stringent data laws in the world, impacting the way every 
entity uses and holds Europeans’ personal data inside and outside Europe. For example, it adds 
a number of new elements, namely compliance requirements, transparency, enforcement, 
sanctions and remedies frameworks to apply to all organizations, including data processors. Its 
potential global impact is beyond doubt. However, the EU legal regimes are only legally 
binding among the 28 EU member states and as such the expansion of these rules is not possible 
outside Europe. 
Another regional legally binding instrument in the sphere of data protection is the 
relatively new Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (AU 
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Convention),1640 adopted by the African Union. The AU Convention represents a significant 
step towards the enhancement of human rights, in particular data protection in Africa. The AU 
Convention was adopted in July 2014. It has a broad scope and covers three substantial areas, 
namely electronic transactions, personal data protection, together with cyber security and cyber 
crime.1641 In this sense, the Convention is very broad in scope as it seeks to regulate in one 
legal instrument Africa’s most pressing and diverse problems in relation to information and 
communication technology, that is electronic transactions, data protection and cyber security. 
As regards data protection, the AU Convention has two main objectives. The first is the 
requirement that state parties are to ‘establish a legal framework aimed at strengthening 
fundamental rights and public freedoms, particularly the protection of physical data and to 
punish any violations of privacy without prejudice to the principle of free flow of data’.1642 The 
second objective requires that such framework established by member states ‘shall ensure that 
any form of data processing respects fundamental freedoms and rights of natural persons while 
recognizing the prerogative of the State, the rights of local communities and the purpose for 
which the businesses are established’.1643 The AU Convention is applicable to any processing 
carried out on the territory of the 54 state parties of the African Union. The treaty contains 
many safeguards regarding the data protection that mirror the CoE Convention 108 and EU 
Data Protection Directive. However, it also contains a number of weak provisions, that may 
give room for misuse. One example is an exception in Article 14(2) that allows for processing 
of personal data without the data subject giving consent on the grounds of ‘public interest’.1644 
Equally, Article 33(1) 1645  is seen as possibly giving too much authority to courts and 
investigatory judges to access personal data and conduct surveillance. 1646  Other problems 
relate not so much to the general nature and the content of the Convention, but its 
implementation. Since its adoption in June 2014 no African state has yet ratified it.1647 The AU 
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Convention requires that at least 15 countries do so, before it can come into force. Some 
commentators point out that attaining this number of ratifications will probably take years 
before the Convention takes effect. 1648  Additionally, even if the specified number of 
ratifications is achieved, African states tend to merely ratify treaties, without taking the 
necessary steps to implement them. The AU Convention is not a self-executing treaty, but 
requires in Article 8 that ‘each state party shall commit itself to establishing a legal framework’, 
which means that its provisions will not be enforceable in courts without prior legislative 
implementation. Thus, the effect of the Convention on the region will take time to be fully 
ascertainable. It seems therefore that ‘integration on an African-wide scale is extremely 
ambitious especially because of population and size of the African continent’.1649 Equally, the 
reluctance of the African states to ratify the instrument means that its impact as a global data 
protection standard will take a long time to be established.  
 
In view of the above, neither the EU data protection regime (being legally binding on 
EU member states only), nor the AU Convention (being still at the very early stages of adoption 
and implementation by state parties) seem to be able at this stage to provide the basis for the 
global data protection standards. In this sense, CoE Convention 108 is viewed as ‘having 
potentially a universal application’. 1650  However, despite the many advantages of 
‘globalization’ of Convention 108, some issues need further clarification, not least of which is 
the individual enforcement rights for non-Europeans and the relationship between the 
Convention and Article 17 ICCPR. Under the current regime, European countries cannot 
accede to Convention 108 without first being a party to the ECHR.1651 Europeans are able to 
bring an action before the ECtHR and enforce Convention 108 indirectly, which places non-
European at a disadvantage. One solution would be that Convention 108 places an obligation 
on all non-European countries seeking accession to Convention 108 to also accede to regional 
                                              
< https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/29560-sl-
african_union_convention_on_cyber_security_and_personal_data_protection.pdf>. 
1648 Lukman Adebisi Abdulrauf and Charles Maga Fombad, ‘The African Union’s Data 
Protection Convention 2014: A Possible Cause for Celebration of Human Rights in Africa?’ 
(13 June 2016), Journal of Media Law,  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/17577632.2016.1183283?scroll=top&nee
dAccess=true>. 
1649 ibid p. 23.  
1650 Christopher Kuner ‘An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and 
Prospects’ (2009) 25 Computer Law and Security Review 313.   
1651 supra note 190. 
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human rights agreements  and/or be a party to the ICCPR and its 1st Additional Protocol.1652 
This would give those individuals an option to enforce their data protection rights via their 
national courts and allow them to make ‘communications’ (complaints) to the Human Rights 
Committee that Convention 108 is not observed by their country. Such a complaint mechanism 
would empower the Committee to make recommendations (but not binding decisions) to 
member states placing non-Europeans, whose state ratified both Convention 108 and the 
ICCPR 1st Additional Protocol, closer to the position of the Europeans. 1653  The Special 
Rapporteur Cannataci has endorsed Convention 108 as one of the key contributors to global 
protection of privacy and his mandate includes the identifying of the principles and best 
practice for protecting privacy at international level.1654  
In view of the fragmented nature of the existing legally binding data protection regimes, 
the lack of an international organization to oversee the implementation and adoption of a global 
standard and the differences between the various regional systems of data protection laws, the 
adoption of an international legal framework is challenging. Nevertheless, the Council of 
Europe Convention 108 presents at present perhaps the best candidate for an international data 
protection benchmark. Another option, discussed in the next part of this chapter, is the use of 




PART II:  THE USE OF SOFT LAW AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES 
   
 
a. Solution 5- Soft Law Instruments 
 
i. Soft Law in International Law Making  
 
Soft law is best understood as a descriptive tag for a variety of non-legally binding instruments 
used in contemporary international relations by states and international organizations.1655 It 
                                              
1652 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (UNGA 
2200A(XXI) (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
1653 supra note 146. 
1654 supra note 58. 
1655 Malcolm D. Evans, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 120. 
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comprises of, inter alia, inter-state conference declarations, 1656   UN General Assembly 
instruments, 1657  together with resolutions, declarations, codes of conduct, guidelines and 
recommendations. Soft law agreements are not subject to international treaty law, (Article 
2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties), particularly its central principle 
of pacta sunt servanda and therefore the legal consequences arising from non-fulfilment of the 
key commitments contained in these instruments.1658 In this sense, international law does not 
attribute to soft law the status of a source of law,1659 as it does not directly produce customary 
international law. However, it may nevertheless produce certain legal effects. These can ‘range 
from providing the evidence of the state practice and opinio juris required to establish a rule of 
customary international, through providing assistance in the interpretation and application of 
conventional and customary law whose precise requirements remain unclear, to indicating the 
likely future course of international law’s development’.1660 Therefore, soft law can potentially 
be law- making in a similar way to multilateral treaties because it evidences at least an element 
of good faith commitment, a desire to influence state practice, or express some measure of law 
making intention.1661  Soft law is not regarded by states as substitutes for treaties, but as an 
independent tool, which can be use to regulate their behaviour in cases where, a  treaty may 
not be an option.1662  As such, it may be a viable alternative to law making by treaty for a 
number of reasons. First, it may be easier for states to reach agreement, especially when they 
are not ready to assume legal obligations, but wish to undertake some kind of commitment 
short of a legally binding one. Secondly, soft law instruments are flexible and as such will 
normally be easier to supplement, amend or replace than treaties.1663 Thirdly, treaties take a 
long time not only to negotiate, but also to replace, or amend. Fourthly, soft law instruments 
may provide more immediate evidence of international support and consensus than a treaty, 
whose impact is heavily qualified by reservations and the need to wait for ratification and entry 
into force.1664 Finally, the soft law norm may be the short term solution chosen in order to 
                                              
1656 for example, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992. 
1657 for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Declaration of the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples 2007. 
1658 Hartmut Hillgenberd, ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’ (1999) European Journal of 
International Law, 499-515, p. 513. 
1659 ibid, 514. 
1660 Stephen Hall, ‘Researching International Law’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007), p. 203. 
1661 ibid, p. 120. 




prepare the consensus necessary until a hard law rule may emerge in the long run, whether in 




ii. UN General Assembly Resolutions on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age 
 
A number of soft law instruments have emerged at the UN level in the aftermath of the 
Snowden revelations. Among these are UN GA resolutions on the right to privacy in the digital 
age.1666 Resolution 68/167, discussed in Chapter 4 of this study,  initiated the UN process to 
protect privacy and other human rights online and was followed by resolution 69/166.1667 This 
latter resolution reiterated that ‘surveillance of digital communications must be consistent with 
international human rights obligations and must be conducted on the basis of a legal 
framework’ and that ‘any interference with the right to privacy must not be arbitrary or 
unlawful’.1668 The Resolution also for the first time referred explicitly to the collection of 
metadata,1669 the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights1670 and stated 
that any measure taken by states to supress, or prevent terrorism must comply with states 
obligations under international human rights. 1671  Moreover, it called on member states to 
‘provide individuals whose right to privacy has been violated by unlawful or arbitrary 
surveillance with access to an effective remedy, consistent with international human right 
obligations’.1672 A year later the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)  adopted resolution 28/16 
which also urged states to provide ‘an effective remedy’ and encouraged the Human Rights 
                                              
1665 Antonio Segura-Serrano, ‘Internet Regulation: A Hard Law Proposal’, (2006) Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 10/06 < http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/061001.pdf>, p. 7.  
1666 supra note 53. 
1667 ibid. 
1668 ibid. 
1669 ibid. The preamble acknowledged that metadata ‘can reveal personal information and can 
give an insight into an individual’s behaviour, social relationships, private preferences and 
identity’. 
1670 ibid. UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, John Ruggie’ (21 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31,  
1671 ibid. 
1672 ibid para 4(e). 
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Council to identify ‘principles, standards and best practice’ for protection of privacy. 1673  
Consequently, the HRC decided to appoint for a period of three years a special rapporteur on 
the right to privacy, whose mandate includes, inter alia, ‘to identify possible obstacles to the 
promotion and protection of the right to privacy, to identify, exchange and promote principles 
and best practices as the national, regional and international levels and to submit proposals and 
recommendations to the Human Rights Council’.1674  
These are significant developments, which testify to the deep concern with state 
sponsored cyber surveillance. They may also have an impact on states behaviour in cyberspace, 
if they become customary international law. Generally, UN General Assembly resolutions are 
non-binding, but they do constitute evidence of state practice and understanding of the law. 
Therefore, in time they may be converted into a binding customary law.1675  This would depend 
on states’ practice, including the consistency in voting for the resolutions and the existence of 
opinio juris. The International Court of Justice in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion1676 stated that: 
 
[t]he General Assembly Resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have 
normative value. They can in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for 
establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of opinion juris. To establish 
whether this is true of a General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its 
content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio 
juris exists as its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual 
evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule.  
 
Both resolution 68/167 and 69/166 have been adopted without a vote and at least one seems to 
be a result of a political compromise.1677 Therefore, it could be said that these resolutions are 
influential in that they emphasise the role and importance of international human rights law in 
                                              
1673 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 28/16 The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, (1 
April 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/18. 
1674 ibid, para 4(c). 
1675 Malcolm Show, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 115. 
1676 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports, 1996, 
226, pp. 254-5. 
1677 Adam Jusitce, ‘UN Committee Spotlights “Highly Intrusive” Digital Spying’ (2014) 
Reuters < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-spying-un-idUSKCN0J92I120141125>. A 
reference to metadata surveillance as an intrusive act was removed from resolution 69/166 to 
appease the Five Eyes alliance. 
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cyberspace, particularly in relation to state sponsored surveillance. However, at this stage they 
probably have only a political, rather than normative value. Nevertheless, in time they may be 
converted into legally binding rules, as a result of either formalization into a binding treaty, or 
by acceptance as a customary rule, provided that the necessary conditions (consistent state 
practice and opinio juris) have been fulfilled.  
 
iii. Soft Law and Data Protection 
 
The first UN instrument dealing directly with data privacy was a 1968 resolution of the General 
Assembly 2450,1678 which resulted in a report of 1976 urging states to adopt data privacy 
legislation covering computerised personal data systems in the public and private sector and 
listing minimum standards for such legislation.1679 In 1990 the UN GA adopted a set of non-
legally binding Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files (UN Guidelines).1680 
The Guidelines lay down minimum guarantees for inclusion in national data privacy laws1681 
and encourage international organizations (governmental and non-governmental) to process 
personal data in a responsible, fair and privacy friendly manner.1682 The Guidelines contain 
some progressive elements, such as for example the ‘principle of accuracy’,1683 the ‘principle 
of purpose specification’ 1684 and the ‘principle of interested-person access’.1685 They also 
address the flow of data across borders stipulating that: 
                                              
1678 UN General Assembly Resolution 2450 of 19 December 1968 UN Doc E/CN.4/1025. 
1679 Points for Possible Inclusion in Draft International Standards if the Protection of the 
Rights of the Individuals against Threats Arising from the Use of Computerized Personal 
Data Systems’ UN Doc E/CN.4/1233. 
1680 Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files (UN General Assembly 
Resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990) UN Doc E/CN.4/1990/72. 
1681 ibid, Part A.  
1682 ibid, Part B.  
1683 ibid. Part A- Principles Concerning the Minimum Guarantees That Should Be Provided 
in National Legislations, para 2 (Principle of Accuracy): 
 [p]ersons responsible for the compilation of files or those responsible for keeping  
 them have an obligation to conduct regular checks on the accuracy and relevance of  
 the data recorded and to ensure that they are kept as complete as possible in order 
 to avoid errors of omission and that they are kept up to date regularly or when the  
 information contained in a file is used, as long as they are being processed.   
1684 ibid, para 3 (Principle of Purpose Specification): 
 [t]he purpose which a file is to serve and its utilization in terms of that purpose should 
 be specified, legitimate and when it is established, receive a certain amount of 
 publicity or be brought to the attention of the person concerned […]’ 
1685 ibid, para 4 (Principle of interested-person access): 
 [e]veryone who offers proof of identity has the right to know whether information  
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 [w]hen the legislation of two or more countries concerned by a transborder data flow  
 offers comparable safeguards for the protection of privacy, information should be  
 able to circulate as freely as inside each of the territories concerned. If there are no  
 reciprocal safeguards, limitations on such circulation may not be imposed unduly and  
 only in so far as the protection of privacy demands.1686  
 
However, the Guidelines have not been very popular and made an insignificant practical 
impact.1687 One reason may be the lack of definitions of its central terms, such as ‘personal 
data’, ‘personal data file’, and ‘comparable’ or ‘reciprocal’ safeguards, which makes these 
terms more diffuse, loose and confusing.1688  
A fair number of other non-legally biding soft law regional data privacy initiative have 
been undertaken, many outside Europe. Notable in this regard are the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  
(APEC) 1689  ‘Privacy Framework’ 1690  and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)1691 harmonized data privacy regimes.1692 Beyond these relatively recent initiatives 
is a whole host of bodies and interest groups advocating strong regimes for protecting of 
                                              
 concerning him is being processed and to obtain it in an intelligible form, without  
 undue delay or expense and to have appropriate rectifications or erasures made  
 in the case of unlawful, unnecessary or inaccurate entries, and when it is being 
 communicated to be informed of the addressee. Provision should be made for the  
 remedy, if need be with the supervisory authority […]. The cost of any rectification  
 shall be borne by the person responsible for the file. It is desirable that the  
 provisions of this principle should apply to everyone, irrespective of nationality or  
 place of residence.  
1686 ibid, para 9 (Principle of Transborder Data Flows). 
1687 ibid.  
1688 Bygrave, supra note 167, p. 53. 
1689 ibid p. 75. The APEC states are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the USA and Vietnam. 
1690 ibid. This is another non-legally binding regional instrument inspired by and modelled 
upon the OECD Guidelines. 
1691 ibid, p. 79. The ASEAN comprises ten nations, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  
1692 ibid. The regime aims to develop harmonized legal infrastructure for e-commerce but 
little information is publically available as to precisely what kind of harmonized regimes 
ASEAN is aiming at apart from the fact that they are to accord with best practices/ 
guidelines’. 
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personal data, such as the Data Protection Working Party set up under Article 29 of the EU 
Data Protection Directive (A29WP) mentioned in Chapter 1 and 4 of this thesis, the 
International Working Group of Data Protection and Telecommunications, the Asia-Pacific 
Privacy Authorities as well as civil society groups, such as Electronic Privacy Information 
Centre and Privacy International.1693  
 
 
iv. Soft Law as a Tool to Enable Data Transfers  
 
The issue of transborder data flows has historically been problematic as different 
countries offer varied standards of data protection. This was one of the main reasons for the 
European Union adopting a legally binding data protection framework, with the Data 
Protection Directive having the greatest international impact on data transfers to countries 
outside the EU. Articles 25-26 of the Directive contain a comprehensive ban on transfers to 
states that do not provide an adequate level of protection of personal data and  reflects European 
officials’ mistrust the US legislation, which was viewed as insufficiently protective of them.1694 
As a result of these concerns, an international understanding between the US and the EU had 
to be reached in order to avoid disrupting data flows. This was achieved by means of a non-
legally binding instrument, called the Safe Harbour Agreement between the US and the EU.1695 
The scheme allowed for the flow of personal data from the EU to US organizations that through 
self-certification voluntarily agreed to abide by a set of data privacy principles based loosely 
on the EU Data Protection Directive. Initially the scheme was recognized as a ‘resounding 
success, both in terms of raising the level of privacy compliance in the USA and in facilitating 
the recognition by the US business that privacy is a critical factor to success in the global 
marketplace’. 1696  However, it soon became subject of criticism for the role it played in 
obtaining data from PRISM by majority of private companies, who became party to it. 
Reportedly a number of major US based corporations were collaborating in PRISM and related 
surveillance programmes of the NSA, enabling the latter to gain ready access to personal data 
                                              
1693 ibid, p. 19. 
1694 supra note 195, p. 16. 
1695 Decision 2000/520/EC on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour 
privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of 
Commerce [2000] OJ L 215/7. 
1696 Damon Greer, ‘Safe Harbour-a Framework That Works’ (2011) 1 International Data 
Privacy Law, p. 143. 
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kept on, or transmitted between the corporations’ servers.1697 This collaboration has been 
allegedly over the above what has been legally required of these corporations.1698 According 
to the European Commission, the Safe Harbour scheme has been ‘one of the conduits through 
which access is given to US intelligence authorities to collecting personal data initially 
processed in the EU.’1699 This led to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
annulment of the scheme in Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner.1700 The 
main reason was that the law and practice of the US did not offer sufficient protection against 
the NSA surveillance by the public authorities of the personal data transferred from Europe to 
that country. The CJEU noted that the scheme was applicable solely to the US undertakings 
and not to the US public authorities. Furthermore, national security, public interest and law 
enforcement requirements of the US prevailed over the Safe Harbour Agreement, so that US 
companies were bound to disregard, without limitation, the protective rules laid down by that 
scheme where they conflicted with such requirements. Indeed, the CJEU observed that the 
agreement enabled interference by the US public authorities with the fundamental rights of 
European citizens. Specifically, the US authorities were able to access the personal data 
transferred from the EU member states to the US and process them in a way incompatible with 
the purposes, for which they were transferred and beyond what was strictly necessary and 
proportionate to the protection of national security.1701 
From an international law perspective, the Safe Harbour Agreement was not an international 
treaty, as it was neither signed nor ratified and therefore not subject to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties.1702 It is an example of an informal international cooperation. It also 
illustrates the fact that being non-binding, it was relatively quick and easy for the European 
Commission and the US authorities to replace it. This was achieved by negotiating a new 
scheme, called the EU-US Privacy Shield in July 2016, not even a year after the Safe Harbour 
Agreement was annulled. The Privacy Shield’s aim is to provide companies on both sides of 
the Atlantic with the mechanism to comply with EU data protection requirements when 
                                              




1699 Fanny Coudert, ‘Schrems vs Data Protection Commissioner: A Slap on the Wrist for the 
Commission and New Powers for Data Protection Authorities’ (15 October 2015) European 
Law Blog, < http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2931>. 
1700 Schrems, supra note 65.  
1701 ibid. 
1702 Segura-Serrano, supra note 222, p. 17. 
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transferring personal data from the European Union to the United States in support of 
transatlantic commerce. 1703 This framework is said to impose stronger obligations on US 
companies to protect Europeans’ personal data and it is based on a set of new, robust principles, 
not previously found in the Safe Harbour Agreement. Among these are the principles of 
transparency obligations of the US government access to data, several possibilities regarding 
the redress mechanism for individuals, as well as annual joint review mechanism. As to the 
safeguards and transparency obligations of the US, the US government has given the EU  a 
separate, written assurance that the access of public authorities for law enforcement and 
national security is subject to clear limitations, safeguards and oversights mechanisms.1704 The 
US has ruled out indiscriminate mass surveillance on personal data transferred to the US, whilst 
bulk collection of data would only be used under specific preconditions and needs to be as 
targeted and focused as possible.1705 Furthermore, for the first time the Privacy Shield promises 
that any individual who considers that their data has been misused under the scheme will 
benefit from several accessible and affordable resolution options, including free of charge 
alternative dispute resolution, resort to their national Data Protection Authorities and, as a last 
resort, an arbitration mechanism.1706 Redress possibility in the area of national security for the 
EU citizens will be handled by an Ombudsperson independent from the US intelligence 
service.1707 The additional safeguards, in the form of an annual joint review, promises that the 
European Commission and the US Department of Commerce will conduct the review and the 
Commission will issue a public report to the European Parliament and the Council. 
 
 
v. Soft Law and Access to Data by Law Enforcement Agencies 
 
In the sphere of transfers of data for the purposes of obtaining evidence in criminal 
investigations by the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
                                              
1703 US Department of Commerce Fact Sheet, ‘Overview of the EU-US Privacy Shield 
Framework for Interested Participants’ (12 July 2012) 
<https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/fact_sheet-_eu-
us_privacy_shield_7-16_sc_cmts.pdf>. 
1704 European Commission Press Release, ‘European Commission Launches EU-US Privacy 
Shield: Stronger Protection for Transatlantic Data Flows’ (12 July 2016) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2461_en.htm>. 
1705 ibid.  
1706 ibid.  
1707 ibid. 
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the Council of Europe in 1987 adopted Recommendation No. R (87)15 (the Recommendation) 
on the Use of Personal Data in the Police Sector. These soft law agreements amongst European 
states provides guidance for the collection, storage, use and communication of personal data 
for police purposes that are subject of automatic processing.1708 Although not legally binding, 
the Recommendation has been widely adopted across Europe-in 30 out of 47 Council of Europe 
member states.1709 It restricts data transfers to foreign authorities by providing that this can be 
done only by police bodies.1710 All other transborder transfers are allowed on specific grounds:- 
namely, if there exists a clear legal provision under national or international law, or in the 
absence of such a provision, if the communication is necessary for the prevention of a serious 
and imminent danger, is necessary for the suppression of a serious and imminent danger, or is 
necessary for the suppression of a serious criminal offence under ordinary law. 1711  An 
investigation into the practice of states carried out twenty-five years since the adoption of the 
Recommendation revealed1712 that many European states prima facie regulate police use of 
personal data in a way compatible with the Recommendation. The Report found disparities in 
the way that states chosen to implement Recommendation, but bearing in mind that it is a soft 
law instrument, it conceded that it still left its mark across Europe. Greater harmonization 
within the European states was nevertheless recommended.  Meanwhile a legally binding EU 
Directive (Draft Directive 5833/12) on processing of personal data for police purposes is 
currently under way. 1713  However, even if greater legislative harmonization of the 
Recommendation is to take place regarding its implementation, the open-textured norms and 
broad, general clauses (such as the ‘legitimate interest test’) will inevitably continue to be 
                                              
1708 Recommendation No. R (87) 15, Scope and Definitions: 
‘[t]he principles contained in this recommendation apply to the collection, storage, 
use and communication of personal data for police purposes which are the subject of 
automatic processing.’    
1709 Council of Europe Report, ‘Recommendation R(87)15- Twenty Five Years Down the 
Line’ (23 September 2013) < http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/oct/coe-report-data-
privacy-in-the-police-sector.pdf>. 
1710  ibid, art 5(4) International Communication: Communication of data to foreign authorities 
should be restricted to police bodies. It should only be permissible:  
a.  if there exists a clear legal provision under national or international law,  
b.  in the absence of such a provision, if the communication is necessary for the 
prevention of a serious and imminent danger or is necessary for the 
suppression of a serious criminal offence under ordinary law, and provided 
that domestic regulations for the protection of the person are not prejudiced.  
1711 ibid. 
1712  supra note 266. 
1713 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Directive 5833/12 (16 December 2015). 
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interpreted and applied differently across varied legal cultures and traditions.1714 In addition 
and perhaps more importantly, the Report emphasized that data controlled by private 
commercial organizations (such as Google, Facebook, Chrome etc.,) are open to scrutiny and 
potential abuse by both the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as was brought to the 
public attention by Snowden in 2013.1715 It was also acknowledged that LEAs require timely, 
but measured access to personal data in order to prevent and detect crime, as delays could 
potentially put human life, dignity and privacy at risk. This creates a need for pre-
authorization,1716 which  can only be properly provided by binding laws and an oversight by 
an agency with powers, which transcend national jurisdictions. The Report concluded that none 
of this is achievable without the right legally binding framework. It noted that at present neither 
the Council of Europe through the Recommendation, nor the European Union in its Draft 
Directive 5833/12 provide a legal framework, that responds adequately to the realities, where 
national LEAs increasingly intrude into the personal data of the citizens of other states and 
where the data is under the control of a data controller in a third jurisdiction.1717  
 
The highlighted developments in the field of data protection and transborder data flows 
reveal a cluttered ideological landscape with cross-cutting sets of norms and interests, such as 
human rights, trade and commerce, national security and law enforcement. Whilst soft law 
instruments, such as the Guidance of the OECD and the UN have proved influential in the 
development of the field of data protection, they seem under used or more or less abandoned. 
That does not diminish however the role that non-binding schemes play in shaping this area. 
The Privacy Shield is a good example of the flexibility of such instruments, in that it relatively 
easily replaced its predecessor the Safe Harbour Agreement following its invalidation by the 
CJEU. Bearing this in mind, it could be said that the use of these soft law agreements 
contributes to the development of international law as they guide state behaviour is the sphere 
of data protection and the transfers to data to a certain extent. As such, they are a valuable 
alternative to law making by treaty. In addition to these agreements, a number of recent 
diplomatic developments also point towards greater, informal cooperation among states 
discussed below.   
 
                                              
1714 supra note 269, p. 32. 
1715 ibid, p. 38. 
1716 ibid, pp. 38-39. 
1717 ibid. 
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vi. Confidence Building Measures  
 
Confidence Building Measures (CBM) ‘are actions and procedures undertaken within the 
context of policy, legal and/or institutional framework(s) for the purpose of enhancing 
openness and transparency, assuring mutual understanding and reducing misunderstandings, 
threats and tensions among States’. 1718  They have long been used by the international 
community for the purpose of promoting peace and security and can be traced to the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act,1719 followed by the 1986 Stockholm Document on Confidence and Security 
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 1720  together with the 1990 Vienna 
Document.1721 According to the UN Disarmament Commission the main objectives of these 
measures are: 
 
[t]o reduce or even eliminate the cause of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding and 
miscalculation with regard to relevant military activities and intentions of other States, 
factors which may generate the perception of an impaired security and provide 
justification for the continuation of the global and regional arms build-up […] to reduce 
the risk of surprise attacks and of the outbreak of war by accident; and thereby, finally, 
to give effect and concrete expression to the solemn pledge of all nations to refrain from 
the threat or use of force in all its forms and to enhance [international] security and 
stability.1722  
 
                                              
1718 Ram S. Jakhu, ‘Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures for Space Security’ in 
Aley Lele (ed.), Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 
(Pentagon Security International 2012), 35-46, p. 36. 
1719 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Conference on Security 
Cooperation, ‘Conference on Security Co-operation in Europe: Final Act’ (1975). 
1720 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Document of the Stockholm 
Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the 
Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe’ (19 September 
1986). 
1721 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Vienna Document 1990 of the 
Negotiations on Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the 
Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe’ (17 November 1990). 
1722 UN General Assembly, Special Report of the Disarmament Commission to the General 
Assembly at its Third Special Session Devoted to Disarmament, UN Doc A/S-15/3 (28 May 
2006). 
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CBMs have been adopted as either ‘stand alone actions on in combination with other means: 
(a) to complement legally binding treaties, particularly those that facilitate verification of arms 
limitation and disarmament agreements; (b) to lay the foundations, as a first step, that could 
build the momentum for the future legal agreements or other binding instruments; and (c) to 
reduce mistrust, fear and misunderstanding in specific areas of human activity.’1723 
 Recognizing the importance that the internet plays in the delivery of basic services, on 
the critical national infrastructures and economic growth of nations, international community 
has engaged in the process of cyber diplomacy to build a global consensus on how to apply 
existing international law in cyberspace and develop norms of responsible state behaviour and 
of confidence building measures. These efforts have been initiated and coordinated by four 
consecutive United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGEs).1724 
The first group of experts was convened in 2004 at Russia’s instigation with an aim to analyse 
international legal provisions relating to various aspects of international information security 
and study existing concepts and approaches. 1725  Another two reports from the UN GGE 
followed in 2010 and 2013.1726 It was not however until the Report of the 2015 Group that a 
catalogue of confidence building measures aimed at reducing the risks of misperceptions and 
conflicts linked to the attacks on the information and communications technology enabled 
infrastructure was agreed.1727 The 2015 UN GGE report reiterated the agreement reached by 
the 2013 UN GGE that international law, in particular the UN Charter applies to states’ use of 
information and communications technologies.1728 It also ‘identified  as of central importance 
the commitments of [s]tates to […] respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.’1729 The Report ‘emphasised that States 
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1724 Patryk Pawlak, ‘Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace: Current Debates and 
Trends’ in Anna Maria Osula and Henry Roigas (eds.), International Cyber Norms: Legal, 
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1725 ibid, p. 136. 
1726 UN GA, ‘Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunication in the Context of International Security’ UN Doc A/68/98 (24 June 
2013). 
1727 UN GA, ‘Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’ UN Doc A/70/174 (22 July 
2015).  
1728 ibid, p 12.  
1729 ibid, p. 12.  
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should guarantee full respect for human rights, including privacy and freedom of 
expression’.1730 The Group recommended that states should consider the adoption of a number 
of confidence building measures, among them  ‘the voluntary provision […] of their national 
views of categories of infrastructure that they consider critical and national efforts to protect 
them, including information on national laws and policies for the protection of data and ICT 
[information and communication technology] enabled infrastructure.’1731 The successive UN 
GGE reports therefore have laid down the foundations for the discussion about the confidence 
building measures in cyberspace, which also form foundations for the effort undertaken within 
regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe and 
the ASEAN Regional Forum.1732  
In recent years a number of bilateral agreements between some states have emerged, which 
are viewed as a way to provide additional guarantees that their signatories will behave 
responsibly in cyberspace. These include the US-Russia agreement of June 2013 (an agreement 
to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace through real time communications about incidents 
of national security concerns)1733 and Russia-China agreement of May 2015 (a non-aggression 
agreement to refrain from cyber attacks against each other and to jointly respond to 
technologies that may have a destabilizing effect on political and socio-economic life or 
interfere with internal affairs of the state).1734 It has to be said however that to date, confidence 
building measures concentrated on the need to address security challenges in cyberspace and 
not specifically on setting out the norms for responsible signals intelligence collection. 
However, in September 2015 the US and China have reached a cybersecurity agreement (Cyber 
Agreement), which aims at refraining from conducting mutual commercial espionage. 1735 
Cyber espionage is understood as the theft of trade secrets, intellectual property and negotiating 
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1732 supra note 281, p. 135.  
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1735 Scott Warren Harold, ‘The US-China Cyber Agreement: A Good First Step’  
<http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/08/the-us-china-cyber-agreement-a-good-first-step.html> 
 330 
tactics with the intent of using the information to provide economic benefit to an commercial 
enterprise.1736 The US-China Cyber Agreement provides for increased communication and 
cooperation between the two countries to investigate and prevent cyber crimes emanating from 
their territories and states that neither country’s government would knowingly conduct or 
support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.1737 It was also agreed that both countries 
are committed to identifying, developing and promoting appropriate norms of state behaviour 
in cyberspace within the international community and establishing a high-level joint dialogue 
mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues. 1738  The US-China agreement is 
undoubtedly the first step towards establishing of the international norms of state behaviour in 
cyberspace, in particular in relation to  the espionage activities. Until the agreement was 
reached, China was reluctant to recognize economic espionage, as a distinct category of 
espionage.1739 In this sense, President’s Xi agreement that the Chinese government does not 
engage in, or knowingly support the theft of intellectual property in order to provide 
competitive advantage to private companies, is a recognition that there exists a type of cyber 
espionage distinct from national security espionage.1740 This view has long been held by the 
US. Accordingly, cyber intelligence gathering pertaining the collection of information about 
economic and financial matters for the purposes of benefiting national security are routine 
intelligence activities not acts of cyber economic espionage.1741 If both countries agree that 
spying for corporate profit is distinct from and less acceptable than state spying for national 
security purposes, this could have a profound effect on international norms.  It may even 
eventually lead to the official recognition of another distinct form of espionage- cyber 
surveillance and the gradual setting out of norms to deal with that problem too.  
 Confidence building measures have the undoubted benefit of opening an international 
dialogue about matters, in relation to which states find difficult to reach a legally binding 
agreement. They are not regarded as substitute for treaties, but are perceived as standalone 
measures having normative value, or as supplementary mechanisms to other legally binding 
and non-legally binding measures. States have not yet addressed the issue of mass cyber 
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surveillance through the mechanism of confidence building measures. Having said that, as 
shown above, a bilateral agreement has been reached between the US and China regarding 
cessation of economic cyber espionage. The voluntary and non-legally binding nature of such 
agreements means that they may be expanded to cover new policy areas, such as privacy 
protection challenged by mass surveillance. In this sense, they may contribute to opening a 
dialogue regarding not only cyber espionage, but also mass cyber surveillance and play a 
positive role in re-gaining the lost trust between states and international level. Eventually, they 
may also lead to the development of binding international law norms and/or international 







The picture that emerges from the foregoing analysis is one of a fragmented landscape replete 
with legally and non-legally binding norms relating to privacy and data protection, which exist 
in a highly politicised cyber environment. This chapter recognized that limiting cyber 
surveillance will be incremental and achieved through a combination of updating and 
harmonizing the existing international human rights and data privacy legally binding norms, 
soft law agreements and diplomacy. There are no ‘quick fixes’.   
The privacy of communications is protected by international law (ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR) 
and these legally binding frameworks apply to the digital environment. This chapter analysed 
the need to both update and supplement these laws in the light of increasing state surveillance 
powers. The chapter has also identified a need to safeguard how data is accessed and processed 
by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies across jurisdictions in a way that protects 
digital communications. Although such a regime has been in existence for some time in the 
form of Convention 108, it remains regional in scope and the process to develop a global data 
privacy rules has only just begun. On an international level, data protection and data transfers 
are regulated by the ICCPR and a series of soft law agreements, most notable of which are the 
EU-US schemes. The 2013 Snowden disclosure of the NSA and its Five Eyes partners 
unconstrained surveillance, as well as unrestricted access to data held in foreign jurisdictions 
by law enforcement agencies, both in breach of the right to privacy of communications and 
data protection, saw a renewed interest in governing cyberspace through a hard law instrument. 
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There seems to be a broad consensus that cyberspace and the internet ought to be governed on 
this basis. A failed attempt was made to that end in 2011 and 2015 with a proposal of the Draft 
International International Code of Conduct for Information Security. Equally, a separate 
Additional Protocol to the ICCPR specifically addressing cyber surveillance and privacy has 
been put forward but rejected by the US. Nevertheless, a submission has been made by the 
Republic of Malta in 2015 to the UN General Assembly that the internet regulation should 
continue on the multistakeholder model but be based on the Common Heritage of Mankind 
applied by analogy with Article 136 UNCLOS 1982 to that domain. This indicates a renewed 
interest in the Common Heritage of Mankind with regards to its application to the internet 
governance and the future discussion in the UN General Assembly should reveal how receptive 
the wider international community is to this idea.  
Having said that, negotiating a binding global cyber treaty is bound to take a long time 
and be fraught with difficulty, as evidenced by the protracted political processes involved in 
the internet governance thus far. In addition, apart from the loose consensus that the internet 
ought to remain open and that international law, including human rights law, applies it is still 
unknown how exactly the international human rights legal framework is to fit in and what 
institution should be in charge of overseeing the implementation of such a treaty. Faced with 
this reality, an interim solution could be a multilateral treaty regulating only selected aspects 
of unlawful behaviour in cyberspace, particularly cyber surveillance. Addressing this problem 
through a regional treaty for the European states aimed at regulation of the working methods 
of the intelligence agencies has recently been proposed by the Council of Europe. However, 
states’ reaction to the proposal has been rather muted.   
For these reasons, the most realistic solution at this stage appears to be the reliance on and 
further development of soft law instruments, together with the broadening of the scope of 
confidence building measures to cover mass cyber surveillance. In addition to these non-legally 
binding and diplomatic efforts, the work to expand the scope of the Council of Europe 
Convention 108 must continue together with the redefining of the scope of the protected right 








Chapter 6: ‘Concluding Observations’  
 
 
The catalyst for this research were the 2013 disclosures of mass surveillance of Edward 
Snowden. The thesis focused on the mass surveillance activities of states, as against private 
multinational entities, since states  remain the major actors and participants in the international 
legal system1742 and are the primary focus for the social activities of humankind and thus for 
international law. 1743 This state sponsored surveillance forms part of their broader cyber 
espionage activities. There is sufficient evidence based in current state practice to suggest that 
these activities are not only set to continue in the current form, but that they will gain in 
propensity because of innovation and improvements in digital technologies. The thesis 
therefore advanced that cyber surveillance ought to be treated as a disparate and separate sub-
category of cyber espionage by international law for the purposes of its future regulation. This 
could facilitate the formulation and development of a much needed legal framework aimed at 
regulating the working methods of state intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 
 All major United Nations organizations, (such as the General Assembly), human rights 
treaty bodies, (including the Human Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights), regional human rights organizations (such as the Council of Europe), not 
to mention the courts (the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of 
Human Rights) expressed uniform condemnation of these large scale and unjustified privacy 
violations. It has been widely recognized that the right to privacy of communications contained 
inter alia in Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR applies equally online as well as offline. 
Yet, as this thesis showed these legal frameworks are no longer adequate to address the threats 
to privacy and other rights in the rapidly evolving digital environment. For most part, the law 
is outdated, too general and fragmented to provide sufficient protection for individuals world-
wide against the power of states to continue in their unfettered signals intelligence gathering 
practices ostensibly for national security purposes. In addition, it remains largely unsettled how 
the right to online privacy relates to states’ cyber surveillance conducted abroad. An example 
of such uncertainty is the lack of consensus among the International Group of Experts preparing 
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1743 ibid, p. 197. 
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the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in relation the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties.1744 
This is a fundamental, yet unsettled matter, which is exacerbated by the unjustifiable 
discrimination made in the legislation of the Five Eyes, which differentiates between 
internal/external communications and/or those between nationals/non-nations of the country 
conducting surveillance. Equally, the granting of surveillance powers of interception in 
domestic laws that provides for different procedural standards depending on whether the 
intercepted communications are external/internal, or foreign/domestic is discriminatory and 
contrary to the concept of universal human rights. This distinction is meaningless in the cyber 
context, as most internet communications will inevitably involve data travelling through a 
multitude of jurisdictions, even if both the sender and the recipient reside in the same country.  
The human rights treaty bodies and regional human rights organizations have made 
repeated calls on states to bring their secret, often outdated and inadequate legislation 
authorising the activities of the intelligence agencies in line with the human rights obligations.  
State practice evidences that these calls have not been heeded. In many respects, a number of 
states adopted more draconian surveillance powers in their domestic systems in the time that 
this research has been conducted. In this sense, the practice of states and the wishes of 
international human rights organizations operate as ‘parallel universes’, almost totally 
disregarding each other.  
This situation makes reform necessary. What does not help however is the fact that 
international human rights framework lags behind the rapid technological changes brought 
about by the ‘digital revolution’. This in part accounts for calls from some states in the 
aftermath of the 2013 Snowden disclosures for a global hard law solution in the form of a new 
digital international human rights treaty by means of a new additional protocol to Article 17 
ICCPR. Although the specially appointed in 2015 Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, 
Professor Cannataci, has recognized the need to develop international law relevant to privacy, 
he emphasised that a new global all encompassing international convention covering all of 
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privacy and internet aspects is not envisaged. Equally, the US expressed no interest in such a 
solution. The alternative ways to address the problem is through the process of modernizing 
and supplementing the existing privacy standards by the human rights treaty bodies, for 
example by replacing the outdated General Comment No. 16. Other options include the process 
of Universal Periodic Review of states’ compliance with their privacy obligations.  
As there is no body of international law (either treaty or customary law rules) to regulate 
peacetime espionage, there is nothing to draw an analogy from regarding cyber espionage. This 
is partly due to the fact that historically states have been reluctant to subject peacetime 
espionage to regulation through international treaties. This situation has changed markedly 
with the wielding of mass surveillance programmes world-wide post 11 September 2011. 
Consequently, some states together with international human rights organizations called for 
specific ‘no-spy’ hard law instruments to address these practices. There can be no doubt that 
such a solution is needed, but whether it is achievable depends on the political will of states, in 
particular those with the greatest cyber surveillance capabilities. Bearing in mind the recent 
trends towards the adoption of more draconian surveillance laws, in such countries as the UK 
(the Investigatory Powers Act 2016) or the US (the Cybersecurity Sharing Act 2015), coming 
to fruition of such an agreement seems allusive.  Hard law regulation of state intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies is at this stage most likely to be achieved either through the 
cooperation of a small group of states,  agreeing to a legally binding regional treaties (for 
example the Council of Europe or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states), or 
soft-law bilateral instruments (such as the US-China Cyber Espionage Agreement 2015), which 
may eventually lead to hard law and/or the development of customary international law rules.  
Moreover, that the international community will come together and agree to a cyber 
treaty to regulate a whole host of cyber activities in one international document may be 
desirable, but seems far off. This thesis had considered the theoretical foundations for such an 
instrument, proposing the application by analogy of some of the legal structures contained in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982). The tendencies 
in state practice indicate that the content layer of cyberspace, as a legal domain can be best 
analogized with the Exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf regimes. It does not have the 
characteristics of sovereign territory, terra nullius or a global common. Many states show 
increasing tendencies to regulate activities over their parts of the content layer, whilst 
performing unlawful interception and bulk collection of content and metadata at home and 
abroad. Regulation of these activities may be possible, at least in theory, through an explicit 
recognition of separate but interrelated zones (akin to the Exclusive Economic 
 336 
Zone/Continental Shelf regimes set out in the UNCLOS 1982). Furthermore, the applicability 
and utility of the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind to the internet has been recognized 
and endorsed in international forums, such as the UN General Assembly. It may well serve to 
protect future free flow of information.  
Above all, it is states and their intelligence and law enforcement agencies who must 
have clear operational standards in order to discharge their national security/law enforcement 
duties and do so within the rule of law. This can only be achieved if international law defines 
such parameter, together with meaningful judicial oversight on national level, enforcement and 
redress mechanisms for non-compliance. At the moment the law on privacy and data protection 
is fragmented and replete with often outdated mixture of soft law instruments and treaties- on 
international, regional and domestic levels. 
As this thesis has shown, much has been debated on surveillance since Edward 
Snowden 2013 disclosures. His revelations as well as information obtained in official inquiries 
or exposed by journalists, academics and civil society provided information in relation to the 
global surveillance programmes of the UK and the US. This study has focused principally on 
the activities of these two countries. The question that is pertinent at this stage is ‘has state 
practice changed since the 2013 Snowden disclosures as a result of these world wide 
condemnations’?  The research conducted since 2013, in particular that of the University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law in a study titled Boundaries of Law: Exploring Transparency, 
Accountability and Oversight of Government Surveillance Regimes (Boundaries of Law),1745 
reveals that the answer to that question is negative. The study showed continued and 
exponential growth in indiscriminate, generalized mass surveillance between 2013-2017. It 
went beyond domestic and global surveillance of the UK and the US and based its analysis on 
a diverse selection of 14 counties from five different continents, namely Columbia, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, 
South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.1746 The key findings paint a 
bleak picture that the Boundaries of Law summarised in ten points:  
1. ‘globally, legal surveillance frameworks are ineffectual. [..] The overwhelming 
majority of countries lack effective checks and balances on mass surveillance 
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powers. Not only are legal surveillance frameworks on “international 
communications” very weak in the US and the UK, but the laws and practices in 
may other countries are just as bad, and in some cases worse. These frameworks 
are so feeble that they allow governments to interfere arbitrarily with the right to 
confidentiality of communications of hundreds of millions of people worldwide by 
collecting data in bulk without proven cause for suspicion’;1747 
2. the right to privacy is guaranteed in principle, but not respected in practice. In all 
14 countries the right to confidentiality of correspondence is expressly protected 
(either through a constitution or the incorporation of international human rights 
standards into the domestic legal system). The countries surveyed impose serious 
substantive and formal constraints on interception in criminal cases. However, these 
constrains tend only to apply to the interception of the content of communications 
and are often undermined by loopholes, secret laws, extra-legal proceedings and 
interference with network operators and telecommunication service providers so as 
to weaken these safeguards in practice;1748 
3. there is even less constraint on access to metadata than on content data; 
4. ‘national security’ is so broadly defined, it is meaningless. The study considered 
this as one of its ‘most warring findings’ stating that ‘vague laws often allow 
unlimited or barely limited access to both metadata and the content of user 
communications by law enforcement and/or national security agencies, outside of 
the normal framework for criminal investigations in the name of “national 
security”’.1749 It explains that ‘the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information’- a document which was drafted 
by civil society and endorsed by the UN Special Rapporteurs stresses that the notion 
‘national security’ should be limited to real, immediate threats to the very existence 
of the state or the democratic order. However, the study found that ‘in many 
countries the concept is stretched to include for example the fight against organized 
crime and the protection of the economic interests of the state (France, Germany), 
the prevention of incitement to commit [apparently any] offences (India), anything 
relevant to the country’s ‘international affairs (the USA), or any ‘national interest’ 
                                              




(Kenya). In other cases, it is deliberately undefined (the UK), or left to the discretion 
of the authorities (Egypt)’;1750 
5. mass surveillance rarely requires judicial authorisation. Mass surveillance in many 
countries may be authorised by government (Myanmar, Pakistan); a minster (the 
UK); the prime minister (France); the president (the US); senior officials (India); 
the police, the military and the intelligence services (Columbia, DR Congo, Egypt); 
or indeed ‘any authorised agency’ (Turkey). Kenya, Russia and South Africa 
requires judicial authorisation, but no evidence of any actual crime or plot is 
required and ‘national security’ is defined so broadly that the threshold for granting 
authorisation is very low. Consequently, the relevant judges are given such little 
leeway to reject requests that it cannot be considered effective judicial control in 
practice’;1751 
6. governments can demand direct access to telecommunications infrastructure 
through ‘back doors’. The study concluded that the authorities of most surveyed 
states under their laws demand that Telecommunication Service Providers (TSPs) 
and Mobile and Other Network Operators ((M)NOs) install devices to facilitate 
interception and that this would be interpreted as including ‘back doors’. This grants 
the authorities direct access to the systems of these providers and operators that can 
not be monitored by the companies themselves;1752 
7. laws under which untargeted mass surveillance takes place are secret and opaque. 
Although under international law all legal rules, in particular those that allow for 
interference with fundamental rights, must be publically accessible, in most 
surveyed countries some laws and primary rules appear to be kept secret (for 
example Columbia, Russia and Pakistan). This also relates to the subsidiary rules 
and guidelines on or interpretation of the law (DR Congo, Egypt, Kenya, Myanmar, 
India, South Africa and Turkey). Even in the US and the UK the most important 
rules and guidelines and legal interpretations underpinning surveillance have been 
kept secret until exposed by Snowden or forced into open litigation. In France the 
recently adopted law (the 2015 French ‘Patriot Act’) contains a provision that 
allows for secret decrees by the Conseil d’Etat to regulate the details of the relevant 
surveillance. In addition, there is very little transparency about the actual practices. 
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In Columbia, Pakistan, Russia and the UK for example, the law either expressly 
prohibits the TSPs and (M)NOs from realising statistical information on 
interception, or allows the authorities to prohibit it;1753 
8. there is a trend towards countries conducting surveillance under semi-permanent 
states of quasi-emergency. In most of the surveyed countries the authorities are 
granted extremely wider-ranging powers at times of war and national emergencies 
‘threatening the life of the nation’. However, the study found that mass surveillance 
powers are granted in laws that are supposed to apply within the normal 
constitutional frameworks. Thus, laws that would not normally be deemed 
acceptable are becoming an integral part of the permanent legal fabric of the 
surveyed countries. They are creating a ‘semi-permanent quasi-emergency’ legal 
framework, not fully in accordance with the normal rules but also not formally seen 
as emergency law. For example, following the recent attacks in Paris the French 
president has declared the country to be ‘at war’ with the ‘Islamic State’ and is 
seeking to change the constitution to give the authorities wider, less judicially 
constrained powers. Such action, rather than relying on a temporary derogation for 
a defined war or emergency underlines the insidious effects of permanent ‘special’ 
anti-terrorist laws;1754 
9. an alarming amount of mass surveillance happens illegally anyway. In most 
surveyed countries mass surveillance was conducted outside the official, known 
legal frameworks altogether (France, Germany, South Africa, Columbia, Egypt, 
Kenya and Pakistan). In others (Myanmar, Russia and Turkey), the law is so unclear 
as to make is impossible to distinguish between legal and extra-legal activities;1755 
10. oversight systems are often non-existent or ineffective because they are not 
independent. In six of the countries studied (DR Congo, Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, 
Russia and Turkey) there is effectively no independent oversight over the use of the 
powers of mass surveillance. In other countries, the oversight systems are in place 
but they have proved to be ineffective (the US, the UK). In Germany large 
surveillance operations, including some carried out with or on behest of the US 
NSA were not known to the oversight body, the G10.1756 
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The Boundaries of Law concluded that ‘the discrepancy between continuing government 
surveillance practices and the relevant international human rights and rule of law standards is 
breath-taking’.1757 It warned that ‘the resulting concentration of secret powers in the hands of 
intelligence agencies may prove deeply corrosive to democracy, commerce and the rule of 
law.’1758 Clear global standards must therefore be put in place to call on states to establish 
appropriate checks and balances on their surveillance powers.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
State sponsored mass surveillance is but one manifestation of the profound changes that 
rapid technological progress of the ‘Silicon Valley’ has had and will continue to have not only 
on human rights, but across economies, societies and democracies.1759 The involvement of the 
companies, such as Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Apple in the mass surveillance apparatus is 
beyond the scope of this study. There can be no doubt however, that future research into the 
activities of these ‘technology giants’ in relation to facilitating mass surveillance 
(inadvertently, or otherwise) will call for the stringent regulation by internationally binding 
standards, including the international human rights framework. At the moment, such a 
framework does not exist. However, the United Nations Human Rights Council “Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights Implementing the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework’” 1760  do apply. The Principles recognize the ‘[s]tates existing obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil human rights and fundamental freedoms’,1761 together with the ‘role 
of business enterprises as specialised organs of society performing specialised functions, [who 
are] required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights.’ 1762  The 
Principles relate to ‘all [s]tates and all business enterprises, both transnational and others, 
regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership and structure’.1763 However, they do not 
create new international law obligations, but ‘should be read [..] in terms of their objective of 
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enhancing standards and practices with regard to business and human rights so as to achieve 
tangible results for affected individuals and communities and thereby also contributing to a 
socially sustainable globalization.’1764 
The next part of this chapter will demonstrate that such non-legally binding norms, as the 
‘Ruggie Principles’ seem insufficient in the light to the ongoing technological developments. 
Indeed, the challenge for international law is to maintain relevance to a word-wide market 
dependency that is developed and controlled by an industry spending billions of dollars 
annually. The following considers likely areas of technological progress in the digital world 
that will have direct ramifications on cyber surveillance (by state and non-state actors). These 
include, but are not limited to: (a) quantum computers; (b) encryption and deciphering; (c) Big 
Data; (d) the Internet of Things (IoT); (e) Psychrographics and Psychometrics; (f) Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and Machine Intelligence (MI). 
 
(a) Quantum Computers 
 
The largest computer in the world was announced in June 2016 at the International Super 
Computer Conference in Germany.1765 It is the Chinese Sunway TaihuLight with a memory 
capacity of 20 petabytes (2 x 10¹⁶), which can execute almost 10¹⁷ calculations per second.1766 
In the article titled  ‘Qudits: The Real Future of Quantum Computing’1767 it is claimed that 
quantum computers will be at least one thousand times faster (10²⁰) than the Chinese Sunway 
TairhuLight machine, with backing storage capacity in the yottabytes range 
(10²⁸). 1768 Forecasts of their commercial availability range from ten to thirty years.1769 Such 
machines will potentially have enormous impact, especially on governments’ capacity for 
cyber surveillance and deciphering. 
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(b)  Encryption and Deciphering 
 
The encryption and deciphering (the ability ‘to scramble and unscramble’ data-easy to do and 
difficult to undo) is vital in maintaining the confidentiality of information, whether that relating 
to business, commercial transactions, banking, personal medical records, or government 
secrets.1770 Public key cryptography1771 was invented at GCHQ in 1973 by Clifford Cox but 
only declassified in 1997.1772  In 1978 Rivest, Shamir and Adleman published a similar  system 
(the RSA cryptosystem).1773 Their algorithm solved the practical difficulty of factoring large 
prime numbers.1774 Today, as aptly summarised by one commentator 
 
[c]omputing power is used to both make and brake codes as the cost of computing  
plummets, cryptographic systems that once offered adequate protection for data  
become insecure. By the same token, however, cheaper computers also make it cost  
effective to encrypt data where once it would have been uneconomic. Paradoxically,  
then, plummeting computing costs have enabled the widespread use of encryption to  
defend information security and increase the ability of moderate to large organizations  
(in the private sector and governments) to afford the computing resources needed to 
successfully attack once-capable encryption systems. To balance these shifting forces 
the Unites States must grapple with multiple and often conflicting objectives.1775 
 
 
                                              
1770 Kenneth Flamm, ‘Deciphering the Cryptography Debate’ (21 July 1997)  
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/deciphering-the-cryptography-debate/>. 
1771 Public-key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptography, is an encryption scheme that uses 
two mathematically related, but not identical, keys - a public key and a private key. Unlike 
symmetric key algorithms that rely on one key to both encrypt and decrypt, each key 
performs a unique function. The public key is used to encrypt and the private key is used to 
decrypt. In Global Sign, ‘What is Public Key Cryptography?’ 
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These tensions and the balancing of interest is of course not only confined to the US, but effect 
the larger international community.1776 The Apple Encryption Dispute,1777 discussed in Chapter 
4 of this thesis clearly illustrates the need for a uniform policy to balance the operational 
objectives of the security and law enforcement on the one hand and the potentially catastrophic 
consequences of the private sector having to compromise encryption standards imposed on 
them through legislation. An example of such legislative measures is the US ‘encryption draft 
bill’, proposed by the US Senate Intelligence Committee and leaked to the public 2016.1778 The 
draft bill would authorise US state and federal judges to order ‘any person who provides a 
product or method to facilitate a communication or the processing or storage of data’ to 
‘provide data in intelligible form or technical assistance in unlocking encrypted data’ and that 
‘any such person who distributes software or devices must ensure they are capable of 
complying with such order’.1779  Equally worrisome are calls from the UK Prime Minister 
Theresa May, who in the aftermath of the London terrorist attacks in June 2017 demanded 
internet regulation, placing particular emphasis on the private sector to effectively abolish 
encryption.1780 
 These governmental policy trends coupled with the projected operating speed of 
quantum computers (greater than 10²⁰ operations per second), which will greatly enhance the 
intelligence and security services’ ability to decipher encrypted signals, at the very least 
necessitates research and informed public debate on such issues as data security, privacy, the 
role of the private sector and the effectiveness of these proposed measures in 
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(c) Big Data 
 
Big Data concerns the use of very large amounts of data retained on computer storage devices 
that can then be analysed in a variety of ways to reveal patterns, trends, associations and much 
more especially related to human behaviour and interactions.1781 The origin of the term is 
indeterminate. 1782 The analysis of interrelationships of names, addresses and frequency of 
correspondence by internet is referred to as metadata and used by the intelligence and security 
services to help identify the activity of terrorists groups in particular.1783 The data collected 
today on each individual, by a myriad of players covers all aspects of human behaviour 
including, education attainment, grocery preferences, travel, entertainment, health, banking 
and financial services, leisure activities to www surfing and especially telecommunications.1784 
The sole purpose of predictive analysis is to simulate, or emulate  accurately an individual’s 
future behaviour. 1785   To supermarkets and the like this means the ability to predict an 
individual’s, or community’s current and future buying habits and manipulate these results for 
huge commercial and financial gain.  For others, including the intelligence and security 
services it could mean something more insidious, such as the ability to monitor, predict and 
manipulate the behaviour of each individual, as described below in the section dealing with 
psychrographics/psychometrics. Edward Snowden disclosed in 2014 that the NSA captures and 
stores from the internet the equivalent of all the data in British Library every 8 minutes.1786 
Such volumes of stored and processed data are only possible because of current computer 
process speeds and storage capabilities. Quantum computing, it is predicted, will increase such 
ability by three orders of magnitude or more.1787 
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(d) The Internet of Things 
 
 The Internet of Things (IoT) is a term that ‘encompasses everything connected to the internet, 
but it is increasingly being used to define objects that “talk” to each other’.1788  The IoT is made 
up of devices, from simple sensors to smartphones and wearables, connected together.1789 It 
will be a major future source of information for Big Data. 
In 1999, Kevin Ashton, in a presentation to Proctor and Gamble coined the phrase ‘the Internet 
of Things’, by which he meant interconnection ‘in real time’ via the internet of everyday 
objects having ‘embedded sensors’ that are programed to ‘talk to each other’. 1790 This is 
ubiquitous connectivity, of which there is no limit to the range of such talking objects- 
everything from cars to refrigerators, kettles to TV sets, buttons on clothes to animal collars, 
central heating to tins of beans.  Each of these items defining a specific feature/location/activity 
of the owner will transmit continuously over the internet and thereby contribute to the sum 
total of stored knowledge of that individual and item. Over time there will be nothing that is 
not known about each one of us.    
Whilst many believe such ‘convenience facilities’ will make life simple and commerce hyper 
efficient, they are nothing more than ‘listening devices’ that will eventually entrap us all by 
surveillance. In February 2016 James Clapper, the former director of US national intelligence, 
speaking to the US Senate publically acknowledged for the first time that the intelligence 
agencies might take advantage of the new possibilities presented by having computers built in 
ever-more home appliances.1791 In his words ‘in the future intelligence services might use (the 
Internet of Things) for identification, monitoring location, tracking and targeting for 
recruitment, or to gain access to networks or use credentials.’1792 In 2015 the Korean TV 
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manufacturer advised its customers to switch off their sets at the mains as the devices were 
able to transmit conversations in the home.1793   
Communications related to IoT are a two-way process; that is the devices can be made to send 
and receive data/instructions. Thus, whilst convenient instructions can be traded between 
refrigerator and supermarket, such devices are also open to malicious instruction by 
government and hackers. Motor vehicles, central heating, hospital instruments, factory robots 
could all be open to ‘Stuxnet’ like attacks with catastrophic consequences. Furthermore, this 
‘meta intelligence’ of connecting everything to everything else could easily lead to 
dehumanisation of homo sapiens. Initially Google was a search engine, now it searches us.  
Similarly, Facebook connected friends, now those friends are the content of Facebook.  Gartner 
Inc., of Stamford, Connecticut (the world’s leading information technology research and 
advisory company) forecast that within the US, China and Europe there will be 8.4 billion IoT 
connections in 2017, rising to 20bn by 2020 (being 67% of the total) and representing spending 
of $12 trillion.1794 Edward Snowden warned that such enormous amounts of IoT data collected, 
stored and analysed by commercial enterprises and state security services could subvert the 
law.  
 
(e) Psychrographics and Psychometrics 
 
 
In 1928 Edward Barnays published his influential work, Propaganda, in which he argued that 
public relations is not a gimmick but a necessity, stating that ‘[c]onscious and intelligent 
manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in 
democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an 
invisible government, which is the true ruling power of [the] country’.1795 
Psychographics is the study and classification of people according to their attitudes, 
aspirations and other psychological criteria. 1796 Psychometrics is the process of measuring 
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mental capacities and processes.1797  Both of these are long established marketing tools that 
have possibly become insidious techniques in the hands of the ‘Silicon Valley Data Barons’, 
used inter alia to manipulate the outcome of general elections. For example, in 2012 Facebook 
published a paper in Nature reporting on their producing 340 000 extra voters in the 2010 US 
Congressional elections using a form of subliminal messaging.1798 Subsequently, Jeff Hancock 
of Cornell University transmitted ‘news feeds’ having skewed positive and negative content 
for the purpose of manipulating the moods of 700,000 unwitting  Facebook users.1799 This 
‘mood manipulation experiment’, using their own emotional language, showed that emotional 
contagion occurred among those Facebook users.1800   
In 2014 Google  beat Facebook in buying  the British embryo psychographics modelling 
company, Deep Mind, for $500m.1801 Deep Mind’s technical objectives are ‘making computers 
think like human beings’. 1802  Dr Michael Kosinski of Stanford School of Business is a 
psychologist and data scientist who co-ordinates the ‘My Personality Project’.1803  Part of the 
project, working on a data base of 6million Facebook volunteer records, entails the 
development of algorithms that are able to predict from ‘digital footprints’ a large number of 
the most precise personal characteristics and motivations of each individual.1804 These can 
include education, religion, food, music, reading, TV programmes  and holiday preferences 
etc.  By these means Google and others are, in specialist operations such as Deep Mind, able 
to build ‘virtual dopplegangers’ of each individual with the ultimate intention of being able to 
predict the actual individual’s needs before they realise it themselves.  
Antonio Garcia Martinez, from 2011 to 2013 developed Facebook’s means of making money 
by combining their experience of subliminal manipulation with their huge membership data 
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base and selling the facility to third parties. In May 2017 the Guardian published comments 
by Martinez where he warned that ‘we are sleepwalking towards a technical apocalypse’.1805 
He disclosed that Facebook were able, by the use of complex computer algorithms, to apply 
psychographic-type targeting to a market population subset that were susceptible to a particular 
message. According to Martinez, online marketing was new, lightning fast and real time with 
success being monitored via a ‘click through rate’.1806 According to his account ‘[they] were 
able to manipulate their membership for their own ends and those of others who paid them’.1807  
The true significance of the combination of psychographics, Big Data and computer 
processing capacity was demonstrated in Jamie Bartlett’s BBC 2 programme ‘Secrets of Silicon 
Valley’ broadcast on 13 August 2017.1808 In the programme Bartlett uncovered a remarkable 
marketing strategy named ‘Project Alamo’, involving specialist technical skills from both sides 
of the Atlantic to promote presidential candidate Donald Trump during the 2016 US 
presidential elections.1809 Theresa Hong, the director of Donald Trump’s campaign stated in 
that programme that ‘without Facebook, Trump couldn’t have won’.1810 To aid the campaign, 
Cambridge Analytica (a London psychometrics/psychographics operation) were hired just five 
months before polling day. According to the ‘Secrets of Silicon Valley’, Donald Trump’s 
election programme had two thrusts, one- to boost  him and the other- to denigrate Hillary 
Clinton in the eyes of her followers.1811 Using a ‘legacy data base’ of three years information 
from Senator Cruz’s failed presidential campaign and Facebook’s membership, Cambridge 
Analytica bombarded them with up to 100 different adverts per day, each tailored to maximise 
on identified motivations.1812 It is claimed that more than 200 million voters were contacted by 
Project Alamo.   Donald Trump won the election, having spent $85m with Facebook, compared 
with Hilary Clinton’s $1.2bn. total spend.1813   
Currently there are seem to be no national, or international legal constraint to the use of 
psychometrics/psychographics for whatever purpose. It seems that these methods could be used 
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without constraint to influence/skew democratic processes in any country in the world, 
depending on the financial clout of an individual(s) wishing to hire such services.  In the 
President Trump’s example, clearly the outcome of the democratic process was influenced by 
dubious information and means, over which there was no moral, nor legal filter. This largely 
has been made possible through the operation of the US 1996 Communications Decency Act 
(CDA), section 230. This is a landmark internet legislation that provides immunity from 
liability for provides and user of the ‘interactive computer service’, who publish information 
provided by others.1814 Without section 230 CDA 1996 it is probable that the large internet 
companies, such as Facebook would not exist at all, or would be a shadow of their current form 
in terms of wealth and power. It also illustrates that one country’s legislation can and does have 
a profound social and political effect world-wide.  If section 230 of the CDA 1996 were to be 
amended or repealed to make Facebook legally responsible for the online content, that and 
other similar companies would be forced to censor material of a sensitive, libellous and/or 
untruthful nature. Such a change in the law would also reduce the financial muscle of Facebook 
and thereby their political power.  
   
(f)  Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Intelligence (MI) 
 
Artificial Intelligence (IA) and Machine Intelligence (MI) is a combination of computing 
capacity and complex algorithms, such as the Deep Mind, described above. 
On the 27 October 1949 a large interdisciplinary meeting was held in Manchester University, 
the work place of Alan Turing, to consider ‘Discussion on the Mind and the Computing 
Machine’.1815 The following year Alan Turing published a paper titled ‘Computing Machinery 
and Intelligence’, in which he introduced the term ‘imitation game’.1816 He speculated that ‘[i]f 
an interrogator could not distinguish between a human being and a computer by questioning  
then it would be unreasonable not to call the computer intelligent’.1817  In other words, AI is 
                                              
1814 Codified as 47 U.S.C.§230, the section states that ‘[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider’. 
1815 Turing Sources, ‘Discussion on the Mind and the Computing Machine, 27 October 1949’ 
<http://www.turing.org.uk/sources/wmays1.html >. 




applied when a machine mimics ‘cognitive’ functions that we associate with other human 
beings such as learning and solving problems.1818 
Nowadays capabilities generally classified as AI and MI include the understanding of human 
speech, high level strategy games such as chess and Go, reasoning, perception and military 
simulations. 1819 The specialist skills involved in developing these technologies include 
computing, maths, psychology, linguistics, psychology, neuroscience and many others. 
Whilst there are many potential benefits of AI,1820 there are serious potential dangers and 
undesirable risks in these technologies, probably with unintended consequences. Martin Ford, 
in his book The Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of Mass Unemployment, warns 
of 30% unemployment within ten years caused by the replacement of humans by machines.1821  
Such jobs cover the whole spectrum from lawyers, through clerks to delivery drivers, much of 
medical diagnosis and prescribed treatments.1822  Only dentists seem to be indispensable. 
Interviewed for BBC News in October 2015 Professor Stephen Hawking raised the danger 
stakes warning that: 
 
[t]he development of full artificial intelligence could speed the end of the human race. 
Once humans develop artificial intelligence it will take off on its own and redesign 
itself at an ever increasing rate. Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution 
couldn’t compete and would be superseded.1823 
                             
This ‘Doomsday’ vision was echoed in Nick Bostrom’s book Superintelligence: Paths, 
Dangers, Strategies, where he noted that AI would be ‘the last invention humans would need 
to make’.1824 He forecast that the chance of Human Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI)  being 
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reached by 2030 would be 10%, 50% by 2050 and 90% by 2090.1825 The recent success of a 
program developed by Google, the Deep Mind, in defeating the world champion at the ancient 
game of GO shows that AI is developing faster than thought possible. 
   
The above summary distils to the core developments of computing and its subsequent 
applications, largely for profit in the recent years. The emotive vocabulary in common use by 
the ‘digital commercial community’ exploiting the technology includes ‘connectivity, hyper-
efficiency, real-time and so on’. The words ‘security, privacy, confidentiality, honourable, fair, 
good, freedom’ are largely absent. These feature in the vocabulary of human rights activists 
and organizations.  Cupidity is usually the main corporate and individual objective. There is a 
myriad of questions demanding answers, especially dealing with moral and legal issues. Of 
particular interest are: 
 
 where is the (international) law in all of this? 
 when will it catch up with these technological developments? 
 what will the process be? 
 how will it ensure that it envelopes the ‘Silicon Valley Technology Barons”? 
 could section 230 of the US Communications Decency Act 1996 be changed? 
   
    
These and other questions are a fertile ground for further research.    
 
CONCLUSION 
This research has a narrow focus, in that it considers the privacy violations of a handful of 
technologically advanced states. The prism through which the study has been conducted has 
highlighted a range of aspects within the ‘digital world’ that are of concern not only to human 
rights organizations but also society at large.  
The overview included in the section laying out some of the areas of future research has opened 
up a Pandora’s box, contents of which will demand continued close scrutiny. Circumspection 
is needed when viewing these technical and application developments in the framework of 
human rights law. The rate, at which technical developments are taking place and their potential 
harmful consequences are of concern to many working within that environment. Equally, the 
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intelligence and security services are looking to protect the state and its citizens against internal 
and external antagonistic forces. Part of their task is to keep watch on developments within the 
digital domain, some of which they use in their own duties. Axiomatically, those within the 
digital sphere driven by cupidity and/or intellectual challenge will identify opportunities suiting 
their motivations well ahead of most of us. In doing so, they are more likely to see blurred legal 
boundaries and justify their objectives with a skewed logic. 
 There is a need for a set of sound social principles for both those ‘developing’ the digital 
world and for states, as principal international law makers, that would define their activities as 
being for the general good and operating within the rule of law. There is a lot of merit in not 
leaving these practices to a system of self-regulation, but imposing legal parameters. Even so, 
for the law to be effective, it needs to be supported within the range of relevant principles and 
practical means of enforcement and oversight. With respect to the security/law enforcement 
services, the operative objectives and modus operandi must be lawful, necessary and 
proportionate to the task.1826 Published definitions of these objectives, together with stated 
public oversight and meaningful reporting, whilst protecting national and international interests 
are essential. Accountability to the democratic, elected body on operational violations must be 
clearly reported and dealt with through the processes of the law. Domestic legislation 
authorising mass surveillance must continue to be challenged in the courts.1827  
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A whole host of legal challenges lie ahead in terms of how exactly is online privacy to 
be protected and how is is it to fit within the broader cyber security and internet governance 
agendas. A rhetorical question that this thesis end with is how realistic is it that a critical mass 
of states would agree to impose any legal constraints on themselves and the ‘technology giants’ 
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